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PREFACE 
his book is without doubt a highly original and ambitious endeavour 
to peer into one of the major ‘known unknowns’ of the 21st century. 
The question is what will become the rules of the game for foreign 
policy at the global level when, as obviously now emerges, there are 
multiple major powers on the world scene. The 20th century era when the 
United States came to rule virtually alone is over.  
This project starts from the perspective of the European Union. The 
EU sees itself as both an emerging global actor, and one that clearly 
identifies itself in principle with certain norms and values: democracy, 
human rights, international law and a functioning multilateral order. But 
we have to see what it does, as well as what it says. Is it true that the EU is 
a ‘normative’ foreign policy actor in practice? And what about the other 
major actors – China, India, Russia and the US? What do they say, and 
what do they do? What does it mean to be a ‘normative’ foreign policy 
actor? Who – if anyone – proves to be a normative foreign policy actor in 
practice? 
This project led by Nathalie Tocci applies a rigorous common 
analytical framework to explore these vital questions. High standards are 
set for ‘normative’ foreign policy: there has to be consistency in the 
objectives, the means employed and the results obtained. Otherwise, it is 
just talk. The analytical framework identifies four paradigms of foreign 
policy behaviour: the normative, the realpolitik, the imperial and the status 
quo actor.   
The originality of this research project has been to apply this 
analytical grid to case studies of the actual foreign policy behaviour of our 
new gang of five – China, the EU, India, Russia and the US. What emerge 
are two big complications. The first is that each major power can have its 
own conception of the normative. Whereas the EU and the US share a large 
common ground, each of the other three countries brings its own distinct 
history, political philosophy and resources to bear upon the question. The 
biggest cleavage is between the old democracies that give weight to their 
values and elements of international law that they themselves established, 
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and the new powers who have in living memory experienced colonialism 
or humiliating defeats at the hands of the old democracies, and as a result 
give weight to the principles of non-interference, blended in the cases of 
India and China with more ancient philosophical traditions. The second 
complication is that in applying the common analytical grid to actual 
policies, it is found that all five actors reveal different episodes 
corresponding to each and every possible paradigm of foreign policy 
behaviour. Everyone is capable of everything.  
But surely this is not a satisfying result. Where nonetheless is the 
centre of gravity in the behaviour of each actor, and how has this centre of 
gravity possibly shifted over time? And what has induced these actors to 
behave in such different ways according to the case in point? The case 
studies and concluding chapter wrestle with these questions, and have 
much of substance to report, which it is not the role of a mere preface to try 
to summarise.   
Still the book can claim to be a path-breaking attempt to delve in 
some depth into the fundamental question – What or who is a normative 
foreign policy actor? It does not claim to supply definitive answers to this 
question, but hopefully will stimulate further contributions. Returning to 
the starting point, namely the EU’s own ambitions to be a distinctively 
‘normative’ foreign policy actor, the book is a sobering reminder to all its 
artisans that no such claim can be taken for granted. The EU is not always 
as ‘normative’ as it sometimes says, and the other actors have their own 
and often different ideas as to what is the ‘normative’. But the even more 
sobering reminder to all the actual or aspiring global actors is that they 
have somehow to work out what is going to happen to the world order, or 
disorder, when different conceptions of the ‘normative’ are backed by 
multiple centres of huge human and economic resources: convergence, or 
complementarity, or conflict?   
Our final word is to thank the scholars contributing to this book to 
have accepted to ‘play the game’, by subjecting their own country of 
expertise to the common analytical framework devised by Nathalie Tocci, 
especially Daniel Hamilton, Radha Kumar, Andrey Makarychev and 
Brantly Womack. Some squeals of unease or discomfort were heard in the 
course of so doing, but we trust that the product has justified the effort.    
Michael Emerson 
CEPS Programme Director 
European Foreign and Security Policy | 1 
1.  PROFILING NORMATIVE FOREIGN 
POLICY: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND 
ITS GLOBAL PARTNERS 
NATHALIE TOCCI* 
his chapter is the first in a series intended to explore fundamental aspects of 
foreign policy at the global level, against the backdrop of a proliferation of 
global actors in the 21st century, following half a century with only one 
undisputed global hegemon: the US. The European Union is itself a new or 
emerging foreign policy actor, driven by self-declared normative principles. But 
Russia, China and India are also increasingly  assertive actors on the global stage 
and similarly claim to be driven by a normative agenda. The question is how will 
these various global actors define their foreign policy priorities, and how they will 
interact, especially if their ideas of normative behaviour differ? This introductory 
chapter sets out a conceptual framework for exploring these issues and defines 
‘normative’ as being strongly based on international law and institutions, and thus 
the most ‘universalisable’ basis upon which to assess foreign policy. The foreign 
policy actor nevertheless has to be assessed not only on its declared goals, but also 
on the means it employs and the results it obtains. The truly normative foreign 
policy actor should score consistently on all three counts and in many different 
contexts, which will condition the extent to which normative policies are chosen, 
viable and effective. Subsequent chapters in the book will apply this conceptual 
framework to five case studies on China, the EU, India, Russia and the US. 
1.  Introduction 
In both academic debate and policy discourse, the European Union has 
traditionally been considered as a distinctly ‘different’ type of international 
actor. Over the years the EU has been described as a civilian power, a soft 
power and more recently as a normative power in international relations. 
These three concepts have been closely interlinked. Dûchene’s ‘civilian 
                                                      
* Nathalie Tocci is a Senior Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome and 
a Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels. 
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power’ included the idea of pursuing the domestication or ‘normalisation’ 
of international relations by tackling international problems within the 
sphere of contractual politics (Dûchene, 1973, p. 19). Nye’s ‘soft power’ was 
related to forms of foreign policy influence which relied on cooptation, 
multilateral cooperation, institution-building, integration and the power of 
attraction (Nye, 2004, p. 5); an idea which Hill considered as describing 
most accurately the EU’s fledging foreign policy (Hill, 1990). Introducing 
the idea of the EU as a normative power, Manners (2002, 2006) described 
the EU as a foreign policy actor intent on shaping, instilling, diffusing – and 
thus ‘normalising’ – rules and values in international affairs through non-
coercive means. The EU’s official texts make similar claims about the 
Union’s role in world politics. Most recently, the Lisbon Treaty states that 
in international affairs the EU would be guided by and would seek to 
promote the values on which the Union is founded, including democracy, 
human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law (Article III-193(1), 
Article I-2 and I-3).1  
The principal explanations for this allegedly ‘normative’ role in 
foreign policy have focussed on the EU’s sui generis nature. What the EU is 
has been considered as the principal explanation for what it does beyond its 
borders (Manners, 2002; Whitman, 1998). Different reasons for this have 
been brought to the fore. Some have focussed on the EU’s institutional set-
up, arguing that the multiple layers of EU authority (member state 
governments, parliaments, courts, EU institutions and public opinion) 
create a set of constraints that make the EU’s pursuit of hard-nosed 
realpolitik less likely (H. Smith, 2002, p. 271). Others have focussed on how 
the Union’s institutional setting filters and channels member state interests, 
shaping the output of EU external policies in normative terms. The EU’s 
internal governance is thus transposed externally (Lavenex, 2004), 
moulding the nature of its foreign policies. More specifically, the EU’s 
internal system of rules and laws is transposed externally through the 
contractual relations the Union establishes and develops with third parties 
(Tocci, 2007).  
Others still have argued that the EU’s normative foreign policy is the 
result of the fundamentally different way in which the Union views the 
world. To some (Leonard, 2005; Cooper, 2000), this is the result of EU 
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strength. After centuries of warfare, members of the European family 
appreciate that cooperation and integration are the only route to shared 
security, peace and prosperity. This internal Kantian logic is then extended 
to the realm of foreign policy, engendering a normative European foreign 
policy. Hence, the EU is conceived as a ‘post-modern’ actor, which unlike 
the modern state, does not base its foreign policy on balance of power and 
z e r o - s u m  l o g i c .  I t  r a t h e r  a c t s  o n  the belief that cooperating with and 
strengthening third countries is the best means to pursue EU interests. A 
greater sense and changed understanding of security on the inside has 
induced the Union to promote a developed and well-governed 
environment on the outside. By contrast, others have argued that the 
normative lens through which the Union views the world is predicated 
upon its weakness (Kagan, 2003). The Union wishes to promote a Kantian 
world because of the weakness of its foreign policy instruments and its 
incoherent foreign policy apparatus, unable to confront decisively the real 
threats and challenges it faces. The ‘dirty work’ is left to its ally the US, 
which has the military clout and the strategic resolve to act in world affairs, 
allowing the EU to free-ride on the US and NATO’s achievements. 
Common to all these arguments, which stem from a rich diversity of 
theoretical approaches and empirical analyses, is the understanding that 
EU foreign policy is ‘normative’ and that the reason for this lies in what the 
EU is. The aim of this paper is to set a frame of reference in order to test the 
validity of these claims. What or who is a normative foreign policy actor, 
how does it act, what does it achieve and what are the conditioning factors 
determining or guiding its actions? Is the EU a normative foreign policy 
actor and if so is this the result of its hybrid nature? Or is it the product of 
its status within the international system? In other words, does the Union 
categorically differ from other foreign policy actors such as the US, Russia, 
China and India? Historically, all states and empires have been based on 
specific normative underpinnings, reflecting these in their foreign policies. 
The values of liberty, equality and fraternity that underpinned the French 
revolution; American republican and liberal norms that aim to transcend 
the power politics of the old continent, o r  t h e  P a n s l a v i s t  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  
Tsarist Empire are but a few examples. More generally, the study of norms, 
ideas and values has long been an accepted domain in foreign policy 
analysis (Smith & Light, 2005). Hence, in so far as states also claim to 
pursue normative aims, what makes the EU ‘different’? Do arguments 
about the normative nature of EU foreign policy overplay the Union’s 
ontological differences with state actors, covering-up EU weakness and 4 | NATHALIE TOCCI 
 
presenting it as virtue? While the EU is undeniably a novice actor in the 
international system in so far as it lacks the typical attributes of 
sovereignty, does this necessarily make it a more normative actor in world 
affairs? This paper aims to present a conceptual framework to help answer 
these questions, a framework that can be applied equally to the EU and to 
its global partners in order to be able to discern what, if anything, 
distinguishes the Union from other international actors. 
2.  The Dimensions of a Normative Foreign Policy 
In order to ascertain what characterises a normative foreign policy actor, 
w e  m u s t  f i rs t  d e f i n e  w h a t  w e  m e a n  b y  ‘ n o r ma t i v e ’ .  ‘ N o rm a t i v e ’  c a n  b e 
interpreted in a neutral or non-neutral manner. First, ‘normative’ can be 
taken to simply mean what is considered ‘normal’ in international affairs 
(Manners, 2002, p. 32). It can thus convey a sense of standardisation and the 
expectation of non-deviance, rather than a moral imperative. Under such 
an interpretation, norms become closely associated with power, in so far as 
only major international actors have the power to shape or determine what 
is considered ‘normal’. In other words, all major international actors would 
have ‘normative’ foreign policies by definition, in that they all contribute to 
determining and shaping the ‘norm’ in international affairs (Sjursen, 2007). 
Hence, the EU – just like the US, Russia, China, India, and perhaps even 
Japan, Brazil or South Africa – would be a normative foreign policy actor, 
at least in those regions and in those policy areas in which it has an active 
interest and presence (e.g. in its neighbourhood). For this reason, we can 
discard an ethically ‘neutral’ interpretation of what a normative foreign 
policy consists of.  
This leads to a second ‘non-neutral’ interpretation. This is the 
interpretation most commonly found in the literature on EU foreign policy 
and which will be explored here. In opting for this second non-neutral 
interpretation of normativity, however, we have to avoid the serious pitfall 
that has bedevilled much of the literature on EU foreign policy: subjectivity 
and presumed universality. If we associate a normative foreign policy with 
a ‘good’ or an ‘ethical’ foreign policy, then we have to take great care not to 
slide into an imperialistic imposition of what is subjectively considered 
‘good’ on the grounds of its presumed universality. Doing so is not only 
problematic in and of itself, but would also lead us back to a definition of 
normativity which is inextricably tied to power and power-based relations. 
It is indeed critical to strike a balance between claims to the ‘objective’ and PROFILING NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY | 5 
 
universal nature of particular norms and the ‘subjectivity’ from which these 
derive (Luccarelli & Manners, 2006, pp. 203-205). Projecting or coercively 
imposing specific norms with a claim to their universality amounts to little 
more than an imperialist export of one’s chosen form of political 
organisation. Examples of this include Napoleon’s export of the tenets of 
the French revolution or la mission civilizatrice of European colonial powers 
(also known as the white man’s burden), which proclaimed the virtues of 
free trade, Christianity and science that would bring peace, order, and 
civilisation to the rest of the world.  
By contrast, particularly if we intend to analyse and compare 
different international actors and the normative (or otherwise) nature of 
their foreign policies, it is necessary to avoid, as far as possible, claims of 
presumed objectivity, recognising the role played by time, place and power 
in shaping these claims. At the same time, simply asserting the subjectivity 
and relativity of specific norms leaves us without a solid basis for a clear 
definition to guide subsequent comparative analysis. In other words, our 
definition of a normative foreign policy, while being non-neutral in ethical 
terms, must be based on set standards that are as universally accepted and 
legitimate as possible. These standards require an ‘external reference point’ 
(Manners, 2006a, pp. 170-22) and cannot be simply defined and interpreted 
by the international actor in question at will. Related to this, our definition 
of what is normative, rather than being a pure expression of power, must 
undertake the function of ‘taming’ and regulating power. In the search for 
these standards, we will consider three dimensions of a normative foreign 
policy: what an actor wants (its goals), how it acts (the deployment of its 
policy means) and what it achieves (its impact). 
2.1  Normative goals 
What constitutes normative versus non-normative foreign policy goals? 
Several distinctions can be considered. One is the distinction between 
values (normative) and interests (non-normative). Yet this distinction has 
been eloquently criticised from different theoretical perspectives. Hans 
Morgenthau claimed that ‘the choice is not between moral principles and 
the national interest, devoid of moral dignity, but between one set of 
principles divorced from political reality and another set of principles 
derived from political reality’ (Morgenthau, 1982, p. 34). Chris Brown, on 
the other hand, argued that pursuing the interests of one’s people is no less 
of a value than respecting and promoting the norms of international 6 | NATHALIE TOCCI 
 
society, as both set of priorities involve interests and ethics (Brown, 2005, p. 
26). Constructivists have focused on the subjective and self-constituting 
nature of interests and values. On the one hand, the interpretation of a 
value is conditioned by the underlying interest-based incentive structure 
shaping an actor’s choices. On the other hand, values represent the 
conceptual prism through which interests are constructed, interpreted, 
prioritised and operationalised, that is, the ‘bounded rationality’ within 
which they operate.  
The difficulty this entails is exacerbated when we apply these 
observations to specific cases. All-encompassing values such as 
‘democracy’, ‘peace’, ‘justice’ or ‘order’ can be interpreted in a myriad 
different ways by different actors at different points in time. In addition, 
the pursuit of different values may be viewed as contradicting one another 
in specific circumstances. In some instances, pursuing the prosecution of 
war criminals may be considered to harm the goals of promoting a peace 
agreement between warring parties. In other instances respecting the 
independence of peoples or fighting organised crime may contradict the 
protection of individual human rights. In other instances the promotion of 
democracy might contradict the value of maintaining order and stability. 
Specific interpretations of values and the chosen hierarchy between them 
are largely shaped by underlying interest configurations. Moreover, new 
norms (i.e. what is considered ‘normal’) result from the assertion of 
changing interests and the ability to impose particular interests over others. 
The idea of the ‘pre-emptive war’ in the run-up to the attack on Iraq in 
2002-03 is a clear example of when a norm begins to take root due to 
powerful interests pushing in that direction. 
Another problematic distinction juxtaposes normative goals and 
strategic ones. Hence, whereas normative goals would include the 
promotion of peace, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, 
international law and sustainable development; strategic goals would 
include the protection of commercial interests, migration management or 
energy security. Yet also in this case a clear distinction proves elusive. The 
pursuit of strategic objectives is not necessarily ‘un-normative’. According 
to Lieven and Hulsman, goals such as stability, prudence, the search for 
compromise and accommodation have real normative content (Lieven & 
Hulsman, 2006). Moreover, the pursuit of allegedly normative goals may 
underlie strategic objectives. Waging war in the name of democracy can 
cover strategic aims such as advancing energy security or pursuing 
hegemonic control. Likewise, the promotion of the normative goal of PROFILING NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY | 7 
 
multilateralism may conceal a mid-level power’s strategic objective of 
asserting its power and promoting multipolarity within the international 
system (e.g. China).   
Following on from this, our definition of normative goals refers back 
to Wolfers’ definition of ‘milieu’ goals, in contrast to possession goals. 
Milieu goals are those which, while indirectly related to a particular actor’s 
specific interests, are essentially concerned with the wider environment 
within which international relations unfold. Furthering milieu goals may 
contribute to the advancement of possession goals. However, unlike 
possession goals, milieu goals are pursued consistently over time, and not 
only at the time when they also represent immediate possession goals. As 
put by Wolfers: 
One can distinguish goals pertaining, respectively, to 
national possessions and to the shape of the environment in which 
the nation operates. I call the former ‘possession goals’, the latter 
‘milieu goals’. In directing its foreign policy toward the attainment 
of its possession goals, a nation is aiming at the enhancement or 
the preservation of one or more of the things to which it attaches 
value. The aim may apply to such values as a stretch of territory, 
membership in the Security Council of the United Nations, or tariff 
preferences. Here a nation finds itself competing with others for a 
share in values of limited supply’… ‘Milieu goals are of a different 
character. Nations pursuing them are out not to defend or increase 
possessions they hold to the exclusion of others, but aim instead at 
shaping conditions beyond their national boundaries. If it were not 
for the existence of such goals, peace could never become an 
objective of national policy’… ‘Similarly, efforts to promote 
international law or to establish international organizations, 
undertaken consistently by many nations, are addressed to the 
milieu in which nations operate and indeed such efforts make 
sense only if nations have reason to concern themselves with 
things other than their own possessions. (Wolfers, 1962, p. 73) 
In order to provide as sound a definition as possible, we could add 
that normative foreign policy goals are those that aim to shape the milieu 
by regulating it through international regimes, organisations and law. As 
put by Risse, a high degree of international institutionalisation and 
regularisation allows for and induces a ‘common lifeworld’. International 
institutions, regimes and law provide a ‘normative framework’ structuring 
relations – including the pursuit of possession goals – in different policy 8 | NATHALIE TOCCI 
 
areas (Risse, 2000, p. 15). This relates to Dûchene’s idea of a civilian power, 
which aims to domesticate relations between states by drawing 
international problems within the sphere of contractual structures and 
relations (1973, p. 19). It is however fundamental to add that a normative 
goal is one that pursues international regularisation in a manner that binds 
the behaviour of all parties, including that of the actor in question. It is 
particularly important to add this proviso because international law is also 
the product of international power relations and not a magic formula that 
perfectly objectivises and universalises norms. Notwithstanding this, a 
focus on law diminishes the risks of imposing one’s chosen definition of 
norms on others through the sheer exercise of power, as well as of acting 
inconsistently and selectively in world affairs. In other words, law can 
provide a normative boundary within which several codified norms can be 
interpreted and pursued.2  
2.2  Normative means 
In principle, the promotion of normative goals such as the 
institutionalisation and legalisation of human rights and democratic 
standards could be pursued through a variety of means. Yet pursuing the 
entrenchment of democratic standards through war unauthorised by 
international law can hardly be viewed as normative. To be normative, 
foreign policy must pursue normative goals through normative means. But 
what is meant by normative foreign policy means?   
When normative foreign policy is equated or associated with the 
notions of ‘civilian’ power, the normative character of foreign policy means 
emphasises economic, social, diplomatic and cultural instruments as 
opposed to military ones. In relation to the European Community, Dûchene 
(1973) argued that the lack of common military means, far from being a 
source of weakness, represented a virtue of the Community’s role in the 
world. Transposing this claim to present circumstances, Whitman (1998) 
argued that even if the Union develops a military capability, its civilian 
character remains intact in view of the secondary nature of its military 
means as opposed to the prime emphasis placed on economics and 
                                                      
2 The substantive and detailed mapping of the bodies of law (and strong quasi-
legal policy rules) that are relevant to the foreign policy field will be the subject of 
another paper in this series. PROFILING NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY | 9 
 
diplomacy. There is in fact a stark ‘normative’ difference between the 
protection of human rights and democracy through military means as 
opposed to the pursuit of these same goals through aid, diplomacy or 
technical assistance. Yet attributing normative value solely to the type of 
instrument deployed is problematic. In some instances, the deployment of 
economic sanctions can be as or more harmful and coercive to affected 
populations than the conduct of war.  
As such, more relevant to our definition of normative foreign policy 
means is how rather than which policy instruments are used. Here we relate 
back to Nye’s definition of soft power, as power that relies on cooptation 
rather than coercion (Nye, 2004, p. 5). Using Holsti’s classification, we can 
refine this distinction further by introducing a continuum of foreign policy 
means, ranging from soft methods of persuasion, moving to the granting or 
promising of rewards, to the threat or infliction of punishments, ending 
with the hard methods of the use of force (Holsti, 1995, pp. 125-126). 
Related to this continuum, some authors have classified soft methods based 
on joint ownership, engagement, persuasion and cooperation as more 
‘normative’ than coercive methods such as conditionality, sanctions or 
military action. Methods based on joint ownership, cooperation and 
dialogue in principle hedge against the dangers of imposing allegedly 
‘universal’ norms through sheer power and against the needs and desires 
of local populations in third countries. These methods allow for and are 
driven by motivations which are ‘other-empowering’ rather than  ‘self-
empowering’ (Manners, 2006b).  
Yet serious doubts can be raised about the rationale of these 
presumably more normative means. First, it is awkward to argue that 
cooperation with an authoritarian regime is more ‘normative’ than 
punishment-based incentives towards it. Second, the use of persuasion 
when exercised by the strong towards the weak is devoid of concrete 
meaning. The voluntarism inherent in these theoretically ‘soft’ methods 
falls victim to the power-political context in which they are exerted, 
rendering the distinction between persuasion and coercion meaningless in 
practice. In so far as persuasion is premised on the recognition of parity 
between actors, the strong does not in practice exert influence on the weak 
through sheer persuasion and is certainly not perceived as such by the 
latter. On the other side of the coin, relying on persuasion may be the mere 
result of weakness rather than of virtue. When lacking coercive means, a 
weak international actor may have no alternative to the use of persuasion.  10 | NATHALIE TOCCI 
 
Related to these arguments, others have considered positive forms of 
conditionality such as political engagement (political rewards), recognition 
(symbolic awards), or market access, technical assistance and aid (economic 
rewards) as preferable to negative ones such as sanctions or war (Cortright, 
1997 and Dorussen, 2001). From a normative perspective, positive 
incentives are viewed as being less intrusive into a third country’s 
sovereignty and thus less likely to generate psychological retrenchment 
and rigidity (K. Smith, 2004). Unlike negative forms of leverage, they are 
also less likely to harm local populations. Furthermore, positive 
conditionality allows for the retention and development of open political 
channels with third parties, which in turn provide additional avenues to 
exert influence. In this respect, the lack of official contact with certain 
authoritarian regimes such as Belarus or Libya has been criticised for 
failing to influence domestic political dynamics in these countries. Others 
have rebuked that while being more ‘normative’ at face value, in practice 
positive and negative incentives hinge upon similar coercive logics 
intended to alter the cost-benefit calculus within third parties. In different 
contexts they can equally represent forms of hard power exerted and 
delivered with the velvet glove of diplomacy. In addition, when applied to 
specific cases, the withdrawal of benefits such as aid can be as coercive and 
harmful as the imposition of sanctions. The context in which these 
incentives or disincentives are applied is thus critical in determining the 
extent to which they can be viewed as normative or otherwise.    
Hence, while a focus on ‘normative foreign policy means’ calls for 
greater attention to how rather than which policy instruments are deployed, 
there is no clear consensus as to what constitutes ‘normativity’ in the 
deployment of these means. A way forward may be to adopt the distinction 
made in sociology between normative as opposed to cognitive approaches. 
Whereas normative approaches delimit the sphere of permissible acts, 
cognitive approaches permit, through trial and error, all means and 
methods to pursue specific ends. Picking up on the discussion on 
normative foreign policy goals, we define normative foreign policy means 
as instruments (regardless of their nature) that are deployed within the 
confines of the law. Legality in the deployment of foreign policy 
instruments relates first to the legal commitments of a foreign policy actor 
towards itself, i.e., the deployment of foreign policies in respect of internal 
legal standards of democracy, transparency and accountability (Stavridis, 
2001, p. 9). It also relates to external legal commitments, that is, acting PROFILING NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY | 11 
 
multilaterally where possible and with UN authorisation and more 
generally respecting international law.  
Legal foreign policy means can be considered as normative in 
different ways. First, it asserts the primacy of right over might, taming the 
power of the strong while protecting that of the weak, and thus preserving 
a minimal level of equity within the international society. Second, it sets the 
rules governing choices when different normative/non-normative goals 
compete (e.g. peace versus human rights or democracy in certain 
situations). While far from a perfect guide to normative action, in such 
situations the law ensures that choices are not crude reflections of political 
contingency, but rather are made within the boundaries of legally 
permissible acts.  
2.3  Normative impact 
A third and final variable of a normative foreign policy focuses on its 
results. Most studies on civilian, soft or normative foreign policy tend to 
place primary emphasis on declared intent rather than on actual results. 
Yet highlighting what a foreign policy actor actually does or does not do – 
its external impact – seems to be as important as an analysis of its internal 
aims and instruments. First, a focus on results would act as a double check 
on what a foreign policy actor’s objectives actually are. Put simply, when 
declared objectives point towards the desirability of strengthening the 
rights of refugees and asylum seekers, yet ensuing policy action prioritises 
possession goals such as the containment of migration flows, declared 
objectives cannot simply be taken at face value. Second, the analysis of 
results derives from an understanding of normative foreign policy 
grounded upon consequentialist ethics (Manners, 2006b). By 
consequentialism here we do not mean a mere utilitarian approach, 
permitting any action in order to achieve a particular result (which as 
argued above would violate normative foreign policy means). A normative 
foreign policy would thus pursue normative goals through normatively 
deployed means and it would be effective in fulfilling its normative intent. 
Here equal focus would be placed on discerning foreign policy actions as 
well as inactions.  
A normative impact is one where a traceable path can be drawn 
between an international player’s direct or indirect actions and inactions (or 
series of actions) on the one hand and the effective building and 
entrenchment of an international rule-bound environment on the other. 12 | NATHALIE TOCCI 
 
The task would be that of delineating when, how and to what extent 
specific foreign policies engender specific institutional, policy or legal 
changes within a third country. Doing so is no simple feat. Rarely is a 
particular change within a third country the simple result of a specific 
foreign policy at a precise moment in time. With the (partial) exception of 
highly coercive military measures whose impact is highly visible, impact 
assessment of most foreign policies requires a detailed analysis of the 
interaction between policy on the one hand and the political opportunity 
structure underpinning the situation within a receiving party on the other. 
3.  The Interplay between the Three Dimensions of Normative 
Foreign Policy 
Taking our three variables, which collectively constitute a normative 
foreign policy and exploring different combinations between them, we 
arrive at a set of stylised alternatives. These stylisations reflect and describe 
different foreign policy actors. Beginning with the first two ‘internal’ 
variables in foreign policy (goals and means) and exploring different 
combinations between them, we reach a 2x2 matrix of stylised alternatives 
(see Table 1).3 These stylisations represent different foreign policy types, 
which can be labelled as normative, realpolitik, imperial and status quo.   
Table 1. Foreign policy types 
   Legitimisation of foreign policy goals 
   Normative  Non-normative 
Normative  Normative Status  Quo  Foreign policy means 
Non-normative  Imperial  Realpolitik 
 
A  normative  foreign policy type is one which satisfies both 
conditions (goals and means). It thus justifies its foreign policy actions by 
making reference to its milieu goals that aim to strengthen international 
law and institutions and promote the rights and duties enshrined and 
specified in international law. It does so by respecting its internal and 
international legal obligations. On the opposite end of the spectrum we 
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find the realpolitik foreign policy type. Here an international actor pursues 
possession goals by deploying all policy instruments at its disposal 
(coercive and non-coercive) regardless of its internal and international legal 
obligations. Beyond these two extremes, two further stylised alternatives 
can be depicted as follows. The imperial  foreign policy type  claims to 
pursue normative foreign policy goals, yet not in a manner that binds itself. 
Rather than conforming to international law and multilateral frameworks, 
it uses all means at its disposal to impose new norms, even if this entails the 
breach of international law. The imperial type does not view itself as bound 
by existing law. Like a Gramscian hegemon, it shapes the normative milieu 
by abrogating existing rules, promoting or preventing the adoption of 
others, and playing a dominant role in creating others still in order to 
regulate its subjects in a manner that best serves its interests. A final 
stylised foreign policy type is the status quo foreign policy type. In this 
case, an international actor operates in the international system and 
pursues its policies in respect of its domestic and international legal 
obligations and, where relevant, it operates within the context of 
international organisations (Diez & Manners, 2007). Yet it is not driven by 
and does not attempt to pursue normative foreign policy goals; that is the 
entrenchment and development of international law and institutions. It 
operates as a status quo actor, respecting existing laws and rules without 
wishing to pursue their further development in different regions and issue 
areas. 
Depending on whether the achieved impact reflects original goals or 
not, the foreign policies of the four stylised types can be ‘intended’ or 
‘unintended’ (see Figure 1 and Table 2). An intended outcome is one in 
which the goal reflects the impact regardless of whether they were 
normative or otherwise. An unintended impact is where the goals are 
normative but the impact is not, or vice versa. Adding this dimension to the 
classification of impacts, we have eight logical possibilities. 14 | NATHALIE TOCCI 
 
Figure 1. Foreign policy types and nature of impact 
 
Table 2. Foreign policy outcomes 
Normative  Realpolitik  Imperial Status  Quo  Type of 
actor  Intended Un-
intended 
Intended  Un-
intended 
Intended  Un-
intended 
Intended Un-
intended 
Goals                
Means                
Impact                 
 
Non-normative Normative 
 
Normative  Imperial  Realist  Status Quo 
intended  unintended  intended  unintended  intended  unintended  intended  unintended 
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In order to have an effective or ‘powerful’ normative foreign policy, 
an international actor not only needs to pursue normative goals through 
normative means, it also needs to achieve a discernible normative impact. 
The impact of its policies must be ‘intended’. Empirically, meeting all three 
conditions fully is arduous and may only rarely be achieved. The relevant 
question would thus be to determine whether in a particular instance, an 
actor’s foreign policy ‘essentially’ fulfils these three conditions. An a priori 
determination of what ‘essential’ entails is hard to achieve and requires a 
case-by-case qualitative analysis. Alternatively, an international actor could 
pursue normative goals through normatively deployed means, yet it may 
fail to achieve a normative impact: its results will then be ‘unintended’. 
While its foreign policies may achieve particular political, economic or 
social impacts, these are not related to the development/entrenchment of 
international law and institutionalisation and to the promotion of rights 
and duties enshrined in international law. This international player could 
pursue normative goals through normative means because of the weakness 
of its internal capabilities and its lack of internal resolve. Its weakness 
generates an overlap between its milieu and possession goals. The weak 
actor protects itself by trying to strengthen international law and 
institutions. International regularisation protects the weak actor from the 
encroaching power of the strong and hedges against threats it has no 
weapons to confront. Lacking the means and resolve to pursue its 
possession goals, this actor conforms to internal and international legality, 
but its normative action is the result of a lack of choice. Alternatively and 
more benignly, this international player may full-heartedly pursue 
normative goals through the deployment of normative means. Yet it may 
fail to achieve normative results because of an unfavourable external 
environment, which it, alone, cannot shape.  
The other foreign policy types may also have intended or unintended 
impacts. As in the case of the normative foreign policy type, the extent to 
which impacts are ‘intended’ or ‘unintended’ are a question of degree, 
which calls for careful qualitative assessments. The realpolitik type may 
‘succeed’ in its non-normative intent, fulfilling its possession goals by 
exploring and deploying all policy instruments at its disposal as it sees fit 
regardless of its domestic laws and international legal obligations. 
Unsurprisingly, its foreign policy impact is not normative nor is it intended 
to be. Alternatively, the realpolitik actor may perversely achieve an 
entrenchment and development of international law. Precisely as a reaction 
to its encroaching power, other international players may pursue the 16 | NATHALIE TOCCI 
 
development of international law and institutions more actively as a means 
to contain and constrain the realpolitik player’s foreign policies. In other 
words, the flouting of international law in the exclusive pursuit of 
possession goals may generate the unintended result of a further 
development of international law and multilateral frameworks – as a 
boomerang effect of the realpolitik actor’s policies.   
Similarly, the imperial type may achieve its normative goals, despite 
its flouting international law and institutions. More precisely, in this case 
the imperial actor would succeed in creating new norms, subsequently 
codified and enshrined in new international law. Alternatively, the 
imperial actor may fail to achieve a normative impact given that, while 
having the capability and resolve to pursue normative goals, its breaking of 
the law sets a strong a model and precedent for other international players, 
which impedes the achievement of an overall normative impact.  
Finally, the status quo type may both achieve impacts exclusively 
confined to the pursuit of its possession goals; or alternatively, by acting 
within the confines of the law, it may unintentionally trigger further 
international legalisation and institutionalisation. In the former case for 
example, the pursuit of commercial interests can encourage the growth of 
‘crony capitalism’ or rising socio-economic inequalities in third countries. 
In the latter case, the status quo player, pursuing its commercial interests 
within the framework of the WTO and its international trade agreements, 
may unintentionally trigger the regularisation of market economies in third 
countries even though results fall beyond the scope of its original intent.  
4.  Conditioning Factors  
Rarely if ever does a foreign policy actor fall squarely into one of the 
typologies described above. In different regions and in different policy 
areas the same international actor can display a normative, realpolitik, 
imperial or status quo foreign policy at different points in time. Moreover, 
when analysing a particular foreign policy and examining how it evolves 
over time, different traits are likely to come to the fore. Hence, merely 
describing different foreign policies according to their normative or non-
normative features may be of little interest and explanatory power in and 
of itself. The choice of which foreign policies to focus on, in which regions 
and at which points in time inevitably leads to different empirical results, 
rendering the exercise highly subjective in nature. The challenge is thus to 
identify under which conditions and circumstances an international player PROFILING NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY | 17 
 
is normative (as opposed to realpolitik, imperialist or status quo). And 
returning to the original question spelled-out at the outset, under which 
conditions do different international actors opt for similar or different 
foreign policy approaches? Under similar conditions, does the EU act in 
similar or dissimilar ways to the US, Russia, China or India? When it 
pursues a normative foreign policy is this the result of its sui generis 
nature, or do state actors adopt similar foreign policy approaches under 
similar conditions? 
In order to tackle these questions, we have identified three principal 
conditioning factors that shape and influence the likelihood that an 
international actor will pursue a normative (or non-normative) foreign 
policy. The first two conditioning factors relate to the internal nature of the 
foreign policy actor in question and more precisely to the features 
influencing its chosen foreign policy goals and means. The third 
conditioning factor relates to the external environment in which foreign 
policy unfolds.  
4.1  The internal political context: What interests are at stake? 
A first conditioning factor is the internal political context in which a foreign 
policy actor conceptualises, interprets, prioritises and operationalises its 
foreign policy goals. It takes into account the different constituencies (e.g. 
political parties, interest groups, civil society, the media, public opinion, 
business, etc) pushing for the adoption of particular foreign policy goals as 
well as the role played by official institutions developing, articulating, 
channelling, interpreting and operationalising those goals.  
Are there, for example, internal constituencies pushing for the 
adoption of particular milieu goals? Is there an internal ‘demand’ for them? 
On issues such as Burma/Myanmar for example, Western public opinion 
and media attention on the widespread human rights violations have been 
sparse, ad hoc and confined to specific incidents. This has reduced the 
incentives of European or American foreign policy-makers to adopt and 
pursue strong milieu goals on the question.   
Do internal political and institutional forces push for the adoption of 
milieu and/or possession goals? Actors such as the EU and the US have 
paid limited attention to human rights and international law violations in 
Chechnya and Tibet respectively. In some instances (e.g. in the early period 
of the first Chechen war), Western countries took a strong stance against 18 | NATHALIE TOCCI 
 
ongoing violations, while in later years (i.e. during the second Chechen 
war), despite ongoing violations, the pursuit of strategic trade or energy 
related goals appear to have trumped the pursuit of milieu goals. 
Is the articulation of milieu goals presented as competing or 
complementary to the fulfilment of possession goals? In the context of the 
WTO for example, business lobbies can conceptualise and pursue their 
commercial interests in a manner that is either competitive or 
complementary to the pursuit of milieu goals in the fields of development, 
environment, labour rights or health.  
When milieu goals are conceptualised as competing with possession 
goals, do internal stakeholders push for the prioritisation of the former or 
the latter? In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, a highly securitised 
environment often led to the clear prioritisation by official institutions, the 
media and public opinion of security concerns over the need to respect civil 
and political rights. Moreover, the respect for human rights, such as the 
right against torture, has at times been viewed as hindering an effective 
fight against terrorism.  
4.2  Internal capability: What foreign policy means are available?  
A second conditioning factor is the internal capability of a foreign policy 
actor, shaping above all its chosen foreign policy means, although also the 
scope of its foreign policy goals. The extent to which a foreign policy actor 
deploys its foreign policy instruments in a normative or non-normative 
way depends crucially on its internal capability and resolve and the 
different foreign policy instruments at its disposal.   
Does a foreign policy actor have the capability to pursue non-
normative means? Does it have the foreign policy instruments to pursue 
particular objectives by breaking international law and operating outside 
international organisations? This relates back to the question of strength 
and weakness as discussed above. Enjoying strong military means or 
economic leverage, major powers such as the US, Russia, China or India 
have more possibilities to pursue their foreign policy goals by breaching 
international law through the use of force of unauthorised sanctions than a 
small neutral state such as Switzerland or a small under-developed country 
in sub-Saharan Africa. 
What is the relational context in which a foreign policy actor deploys 
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individual, but exists when a group allows and empowers an individual to 
act in a particular way (Arendt, 1969, p. 44). The ability to act is determined 
first by the material configuration of relations between parties, i.e., by the 
levels of dependence and interdependence between them. This, for 
example, determines the extent to which an actor may rationally consider 
the deployment of economic sanctions, even when these are unauthorised 
by international law. If the targeted third party’s economic dependence is 
low instead, it is less likely that a foreign policy actor will choose to bear 
the costs of violating international law, given that the prospects of its 
sanctions achieving their desired foreign policy results are low. The 
opposite situation may arise instead, whereby a foreign policy actor does 
not have the sufficient relational power vis-à-vis a third country to deploy 
its foreign policies within the confines of contractual relations. In the case 
of migration for example, the EU has tended to conclude and make use of 
readmission agreements with its Eastern neighbours. However, the 
weakened relational power of the EU vis-à-vis its North African 
neighbours, due to heightened European concern over border security, has 
hindered the conclusion of such agreements. Lacking an appropriate legal 
framework to deal with the question of readmission, the Union has thus 
tended to reach ad hoc and informal arrangements with countries such as 
Morocco (Cassarino, 2007).  
4.3  The external environment: How does a foreign policy unfold in the 
international system? 
The third conditioning factor shaping when, to what extent and why a 
foreign policy actor may fall into one or another stylised category relates to 
the external context in which the foreign policy actor operates. When 
analysing the role played by the external environment in shaping the 
results of a particular foreign policy – at times reinforcing and at other 
times hindering the pursuit of an actor’s foreign policy goals – three 
principal levels of analysis and accompanying questions could be borne in 
mind. 
First, how does a foreign policy interact with the domestic dynamics 
within the targeted third state? In the case of Kosovo for example, the 
unauthorised NATO bombing in 1999 seriously weakened but did not lead 
to the direct overthrow of the Milosevic regime in Belgrade. The overthrow 
of the regime occurred one year later, when a critical mass of domestic 
political opposition organised and counter-mobilised, triggered by the 20 | NATHALIE TOCCI 
 
results of the September 2000 presidential elections. In the case of EU-
Turkey relations, while EU conditionality spurring democracy and human 
rights reforms led to few and superficial reforms between 1999 and 2002, it 
was only after the 2002 watershed elections in Turkey that a strong 
government, backed by large swathes of civil society, passed a set of 
fundamental constitutional and legal reforms in the country, in compliance 
with EU demands.  
Second, how does a foreign policy interact with the policies of other 
international actors within a third state or in a specific issue area? In the 
case of the Ukraine or Georgia for example, the 2003 Rose Revolution in 
Georgia or the 2004-05 Orange Revolution in Ukraine were declaredly 
aimed at redirecting these two countries towards the US and the EU, and 
promoting democratic, good governance and market economy reforms. Yet 
equally, if not more important than the normative foreign policies of the 
EU or the US towards these two post-Soviet states, Russia’s realpolitik 
approach towards Tbilisi and Kiev reactively mobilised change within 
these two post-Soviet states.   
Third, how does a foreign policy interact with the wider international 
context shaping the developments within a third state or issue area? Here 
several issues could be considered. What international pressures bear upon 
a foreign policy actor and how do these influence foreign policy choices 
and their ensuing results? In the case of the EU vis-à-vis the Palestinian 
government, following the signature of the Mecca agreement between 
Fateh and Hamas in February 2007, internal forces within the EU were 
inclined to recognise the Palestinian government and consider the 
resumption of financial aid to it. However the US and Israel’s strong 
opposition to this and the EU’s priority to maintain cooperation with both, 
and unity within the Quartet, militated against lifting the boycott on the 
PA. Alternatively, what is the role played by a foreign policy actor within 
international organisations and how do these organisations affect the 
foreign policy impact of an international player? A key determinant of 
normative foreign policy is the extent to which normative goals are 
promoted, monitored and enforced by international organisations, as well 
as the degree to which a foreign policy actor successfully makes use of 
these organisations to promote its goals. For example in pursuing EU 
policies of conditionality on democratic standards and human rights in 
Central and Eastern Europe, the norms promoted by the UN, the OSCE, the 
Council of Europe or NATO played a key role in determining the extent to 
which the Union succeeded in achieving normative foreign policy results.  PROFILING NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY | 21 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
There has been a growing body of literature and debate in the last decade 
describing and analysing European foreign policy in normative terms. Yet 
in academic literature, in policy research and in official discourse, this 
representation of the EU has tended to be rather self-referential, being 
conducted largely by Europeans and for a European audience. 
Unsurprisingly, it has had limited resonance and support in wider 
academic and policy circles.  
Strongly believing that a normative understanding of foreign policy 
in general and of European foreign policy in particular is not only long 
overdue but also highly desirable, this paper offers an analytical 
framework to broaden the existing debate. It does so by providing a 
definition of what is ‘normative’ that is strongly based on international law 
and institutions, claiming that law, while man-made and far from immune 
to international power politics, represents the most universal and 
universalisable ‘normative boundary’ within which to assess foreign policy.  
This paper has also provided three primary variables: goals, means, 
and impact, whose normative qualities need to be ascertained in order for a 
foreign policy to be considered overall as being normative. Fulfilling all 
three conditions may be viewed by some as setting the bar at an 
unrealistically high level. To this one could nonetheless respond that 
having or claiming to have a normative foreign policy is no mean feat in 
itself. Finally, and based on the premise that any international actor is likely 
to pursue normative, as well as realist, imperial and status quo policies 
depending on time and place, this paper has set out three ‘conditioning 
factors’, which could help understand when and why a particular 
international actor may or may not pursue a normative foreign policy. It 
has done so by presenting more questions than answers. Yet hopefully 
these are questions that may prove useful in conducting subsequent 
empirical research applied to different international actors and to the 
nature of their foreign policies.  
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2.  THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A 
NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR 
NATHALIE TOCCI 
WITH CASE STUDIES BY HAKIM DARBOUCHE, MICHAEL 
EMERSON, SANDRA FERNANDES, RUTH HANAU-SANTINI, 
GERGANA NOUTCHEVA AND CLARA PORTELA* 
he opening chapter set out the conceptual framework for exploring the 
question of Who is a normative foreign policy actor? The European Union 
and its Global Partners. This chapter constitutes one of several case studies 
applying this framework to the behaviour of the European Union, whereas the 
others to follow concern China, India, Russia and the United States. A normative 
foreign policy is rigorously defined as one that is normative according to the goals 
set, the means employed and the results obtained. Each of these studies explores 
eight actual case examples of foreign policy behaviour, selected in order to illustrate 
four alternative paradigms of foreign policy behaviour – the normative, the 
realpolitik, the imperialistic and the status quo. For each of these four paradigms, 
there are two examples of EU foreign policy, one demonstrating intended 
consequences and the other, unintended effects. The fact that examples can be 
found that fit all of these different types shows the importance of ‘conditioning 
factors’, which relate to the internal interests and capabilities of the EU as a foreign 
policy actor as well as the external context in which other major actors may be at 
work. 
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1.  Introduction 
Since its inception, the European Union has been conceptualised (and 
prided itself) as being a distinctly ‘different’ type of international actor. 
Over the decades, it has been described as a ‘civilian’ (Dûchene, 1973, p. 
19), a ‘soft’ (Hill, 1990) and most recently a ‘normative’ power in 
international relations (Manners, 2002, 2006). The EU’s official texts make 
similar claims about the Union’s role in world politics. Since the 1970s, in 
fact, norms and values began distinctly to permeate European foreign 
policy documents and declarations (see Hill & Smith, 2000). At a two-day 
meeting of EU heads of state on 14-15 December 1973, which resulted in a 
declaration on Europe's identity, the delegates talked about building a ‘just 
basis’ for international relations. The 1986 Single European Act called upon 
the Community to “display the principles of democracy and compliance 
with the rule of law and with human rights” in its conduct of external 
relations. The 1988 Rhodes European Council called for an EU role in 
preserving international peace, promoting the solution to regional conflicts, 
demonstrating solidarity for democracy, supporting the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, strengthening the effectiveness of the United 
Nations and improving social and economic conditions in less developed 
countries. The Maastricht Treaty went further, calling for the preservation 
of peace and security, the promotion of international cooperation, the fight 
against international crime, the development of democracy and the rule of 
law, the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the 
support for economic and social development (Article J.1). Most explicitly, 
the Reform Treaty states that in international affairs the EU would be 
guided by and would seek to promote the values on which the Union is 
founded, including democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and 
the rule of law (Article III-193(1), Article I-2 and I-3).4  
This chapter seeks to test these assertions. Rather than assuming that 
the EU is a normative international player simply by virtue of its ‘different’ 
non-state nature, we show that in different geographical regions and at 
different points in time, the Union’s foreign policies have taken on 
dramatically different forms. If by a normative foreign policy we mean 
pursuing normative goals through normatively deployed instruments and 
having a discernible normative impact, then what emerges, perhaps 
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inevitably, is that the EU is not always a normative international actor. 
Through the analysis of eight case studies, this chapter examines how EU 
foreign policy has at times been normative, while at other times it has been 
realist, imperialistic and status quo-oriented. In a final section we tease out 
the principal dynamics at work in determining why the EU acts the way it 
does in different cases and draw some lessons concerning the nature of the 
EU’s role in the world.  
We reproduce below the table developed in chapter 1, showing the 
eight case studies of EU foreign policy selected for analysis in this paper. 
Table 1. The EU’s role in the world: Selected sub-case studies 
Normative  Realpolitik  Imperialistic Status  Quo  Type of 
actor 
Intended Un-
intended 
Intended  Un-
intended 
Intended  Un-
intended 
Intended Un-
intended 
Goals 
 
 
 
             
Means 
 
              
Results 
 
               
Case 
Study 
Central 
and 
Eastern 
Europe 
 
Belarus 
 
Russia 
 
Syria  
 
Kosovo 
 
Israel- 
Palestine 
 
North 
Africa 
 
Ukraine 
2.  Enlargement Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe, 
1989-2007: Normative Intended 
Contributed by Gergana Noutcheva 
2.1  Normative goals 
The normative objectives of democratisation and economic modernisation, 
achieved by anchoring the post-communist states in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) in the Western model of political pluralism and economic THE EU AS A NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR | 27 
 
liberalism, have been the cornerstones of the EU’s enlargement policy in 
the 1990s. The EU’s response to the collapse of communism in Eastern 
Europe in 1989 was to extend the prospect of membership to the countries 
in the region, in an attempt to steer their domestic transformation and 
return to the European mainstream. The EU’s offer of membership was 
made conditional on these countries’ achievement of high standards of 
domestic governance and the normalisation of their relations with their 
neighbours. The ‘Copenhagen criteria’ embodied the EU’s vision of the 
necessary political and economic trajectory to emerge from the deep 
economic, political and social crises that resulted from the region’s abrupt 
change of regime.  
In essence, the accession requirements of democracy, market 
economy and legal harmonisation with the EU can be seen as an invitation 
to take on board the EU’s political, economic and legal acquis before being 
admitted to take part in EU power-sharing mechanisms. Although 
especially designed to evaluate the readiness of the CEE candidates to join 
the EU, the Copenhagen criteria are deeply rooted in the EU’s own legal 
traditions and common policy practices. Art. 6 of the Treaty on the 
European Union codifies the EU’s democracy, human rights and rule of 
law principles as constitutive elements of the EU’s political community. 
The joint governance of the EU’s economic space through common policies 
and institutions has a firm legal basis in the EU’s treaties too. What the EU 
asked the candidates to comply with prior to accession is in principle 
applicable to EU member states too. The design and implementation of the 
enlargement policy by EU institutions can be viewed as an expression of 
the Union’s own identity.    
2.2  Normative means  
To understand the normative dimension of the EU’s enlargement policy, 
one needs to keep in mind the voluntary nature of the process, attributing 
normative qualities also to the policy means employed by the Union. In the 
early 1990s, it was the Eastern European countries that demanded 
integration into EU structures, not least as protection against the former 
imperial power – the Soviet Union. The EU was reacting to external events 
and developing an enlargement strategy in parallel to its internal agenda.  
The major instrument for pursuing the EU’s normative goals in the 
enlargement context was the conditionality principle of ‘carrots and sticks’ 
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by the EU has not involved the active punishment of EU candidates that 
fell short of reform expectations. Instead, the EU withheld benefits from the 
accession hopefuls by delaying their progress on the way to membership. It 
also played up symbolic politics by allowing good performers to advance 
in the process while highlighting lost opportunities to the laggards. 
Academics have described this conduct as ‘reinforcement by reward’ 
(Schimmelfennig, Engert & Knobel, 2006) or ‘gate-keeping’ (Grabbe, 2003). 
In principle, the EU was more inclined to encourage and reward 
performance than to sanction underperformance, except indirectly. This is 
not to disregard the power asymmetry between the EU and the candidate 
countries. The EU was the one to decide on each candidate’s suitability to 
become a member of the club by setting the accession criteria and 
evaluating the preparedness of the applicants. Whereas in theory the 
candidates formally negotiated accession, in practice very little negotiation 
took place. The acquis was non-negotiable, with the exception of some 
transition periods and temporary derogations. And the EU alone could 
decide whether and how a candidate fulfilled the criteria for membership. 
Yet what empowered the Commission to demand compliance with its 
accession requirements were especially its references to political values and 
economic norms. The Commission progressively felt comfortable to 
criticise and ‘shame’ the candidates’ shortcomings by publicly announcing 
policy recommendations, mobilising further reform constituencies within 
these countries and galvanising other international actors with stakes in the 
reform process, e.g. international organisations, donors and international 
business (Grabbe, 2001). By acting in pursuit of its normative goals, the EU 
demanded conformity with its values of candidates wishing to become 
equal partners in the European project.  
In addition, conditionality was accompanied by softer mechanisms of 
policy transfer in various sectors based on social interaction and contacts 
between the EU institutional machinery and the national administrations 
and political bodies of the candidate countries. In the first half of 1990s, the 
EU signed Association Agreements (known as Europe Agreements) with 
the CEE applicants which not only liberalised trade exchanges but also 
institutionalised the political relations between the EU and the respective 
national authorities. The Accession Partnerships initiated in the late 1990s 
provided a further forum for dense institutional contacts between the EU 
and the candidates’ public bodies, detailing reform priorities and 
monitoring mechanisms. The annual monitoring reports of the European 
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candidate, offered another opportunity for information exchange between 
Brussels and the national capitals. In short, the active socialisation of the 
applicants into the ‘European way of doing things’ complemented the more 
forceful incentive-based method of conditionality, although the latter was 
by far given more credit for the results achieved in the short period of 
accession preparations.  
2.3  Normative results 
The eastern enlargement in two successive rounds in 2004 and 2007 has 
widely been acknowledged as the EU’s biggest foreign policy successes to 
date. This is due to the pace and depth of the political and economic 
transformation that enlargement engendered in Central and Eastern 
Europe between 1989 and 2004-07. On the whole, in just over one decade, 
the East European countries established the institutional foundations of 
modern states and transformed themselves from being full-blown 
dictatorships into liberal democracies with vibrant pluralism and engaged 
civil societies (Vachudova, 2005). They also went through deep economic 
change cutting down on the losses of the centrally planned system and 
establishing the fundamentals of modern market economies, attracting 
billions of euros of foreign direct investment (FDI) every year and growing 
at high rates (Gros & Steinherr, 2002).  
This is not to say that everything went smoothly and every country 
achieved the same results. Some countries took longer than others to 
embark on a consistent reform track. Some had more favourable starting 
conditions than others and progressed faster. Some went through setbacks 
and had to struggle harder to overcome domestic resistance to change. But 
the overall record is highly positive. Critics may still question the quality of 
domestic governance in the new member states compared to the older 
ones. A governance quality gap between Western and Eastern Europe still 
exists. But given their point of departure in the early 1990s, the Central and 
Eastern European countries have gone a long way towards becoming 
credible partners in the European integration project.  
2.4  Conditioning factors  
What explains the EU’s normative behaviour in the enlargement context? 
The answer to this question is complex, but the key to understanding these 30 | NATHALIE TOCCI ET AL. 
 
normative results is the combined effect of external and external dynamics 
which converged to produce the observed outcome.  
Internal interests 
Above all, the EU’s internal political context became increasingly 
favourable towards enlargement. Enlargement-sceptics were progressively 
silenced over the course of the 1990s and an overall sense of priority 
emerged around the enlargement agenda. Points of difference between the 
member states existed but related more to questions of how and when to 
enlarge rather than to whether and why. This internal consensus was 
critical for finding solutions to the many problems and difficulties along 
the process. Did rational interest-based motives underlie the ‘normative’ 
appearance of the EU’s enlargement discourse? For some scholars, the EU 
had good geo-political and economic reasons to support the transition 
process in Eastern Europe and attempt to influence developments there to 
its advantage (Vachudova, 2005). For others, the EU had no real interest in 
proposing full institutional inclusion to the Eastern European states and in 
accepting their leaders as equal partners in EU decision-making structures 
(Schimmelfennig, 2001). An advanced association with the EU might have 
served the geostrategic objective of anchoring these countries to the West 
both in political and economic terms. What could explain the EU’s 
generous offer of membership is the feeling of kinship and moral duty to 
the East Europeans who were cut off from the European integration project 
as a result of unfortunate geo-politics in the aftermath of the Second World 
War (Sjursen, 2002). Official EU documents and speeches indeed often 
invoke the widespread sentiment among EU policy-makers that this was 
‘an historic opportunity’ to reunite the continent and do away with 
ideological divisions and artificial barriers. Yet regardless of whether 
interests also dictated or influenced EU actions, this does not belittle the 
predominance of normative goals in the Eastern enlargement policy.  
Internal capacity 
Beyond the convergence on normative priorities, the EU initially did not 
know how to support the transition process from communism to 
democracy and a market economy, nor did anyone else. There was no 
grand plan to achieve the desired objectives apart from the promise of EU 
membership, and the EU’s enlargement policy was in many respects 
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was entrusted by the member states to oversee the enlargement dossier 
which it took very seriously, not least because this was an opportunity to 
raise its institutional profile in the foreign policy domain. Subsequently, the 
Commission mobilised its internal resources and worked devotedly to 
build the necessary internal capacity to see this process through to a 
successful end. The Union put at work the policy instruments it knew how 
to use best – those linked to integration – rather than foreign policy 
capabilities, which it was known to lack.   
External environment 
Finally, the external environment was conducive to the EU’s overall 
normative role in Central and Eastern Europe in the post-communist 
period. The geo-political change triggered by the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union challenged the ideological division that 
had marked Europe’s post-war history. It also triggered a realignment of 
geo-strategic orientations and foreign policy priorities in Eastern Europe. 
Not only was the West ready to offer financial support and security 
guarantees, but also the East Europeans were willing to integrate in the 
Euro-Atlantic structures as an expression of their normalisation and ‘return 
to Europe’. The US firmly supported the anchorage of the region in 
Western institutional frameworks and contributed to the democratisation 
and economic modernisation of these countries. In this sense, a favourable 
constellation of external and internal factors existed and prepared the 
ground for the EU’s normative role.  
3.  Sanctions against Belarus: Normative Unintended 
Contributed by Clara Portela 
3.1  Normative goals 
The goals pursued by the EU vis-à-vis Belarus through its sanctions policies 
are unequivocally normative. The EU refers to the ‘violations of 
international electoral standards’ in the 2006 presidential elections and the 
‘crackdown on civil society and democratic opposition’ as the primary 
reasons for the imposition of sanctions. The EU sanctions strategy against 
Belarus has followed an incrementalist logic, unfolding in parallel to the 
evolution of the Belarusian state towards authoritarianism. 
The EU’s goals have also been consistent over time: Belarus 
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democracy. The origins of the current sanctions regime can be traced back 
to the EU’s reaction to the Belarusian constitutional crisis of 1996: 
restrictions on the freedom of demonstration and the freedom of speech, 
followed by the enactment of a new constitution concentrating powers in 
the president’s hands were met by a first wave of negative EU measures: 
the Council decided, among others, to limit political contacts with the 
Belarusian authorities, and froze negotiations on a Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement and on a new TACIS aid programme. For its part, 
the European Parliament announced its intention to withdraw assent to 
any bilateral agreement with Belarus. Subsequently, every step towards 
greater authoritarianism was met by a tightening of EU sanctions. On top 
of successive flawed elections, the disappearance of four Belarusian citizens 
triggered a separate sanctions regime. EU sanctions now encompass a visa 
ban and freezing of assets on individuals connected with the violations of 
international electoral standards, the repression of peaceful demonstrators 
and the obstruction of justice.   
Beside CFSP sanctions, the EU has also suspended the application of 
trade privileges, the generalised system of preferences (GSP), due to the 
lack of freedom of trade unions. Finally, the European Commission (2006) 
has declared in a non-paper that it expects Belarus to guarantee the rights 
of entrepreneurs to “operate without excessive intervention by the 
authorities”. In sum, all EU institutions – the Council, Parliament and the 
Commission – converge in their condemnation of the Belarusian regime, 
although the focus on pro-democratic reforms and the strengthening of the 
rule of law has recently been supplemented by requirements pertaining to 
free-market liberties. 
The legitimacy of EU goals is enhanced by the fact that its sanctions 
were imposed in support of claims made by pan-European organisations. 
The disappearance of the four public figures had been the subject of an 
April 2004 report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(the ‘Pourgourides Report’) demanding an independent enquiry. Elections 
were deemed to be flawed because they failed to meet OSCE standards. 
Accordingly, the EU has pledged to review its position “in the light of 
reforms made to the Electoral Code to bring it into line with OSCE 
commitments” and “actions by the authorities to respect human rights with 
regard to peaceful demonstrations”, such as the “release and re-habilitation 
of political detainees”. Concerning the disappearance of the four citizens, 
the EU announced that it would take into account the willingness of the 
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those responsible to justice. Finally, the minimum standards for the 
freedom of trade unions, which Belarus fails to respect, are set by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO).   
3.2  Normative means 
The means applied by the Union in pursuit of these predominantly 
democratic standards are also normative, i.e. they can be located within the 
confines of the law. This is due to the fact that the measures wielded 
against Belarus consist in the withdrawal of unilaterally granted benefits. 
In other words, the EU is simply refraining from providing benefits that it 
is free to withhold. No international actor is obliged to provide technical 
assistance to another state, grant visas to third country nationals or offer 
preferential trade conditions unless it is committed to do so by treaty. In 
the case of the EU, granting of preferential trade is governed by an EC 
Regulation stipulating the conditions under which preferential treatment 
can be granted. The suspension is foreseen only after the time-consuming 
and meticulous investigation of a third state’s non-compliance with 
internationally agreed ILO standards. 
The EU follows a declared double-track approach, drawing a 
distinction between those responsible for the violation of electoral 
standards and human rights, and the Belarusian population at large. Its 
asset freeze and visa ban target the responsible individuals whose names 
appear in public blacklists, thereby earmarking them “persona non grata” 
(Pomorska, 2006). By contrast, the EU maintains contacts with mid-range 
officials. At the same time, the EU has consistently made clear that it would 
“avoid sanctions which harm the wider population” (Ferrero-Waldner, 
2006). Indeed, it claims to support the ‘needs of the population’ through 
social and economic development. No trade restrictions have ever been 
imposed, and the EU continues to provide assistance which directly 
benefits the population though NGOs. In response to the original crisis in 
1996, the EU pledged to examine ways of associating civil society with the 
democratisation process. The EU supports democratisation, for example, 
through the funding of independent TV and radio programmes.  
3.3  Non-normative results 
The increasing assertiveness in the EU’s responses to the deterioration of 
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the early phases of Lukaschenko’s rule, EU-inspired sanctions solved a 
dispute over the ill-treatment of Western diplomats (the Drozdy crisis) and 
reversed the closure of the OSCE mission in Minsk (Toledano, 2001). 
However, EU sanctions have not promoted wider democratic practices. 
Equally, and in spite of the EU’s dedicated effort to send a positive message 
of support to the Belarusian people, democratic forces in the country have 
not been substantially strengthened as a result of EU pressure. It is 
generally assumed among Western observers that if free elections were 
held under present circumstances, President Lukaschenko would still win a 
majority (Grant & Leonard, 2006). 
3.4  Conditioning factors  
In comparison to traditional coercive policies, such as blanket trade 
embargoes, the EU displays a sophisticated strategy respecting the division 
between the individuals it aims to condemn, and the wider population it 
intends to support. How can the failure of the double-track strategy be 
accounted for? Why has the EU failed to compel change in the behaviour of 
the leadership, or in substantially strengthening Belarusian democratic 
forces?  
The internal political context 
The internal political context is key to understanding the normative 
framing of the sanctions against Belarus. The European Parliament and a 
number of national parliaments have been vocal supporters of the 
sanctions, as well as the initiators of the positive measures that are adopted 
in parallel. The preoccupation for sparing the population typically 
accompanies EP demands for negative measures. Particular interest groups 
and civil society organisations have played a central role in the suspension 
of the GSP. According to the EC Regulation on GSP, investigations on non-
compliance leading to suspension can only be initiated at the request of 
affected groups. In this case, it was the initiative of international trade 
unions that set the process in motion. The decision to suspend was taken 
reportedly against the will of Belarus neighbours Lithuania and Poland, 
which saw the interest of their cross-border enterprises negatively affected. 
But by and large the internal political consensus crystallised in favour of 
sanctions.   
This is largely because little contradiction exists in this case between 
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Working Document No. 279.5 Sanctions have not imperilled possession 
goals, such as the pursuit of commercial and energy interests. CFSP 
sanctions do not affect trade – commercial exchanges between the EU and 
Belarus have continued. According to 2006 statistics, Belarus is only the 47th 
trading partner of the EU, and its planned economic system makes it 
unattractive for further investment. Virtually deprived of raw materials, 
Belarus is only relevant as a transit country for Russian energy supplies. 
When bilateral cooperation has become pressing, it has taken place in spite 
of the sanctions. Sanctions have not prevented holding discussions on 
energy matters between the Commission and Belarusian mid-rank officials 
in the aftermath of the crisis with Russia in January 2007. Given that 
possession goals (trade and energy security) do not collide with milieu 
goals (pro-democracy sanctions), there is no internal constituency within 
the EU that is fundamentally opposed to the sanctions.  
Internal capability 
In theory, the EU is well-placed to coerce Belarus through economic means. 
In relational terms, Belarus is dependent on trade with the EU, while 
Belarus is a negligible market for the EU as a whole. The EU is Belarus’ 
second trading partner, and its first export partner, absorbing over 45% of 
its exports. By contrast, Belarus accounts for a mere 0.3% of the EU’s total 
trade volume. Thus, trade restrictions could greatly harm Belarus without 
causing much damage to the EU’s economy. The limitation on the EU’s side 
is rather its unwillingness to incur any tangible cost for the sake of Belarus’ 
reorientation towards democratic rule. Firstly, a possible retaliation by 
Belarus consisting in stopping the supply of Russian energy and oil would 
entail serious costs to the EU and compete with the goal of ensuring energy 
security. Secondly, there is virtually no constituency inside the EU that 
would support forceful means, while Lithuania and Poland, as well as the 
wider business communities, would strongly oppose it.  
The external environment  
Beyond the unwillingness to incur high costs, the main reason explaining 
the EU’s failure to engender normative results in Belarus is located within 
the country’s domestic dynamics. As typically the case with many 
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countries under sanctions, the leadership has been able to capitalise on 
Western condemnation to its advantage. It portrays the country as being 
‘demonised’ and ‘under siege’. This perception is partly aided by the fact 
that the country has been subject to sanctions of diverse nature (most 
recently the suspension of GSP). This is unsurprising in a country where 
free media and civil liberties are severely constrained. Public diplomacy 
aside, other circumstances weigh heavily in the attitude of Belarusian 
citizens. In economic terms, Belarus was better off than its southern 
neighbours Ukraine and Moldova when the Soviet Union collapsed and 
this despite the scarcity of raw materials (Beichelt, 2007). This difference 
persists today, despite these countries’ Euro-Atlantic choice. The 
comparatively high living standards in Belarus, coupled with an unusually 
positive image of Russia as a protector, have all aided the popular 
perception of Lukaschenko as both the guarantor of close ties with Russia 
and of Belarusian wealth (Zurawski, 2005).  
The domestic configuration of Belarusian politics is closely linked to 
the role of Russia as a ‘protecting power’. Russian support has been critical 
to the resilience of the Lukaschenko regime. In economic terms, Russia has 
supplied Belarus with subsidised energy. In political terms, the close ties 
with Russia have allowed Belarus to present itself as displaying an ‘Eastern 
orientation’, rather than being internationally isolated (Zurawski, 2005). 
However, the relationship between the two countries has come under 
considerable strain in recent years, suggesting that Russia no longer offers 
unconditional support to its Western neighbour. Interruptions of Russian 
gas supplies, provoked by the Belarusian rejection of increases in energy 
prices, have taken place consecutively in 2006 and 2007. The 2007 energy 
crisis prompted Belarus to establish ‘structured discussions’ on energy 
issues with the EU – a cooperation framework at expert level falling short 
of a fully fledged ‘energy dialogue’. These developments suggest that a 
weakening support of Russia might open the space for increased EU 
leverage on Minsk.  
The influence of other international actors also plays an important 
albeit secondary role. The EU finds itself between two powers whose 
influences and positions largely cancel each other out. When imposing 
sanctions against Belarus, the EU has acted in concert with the US. 
Transatlantic cooperation is habitual in sanctions policies, and in this case it 
is unknown which side took the initiative. Given that Belarus is in a state 
union with Russia, such move was seen as a step aimed at challenging 
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considers Belarus a priority, and that the nature of sanctions have not 
seriously affected Belarus’ economy, the sanctions were bound to remain 
rather uncontroversial in the wider international context. 
4.  EU Policies towards Russia, 1999-2007: Realpolitik Intended 
Contributed by Sandra Fernandes 
4.1  Non-normative goals 
EU declarations on Russia are rife with normative intent, but revealed 
preferences suggest these have been trumped by other goals, notably 
related to energy security and the penetration of Russian markets goals. Yet 
unlike the cases of Eastern Europe and Belarus, the pursuit of these goals 
vis-à-vis Russia has contradicted the EU’s normative agenda. In 2003, the 
Wider Europe initiative and the European Security Strategy clarified that 
the EU aimed to create prosperity and security on its borders and 
highlighted the importance of its relations with Russia. In particular, the 
EU repeatedly stated its intention to promote, in its institutionalised 
dialogue with Russia, the rule of law, good governance, the respect for 
human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good 
neighbourly relations, the principles of market economy and sustainable 
development. The spirit of the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (Emerson et al., 2006b, pp. 62-94) also included the goal of 
promoting international security, in equality and partnership. The goals 
stated by the EU advocate an international order based on ‘effective 
multilateralism’ and international law, as codified by the United Nations, 
the Council of Europe and the OSCE (Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe). Yet other goals and objectives have progressively 
come to trump the EU’s normative agenda vis-à-vis Russia. In particular, 
since the beginning of President Putin’s second mandate in 2004, the EU 
has mainly acted in pursuit of its energy interests and pushed for Russia’s 
WTO accession in order to make Russia a more economically attractive, 
credible and trustworthy partner. Normative goals have thus remained 
dead letter, while concrete actions have focused on the pursuit of narrow 
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4.2  Non-normative means 
The EU’s normative goals vis-à-vis Russia have thus been sidelined, as the 
relationship has evolved through cooperation on an issue-by-issue basis 
achieving progress on several concrete issues such as visa facilitation. The 
most visible example of the EU’s normative neglect in its ties to Russia has 
been its stance on the Chechen conflict, in which Russia has adamantly 
refused international interference and the EU has accepted Moscow’s view, 
treating Russia as a partner – despite the growing normative gap between 
the two. Even during times of crisis, Putin has been received by EU leaders 
as a special guest (for instance, during the Lahti informal summit in 
October 2006).  
The EU has established a specific institutionalised human rights 
dialogue with Russia since March 2005, which was considered a notable 
normative achievement. But consultations never took place in Russia and 
the dialogue appears to have become an empty shell. Recently, the Mafra 
Summit has evidenced the EU’s inability to use effectively the dialogue 
with Russia, with the failure to agree upon an OSCE election observer 
mission in Russia for December 2007. There is some wishful thinking on the 
European side that the dialogue could produce its desired effects in the 
long-term. Yet the EU is unlikely to socialise Russia into human rights 
observance, as opposed to the case of Eastern enlargement.  
In recent years, the goal of promoting peace has made it onto the EU-
Russia agenda with institutionalised dialogue covering the frozen conflicts 
in Moldova and Georgia and the adoption of the Road Map for the third 
common space in November 2005. Nonetheless, these conflicts are not 
addressed in a manner that challenges Russia’s primary and not always 
constructive role in these conflicts (Pozzo di Borgo, 2007, pp. 25-27). In 
particular, the EU has done nothing to alter Russian coercive policies such 
as its selective visa and trade restrictions on Georgia and Moldova. 
Technical assistance and aid to Russia are also not consistent with the 
EU’s declared normative goals. Since 1994, enlargement became an EU 
priority and since 1999 this tendency was reinforced. In relative terms, 
Russia like other non-accession countries lost out as a result of this 
reprioritisation. More specifically, EU aid to Russia as a proportion of the 
Union’s external assistance budget has decreased over the years 
(Fernandes, 2006). This trend is set to continue as Russia now seems 
unwilling to receive assistance through the ENPI (European 
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recovery and growing national pride. Political conditionality as a means to 
achieve normative goals is also not being effectively used in the case of 
Russia. 
4.3  Non-normative results 
Not only have EU policies failed to induce Russia’s compliance on 
democracy, human rights and conflict resolution. Far more seriously, the 
EU’s declaratory insistence on its common principles with Russia has 
contributed to an unexpected boomerang effect in Russia. The Kremlin 
reasserts Russia’s cultural specificity and its right to have a different 
interpretation of democracy (‘sovereign democracy’). More recently, 
President Putin has criticised the democratic shortcomings in several 
member states and the US, while strengthening his control over Russian 
public opinion through the media and restrictions on and repression of 
NGOs and political opposition. This tendency has become particularly 
acute in the run-up to the Russian elections in the fall of 2007, which have 
seen a peak in Slavophile discourses. The human rights dialogue with the 
EU thus seems to be provoking a negative effect rather than stimulating 
convergence on the basis of shared values. On the one hand, some member 
states feel disappointed and deceived by Moscow, while on the other hand, 
Russia feels misperceived and devalued by a self-righteous EU (Entin, 
2006). The EU’s attempt to engage Russia on Moldova and Georgia’s 
conflicts has also not borne concrete results. On the contrary, Russia views 
the ENP as unwelcome interference in its ‘near abroad’, albeit not as 
problematic as the engagement of NATO or the US (with its anti-missile 
project). In general, the EU’s post-enlargement aims in the common 
neighbourhood are those of a post-modern actor, contrasting with Russia’s 
traditional sovereign prerogatives (Epstein & Gheciu, 2006; White, 2005). 
Instead of becoming a normalised European partner, Russia is becoming an 
increasingly challenging foreign policy actor. When Europeans strive for a 
common internal energy policy and an engagement with Russia to regulate 
the energy market, Russia’s reaction is to seal bilateral agreements with 
select member states to secure supplies to national consumers, as well as to 
create a strong Gazprom monopoly and a sister of this company in the civil 
nuclear realm (Atomenergoprom) in order to consolidate its monopoly in the 
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4.4  Conditioning factors 
Internal political context 
Although the EU declares a set of milieu goals in its relations with Russia, 
these are not consistently pursued; while possession goals, related to 
energy and the penetration of Russian markets, often take the upper hand. 
This is largely explained by the EU’s internal political context, whereby 
Russia has been able to play national European interests against each other 
undermining an integrated EU approach. There is an EU demand to bind 
Russia to common economic rules (milieu goals), but there is also a lack of 
internal consensus about which rules should apply. Indeed there are 
different national perspectives in the EU on Russia and there is no 
consensual approach towards Moscow. Some member states wish to 
reconsider cooperation with Russia on the basis of Russia’s non-normative 
behaviour, while others favour a more pragmatic approach (Allison et al., 
2006). For instance, the three Baltic states and Poland are prone to defend a 
united EU voice towards Russia and to deal with Russia at the EU level on 
all issues. Others, like France, Germany and Italy, have privileged bilateral 
relations with Moscow. On energy in particular, bilateral agreements have 
been celebrated last year to secure gas supplies between several member 
states and Russia.  
Internal capacity 
The Union’s relative power vis-à-vis Russia and its sui generis nature 
constrain its capacity to pursue normative goals towards Russia with 
success. Internally, there is no straightforward process whereby a bilateral 
member state problem with Moscow can be translated and tackled at EU 
level, despite growing intra-EU solidarity at the level of rhetoric. There is 
also a lack of integrated EU foreign policies in general and external energy 
policy in particular, again, inducing member states to go-it-alone with 
Moscow. In turn, member states and the EU as a whole fall back to a 
disintegrated pursuit of security and commercial goals towards Russia 
partly because of insufficient capacity at EU level.  
External environment 
The external environment also explains why the EU has acted as an 
intended  realpolitik player vis-à-vis Russia. Most importantly, Russia is 
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EU standards and insists on the recognition of its specificities (Massias, 
2007) by successfully using its energy leverage and playing divide and rule 
between member states. The increasingly hard-line attitude of Putin’s 
regime, aided by the Kremlin’s re-found role in the regional and global 
scene, makes it less likely for the EU to insist on its normative agenda. The 
Russian veto in the UN Security Council and its ability to block progress on 
several ‘hot’ international issues, such as Kosovo, as we shall see below, 
further heighten Moscow’s assertiveness towards the EU. Furthermore, the 
EU’s strategic alliance with the US adds a further external constraint to a 
normative EU approach towards Russia.   
5.  Policies towards Syria, 2003-07: Realpolitik Unintended 
Contributed by Ruth Hanau Santini 
5.1  Non-normative goals 
EU policies towards Syria represent an interesting case in several respects. 
First, the Middle East is the only region that was singled out in the 2003 
Security Strategy as an area, beyond the Union’s immediate 
neighbourhood, of significant geo-strategic interest and concern to the EU, 
in which the Union is intent in promoting political and economic 
development in line with its proclaimed norms. Second, the EU’s 
repeatedly asserted claim regarding the need to uphold multilateral 
institutions and reinforce their global role directly impacts upon the EU’s 
external action in the Middle East in view of the frequent crises in the 
region and related UN resolutions. This has made the Middle East in 
general a litmus test for the EU’s foreign policy consistency. In this context, 
Syria plays a special role, given its close involvement in Lebanese affairs, in 
which several EU member states are present under the aegis of the UN, and 
given the importance of a future peace agreement between Syria and Israel 
in paving the way for an overarching Arab-Israeli peace.  
Up until World War II, Europe was perceived by Syria as an imperial 
power, due to French colonial ties in the Levant and British interests in the 
broader Middle East. At that time, in view of its non-involvement in Arab 
affairs, a Wilsonian US enjoyed a more positive reputation in the area. For 
Syria the tide changed in 1948 with the creation of the state of Israel, 
staunchly backed by the US, particularly after 1967. In Washington, the 
determining factor changing the relationship with Syria was the country’s 
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sponsoring terrorism, leading to the imposition of US sanctions. The EU 
instead, having suffered from the 1970s’ oil crises and seeking secure 
energy supplies, signed a Cooperation Agreement with Syria in 1977, and 
its political rhetoric started displaying a far more pro-Arab attitude. The 
relevance of Syria as an oil provider is still far from negligible: in 2004 Syria 
was the EU’s 9th largest source of imports in this sector. Energy has indeed 
been the most discernible European interest in Syria at least until the 
beginning of the Oslo process which promised regional agreements 
between Israel and its neighbours. With the beginning of the Oslo process 
in the 1990s, Brussels began redressing the balance between the pursuit of 
its possession (i.e. energy security) and milieu (i.e., regional peace and 
stability, normalising Syria’s regional and international role) goals. In other 
words, since the 1990s, two principal European objectives have dominated 
relations with Syria: safe access to Syrian oil reserves and an attempt to 
influence Damascus’ behaviour towards Israel without, however, 
undermining US policy preferences. 
Yet by favouring the status quo in the regional balance of power and 
following American policy imperatives, the European room for manoeuvre 
and its potential influence on the peace process have been limited. Up until 
2003, Brussels timidly tried to promote a resumption of negotiations with 
Israel over the Golan Heights and the Sheeba farms. With the launch of the 
Quartet’s ‘road map to peace’ in April 2003, however, the Syria-Israel (as 
well as the Lebanon-Israel) tracks have been excluded from the political 
agenda. Hence, despite diplomatic talk of a ‘comprehensive settlement’, the 
EU has considerably narrowed its political goals, failing to provide a much-
needed holistic approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This realpolitik 
approach not only reflects a short-sighted attitude towards the conflict, but, 
as detailed below, it is fundamentally linked to the US resistance to 
engaging in dialogue with Damascus. Finally, the non-normative nature of 
EU policy goals vis-à-vis Syria is exemplified by the residual role of 
democracy promotion in what is mainly an economic relationship based on 
trade and energy. It could be argued that the EU’s liberal reform paradigm, 
which posits that economic reform would lead to political reform, has 
normative content. Yet, the unwillingness of EU leaders to advance a 
political reform agenda in Syria points unambiguously towards a realpolitik 
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5.2  Non-normative means 
With the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the Middle Eastern 
Peace Process (MEPP), Syria has been involved in EU-promoted regional 
stabilisation and alleged democratisation efforts through the Barcelona 
Process. EU-Syrian relations also foresaw the drafting of an Association 
Agreement (AA), covering the three (economic, political and cultural) 
baskets of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. After years of standstill, in 
October 2004 negotiations on an agreement appeared to be on the verge of 
successful conclusion (Raphaeli, 2007). In these talks Syria had allegedly 
agreed to sign a non-proliferation clause, which together with the 
December 2003 WMD strategy is designed to be inserted in all agreements 
with third countries. After initial resistance justified by Israel’s rejection of 
an analogous clause in its Association Agreement with the EU, Damascus 
demonstrated its goodwill. Furthermore, in December 2003, Syria 
introduced a resolution in the UN Security Council calling for a WMD-free 
zone in the Middle East (Zunes, 2004, p. 163). While not representing a 
watershed in EU-Syrian economic relations (the AA would have only 
marginally upgraded the 1977 agreement, given the persisting limits on 
agricultural trade), the conclusion of the agreement would have sent a 
strong political signal not only to Damascus but also to Israel and the US 
concerning the EU’s seriousness in its conduct of the relationship. 
Yet with Washington’s adoption of a new set of sanctions in May 
2004, the US began exerting strong pressure on EU member states to resist 
the EU-Syrian agreement. Alongside this, European attitudes towards 
engagement with Syria became increasingly negative after the assassination 
of the Lebanese anti-Syrian Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005. 
In turn, negotiations were halted and, beyond not extending benefits to 
Syria, the EU undertook negative measures by imposing a freeze on Syrian 
funds and included several Syrian suspects in its terrorist list. Moreover, 
the EU strongly backed UN efforts to establish an international tribunal 
regarding the Hariri murder, a tribunal whose sole mandate is to try Syria. 
Hence, rather than using the potential of contractual relations to engage 
and influence Syria within the framework of EU laws and rules (as in the 
case of Eastern Europe), the Union opted to sideline the AA and use its 
non-conclusion as an additional stick on Syria. In a visit to Damascus in 
March 2007, in fact, EU High Representative Javier Solana (2007) declared 
that the AA would be “unlocked” only “if Syria acts against the suspected 
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western government and the pro-Syrian opposition”. The absence of the 
agreement also reduced the EU’s ability to influence Syria’s participation in 
the November 2007 Annapolis conference and its aftermath.  
Finally, EU aid to the southern Mediterranean, as in the case of 
Russia, also highlights the absence of a strong normative commitment: €800 
million in 2005 were directed to programmes dealing with the control of 
illegal immigration, while a mere €10 million were channelled through the 
European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). The tune is 
strikingly similar when one looks at individual member states’ democracy 
assistance: with the exception of Central Asia, the Middle East is the region 
receiving the least money from member states. Brussels of course did play a 
part in inducing Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, but it did not do 
so in the name of democracy in Syria. On the contrary, some EU 
‘governance projects’ have been co-opted by the ruling Syrian elite to 
strengthen the state’s capacities, while on the rare occasions in which 
domestic opposition has been voiced in Syria (as in 2006), Brussels has 
shied away from lending active support.  
5.3  Normative results 
Quite unexpectedly, Syria has nonetheless skilfully and instrumentally 
adopted a number of relatively normative policies. It would be mistaken to 
trace these policy shifts exclusively to the EU. On the contrary, as and when 
the EU opted not to be a partner of Syria, it opened the space for greater 
interference by other actors.  
This notwithstanding, several normative shifts can be detected. The 
first is Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon. In the aftermath of the Hariri 
assassination and following the 14 March group’s protests against Syrian 
involvement in Lebanese affairs, in April 2005 (after UNSC Resolution 1559 
in September 2004 calling for ‘all remaining forces’ to withdraw from 
Lebanon), Damascus withdrew its military forces from Lebanon. It is 
important to point out, however, that despite ending a three-decade-long 
military presence in Lebanon, Damascus still exercises significant influence 
over Lebanese political life. A second manifestation of goodwill vis-à-vis 
multilateral institutions was Damascus’ acceptance of a reinforced UNIFIL 
mission patrolling its borders with Lebanon in the aftermath of the summer 
2006 war between Israel and Lebanon. What would have been probably 
considered as a blow to national sovereignty was deemed as an act of 
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cautious opening towards Israel, signalling its predisposition to resume 
talks. This reveals Syria’s will to reduce its international isolation, and thus 
diminish Syria’s dependence on Iran, to which Damascus only attaches 
tactical value. 
5.4  Conditioning factors 
Despite the EU’s role as a secondary player, how have EU policies 
interacted with and influenced Syria’s partial normative shift?  
Internal interests 
Internal EU interests, while divided, by and large tip in favour of the EU’s 
non-normative objectives vis-à-vis Syria. The main cleavage within the EU 
is between those prioritising a comprehensive peace deal in the region and 
those whose transatlantic loyalty trumps all other objectives and thus 
shapes EU policy choices towards Syria. To date, the latter school of 
thought has taken precedence. The ratification of the AA with Syria failed 
as a consequence of the interplay between a changed political climate after 
the murder of PM Hariri (particularly in view of the strong ties between 
Jacques Chirac’s France and the Hariri family) and US pressure on some 
member states to postpone ratification. The AA was strongly resisted by 
the US, which feared that this would have paved the way for further EU-
Syria economic ties (e.g. through the ENP) and bolstered Syrian claims to 
enter the WTO, thus reducing the effectiveness of Washington’s cornering 
strategy. Alongside France’s strong ties with the anti-Syrian camp in 
Lebanon, the transatlantic priorities of several member states have 
represented the single-most important factor driving the deadlock in EU-
Syria relations and limiting Damascus’ options to end its international 
isolation. 
Internal capability 
Beyond divided interests, does or would the EU possess the political clout 
and economic leverage in its relations with Damascus? EU-Syrian economic 
relations, despite being significant in relative terms, remain limited to a few 
sectors and their intensity has decreased in recent years. In terms of 
engendering political reforms instead, the ‘Governance Facility’ in the 
context of the ENP could be directed to Syria to support reforms. But so 
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of the AA) and as long as it does not proceed willingly on reforms (for 
which it could be ‘rewarded’ through the Governance Facility), this 
potential is unlikely to materialise.  
The external environment 
Despite the EU’s limited capabilities and its divided interests, some 
normative results can be detected. The most relevant explanation 
accounting for this is the role of the external environment. On the one 
hand, is the Union’s dependence upon US policy in the region: in view of 
US pressure on Syria and heightened concerns over WMD proliferation, the 
EU has essentially bended its policies and interests in order to 
accommodate Washington. This strategic choice, exemplified by the 
Union’s freezing or severing of ties with Damascus, represents the Union’s 
preference to maintain close ranks with the US irrespective of its normative 
agenda in Syria and in the region in general, as noted below in the Israel-
Palestine case study as well. The second factor explaining the unintended 
normative results is instead Damascus’ shaky reliance on problematic 
regional partners. In sharp contrast to the case of Belarus, which feels 
bolstered by Russian support, the Ba’athist regime, feeling regionally 
cornered, has only cultivated relations with Iran and Turkey. On the one 
hand, Iran has provided the necessary security umbrella for the small 
Levant country, shielding Syria from threats emanating from regional 
adversaries and international actors such as the US. Yet this is a double-
edged sword, as Damascus’ association with Teheran is both unreliable and 
has complicated further Syria’s relations with the West, including the EU. 
In the current situation, Syria is in fact increasingly entrapped. To escape 
this bind, Syria has intensified its economic and military cooperation with 
Turkey, epitomised by the opening of a Free Trade Area in 2007. Turkey’s 
close ties with the West and its friendly relations with Israel explain Syria’s 
attempt to forge ties with Ankara, in order to hedge against the possibility 
that its ties with Tehran become increasingly costly.   
6.  Policies towards Kosovo, 1999-2007: Imperialistic Intended 
Contributed by Gergana Noutcheva 
6.1  Normative goals 
If there is one overarching goal in the EU’s complex involvement in 
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long-lasting solution. Kosovo has been on the EU’s security agenda since 
the establishment of a UN administration of the province in 1999, following 
NATO’s military strikes against the Milosevic regime and the subsequent 
withdrawal of the Serbian army from Kosovo’s territory. Since then, 
Kosovo has been a UN protectorate with its external status awaiting a final 
settlement. Officially the province remains part of Serbia, although 
Belgrade has no effective control over the territory.6 The Kosovar 
population and the international community consider the status quo as 
unsustainable and negotiations have been under way throughout 2006 and 
2007 to find a compromise solution.  
Normative discourse on conflict resolution notwithstanding, the EU 
has high stakes in settling the matter. In other words, its milieu and 
possession goals largely overlap. In the 1990s, the EU’s international 
reputation suffered a big loss in the face of its incapacity to prevent and 
stop the bloodshed during Yugoslavia’s dissolution. In the aftermath of the 
Kosovo crisis, the EU tried to reverse this image and took the lead in the 
economic reconstruction of the province under UN auspices.7 It included 
Kosovo in all its regional initiatives designed to stabilise the Western 
Balkans, such as the Stability Pact for South East Europe, the Stabilisation 
and Association Process and the CARDS programme for financial 
assistance. Above all, the EU extended the membership prospect to Kosovo 
and it did so without prejudice as to the final status outcome.8 In short, 
goodwill on the EU’s side to help resolve the problem was not lacking, 
although the Union has not been in the lead in proposing a concrete plan 
for the settlement of the conflict.  
The EU has opted to play a secondary role on the status question by 
supporting the UN-led process to define the parameters of a mutually 
acceptable compromise. Officially, the EU has abstained from favouring 
any outcome, although it has made clear that certain propositions would 
                                                      
6 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) regulates the protectorate status of 
Kosovo as well as its legal relationship with Serbia.  
7 The EU takes the lead of the economic pillar of the United Nations Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK).  
8 The EU’s heads of state extended the membership perspective to the Western 
Balkans at the Feira European Council in 2000 and reconfirmed their commitment 
to the region at the Thessaloniki European Council in 2003.  48 | NATHALIE TOCCI ET AL. 
 
not be acceptable as a matter of principle, such as the partition of Kosovo or 
its unification with another state (European Council, 2005). This is to say 
that a scenario envisaging a change of borders is a non-starter as far as the 
EU is concerned, given the latent grievances of various minorities in the 
region and the considerable international efforts already invested in former 
Yugoslavia to promote multi-culturalism and respect for minority rights. 
Furthermore, the EU’s support for the ‘standards before status’ policy that 
characterised the UN-led post-war involvement in Kosovo also attests to 
the high priority the EU placed on the democratic development of Kosovo, 
irrespective of its final status. Whereas one can doubt the feasibility of 
democratic governance in a legally undefined and socially contested polity, 
the EU’s emphasis on democracy and the rule of law in Kosovo can be 
viewed as part and parcel of the Union’s overall normative objectives in 
Kosovo.  
6.2  Non-normative means 
Despite these normative goals, the international efforts to resolve Kosovo’s 
conflict of which the EU has been part, have deviated from international 
legal norms and multilateral frameworks. This goes back to the 1999 NATO 
military strikes against the Milosevic regime, which many EU member 
states supported and directly took part in but which occurred without the 
official authorisation of the UN Security Council. Russia and China blocked 
the UN channel at the time and Western powers led by the US bypassed 
the formal procedures and resorted to force in violation of international 
law. Gross human rights violations and even threatened genocide were 
cited as reasons for NATO’s military actions but this ‘normative’ goal was 
pursued in breach of international law and in violation of the multilateral 
principles governing the international system.  
The negotiations on the ‘Ahtisaari plan’ for ‘supervised 
independence’ of Kosovo is another example of the resort to means that are 
not entirely respectful of international rules and norms of multilateralism. 
In mid-March 2007, the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for 
Kosovo’s status talks, Maarti Ahtisaari, presented his comprehensive 
proposal recommending eventual independence for Kosovo as well as 
extensive guarantees for the Serbian minority in the province through 
institutionalised decentralisation and international presence on the ground 
to monitor implementation. It was the West’s hope that Ahtisaari’s 
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resolution, paving the way for the deployment of an EU civilian mission in 
Kosovo (ICG, 2007). The plan, however, was rejected by Russia, with China 
expressing unease and opposition to it as well. To appease Russian and 
Serbian objections, a second round of direct negotiations between the Serbs 
and the Kosovars was launched in June 2007, with the mediation of an 
international troika – the US, the EU and Russia. In essence, this step 
moved the process beyond the UN’s multilateral framework and away 
from earlier ideas about seeking agreement on a new UN Security Council 
Resolution that would settle Kosovo’s status. While formally not in breach 
of legal norms, this negotiating format deviates from formal UN channels.  
Without prejudice to final status, the EU has prepared to deploy a 
civilian rule of law mission in the aftermath of a settlement. It has signalled 
that it will launch an ESDP operation on the legal basis of the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244, without explicit UN authorisation. This broad 
interpretation of the legally permissible actions under UNSCR1244 has 
been the EU's second-best choice, yet the only feasible option given the lack 
of consensus among the permanent five members of the UN Security 
Council on a new resolution. Furthermore, on the controversial issue of 
Kosovo's status, the EU has silently participated in a gradual process of 
legitimising an outcome of independence. The Troika process has given the 
EU a more visible and responsible international role in settling the matter, 
intensifying the debates among the member states on possible scenarios 
and action plans. Starting from the proposition that there is no viable 
alternative that would ensure peace and stability, EU member states have 
progressively converged on the independence option, even though publicly 
they have refrained from taking a position, contrary to the US which has 
firmly and openly backed Kosovo’s independence (Moore, 2007). In other 
words, whereas the EU’s aims may merit the label ‘normative’, the way in 
which the Union has deployed its policy instruments has not been entirely 
in line with its self-professed backing of the international legal order.  
6.3  Normative results 
The outcome for Kosovo is of course still unknown, but the two parties’ 
positions have remained as diametrically opposed today as when 
negotiations started in 2006. Pristina refuses to acquiesce to anything that 
falls short of independence, while Belgrade refuses to agree to anything 
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to weigh and adjudicate the legal and moral arguments behind different 
solutions.  
The normative argument in support o f  K o s o v o ’ s  i n d e p e n d e n c e  i s  
grounded in ‘just secession’ theories justifying claims to self-determination 
as a last resort when serious injustice has been committed against a 
community by a state (Coppieters & Sakwa, 2003). The mass violation of 
human rights of the Albanian population in the 1990s by the Milosevic 
regime constitutes the basis for accepting Kosovo’s claim to self-
determination. The international legal system, however, protects the 
sovereignty of states and thus Serbia’s borders. Violating such norms also 
creates dangerous precedents that threaten to undermine the international 
legal order. The EU has presented Kosovo as a sui generis case, but no 
persuasive argument has been advanced as to why it is special (or more 
special) compared to other cases and thus why it should be treated 
differently.  
Hence, while a normative case for Kosovo’s independence exists, it 
has not been made convincingly by the EU or any other international actor. 
This raises legitimate questions as to the extent to which Kosovo’s eventual 
independence can be used as a model for resolving other secessionist 
conflicts in the world. If priority is to be given to the protection of 
individual human rights over state sovereignty, the implications for the 
international system as a whole are potentially very serious. The EU has 
dismissed such interpretation, but the issue has already entered the public 
debate over other ‘frozen conflicts’ (Socor, 2007). In the absence of a clear 
explanation of the uniqueness of Kosovo’s case, this selective application of 
new rules strongly hints at the West’s (and the EU’s) hegemonic behaviour, 
even if in the name of allegedly normative ends. Aware of the European 
(and American) position, it seems likely that Kosovo will ultimately declare 
independence and not reintegrate into Serbia. 
6.4  Conditioning factors 
What explains the EU’s ‘imperialistic intended’ foreign policy in Kosovo? 
Two factors seem critical. On the one hand, EU security interests call for an 
efficient solution that minimises security risks in terms of instability and 
resort to violence. On the other hand, the EU is constrained by the 
international setting, in particular by an uncooperative Russia suspected of 
using every opportunity to block established multilateral channels in order 
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Internal interests  
On the substance of the status settlement, EU member states have been 
divided and as such are unable to take a firm stance. It is no secret that 
member states such as Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia and Romania are 
not keen on recognising an independent Kosovo for fear of sending the 
wrong message to their own sizable minorities as well as to secessionist 
movements elsewhere. In this context, the Kosovo discussions in the EU 
have focused more on the need to preserve unity among the member states 
and to speak with a single voice than on what is normatively desirable for 
Kosovo itself.   
Division on substance notwithstanding, the EU unanimously views 
Kosovo as a security problem that needs to be fixed. There is a sense of 
urgency within EU policy-making circles to close the chapter and move on, 
allowing the conflict parties to concentrate their energies on domestic 
governance in the framework of the accession process. Furthermore, in so 
far as Kosovo is a ‘European problem’, given its geographical location and 
EU membership prospects, member states feel the responsibility to actively 
contribute to a lasting solution. In this context, even the more sceptical 
member states seem to appreciate that independence has progressively 
grown to represent the only viable option for stability and peace in Western 
Balkans.  
External environment  
In addition, the internal situation in Kosovo itself has not only called for 
urgent action but also shaped perceptions of what is a feasible and durable 
outcome. Without a clearly defined status, Kosovo has been on life support 
from international donors for almost a decade. Economic development and 
modernisation have been severely hampered by the uncertainty 
surrounding its constitutional future. The social cost for the population has 
grown heavier with young generations facing no bright prospects for 
professional realisation and losing patience with the status quo. In short, 
the domestic situation has urged determined international action, with the 
Kosovar leadership declaring independence unilaterally in December 2007, 
if no mediated solution is found by then.  
Yet, on the other hand, the wider international context has induced 
the EU to pursue its goals in non-normative ways. As noted also in the 
Russian case study, the EU is confronted with an increasingly assertive 
Moscow, which, in its comeback on the international scene, uses all means 52 | NATHALIE TOCCI ET AL. 
 
at its disposal to assert its role and presence in an often-confrontational 
manner. While the EU would like to treat Russia as an equal partner, 
Russia’s positions are often seen as pursing narrow self-interest rather than 
contributing to the solution of international problems. Hence, the EU and 
the US have found themselves induced to stretch the interpretation of 
international legal norms and work around multilateral channels in order 
to avoid complete blockage. The international environment therefore also 
partly accounts for EU policy towards Kosovo, as well as for the results on 
the ground.  
7.  Policies towards Israel-Palestine, 2000-07: Imperialistic 
Unintended 
Contributed by Nathalie Tocci 
7.1  Normative goals 
The aim of a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has 
consistently been amongst the EU’s principal foreign policy goals (Tocci, 
2005). The articulation of these goals has been distinctly ‘normative’. More 
specifically, the EU’s declared goals have been based on two interconnected 
pillars. The first pillar is the need to respect the self-determination rights of 
the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. The EU historically upheld Israel’s right 
to statehood, living in peace within secure and internationally recognised 
borders. The European position towards the Palestinians was defined 
progressively over the decades, first acknowledging the Palestinian right to 
self-determination in the 1980 Venice Declaration and culminating with the 
1999 European Council in Berlin, which affirmed that “the creation of a 
democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian state…would be the 
best guarantee of Israel’s security” (European Council, 1999). With the 
collapse of the Oslo process in 2000, the Union explicitly advocated the 
creation of two states, Israel and Palestine. The state of Palestine would be 
viable, independent and sovereign, and it would be established along the 
1967 borders.  
The second pillar has been the importance of respecting human rights 
and international humanitarian law (IHL) as well as democratic standards 
and good governance. Most European declarations on the Middle East 
conflict since the 1970s have condemned Palestinian violence and terrorism. 
Since 1973, member states have criticised the acquisition of territory by 
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conquered in 1967, and opposed Israeli settlements in the occupied 
territories (OTs) in violation of the 4th Geneva Convention (European 
Council, 1990). Since 2000, the Union has re-intensified its calls to halt and 
reverse settlement construction and condemned Palestinian suicide 
bombings, Israeli military incursions, extra-judicial killings, forms of 
collective punishment as well as the construction of the West Bank barrier. 
EU declarations advocating a Palestinian state have added that such a state 
should be democratic and well governed, calling for the reform of the PA.  
7.2  Non-normative means 
Despite the consistent formulation of normative foreign policy goals, the 
Union has frequently refrained from pursuing its goals in a normative way. 
Beginning with the association agreements with Israel and the PA, the EU 
has never made use of its rights embedded in the essential elements (Art. 2) 
and non-execution (Art. 79) clauses to suspend the agreements on the 
grounds of the gross violations of international law, human rights and 
democratic standards (EMHRN, 2005, 2007). The inclusion of Israel and the 
PA in the ENP does not promise to alter this fact. Vis-à-vis the Palestinians, 
the ENP has been frozen since the 2006 election of Hamas, and may be 
reactivated only with the unelected Fatah government in the West Bank. 
Vis-à-vis Israel, only one in six ‘priorities for action’ in the Action Plan 
refers to the conflict and human rights, and does so in a vague and open-
ended manner (Tocci, 2007a, chapter 6).  
Far more seriously, the EU has risked acquiescing to Israel’s 
violations of international law (Tocci, 2007a, chapter 6 and EMHRN, 2005). 
One example of this has been the preferential export of Israeli goods 
produced in settlements, where the Union has risked acquiescing to Israel’s 
application of the AA to the OTs, thus extending EU trade benefits to 
settlement enterprises. An analogous problem lies in the area of research, 
where Israel has considered as eligible for EU funding Israeli entities 
within the OTs, leading to EU financing under its Framework Programmes 
of several settlement entities. Future problems are likely to emerge in other 
fields. In the context of the ENP, the European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI), tailored to border regions, does not include 
safeguard mechanisms to ensure that funds will not be directed to support 
actors or actions that contravene public international law in the OTs.  
The (non)-normative dimension of EU policies is more nuanced when 
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relatively successful in conditioning its aid policies to constitutional, 
judicial and fiscal reforms of the PA. The EU also went the extra mile to 
ensure that EU funds were not redirected to finance political violence. 
However, the Union has also been unwilling to completely suspend aid to 
the PA, an act that would trigger the collapse of the Authority and oblige 
Israel to undertake its financial responsibilities as the occupying power. 
This has given rise to a critical dilemma, exemplified by the post-2006 
Palestinian election period. Following the election of Hamas, the Union 
accepted the Quartet’s conditions on the new PA government. Yet with the 
exception of conditionality on violence – which the Union is bound by in 
view of Hamas’s inclusion in the EU terrorist list – the remaining two 
conditions have extremely shaky legal grounds (Tocci, 2007b). Yet not only 
has the Union endorsed legally questionable conditions. It has also been 
unwilling to follow through with its policy, fearing a total collapse of the 
PA. By May 2006, the EU partially resumed aid through a Temporary 
International Mechanism, intended to bypass the Hamas government by 
relying on the presidency and international organisations and directly 
providing material supplies and financial allowances to individuals. While 
leading to a 30% rise of EU aid, the manner in which aid has been delivered 
has reversed the partial steps forward in PA reform promoted by the EU in 
previous years. The situation worsened still after the political violence and 
ensuing separation between Fatah/West Bank and Hamas/Gaza in June 
2007, leading to the establishment of an unelected Fatah government in the 
West Bank to whom the EU has enthusiastically resumed aid and the re-
empowerment of the more hard-line elements within Hamas in the Gaza 
Strip.   
7.3  Non-normative results 
The EU, as a secondary external actor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
could not have represented the major determinant in the evolution of the 
conflict. Yet, in light of the EU’s highly developed bilateral relations with 
the parties, has the Union put its policy means to the best use? The answer 
is largely negative. In a structural context of Israeli dominance and 
Palestinian weakness, there has been a diminishing prospect for the 
establishment of a viable Palestinian state in view of Israel’s accelerating 
colonisation of the OTs. Despite its declaratory support for a two-state 
solution, EU policies have reinforced this trend. Over the Oslo years, the 
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attention to the PA’s performance and Israel’s expanding grip on the OTs. 
Since then, EU efforts have mitigated the humanitarian effects of the 
conflict by pouring aid into Palestine (Le More, 2005). Yet aid to Palestine 
and acquiescence to Israel have supported the deteriorating trends on the 
ground, which are likely to persist despite the Annapolis conference and 
the ensuing process in the fall of 2007. 
7.4  Conditioning factors 
What explains the EU’s behaviour as an ‘unintended imperialistic actor’ in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Why has the Union failed to contribute to an 
approximation of its normative goals in the Middle East conflict? 
Internal interests 
The principal and most convincing factor explaining why the Union has 
deployed its policy instruments in contradiction with its normative goals 
lies in the EU’s internally competing interest agenda. It would be mistaken 
to view the Union’s advocacy of a rights-bound, two-state solution in the 
Middle East as being purely hypocritical. Indeed, as discussed above, the 
EU’s goals in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been distinctly normative. 
Yet while the Union might genuinely support these milieu goals, its 
concomitant pursuit of possession objectives have induced the EU to 
deploy its policies in non-normative ways. In the Middle East, the Union 
has viewed the protection of Israel and close relations with it as a high 
order priority. Europe’s history of anti-Semitism has generated a deep-felt 
preference, particularly in some member states, to foster close relations 
with Israel and promote its security. Although the EU has repeatedly 
underlined that a two-state solution is the only long-term guarantee of 
Israel’s security, the EU majority has also wished to avoid antagonising 
Israel through concrete responses to its conduct in the conflict. This has 
occurred to the extent of bending the Union’s own laws and rules for the 
sake of accommodating (illegal) Israeli policies.  
Another competing EU interest in the Middle East that has trumped 
the pursuit of the EU’s normative agenda has been the priority to seek close 
and cooperative relations with the US. As in the case of Syria discussed 
above, this has generated also in the Israel-Palestine context strong EU 
incentives to accommodate American policies. During the Oslo process, 
this meant that irrespective of the parties’ conduct on the ground, the 
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refraining from criticising the conflict parties’ actions on the ground. Post-
Oslo, it has led to a considerable EU focus on Palestinian reform only when 
this was the main tune played in Washington. Once that tune changed 
(following the election of Hamas), the EU’s priority to rebuild bridges with 
Washington on the Middle East (after the Iraq war) has led the EU to undo 
its partial reform successes in Palestine and first boycott the Hamas-led 
government and then opt to support its unelected Fatah branch in the West 
Bank.  
Internal capability 
Capability or rather limited capability provides a second explanation of the 
EU’s convergence on a non-normative deployment of policy instruments. 
On the one hand, it lacks the necessary ‘hard power’ to compel the parties 
to alter their conduct. On the other hand, its relational power vis-à-vis 
Israel is supposedly weak, in so far as the EU gains from key commercial 
advantages in its relations with Israel which it is unwilling to rescind. Yet 
these arguments belittle the fact that Israel accords high value to its 
relations with the EU. Israel is a small country, whose openness to 
international trade is critical to its economic survival. The EU is Israel’s 
largest trading partner. The political value attributed by Israel to the EU is 
arguably even more important, in so far as Israel’s desire of finding a place 
of belonging in Europe (rather than in the Middle East) is deeply 
embedded in the Israeli Jewish majority (of European descent).  Hence 
while salient, internal capability (or lack thereof) only provides a limited 
explanation of EU policies, while the principal reason must be sought in the 
Union’s internal interest configuration.  
The external environment 
Finally, the external environment provides the principal explanation of the 
non-normative results on the ground. Developments in the conflict have 
been dictated mainly by domestic factors rather than by the EU (Karam et 
al., 2006). More specifically, the flaws in the Oslo process, which came to a 
head at the Camp David II summit, the unwillingness of Arafat to rein-in 
the intifada in its early stages, the election of Sharon and the subsequent 
escalation of violence and colonisation of the OTs underlie the shift away 
from a two-state solution and the mounting violation of human rights and 
IHL. In particular since 2000, several interrelated features have constrained 
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Palestinian suicide attacks explained Sharon’s freehand in crushing the 
Palestinian uprising in open disregard of rights and law. The growing 
Israeli popular desire to ‘disengage’ from the Palestinians and the rising 
awareness of the ‘demographic threat’ posed by them underpinned the 
‘separation barrier’, the Gaza disengagement and the preference for a 
unilateral pursuit of Israel’s perceived interests. The 2006 Lebanon war, 
Hamas’ takeover of Gaza in 2007 and the Bush administration’s desire to 
resurrect its tarnished image in the Middle East explain both the 
resumption of a diplomatic process (in Annapolis) and the probability that 
– more so than the Oslo process – this is unlikely to alter facts on the 
ground.  
8.  EU Trade Policy towards North Africa, 1995-2007: Status Quo 
Intended 
Contributed by Hakim Darbouche 
8.1  Non-normative goals 
The EU’s trade policy vis-à-vis North Africa, as encapsulated by the 1995 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and reinforced by the 2003 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), is characteristically introspective. 
Its intended goal is little more than the preservation of the asymmetrical 
balance of the EU’s trade relations with the region. Although avowedly 
predicated on the axiomatic tenets of free trade, the EU’s trade policy does 
not uphold reciprocity and fairness. The aim of establishing a Euro-
Mediterranean free-trade area by 2010, long viewed as the backbone of the 
Barcelona process, is now considered chimerical. Indeed the immediate 
visible goal behind this policy is the preservation of the EU’s status as the 
region’s main trading partner against a noticeably growing presence of 
American and Asian operators. By locking the North African countries into 
free-trade agreements, the EU hopes to deepen its commercial penetration 
in the region but fails to reciprocate by refusing to rid itself of the 
restricting interference of the Common Agricultural Policy and other 
Community policies. The resulting exemption of agricultural goods from 
trade liberalisation is far from beneficial for countries like Tunisia and 
Morocco whose main comparative advantage lies precisely in this sector. 
Besides sectoral protectionism, the notion of free trade between the EU and 
North Africa has been further undermined by restrictive regimes on the 
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The EU’s trade policy towards the Maghreb has been formulated in 
the context of a broader policy framework providing for political and 
cultural ‘partnerships’ as well. As such it was said to have a normative 
vocation aimed at inducing political liberalisation. However, the failure of 
the EU to meaningfully promote democratic practices in these countries 
and its unwillingness to dialogue with all political actors in the region has 
confirmed its prioritisation of commercial self-interest over other 
considerations. In this vein, EU trade policy is also seen as aiming to reduce 
the flow of migrants from the Maghreb as concomitant FDI is expected to 
generate employment opportunities for the local workforce. But far from 
being a vehicle for the transfer of technology to the local economies, thus 
endowing them with a competitive edge, the quasi-commercial nature of 
the FDI encouraged by the EU has further reinforced the recipients’ 
position as mere outlets for European goods.  
8.2  Normative means 
Contrary to past bilateral arrangements between the EU and the Maghreb 
countries, the Euro-Med association agreements (AA) have been 
normatively less contentious relative to existing GATT/WTO provisions. 
Despite ongoing polemics between the EU and its southern partners 
regarding agricultural trade liberalisation, the EU holds that a more 
restrictive regime in agriculture in the context of its free-trade agreements 
is admissible under Article XXIV of the GATT (Pierros et al., 1999, p. 194). 
As such, its non-normative trade policy goals in North Africa are being 
channelled through normative means. 
Furthermore, as its bilateral mechanisms, the AAs also reflect the 
principles of the Barcelona Declaration beyond mere trade. Besides the 
establishment of a free-trade area in order to share prosperity between the 
EU and its associates, the aims of these agreements are also to: a) facilitate 
the achievement of peace and stability, induce political dialogue and 
promote democratic practices and human rights; and b) promote inter-
cultural dialogue so as to achieve understanding and rapprochement 
between the peoples of the region.  
Finally, the contents of the AAs, although broadly similar, have been 
specifically tailored to and carefully negotiated with the individual 
countries, explaining for instance the protracted negotiations in the case of 
Algeria. The implementation of the association ties has also been 
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parliaments of all member states and those of the Maghreb countries, in 
addition to their scrutiny by the European Parliament, their 
implementation process is reviewed annually by association councils 
constituted of officials from the Commission and the respective partner 
country. Thus, structurally the AAs are the instruments of a partnership 
based on shared norms. Similarly, the ENP Action Plans (AP) provide the 
tools for deepened cooperation with the EU with a view to culminating in 
the progressive integration of the Maghreb economies into the EU’s 
internal market. By complementing both the structure and methodology of 
the AAs, the APs offer the means to the Maghreb countries to choose the 
areas of cooperation with the EU in which they wish to go further, based on 
mutually-delineated normative objectives. So far, however, only Morocco 
and Tunisia have opted for ENPAPs.  
8.3  Non-normative results  
Despite the normative instruments at its disposal, the EU’s trade policy has 
largely resulted in the reinforcement of the status quo which benefits the 
EU as the strongest actor more than its North African partners. In effect, the 
asymmetry in the trade relationship continues to favour the EU. While 
being the Maghreb countries’ major trading partner, the EU still exports a 
majority of capital and manufactured goods in return for raw material and 
semi-finished products. This pattern has kept the EU’s trade surplus with 
these countries intact, except with Algeria which, due to the high oil prices, 
has in recent years realised a trade surplus with the EU. Furthermore, the 
insignificance of intra-Maghreb trade, representing less than 5% of the 
region’s total, has exacerbated these countries’ dependence on the EU. 
Their failure to secure the EU’s reciprocity in liberalising its agricultural 
sector in return for their abolition of industrial barriers has brought extra 
costs onto their already weak economies. 
More importantly, the EU strategy has not helped the Maghreb 
economies develop efficient export-oriented industries, which are 
paramount for the success of their free-trade commitments. Their inability 
to attract the necessary FDI and acquire the required technological know-
how due to the burdensome bureaucratic and financial structures of their 
economic apparatuses have been central to this failure. The expected 
impact of the AAs in addressing these shortfalls in the Maghreb economies 
has not materialised. The expected rationalisation and modernisation of 
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the EU in the context of the AAs has been confronted with, and largely 
failed to overcome, the autocratic nature of the political regimes in place. 
The unwillingness of the EU to tackle the political deficiencies of the 
Maghreb countries in parallel with its trade policy has reduced the 
prospect not only of an effective economic liberalisation but of its eventual 
political spill-over as well.  
The main beneficiaries of the EU’s trade policy towards the region are 
European businesses, which have had easier access to the markets of these 
countries and their counterparts in the Maghreb which operate on large-
scale and have been active in foreign trade already. The latter’s links with 
the governments in place allow them to adapt and modernise through 
access to loans and foreign expertise often channelled through official 
institutions. This has allowed these local businesses to expand into 
monopolies, but their corrupt practices have prevented any wealth creation 
from trickling down to the broader society. Combined with increasing 
unemployment due to the dismantling of infant industries as a result of 
bankruptcy or privatisation, this situation has often been the origin of 
increasing inequalities in these societies. Consequently, the EU is perceived 
in these countries as a force which, far from being interested in their 
welfare, contributes to the perpetuation of their underdevelopment, which 
is beneficial to its own economy as well as to the local elites in these 
countries. 
8.4  Conditioning factors 
What explains the EU’s pursuit of non-normative goals through its trade 
policy despite the normative means at its disposal?  
Internal interests 
The EU’s myopic pursuit of possession goals in North Africa runs counter 
to the calls emanating from certain European political and civil society 
actors advocating the pursuit of normative goals such as sustainable 
development and respect for human rights and democratic values. It 
vindicates the view that, despite the EU’s broader normative discourse, 
priority in practice is given to the pursuit of narrower interests. This can 
partly be explained by the specific interests of several member states. 
Whereas the share of the Maghreb in the EU’s total trade remains largely 
insignificant (less than 3%), its relative importance for the southern 
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Mediterranean policy – has translated into an interest on the part of these 
countries to reinforce the existing patterns of trade between them and the 
Maghreb countries. More specifically, the influence of business lobbies in 
the EU with vested interests in the Maghreb is an internal element that 
needs to be factored-in to account for the EU’s policy. Businesses with an 
economic interest in the North African market push for a liberalisation of 
trade with the region, whereas those competing with its imports advocate 
greater trade restrictions. The result is a strategy that posits the pursuit of 
sustainable development in the Maghreb as competing with the EU’s 
commercial interests.  
More convincingly, the EU’s preoccupation with energy security and 
migration in its broad relations with the Maghreb has raised the 
importance attributed to its political relations with the incumbent elites in 
these countries. This has meant that the Union has taken great care not to 
upset the commercial interests of the domestic political actors in these 
countries with key stakes in trade ties with the EU. The EU’s choice has 
thus been to preserve the prevailing configuration of its relations with the 
Maghreb. 
Internal capability 
The EU is able to pursue possession goals through normative means 
because of its framework of rules and institutions. The EU’s trade relations 
with the region have developed over the course of 50 years, in which 
through trial and error, the EU has successfully built a framework of 
interaction incorporating its normative and strategic interests. The EU’s 
active involvement and power in the formulation of the world trade regime 
has also meant that it has succeeded in legalising the pursuit of its 
commercial interests.   
The external environment  
Factors external to the EU have also been important determinants of EU 
trade policy towards North Africa, contributing to an explanation of the 
EU’s non-normative results. These are internal to the region or pertaining 
to the policies of other international actors. Specifically, the EU’s status in 
North Africa as the main trading partner and only policy entrepreneur in 
this issue area has enabled it to set the policy agenda, leaving the North 
African countries to react and accommodate their interests to the EU-
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the Moroccan and Tunisian regulatory frameworks and that of the EU, 
however, has translated into more positive outcomes for these countries’ 
economies as a result of the EU’s trade policy. The resulting relative 
leverage gained by these countries has allowed them to pursue their own 
possession goals more effectively than countries like Algeria, which has 
been less willing to reform in the economic realm. Internationally, the EU 
has recently seen its traditional position as the region’s main trading 
partner being challenged by the increasing presence of actors like China, 
Russia and the US. The policies of these international actors towards North 
Africa have been aimed exclusively at pursuing crude possession goals 
without any consideration for normative conditionality. In view of rising 
international competition, the EU is increasingly prioritising the pursuit of 
its own possession goals. 
9.  Policies towards Ukraine, 2005-20: Status Quo Unintended 
Contributed by Michael Emerson 
9.1  Non-normative goals 
The EU’s political declarations and official documents on Ukraine are 
always expressed in highly normative language, hoping to see Ukraine 
become a well functioning democracy and European-style social-market 
economy, with wholesale convergence on European values and standards. 
While the EU has not been able to agree on the goal of Ukraine’s full 
membership perspective, even for the long-term, Ukraine itself, especially 
under President Viktor Yushchenko, has made this its headline political 
objective. After the Orange Revolution of 2005, he even advocated 
membership by 2010, which Brussels told him could not even be discussed.  
The reasons for the EU’s refusal to offer the prospect of membership, 
casting in doubt the degree of its normative commitment to Ukraine, seem 
to be a mix of three arguments, both of which are linked to possession 
considerations. The first, partly couched in possession goal terms, is a 
general opposition to further EU enlargement beyond present 
commitments. The reasons for this are firstly a concern for the EU’s 
institutional capability to function with further major expansions, which 
may be viewed as a relatively neutral and technical reason to object. The 
second consideration however has serious implications for our study; it is 
that some existing member states, especially from the original six, give a 
large weight to avoiding a further dilution of their own power within the THE EU AS A NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR | 63 
 
EU, and less weight to the normative argument that advocates a widening 
of the European space of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. A 
third reason, also non-normative in nature, is deference to Russia, as noted 
also in the Russia case study. In the early post-Soviet period, an EU policy 
of ‘Russia-first’ was quite evident. This has been diluted over time as 
Ukrainian independence has been confirmed, and as Russia has turned less 
democratic. Nevertheless, this ‘Russia-first’ tendency is not extinguished, 
and to the extent that this in part motivates the blocking position over 
Ukraine’s membership perspective, it amounts to confirming the non-
normative quality of the EU position in the post-Orange revolution period. 
9.2  Normative means 
The means employed by the EU have clearly been of normative character, 
however, and devoid of forceful realpolitik. The framework for EU policy 
was initially the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), succeeded 
now by the Action Plan of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The 
PCA was the first text to invite Ukraine down the path of convergence on 
EU norms and standards. It identified 21 domains of policy where 
approximation of EU laws was prescribed as a priority task. The Ukrainian 
government, under Leonid Kuchma at the time, instructed its Ministry of 
Justice to embark on an ambitious programme of legislative action to this 
end. The ENP, beginning in 2004, was designed to upgrade the PCA, 
without however granting the still sought after membership perspective. 
The Commission drew up an Action Plan prescribing about 300 lines of 
political, legal and economic reform. Ukraine was pressured into 
negotiating and agreeing upon this plan, which was largely based on a 
watered-down version of the criteria for EU accession, even while 
grumbling that it was not what it wanted.   
In the middle of this negotiation came the dramatic Orange 
revolution of 2005. At the heart of the crisis the EU was invited as a 
mediator to its great surprise. This happened when the presidents of 
Lithuania and Poland were invited to Kiev, and they called Solana to join 
them, which he did. This incident illustrated how the new member states 
began to change the behaviour of the EU towards a more substantial 
concern for Ukraine’s political future. Soon after the Orange revolution, 
there were efforts by Ukraine, backed by several Eastern European member 
states, to get a better ENP Action Plan, but these yielded only token results. 
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agreement as soon as Ukraine has acceded to the WTO. The ‘deep free 
trade’ concept, as set out in a feasibility study done for the Commission 
and government of Ukraine by CEPS, goes far in building a strong 
normative and positive governance content into a trade deal (Emerson et 
al., 2006a). This is through proposing alignment by Ukraine on the EU’s 
internal market laws and policies, which therefore goes into the reform of 
Ukraine’s deeply corrupted domestic governance.  
The EU has also agreed in 2006 to open negotiations for an ‘Enhanced 
Agreement’ to replace the PCA. This new treaty would have a 
comprehensive coverage of all EU competences and political criteria for 
membership (without conceding the membership perspective point) – for 
the political system, human rights, the rule of law, convergence on the EU 
market law, market economy, border management and migration rules, 
and even association with EU foreign policies. This proposed agreement 
may become a new template for the EU’s relations with its close 
neighbours, alongside various improvements to the ENP which have been 
under negotiation within the EU itself (Emerson, Noutcheva & Popescu, 
2007).  
The EU also agreed to respond positively to the invitation of Ukraine 
and Moldova to send a Border Management mission to the Moldovan 
secessionist entity of Transnistria. This mission of EU border guards has the 
mission of controlling smuggling through the borders into both Ukraine 
and Moldova, and is a case study in itself of assistance in bringing the rule 
of law into grossly corrupted state mechanisms (extending way beyond the 
borders of Transnistria into the workings of the Ukrainian port of Odessa). 
9.3  Normative results 
Under Kuchma, Ukraine’s part in the PCA process was thoroughly 
discredited in the eyes of the EU because of the rampant corruption of the 
regime up to the top, its notorious habit of sending contradictory messages 
to Brussels and Moscow (or what came to be referred to as a ‘milking two 
cows at the same time’ policy), and finally to the sordid Gondgadze murder 
(the secret services taped, and later leaked, Kuchma’s conversations in 
which he gave instructions to get rid of this inconvenient journalist). Under 
Kuchma there were no results at the level of governance of Ukraine. Yet the 
social pressures that triggered the Orange revolution were building up 
during those years, and Ukraine’s civil society and media freedoms had 
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amidst chronic divisions and disorganisation at the political level, Ukraine 
has remained a vibrant democracy, with no relapse into a strong state 
regime, refusing notably to copy the model of the Putin regime. Despite 
these normative results, Ukraine remains nonetheless fragile, with a 
dysfunctional democracy. Powerful oligarchs remain in deeply corrupted 
collusion with all parts of the political system. The struggle remains 
between social pressures in favour of European values versus a status quo, 
or between pro-Western and pro-Russian interests. There are some 
tendencies on the part of the oligarchs to orient their priorities increasingly 
towards integration into the European economy.  
9.4  Conditioning factors 
The internal political context 
The divisions between EU member states over both the membership 
perspective and the ‘Russia first’ question have undermined substantially 
the EU’s behaviour as a would-be normative actor in the Ukrainian case. 
EU member states have been deeply divided on the question of 
membership, with Poland and Sweden leading a group that would like to 
offer the seemingly magic words ‘membership perspective’, whereas 
France and Belgium lead the group who are categorically opposed. There is 
a further middle group, including probably Germany and the UK, who 
take a low-profile position. But since anything to do with the EU’s 
enlargement becomes a matter requiring unanimity, this division means 
that the EU is by default refusing the membership perspective.  
Internal capability 
The EU has a comprehensive set of instruments actually or potentially at its 
disposal in the context of the ENP. This was illustrated by Romano Prodi’s 
remark when he was President of the Commission that the partner states, 
and Ukraine in particular, could be offered ‘everything but institutions’. 
The most ambitious conception of the ENP thus offers widespread 
participation in EU policies and approximation or simple copying of EU 
norms and standards, ranging from technical product standards to highly 
political questions. The EU is feeling its way gradually towards this model. 
Yet the member states that have refused the membership perspective are 
acting as a brake even on giving full throttle to an ‘everything but 
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constrained to a lower level than that which can be envisaged. The EU 
could be said to have a potential capability for a much stronger normative 
role in Ukraine. Yet against this there are powerful voices asserting that the 
EU must now define its final frontiers, since otherwise it will destroy itself, 
and in particular its reality as a community of values, by over-expanding 
its frontiers. This argument is effectively denying the EU’s potential 
capability in its Eastern neighbourhood.  
The external environment 
The unintended normative impact of the EU’s status quo approach towards 
Ukraine can instead mainly be attributed to Russia, which, in a 
diametrically opposite way than in Belarus, has helped strengthen the 
appeal of the EU’s normative model by behaving towards Ukraine in such 
a clumsily realpolitik mode. There are numerous examples of this, aside 
from the notorious gas war of January 2006. Russia has been refusing to 
negotiate and agree a precise demarcation of its frontier with Ukraine, 
undermining the consolidation of Ukrainian statehood. In 2004 Russia tried 
unilaterally and forcefully to change the map of the Azov Sea, building a 
land bridge to a crucial island, until finally even Kuchma screamed hard 
enough to stop it. Putin then blatantly backed Yanukovich in the fraudulent 
elections that led to the Orange revolution. Russia has rented crowds of 
babushkas and Cossacks in Crimea to protest NATO activities. It has 
suggested revising the agreement for their fleet to quit Sebastopol by 2017. 
These actions have contributed positively to the consolidation of Ukrainian 
national unity and identity, and the perceived need for a European 
anchorage, in spite of remaining national divisions.  
10.  Conclusions 
10.1  The EU as a multifaceted foreign policy actor 
The EU, as an international player, can act and has acted in a variety of 
different ways in world politics. Without excessively forcing our matrix of 
options, we have been able to find and fit one case per each of the eight 
possible categories. In cases such as the eastern enlargement and policies 
towards neighbouring Belarus, the EU has pursued normative goals 
through policy instruments that were crafted and deployed within the 
confines of the law. Yet while the EU succeeded in engendering 
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double-track strategy has, to date, failed to alter the nature and strength of 
the authoritarian Belarus regime. The Belarus leadership has not reacted 
positively to sanctions, while EU actors recognise that they have been 
unable to convey effectively their message of support to the Belarusian 
population.  
By contrast, in the case of Russia and Syria, the EU has behaved in an 
overall realpolitik manner. Vis-à-vis Russia, commercial and energy interests 
explain the sidetracking of EU political pressure on Moscow exerted 
through dialogue (let alone conditionality). Likewise in Syria, realist 
concerns, such as preserving the regional balance of power between Israel 
and its neighbours and following the line set by the US, have had a larger 
sway over EU policies than aims to see political transformation and a law-
based agreement with Israel. In turn, the deployment of EU policy means 
has been rather inconsistent, ranging from unkept promises of ratifying 
Syria’s AA, to sporadic pressure on the regime (i.e. regarding Lebanon) 
without constant attention to Syria’s human rights record.  
In Kosovo and Israel-Palestine, the EU has behaved as an 
imperialistic actor. While intervening in the pursuit of normative goals (i.e. 
a two-state solution and respect for human rights in the Middle East; and 
the prevention and rectification of injustice in Kosovo), the EU has often 
acted by sidelining the law. Yet results have differed. While Kosovo 
remains an unfinished story, the likelihood is that a solution will be 
reached recognising independence, possibly leading to a revisionist setting 
of ‘new norms’. In the Middle East, by contrast, a viable two-state solution 
appears to be an increasingly distant chimera (Annapolis notwithstanding), 
while violations of human rights and international law persist unabated.  
Finally, the EU has acted as a status quo player in North Africa and 
Ukraine. In both cases, the Union has primarily pursued non-normative 
goals. In North Africa, not only has the EU prioritised its trade interests 
over the promotion of political reform, but it has done so in a manner 
beneficial to itself while detrimental to growth and modernisation of the 
dependent North African economies. In Ukraine instead, while favouring 
Kiev’s European orientation and its reform process in principle, normative 
EU aims have been hollowed-out by the resistance of several member states 
to grant Ukraine a European perspective, not least out of fear an eventual 
dilution of their internal power. In both cases, however, the means pursued 
by the EU have been normative. Relations have been conducted through 
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ENP. Given that the EU has been on the stronger side of these contractual 
ties, Brussels has ensured that the pursuit of its possession goals has been 
channelled through clear and transparent legal rules. The results have 
differed however. In North Africa, EU involvement has not opened the 
way to a deep process of political and economic transformation, while in 
Ukraine, despite widespread feelings of deception from the EU and 
ongoing political instability and corruption, the post-revolution period has 
seen the consolidation of democracy.  
10.2  The dynamics at work in EU foreign policy 
But what do these cases tell us about the EU as a (normative) foreign policy 
actor? And more precisely which are the factors determining how and why 
the EU acts in specific ways in different cases? By taking our eight cases 
studies together, several broad lessons can be brought to the fore.  
Beginning with the goals pursued, we can contrast the normative and 
imperialistic cases, in which the EU opts for normative goals, with the 
realpolitik and the status quo cases, in which non-normative objectives 
prevail. Analysing the conditioning factors in these cases, it emerges that in 
the former two either milieu and possession goals overlap or there are no 
strong and contradictory possession goals working against the pursuit of 
norms. Whereas in the case of Belarus, the EU is able to pursue its (limited) 
trade interests alongside its democracy-driven sanctions, in the case of 
Eastern Europe, once the member states converged on the idea of ‘reuniting 
Europe’, they could not afford to accept blatant violations of norms, in so 
far as these could ultimately threaten the EU from within. In this respect, 
enlargement policy can be seen as a special case precisely because it is not, 
strictu senso, foreign policy. Likewise in the two imperialistic cases, after 
decades (in the Middle East) or years (in Kosovo) of standstill, the member 
states converged at the level of rhetoric, to pursue normative objectives 
consisting in a rights-based, two-state solution in both Israel-Palestine and 
Serbia-Kosovo. In both cases, discursively agreeing on normative goals has 
been the least controversial and divisive option for the EU. In the realpolitik 
and status quo cases, instead, the configuration of internal interests and 
intra-EU divisions has been far more pronounced, leading to a 
prioritisation of possession goals. On the one hand, strong and competing 
possession goals such as energy (Russia), the balance of power in the 
Middle East and transatlantic cooperation (Syria), commercial interests, the 
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their internal power (Ukraine) have trumped competing normative 
objectives. On the other hand, the primary concern of several member 
states to pursue their disjointed self-interests at the expense of EU-wide 
objectives and member state ability in EU foreign policy to veto collective 
action explains the prioritisation of possession goals in these cases.  
Turning to the means, here normative behaviour can be found in the 
normative and the status quo case studies, in contrast to the realpolitik and 
imperialistic cases, in which the EU has acted in contravention of or 
sidelined law and multilateral institutions. The primary, albeit not only, 
explanation of why this has been the case seems to lie in the EU’s internal 
capability, although in a manner that partly contradicts the intuitive 
consensus about EU foreign policy. The problem in fact does not seem to lie 
in the EU’s insufficient capabilities, particularly in the military domain. 
Normative means tend to be deployed when the EU chooses to act within 
the confines of its contractual relations with third states and has no or 
limited coercive instruments at its disposal. Indeed, normative means have 
been deployed in cases where the primary vehicles of EU policy have been 
contractual relations, whether the accession process (Eastern Europe), the 
association process (North Africa), the Partnership and Cooperation 
process (Belarus) or the ENP (Ukraine). By contrast, whereas the EU has 
disposed of contractual options in the realpolitik and imperialistic cases, it 
has either chosen not to make use of these instruments (Syria) or it has 
pursued its objectives beyond the blueprint and stated aims of these 
contracts (Russia, Kosovo and Israel-Palestine). Of course, in some cases, 
the EU has been strongly pressed by external actors and factors to sideline 
rules and law. In the Middle East, the US has induced the Union to either 
avoid concluding a contractual agreement (Syria) or set aside or to violate 
the norms, rules and laws embedded in these agreements (Israel-Palestine). 
In the other cases, Russia’s new assertiveness has either obstructed 
international legal channels (Kosovo) or cornered the Union into sidelining 
the human rights and democracy standards spelt out in its bilateral 
agreements with Moscow.   
Yet while important in defining or constraining foreign policy means, 
the external environment is critical in influencing above all the EU’s foreign 
policy impact. Naturally, what the EU does is the primary determinant of 
its impact. Hence, it is far more likely that the Union will have a normative 
impact when it pursues normative goals and means (Eastern Europe) than 
when it acts in an imperialistic, realpolitik or status quo way. But on the one 
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the other hand the cases of Syria, Ukraine and Kosovo suggest that the EU 
can have a normative impact even when either its goals or policy means are 
not normative.  
Especially in these non-intuitive cases, the role of the external 
environment is of the essence. A conducive external context is of primary 
importance for an effective normative impact. In Syria, Damascus’ isolation 
by the West and its many internal weaknesses explain in part why, to some 
extent, the Ba’ath regime has abided by international norms. Furthermore, 
the EU is Syria’s first trading partner and is viewed as a less aggressive 
actor than the US. Hence, against all odds, Damascus strives to keep a door 
open to Brussels. In Kosovo, despite Russian resistance, the West has the 
power to assert the end-game even if in contravention of international law. 
In Ukraine, paradoxically it is the nearby influence of Moscow that has 
induced pro-reform actors in Kiev to latch on to the EU irrespective of what 
the Union says and does. In the case of Eastern Europe instead, to bolster 
the effectiveness of normative EU goals and means has been these 
countries’ welcoming of the EU’s involvement coupled with the 
complementary support of other international actors, e.g. the US and the 
international financial institutions (IFIs). 
By contrast, however, an unfavourable external environment, 
coupled with EU weakness vis-à-vis third states or the wider milieu, 
reduces the likelihood of a normative impact. In Belarus, in the absence of 
free media, the Belarus leadership has divulgated its own vision of reality, 
hardened its stance and instumentalised Western pressure to induce a ‘rally 
around the flag’ effect. Belarus’ relatively stable economic situation and its 
geopolitical anchorage to Russia have also made the country less 
dependent upon Europe. In Russia, the discovery of energy leverage and 
an accompanying political assertiveness on the international scene have 
contributed to undermining the effectiveness of the EU’s normative 
message and allowed Moscow to play member state interests against each 
other. In the Middle East, the EU’s acceptance of playing second fiddle to 
the US, its preoccupation of maintaining close ties with Israel and the hold 
that Israel itself has on the EU have all induced the Union to strive for a 
modicum of stability in the region short of seeking peace and respecting 
rights. Finally in North Africa, whereas the EU has sufficiently strong 
bargaining power vis-à-vis these countries, the resilience of these regimes 
has reduced the prospect that the EU’s (secondary) normative goals will 
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10.3  Transforming the EU into a normative power in the world 
The discussion on means and impact points to a conundrum. On the one 
hand, the EU is more likely to pursue normative means when power 
relations between the EU and a third state are relatively balanced and 
relations develop within the confines of mutually negotiated agreements. 
On the other hand, power and particularly relational power seems to be of 
critical importance to engendering a normative impact given that even the 
best of intentions may be an insufficient condition of success (Belarus). 
How can the EU escape this conundrum and maximise its chances of acting 
as a ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2002), as it repeatedly proclaims is its 
role in the world?  
In so far as the EU and its member states do not live, at least not 
always, on Kagan’s Venus (Kagan, 2003), but rather are also driven by 
possession goals just like any other international actor, there is little point 
in naively asserting that the EU should sideline its possession goals in the 
name of its proclaimed milieu norms. Desirable as it may be, simply calling 
for this to happen will not change the dynamics at work. Neither can the 
EU single-handedly affect the external environment in which its foreign 
policies unfold. While it can certainly influence the external context, 
particularly in its neighbourhood where it has real foreign policy presence, 
it is bound to also rely on fortuitous external circumstances to effectively 
assert its normative power.    
One suggestion is to improve the EU’s internal capabilities. This 
would not necessarily mean strengthening capabilities in the classic sense 
of the term such as for example acquiring greater economic leverage or 
building military means. Strengthening capabilities in these terms could, by 
contrast, damage the EU’s normative role by generating internal EU 
incentives to bend the law in order to pursue foreign policy goals in the 
interests of the EU or its member states. Instead, the Union could 
strengthen its web of contractual relations with third states in a manner 
that would ‘tie its own hands’, thus reducing its ability to act non-
normatively. This would entail developing further the set of rules and laws 
that bind EU external behaviour in relation to third states, and link these 
rules and norms explicitly to the obligations set under international law. It 
would also entail establishing or strengthening the EU’s internal 
institutional watchdog mechanisms, ensuring that when one EU actor 
behaves or is tempted to behave in contravention of set rules, others are 
ready and able to prevent this from happening. Understanding the 72 | NATHALIE TOCCI ET AL. 
 
importance of working in this direction is predicated upon an appreciation 
that the EU is not necessarily normative and that its internal actors are 
often driven by the very same set of interests and priorities that motivate 
other international actors. A shift in this direction would also substantiate 
claims that the EU’s sui generis nature reflects a truly novel identity as a 
normative actor in world politics.  
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3.  THE UNITED STATES: 
A NORMATIVE POWER? 
DANIEL S. HAMILTON* 
o what degree can the US be considered a normative power? The US foreign 
policy mainstream tends to reflect a varying blend of normative and 
hegemonic approaches. The US has been and continues to be simultaneously 
a guardian of international norms; a norm entrepreneur challenging prevailing 
norms as insufficient; a norm externaliser when it tries to advance norms for others 
that it is reluctant to apply to itself; and a norm blocker when it comes to issues 
that may threaten its position, or that exacerbate divisions among conflicting 
currents of American domestic thought. On balance (and despite exceptions), the 
US has sought to manage this normative-hegemonic interplay by accepting some 
limits on its power in exchange for greater legitimacy and acceptance of its 
leadership by others. The unresolved question today is whether the US and other 
key players are prepared to stick with this bargain. Closer examination of the US 
case also raises a considerable number of questions about the notion of the EU as a 
‘normative power’. 
 
Introduction 
Is the US a normative power? How does it act, what does it seek to achieve 
and what are the conditioning factors determining or guiding its actions? 
To what extent is the normative nature of US foreign policy due to the 
nature of its society and to what extent is it due to the status and role of the 
US within the international system? 
                                                      
* Daniel S. Hamilton is the Richard von Weizsäcker Professor and Director of the 
Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 
International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C. 
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To facilitate the comparisons intended by this project, I have aligned 
myself with the general approach outlined by Nathalie Tocci in chapter 1. 
After presenting a number of case studies, I come to a conclusion similar to 
that reached by the other contributors to this volume: if by a normative 
foreign policy we mean pursuing normative goals through normatively 
deployed instruments and having a discernible normative impact, then one 
can conclude, perhaps inevitably, that the US is not always a normative 
international actor. The eight case studies underscore how the US has at 
times been a norm entrepreneur and at other times a norm blocker; it has 
acted with the coldest calculations of realpolitik, behaved more as a 
hegemon but at times also as an imperial power, and has been content with 
the status quo. It has had successes and failures.  
In and of themselves, however, the case studies tell us little about 
where the centre of gravity lies in US foreign policy, or which of these 
stylised foreign policy types best characterises the US role in the world. For 
that reason I have supplemented each case study with various other 
examples of normative, imperial/hegemonic, realpolitik o r  s t a t u s  q u o  
policies. Throughout the process, however, I have found myself confronted 
with some troubling or incomplete aspects of the notion of ‘normative’ 
power as well as the overall framework. Thus some preliminary comments 
on the theme itself seem to be in order. 
1.  Normative power? 
In her introductory essay, Nathalie Tocci sets a high bar for considering any 
country to be a normative power. “A normative foreign policy”, she states, 
“would pursue normative goals through normatively deployed means and 
it would be effective in fulfilling its normative intent”. If this is the test, 
then the United States is not a normative power. Neither is the EU. In fact, 
no nation on earth could pass this test with any consistency.  
On its own, the label ‘normative power’ is too categorical, too one-
dimensional and too static to capture the complex and dynamic nature of 
any country’s foreign policy. Nations employ a variety of instruments to 
advance a range of foreign policy goals, and both instruments and goals 
change over time. The issue is really less whether a nation is a ‘normative 78 | DANIEL S. HAMILTON 
 
power’, but the degree to which it is one.9 This requires a framework that 
establishes some weighting, or illuminates some relationship, between 
normative ends and means and other interests and instruments of a 
nation’s foreign policy, both in particular circumstances and over time. As 
Tocci states, the challenge is to identify under what conditions and 
circumstances an international player seeks normative goals through 
normative means, and achieves normative results, as opposed to other 
types of ends, means, and outcomes. 
A related question is what we mean by norms. Norms are generally 
understood as standards of appropriate behaviour. ‘Appropriate’, of 
course, is subjective. Who sets the standard? For Stephen Krasner (1983, p. 
2), appropriate behaviour should be measured in terms of “rights and 
obligations” toward others. For Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 
appropriate behaviour is determined from within, by “actors with a given 
identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Finnemore, 1996, p. 22; Katzenstein, 
1996, p.5; Simon & Martini, 2005, p. 2). Krasner highlights external factors; 
Finnemore and Sikkink underscore internal influences. Each aspect is 
important as we examine to what degree the United States is a normative 
power. 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s reference to constitutive norms that create 
identity or define interests is relevant to the literature on EU foreign policy 
and ‘normative power EU’, which underscore the importance of norms as 
an instrument in identity politics. Ian Manners posits that the EU’s 
allegedly ‘normative’ role in foreign policy can be explained in part by the 
sui generis nature of the EU itself. What the EU is, he contends,  is the 
principal explanation for what it does beyond its borders (Manners, 2002; 
Whitman, 1998). In his own paper for this project, Brantley Womack 
underscores the need to understand a nation's own norms in order to assess 
the extent to which that nation could be considered a normative foreign 
policy actor. “Understanding China in its own terms as an intentional 
actor”, Womack (2008, p. 1) states, “would be a prerequisite to 
understanding China as a normative foreign policy actor.” 
This is true for the United States as well. To understand the degree to 
which the US may be considered a normative power, one must seek to 
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understand how it understands its own norms. To understand what the US 
does, one needs to understand something of what America is – the nature of 
American society and the various and often conflicting domestic currents 
that drive US foreign policy. Before turning to specific case studies, 
therefore, I offer below some background on the domestic roots of foreign 
policy. 
The external dimension deserves additional comment as well. 
Krasner’s approach and Tocci’s introductory framework focus more on 
regulative norms that order or constrain behaviour. This leads us to 
consider international law as a common ‘normative boundary’ and 
standard for our comparative case studies. Yet the normative boundaries of 
international law can be quite blurred. International law offers no clear or 
easy normative guide, for example, when it comes to trade-offs between 
national sovereignty and respect for human rights. Today, when the 
world’s most lethal conflicts take place within states rather than between 
them, the claim of national sovereignty can be – and is – invoked as a 
normative barrier shielding massive violations of human rights. Womack 
also questions Tocci’s reduction of what is ‘normative’ to the benchmark of 
international law, and cites instances when international law has been 
wielded by the strong against the weak in clear violation of what might 
generally be considered ‘appropriate behaviour’. 
In short, established norms can be difficult to change, especially as 
they become institutionalised in formal organisations or enshrined in law. 
And yet they may fail to deal with new or other normative challenges, or 
may themselves pose trade-offs between different norms. The dramatic 
structural upheaval of the post-cold war period has posed significant 
challenges to such fundamental norms as state sovereignty, non-
intervention, the legitimate use of force and multilateralism, which have 
underpinned the international institutional order since World War II (Job, 
2006, p. 56). The Iraq crisis exposed a number of structural and normative 
challenges to the notion of a UN-centred world order. Some of these 
challenges, it seems, can be resolved only with institutional reform. Other 
challenges may be resolved through the reinforcement or re-articulation of 
existing norms, or by the creation of new ones (Thakur & Sidhu, 2006, pp. 
520-521). 
In this context, Finnemore and Sikkink refer to the ‘life cycle’ of 
norms and discuss the role of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ and ‘norm blockers’ in 
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evolving through a ‘life cycle’ of three stages. In the norm emergence stage, 
norm entrepreneurs attempt to convince others to follow their desired 
norm. In the norm cascade stage, the ‘norm leaders’ – those who have 
accepted the norm – attempt to socialize others to accept the norm and 
become ‘norm followers’. Some budding norms may fail in either the 
emergence or cascade stages, if the entrepreneurs or norm leaders are 
unable to convince enough states to follow them. Norms that pass through 
the first two stages reach the norm internalisation stage, by the end of 
which “norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a 
matter of broad public debate” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 895-905).  
Norm entrepreneurs are early catalysts who create the initial 
momentum behind consideration of new norms. Norm blockers contest 
and resist new norms, rather than create and support them. They challenge 
the new ‘framings’ advanced by norm entrepreneurs, using a logic that 
reaffirms the need and desirability to adhere to more deeply embedded 
norms. For norm entrepreneurs to succeed in their effort to win wide 
support and perhaps even institutionalization of new norms, they must 
also engage the holdouts, or norm blockers, who continue to reject their 
relevance or ‘appropriateness’. If the norm entrepreneurs succeed, the 
second step is to define and then enforce adherence to such new norms 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Job, 2006).10  
When it comes to considering the United States (as well as the EU 
and other actors), the notions of normative life cycles, norm entrepreneurs 
and norm blockers seem more apt descriptions than the sweeping, one-
dimensional, static designation of ‘normative power’.11 The term 
“normative power” relates to being rather than acting, what it is rather 
than what it does, whereas norm entrepreneur suggests more what 
Manners describes – that the EU, on occasion and on certain issues, has 
sought to advance new norms.  
                                                      
10 For the difficulties in this ‘second stage’, particularly for the EU, see Katzenstein 
(2006). For the role of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in the campaign against terrorism, see 
Simon & Martini (2005). For issues involved in the UN as ‘norm entrepreneur’, see 
Månsson (2002). 
11 This role is not exclusive to the US or the EU, of course; other countries have 
played such a role at certain times. It is not even limited to states, since non-state 
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A further distinction of relevance to the US is that between norm 
entrepreneurs who seek to establish and apply particular norms to all 
actors, including themselves, throughout the international system, and 
what may be called ‘norm externalisers’, i.e. actors that seek to advance 
new norms for others but not for themselves. 
Zaki Laïdi (Laïdi, 2007, for instance, suggests that normative power 
refers to the capacity to produce and put in place a global framework of 
norms that applies to all, including the most powerful. Therefore, when 
considering the degree to which the US is a normative power, it is 
important to examine the extent to which the US has felt bound to the rules 
or norms it has sought to implement, or under what circumstances it has 
acted to exempt itself from the very frameworks it has helped to establish.  
Ian Manners is careful not to exclude the use of military force or 
economic sanctions from his definition of ‘normative power’. This is 
particularly important, because the role of coercive and non-coercive means 
in advancing particular norms is critical when examining the role of the 
United States. Is the US more easily able to be a normative power because it 
has the means to set and enforce norms? Is it less of a normative power 
because it has the means to avoid adhering to such norms? 
Tocci mentions “inaction” as an important element in any 
consideration of normative power, but the framework with which we have 
been asked to work emphasises action over inaction. Failure to act in 
defence of widely-shared norms, however, must also be included. For 
instance, shouldn’t the failure of the US, the EU and other major powers to 
act in the face of genocide in Rwanda be considered as part of the discourse 
on normative power? 
Finally, upon closer inspection it seems as if the normative-realpolitik 
categories offer more of a continuum than the imperial-status quo 
categories. The first two have to do with underlying notions of ideals and 
interests; the second two reflect more how actors relate to relative power. 
For nations with less relative power, the imperial option is not available 
while the status quo option facilitates free-riding. Nations that possess 
what might be called systemic power, on the other hand, face tougher 
choices: Do they use such power to change prevailing norms (what Tocci 
would label imperial), or do they use such power primarily to preserve the 
status quo? Was the American-led post-war order normative, imperial or 
something else? This schematic also seems to ignore the issue posed by 
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revolutionary, i.e. whether to turn over the apple cart of the prevailing 
system altogether, either for normative or realpolitik reasons.  
In short, in the idealised world of the four paradigms, the mutually 
exclusive nature of each paradigm seems to break down along the 
normative/realpolitik and imperial/status quo lines. Can’t a normative 
actor prefer the status quo? Can’t a realpolitik actor also act imperially?  
The assumption inherent in this framework is that normative 
influence can be measured by such metrics of international law as the 
number of new treaties signed. Yet that begs questions of effective 
implementation and the degree to which new norms are internalised within 
nations. The EU is particularly bad in this area; a cursory review of EU 
agreements indicates that implementation lags woefully across member 
states.  
Some of the literature on normative power is troubling in this regard, 
because it tends to focus on the number of states signing up behind a 
particular norm rather than how many states actively change their 
behaviour as a result of the norm becoming accepted. Finnemore & Sikkink 
(1998), Adriana Lins de Albuquerque (2007), Suzanne Katzenstein (2006) 
and others, however, make the case that the only way to measure the 
influence of norms is to examine whether they cause states to act differently 
than they would in the absence of the norm, i.e. whether the government or 
population of a country actually internalises the norm over time. 
I draw on these various points in the following three sections. I begin 
with the domestic roots of US foreign policy, and how the struggles 
between competing conceptions of America’s role in the world affect 
consideration of the United States as a normative actor. The next section 
offers specific cases of US foreign policy within the framework suggested 
by Nathalie Tocci. The final section summarises and offers some final 
conclusions. 
2.  Domestic Currents and US Foreign Policy 
The US is a perplexing case. On the one hand, norms and values permeate 
US foreign policy declarations and documents. The very founding of the 
Republic in the 18th century was grounded and justified by normative 
assertions and universal values. In the 20th century, the US was arguably 
the world’s greatest champion of multilateral rules and institutions, and a 
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country has advanced such far-reaching and elaborate ideas about how 
rules and multilateral institutions might be established to manage 
international relations.  
This was particularly true in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
Ramesh Thakur and Weheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (2006, p. 5) comment:  
After World War II, Washington was the chief architect of the 
normative structure of world order based on the international rule of 
law. There was, alongside this, deep and widespread confidence in 
the United States as a fundamentally trustworthy, balanced and 
responsible custodian of world order, albeit with occasional lapses 
and eccentricities.  
Samuel Huntington (1999, pp. 35-38) added this in 1999: 
In a fashion and to an extent that is unique in the history of 
Great Powers, the United States defines its strength – indeed its very 
greatness – not in terms of its ability to achieve or maintain 
dominance over others, but in terms of its ability to work with others 
in the interests of the international community as a whole. 
On the other hand, the US has also consistently resisted entangling 
itself in institutional commitments and obligations.  It has been reluctant to 
tie itself too tightly to the normative standards and principles it has 
championed for others. It has used military force on a fairly regular basis, 
and has intervened overtly and covertly across borders on a range of issues. 
Eliot Cohen (Cohen, 2005, p. 16) highlights this apparent dichotomy in 
American attitudes and actions:  
The Woodrow Wilson who proclaimed the ideal of open 
covenants openly arrived at sent the US Marines to Veracruz and 
presided over a naval build-up designed to displace the Royal Navy 
as the arbiter of international order; and the Richard Nixon who, more 
than most 20th-century presidents, saw the world in the pale grey light 
of realpolitik spoke the language of both arms control and human 
rights.  
The 2003 US invasion of Iraq exposed these contradictory impulses 
perhaps as never before. Robert Tucker and David C. Hendrickson (2004, p. 
32) sum it up:  
World opinion now sees the United States increasingly as an 
outlier – invoking international law when convenient, and ignoring it 
when not; using international institutions when they work to its 
advantage, and disdaining them when they pose obstacles to US 
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How can we account for these contradictory impulses? Robert E. 
Osgood captured this quandary in his seminal book Ideals and Self-Interest 
in America's Foreign Relations, which discusses how the United States has 
always struggled with the tension between the ideals at the core of the 
American Republic and the realities imposed by a harsh world.12 The 
United States is not alone in facing such dilemmas, of course, but the 
peculiar origins of the American Republic, together with its current power, 
render them particularly acute.  
Unfortunately, much standard analysis, which tends to classify US 
foreign policy debates as those between realists and idealists, hawks and 
doves, unilateralists and multilateralists, or isolationists and 
interventionists, does not adequately address the points raised above, 
particularly the domestic forces that often drive foreign policy, and is 
unlikely to help us get to the core of the issue: whether, or to what degree, 
the US might be considered a ‘normative power’.  
Moreover, examining US foreign policy through these lenses often 
leads to distorted or misleading interpretations, which engenders 
sympathy with those foreign observers who are often baffled by the swings 
and contradictions in US foreign policy. Particularly for our exercise it is 
important to understand that there are many different political traditions in 
the US that reflect divergent and often competing ideas of how the US 
should relate to the rest of the world. Therefore, before examining the 
various case studies and typologies set forth by Nathalie Tocci, I believe it 
useful to look at the question of the US as a normative power by reviewing 
a framework developed by Walter Russell Mead, derived from work by 
historian David Hackett Fischer (1989).13 
According to Mead (2002, p. xvii), 
                                                      
12 Osgood (1953) offers another way of thinking about the distinction Arnold 
Wolfers makes between milieu goals and possession goals. See Wolfers (1962, pp. 
67-80). 
13 Throughout this section I draw closely on Mead, to whom I am indebted. While 
Mead’s basic framework is particularly useful for this exercise, he is not alone in 
arguing that different traditions compete for the privilege of directing American 
foreign policy. For other perspectives of differing American approaches, see 
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Americans through the centuries seem to have four basic ways 
of looking at foreign policy, which have contrasting and sometimes 
complementary ways of looking at domestic policy as well. 
Hamiltonians regard a strong alliance between the national 
government and big business as the key both to domestic stability and 
to effective action abroad, and they have long focused on the nation’s 
need to be integrated into the global economy on favorable terms. 
Wilsonians believe that the United States has both a moral obligation 
and an important national interest in spreading American democratic 
and social values throughout the world, creating a peaceful 
international community that accepts the rule of law. Jeffersonians hold 
that American foreign policy should be less concerned about 
spreading democracy abroad than about safeguarding it at home; they 
have historically been skeptical about Hamiltonian and Wilsonian 
policies that involve the United States with unsavory allies abroad or 
that increase the risks of war. Finally a large populist school I call 
Jacksonian believes that the most important goal of the US government 
in both foreign and domestic policy should be the physical security 
and the economic well-being of the American people. 
Mead names his schools after leading figures in American history. He 
does not seek to ‘prove’ from documents or declarations that these schools 
have existed throughout US history, nor does he argue that these schools 
coincide with particular political parties. He is not attempting to build a 
theory of state action or foreign relations, and the general nature of his 
categories is certain to be criticised by historians and political scientists 
alike. But for the purposes of our exercise, his approach can help us think 
more clearly about the domestic sources of American conduct abroad, and 
in turn about the question of the US as a ‘normative power’.14  
As we shall see, the similarities and differences between these 
approaches do not allow us to align them along either a simple 
conservative-liberal or isolationist-internationalist spectrum. They also 
allow us to illuminate the often-bitter debates within the Democratic and 
Republican parties. In the following I draw on a variety of sources to 
                                                      
14 According to Mead, “the four schools are definite and distinct entities, but they 
change over time, they mix and blur, and most important, they are part of a 
political history of ideas. They are movements and communities of interest and 
feeling rather than abstract principles. They are churches rather than creeds”. 
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explain and contrast these different approaches, but in general stick to 
Mead’s framework.  
2.1  Wilsonians 
Wilsonianism is grounded in two basic notions. The first is that 
democracies are more likely than others to develop fair and effective legal 
systems, and thus make better and more reliable partners than monarchies 
or autocracies. The domestic character of countries is a major determinant 
of national behaviour and hence, world peace. The second premise is that 
the United States is a nation set apart by its values and principles from the 
rest of the world, and thus has both a moral duty and a practical need to 
spread democracy to the ends of the earth. 
Wilson believed strongly that the “force of America is the force of 
moral principle” and that the “idea of America is to serve humanity”. Long 
before he became president, Wilson wrote of his conviction that the United 
States had a “plain destiny [to] serve [rather than] subdue the world”. 
Later, as president, he would contend that this destiny to serve was the 
only possible motivation for American actions in the world.  
The Wilsonian belief that the cause of peace can and should be 
advanced through the spread of democratic values and institutions leads 
them to interventionist policies, reflected in Wilson’s famous statement:  
We are glad…to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world 
and for the liberation of its peoples…for the rights of nations great 
and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of 
life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its 
peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political 
liberty.15 
Wilson was not averse to using force to advance his vision. To help 
other peoples become, in his opinion, more democratic and orderly, Wilson 
sent American troops twice into Mexico, to Haiti, the Dominican Republic 
and Cuba, and maintained US military ‘protection’ of Nicaragua. He also 
intervened militarily twice in the Russian civil war. Wilson best expressed 
his attitude toward such interventions in 1914: “[T]hey say the Mexicans 
are not fitted for self-government and to this I reply that, when properly 
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directed, there is no people not fitted for self-government.” When Wilson 
finally made the decision to enter World War I in April 1917, he again 
justified his action in highly idealistic terms that enabled the American 
people to come to regard the war as a crusade to “make the world safe for 
democracy.” 
While Wilsonians have not hesitated to advance normative goals 
through non-normative means, one can point to at least three broad areas 
in which Wilsonian tradition has led the US to act as a normative power.  
First, Wilsonians look – with some justice – to the development and 
expansion of a democratic Atlantic community as vindication of their 
approach. In this cause they aligned with the Hamiltonian school, 
described below. Second, Wilsonians have been determined opponents of 
colonialism. This is a chequered history, of course, but in many instances 
US determination to advance decolonisation against some of its closest 
allies aligned the US with the rise to independence and development of 
growing portions of the non-European world.  Third, the Wilsonian 
tradition has been a leading force in international efforts to prevent war, 
including through codes of conduct and arms control; and in efforts to 
develop alternatives to war, for instance through the development of 
arbitration treaties and of international organisations for collective security 
such as the League of Nations, the World Court and the United Nations. 
Much leadership in these areas has been European, but American 
Wilsonians have participated and often been successful in securing US 
government support for these and other initiatives, driven by their 
conviction that multilateral organisations and international regimes can 
extend such bedrock American values as respect for the rule of law, due 
process and human rights.16  
Of course, the US does not always conduct its foreign policy along 
Wilsonian lines. Sometimes other currents have subverted Wilsonian 
                                                      
16 For non-US affirmation of this role, see Thakur & Sidhu (2006, p. 8). Henry 
Kissinger, realist par excellence, once noted with some personal chagrin that, “[I]t is 
above all to the drumbeat of Wilsonian idealism that American foreign policy has 
marched since his watershed presidency, and continues to march to this day…. 
Wilson’s historic achievement lies in his recognition that Americans cannot sustain 
major international obligations that are not justified by their moral faith.” See 
Kissinger (1994, pp. 30 and 50). 88 | DANIEL S. HAMILTON 
 
efforts; at other times they have amplified them. This can lead the US to 
appear as a world-class hypocrite. “Wilsonians proclaim noble principles 
and sincerely plan to apply them”, Mead (2002, p. 171) notes, “but then, 
alas, they sometimes lose policy battles. The Clinton administration 
extended most favoured nation status to China despite the country’s un-
Wilsonian approach to human rights. The United States fell far behind in its 
UN dues, despite the fervent lobbying of its Wilsonian friends.” 
In short, the Wilsonian tradition has employed both normative and 
non-normative means to advance what its adherents consider to be 
quintessentially normative goals, and with highly uneven results. As Mead 
(2002, p. 38) notes, there is much in the Wilsonian school that makes foreign 
and domestic actors uncomfortable, particularly the insistence that “the 
United States has the right and the duty to change the rest of the world’s 
behaviour, and that the United States can and should concern itself not 
only with the way other countries conduct their international affairs, but 
with their domestic policies as well”.17 
Yet US support for the Wilsonian ideal has won tolerance, support 
and sympathy for US influence and power, and has prompted nations and 
progressive elements in many societies to identify with this ideal and to 
seek closer ties with Americans. “How useful it is”, Mead (2002, p. 171) 
concludes, that “so many people around the world see Wilsonian ideals as 
defining the norm of American foreign policy, and interpret its other 
aspects as unfortunate and temporary deviations from it.”18  
2.2  Hamiltonians 
The Hamiltonian school is named for Alexander Hamilton, the nation’s first 
Secretary of the Treasury and a co-author of the Federalist Papers. 
Hamiltonians believe that the United States has a profound interest in 
maintaining a relatively open, international and largely maritime trading 
and financial order. Hamiltonians readily speak of the ‘national interest’ 
and ‘the balance of power’, and while they would fit most readily in the 
‘realist’ category, their motivations and approaches should not be mistaken 
for Continental European realism. Hamiltonians view open international 
                                                      
17 See also Eichenberg (2005, pp. 140-177), Kull (2003) and Drezner (2007).  
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commerce, framed by a predictable world order based on international law, 
as a potential cause of peace. These beliefs have led Hamiltonians to 
champion US efforts to ensure freedom of the seas, freedom of the skies, an 
open door for American goods, open access to supplies of strategic 
materials and an international legal and financial order that permits the 
broadest possible global trade in capital and goods. While some observers 
might relegate such aims to the category of ‘possession goals’, this tradition 
most assuredly considers such objectives as ‘milieu goals’. 
Throughout much of US history, these goals appeared to be protected 
by the British Empire. The collapse of the Empire led Hamiltonians to 
believe it was incumbent upon the United States to replace Great Britain as 
the ‘gyroscope’ of an economically-oriented world order that could 
circumvent the zero-sum problem that condemns purely security-based 
systems to endless bouts of war and revisionism. Hamiltonians did not 
hesitate to build strong military forces and international security alliances 
to protect US interests in the emerging cold war, of course, but equally 
important in their mind was a global economic system resting primarily on 
the free participation of independent states. Together with Wilsonians, they 
set out to create a set of international institutions that would ‘civilise’ 
policies around the world, particularly in Europe. 
The result, John Ikenberry (2004) argues, was an “‘American system’ 
organized around a dense array of rules, institutions, and partnerships 
spread across global and regional security, economic and political realms. It 
has been an order built on ‘liberal hegemonic’ bargains, diffuse reciprocity, 
public goods provision, and an unprecedented array of intergovernmental 
institutions and working relationships.” 
This approach survived the cold war period. George H.W. Bush is a 
classic Hamiltonian. While Bush Senior rejected much of the Wilsonian 
credo as dangerous and illusory, he understood that a more cohesive 
democratic community could advance not only American ideals but also 
American interests. Even before the Berlin Wall fell, Bush argued that the 
West had to move beyond a grand strategy “based on the concept of 
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democracies anchoring international peace and stability, and a dynamic 
free-market system generating prosperity and progress on a global scale”.19  
Bill Clinton picked up the challenge, creating the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Community and advancing most-favoured-nation status for 
China; securing US support for the creation of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO); and ensuring ratification of the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral free trade negotiations and the North Atlantic Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). Although this order has been challenged and 
weakened during the presidency of George W. Bush, it has proved its 
resilience in the face of considerable dispute and largely continues today. 
In this system, interests and norms cannot easily be separated. 
Building up institutions after the Second World War was a projection of 
American norms, but it also safeguarded American interests (Cox, 2003, p. 
9). In Wolfers’ terms, for many decades the milieu goal of an open 
international order coincided in significant ways with the possession goal 
of safeguarding American interests. 
Hamiltonians continue to join with Wilsonians to believe that 
international cooperation is necessary to meet today’s challenges – whether 
it is the fight against terrorists, curtailing weapons proliferation, curbing 
the spread of deadly diseases, or containing global warming. Such 
cooperation, they believe, is more likely to be available and effective if it is 
regularised within an institutional setting and according to agreed rules 
and procedures. While Wilsonians would insist that such cooperation could 
only be sustained with other democracies, Hamiltonians are more willing 
to work on common goals with undemocratic regimes as well, if such 
cooperation is necessary to advance a particular objective. 
The alliance between Hamiltonians and Wilsonians has been a 
powerful force in US foreign policy, but it has not always carried the day. 
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Bill Clinton, who more comfortably fits the Wilsonian creed, made the enlargement 
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At times the two schools have split, and at times two other schools have 
succeeded in blunting Hamiltonian-Wilsonian projects.20  
2.3  Jeffersonians 
This school is named after Thomas Jefferson, 3rd President of the United 
States and principal author of the Declaration of Independence. 
Jeffersonians have often opposed both Hamiltonian and Wilsonian policy 
because they believe the most vital interest of the American people is to 
protect and develop democracy at home. “Like Wilsonians”, says Mead, 
“Jeffersonians believe that the American Revolution continues.” Whereas 
Hamiltonians believe that the United States is a country that once had a 
revolution, Wilsonians and Jeffersonians believe that America remains a 
revolutionary country (Mead, 2002, p. 178). Rather than act on the 
Wilsonians’ almost missionary impulse to promote democratic revolutions 
abroad, however, Jeffersonians believe that America is best suited to be an 
exemplar for others by fulfilling the democratic promise of its revolution at 
home. Jeffersonians are preoccupied with the gap between American 
aspirations and American achievements. They believe that liberty, while 
precious, is fragile, and could be subverted as easily from within as from 
without. They are concerned, in Mead’s words (2002, p. 185), that 
“excessive intervention in the Hobbesian world of international politics 
would corrupt and undermine the Lockean, democratic order that the 
American people had established at home”, and so support a limited 
foreign policy that defines US interests as narrowly as possible. 
Foreign observers may characterise this school as isolationist, but for 
the purposes of this exercise it is important to recognise that this movement 
is not simply a knee-jerk impulse, born out of a sense of US invulnerability, 
but derives rather from a profound concern about the vulnerability of 
American norms and values to the consequences of developments abroad. 
“Whatever America hopes to bring to pass in the world”, Dwight D. 
                                                      
20 Samuel Berger (2004, p. 50) has characterised domestic struggles over foreign 
policy broadly as “a battle fought between liberal internationalists in both parties 
who believe that our strength is usually greatest when we work in concert with 
allies in defense of our shared values and interests, versus those who seem to 
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Eisenhower admonished, “must first come to pass in the heart of 
America.”21  
Jeffersonians do not oppose peaceful commercial relations and 
mutually beneficial interactions with other nations, but they insist that the 
priority of Americans must be to build a model society that others might 
emulate, rather than to invest inordinate energy and resources on imposing 
American ways on nations with different histories and traditions. 
Jeffersonians fear excessive concentration of economic, military or potential 
power domestically as well as internationally. They believe that breathless 
talk of spreading liberty, democracy, freedom of speech, civil rights and 
civil society abroad ignores the daily reality that such principles are 
honoured in the breach by racial segregation or discrimination against 
Americans and others at home. They embrace America’s system of checks 
and balances, constitutional restrictions on excessive power and the role of 
the Congress in foreign policy.  
The Jeffersonian tradition is important for our discussion because it 
refutes the premise asserted by Thomas Diez, in his debates with Ian 
Manners about ‘normative power’, that the US lacks a tradition of self-
reflection that Diez considers to be an important component of such power. 
At its core, the Jeffersonian school represents precisely such a tradition, one 
ever on its guard against abuse of power, investigating and often 
controverting claims made by Wilsonian and Hamiltonian activists.  
During the early years following World War II, Jeffersonians fought 
unsuccessfully against Hamiltonian-Wilsonian efforts to build the post-war 
international order. While their influence was muted during the early years 
of the cold war, they enjoyed a certain revival in the wake of Vietnam and 
again after the cold war. Jeffersonians pushed through the War Powers Act 
and the Freedom of Information Act, and have been consistent supporters 
of efforts to subject executive branch intelligence and military agencies to 
constant and rigorous congressional oversight. They have joined with 
Wilsonians to limit arms, and they share Wilsonian abhorrence at US 
activities, such as treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo 
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of the limits of American power, was cautious about excessive concentration of 
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Bay, because they represent Executive branch violations of the cherished 
American principle of rule of law. Jeffersonian opposition to fast-track 
trade authority is often viewed abroad as a sign of isolationalism, 
protectionism or of US efforts to exempt itself from international treaties, 
but this stance more directly reflects Jeffersonian concerns about the 
constitutional integrity of congressional authority over trade and the norms 
of American democracy. 
In short, Jeffersonians are not without influence. In the person of 
Ralph Nader, Jeffersonians arguably torpedoed Al Gore’s bid for the 
Presidency in 2000, and in so doing paved the way for George W. Bush. Yet 
Jeffersonians have been vociferous opponents of the ‘war on terrorism’, 
fearful of its expansive connotations and its impact on civil liberties, and 
wondering, in Michael Ignatieff’s words (2003a), whether via its actions the 
nation “risks losing its soul as a republic”. John Quincy Adams's warning 
of 1821 is emblazoned upon the efforts of present-day Jeffersonians: 
Americans should resist the temptation of going abroad “in search of 
monsters to destroy”, he cautioned, for if America were seduced into 
becoming “the dictatress of the world, she would be no longer the ruler of 
her own spirit.”'22 
2.4  Jacksonians 
The Jacksonian tradition, named for Andrew Jackson, the country’s seventh 
President, represents less an intellectual or political movement than an 
expression of the social, cultural and religious culture of a large portion of 
the American public. Unlike the other schools, which are rooted in a civic 
identity grounded in principles of democracy and the rule of law, 
Jacksonian tradition is rooted in a ‘folkish’ or populist community of 
national experiences – close to what could be termed a national ethnic 
identity, except that Jacksonians, too, have opened to different ethnic, 
religion and other groupings. 
                                                      
22 John Quincy Adams, while Secretary of State under President James Monroe, in 
a speech before the US House of Representatives in honour of Independence Day 
in 1821 (excerpt at http://www.uiowa.edu/~c030162/Common/Handouts/Other/JQ-
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Jacksonians assert that the prime goal of US domestic and foreign 
policy must be the physical security and economic prosperity of the 
American people. They are instinctively democratic and populist, skeptical 
of domestic or foreign ‘do-gooding’ (welfare at home, foreign aid abroad), 
mistrustful of federal authority but supportive of a strong military and 
fond of federal support for the middle class, and deeply attached to the Bill 
of Rights – particularly the Second Amendment and the right to bear arms 
as the ‘citadel of liberty’. (Mead, 2002, p. 225). Jacksonians believe the 
world is and will remain violent and dangerous; Americans must remain 
vigilant and well- armed. Like Jeffersonians, Jacksonians prefer selective or 
limited engagement with the outside world. But when engaged or enraged, 
they are ruthless, and offer no quarter. 
Jacksonians are often obstructionists in foreign policy. Jacksonians led 
by Senator Robert Taft opposed the formation of NATO and the permanent 
deployment of troops to Europe, believing that the US could and should 
have relied on the unilateral exercise of military power to defeat Soviet 
designs. They fought the creation of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund and abhor the UN. They are wary of trade liberalisation 
and economic interdependence, which could imply greater vulnerability 
and loss of economic autonomy. 
Jacksonians are the least likely to support Wilsonian initiatives for a 
better world, have the least regard for international law and practice, are 
least tolerant of Jeffersonian calls for restrictions on US power, and are the 
least willing to support Hamiltonian strategies of balanced engagement. 
For most foreigners continental Jacksonians are the most deplored school. 
As Mead (2002, p. 225) notes, “Jacksonian chairs of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee are the despair of high-minded people everywhere as 
they hold up American adherence to the Kyoto Protocol, starve the UN and 
the IMF, cut foreign aid, and ban the use of American funds for population 
control programs abroad.” Jacksonians readily fit foreign stereotypes of US 
foreign policy as an unhealthy and dangerous mix of ignorance, 
isolationism and ‘cowboy diplomacy’. Jacksonian influence has tended to 
centre in the Congress rather than the Executive branch, but has enjoyed 
considerable influence during the administration of George W. Bush. 
2.5  Assessing the Four Schools 
If one were to characterise recent US presidencies in terms of these four 
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uniformly composed of Hamiltonians; that the Clinton Administration was 
an uneasy blend of liberal Wilsonians, Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians; and 
that the presidency of George W. Bush began as an amalgam of 
Jeffersonians, neo-conservative Wilsonians and Jacksonians. George W. 
Bush came to office proclaiming such Jeffersonian themes as the need for 
‘selective engagement’ and a ‘humble’ foreign policy, but notably excluded 
many Hamiltonians, who were the legacy of his father’s administration – 
people such as Brent Scowcroft and James Baker, who were anathema to 
George Junior. Before the new administration could articulate its particular 
approach to foreign policy, however, the attacks of September 11 
empowered the neo-conservative Wilsonians, enraged the Jacksonians and 
silenced the Jeffersonians, resulting in an historical anomaly – an alliance of 
Wilsonians and Jacksonians. The next US administration is likely to offer a 
different blend of traditions.  
These four schools compete to shape the direction of US foreign 
policy. Each has significant weight in American debates. Each views 
foreign policy primarily as an extension of its domestic political orientation. 
Each has held sway at particular points in American history, but policies 
that have proven to be sustainable have typically needed support from two 
if not three of the schools. They are not neat and tidy categories; there is 
considerable overlap between them. But together they can serve as a 
general guide to help illuminate the sources of American conduct in the 
world.  
Although each of these schools offers a different approach to US 
foreign policy, they are united by a common belief in American 
exceptionalism and the transformative power of America. “From the start”, 
Daniel Bell (1989) notes, “Americans have believed that destiny has marked 
their country as different from others – that the United States is, in 
Lincoln's marvellous phrase, ‘an almost chosen nation’.” Throughout 
American history, exceptionalist belief has framed the discourse of foreign 
policy-making by providing the underlying assumptions and terms of 
reference for foreign policy debate and conduct (Lepgold & McKeown, 
1995).  
What are often interpreted as lusty swings between internationalism 
and isolationism are perhaps better understood as competition and shifting 
alliances among these competing schools over the most appropriate way to 
express their shared belief in American exceptionalism. Thomas Diez and 
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exceptionalism as reason to question whether the US could in fact be 
considered a ‘normative power’ – another element to consider in our case 
studies. 
3.  Case Studies 
With this as a background, let us now examine US foreign policy through 
the categories set forth by Tocci. Since an individual case study cannot 
convey the weight any particular approach may have within broader 
currents of policy, I have also offered in each category other possible 
examples as food for thought.  
Table 1. US case studies 
Normative  Realpolitik  Imperial Status  quo 
Intended Un-
intended 
Intended  Un-
intended 
Intended Un-
intended 
Intended Un-
intended 
Creating the 
WTO 
dispute 
settlement 
mechanism, 
1995-2007 
US 
sanctions 
against 
and 
targeted 
assistance 
to Belarus 
US policy 
towards 
Iraq, 
1980-84 
US 
position 
on the 
Internat’l 
Criminal 
Court, 
2002-07 
US 
invasion of 
Panama, 
1989 
US 
invasion 
and 
occupa-
tion of 
Iraq, 
2003-07 
US policy 
towards 
Taiwan, 
1978-2007 
US and 
South 
Africa, 
1948-90 
 
3.1  Normative Intended: Creating the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism, 1995-2007 
When has the US acted in ways that could be characterised as ‘normative 
intended’, i.e. when has it pursued milieu goals aimed at strengthening 
international legality and institutions in ways that have respected its own 
domestic laws as well as its international legal obligations, and did this 
effort truly have a normative impact and be perceived by its recipients as 
such? This is a tough standard to meet, but one can find a number of cases 
in which US action can be so characterised.  
I have chosen to highlight US leadership in creating the World Trade 
Organisation, particularly its dispute settlement mechanism, in part to 
challenge passing references that consider open commercial activities as a 
possession goal rather than as a milieu goal. When it comes to setting forth 
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paramount. This case also addresses a second important question in the 
debate about normative power, i.e. whether the US is really willing to be 
bound by international law.   
Narrative 
Interest in establishing a predictable open international economic order led 
to US support in 1995 for two related initiatives: a more formal treaty-based 
organisation, the World Trade Organisation, to replace the looser General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) created after World War II; and a 
relatively binding trade dispute settlement mechanism under the new 
multilateral system.  
As the world’s leading economy, the US has an interest in widely 
shared rules and procedures that can underpin a stable, non-discriminatory 
trading order. To ensure the commitment of other governments, the US 
needed to establish its reliability and commit itself to be bound by the same 
rules and obligations. A procedure for settling disputes existed under the 
old GATT, but it had no fixed timetables, rulings were easier to block, and 
many cases dragged on for a long time inconclusively. Frustration with the 
GATT led the US to seek enforceable multilateral rules. The WTO oversees 
about 60 different agreements with the status of international legal texts 
that are binding on its 151 member states. Since the creation of the dispute 
settlement mechanism, the United States has been the most engaged WTO 
member, both bringing cases and complying with cases it has lost.23 
Goals, means and impact  
The goal of the US effort to create the WTO and its dispute settlement 
mechanism was to establish a rules-based, multilateral organisation 
obliging all member nations, including the United States, to conform to 
predictable trading relationships, as outlined in WTO statutes. The means 
consisted of a negotiating effort to replace the loophole-ridden GATT with 
a formal institution under international law. The result requires sustained 
cooperation from member states. While the WTO’s mandate to negotiate 
further liberalisation of trade via the Doha Round continues to be a 
                                                      
23 For further background, see Lawrence (2007), Jackson (1994 and 2006) and Van 
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struggle, the dispute settlement mechanism is respected and continues to 
work as an arbiter of trade disputes, offering an alternative to costly trade 
wars. Without a means of settling disputes, the rules-based system would 
be less effective because the rules could not be enforced. The WTO’s 
procedure underscores the rule of law, affirms the principle that trade must 
be non-discriminatory, and makes the trading system more secure and 
predictable. The WTO not only ensures open markets for the United States, 
it exerts pressure on the US to keep its own market open. When any nation, 
including the United States, is found to have violated WTO statutes, there 
are provisions for redress. While there is room for improvement in 
ensuring compliance, transparency and accessibility, the system has 
worked reasonably well. Despite continuing debates about the WTO in 
many countries, the fact that 151 nations have ratified their membership, 
bring cases to the WTO for resolution and largely comply with its 
judgments must be seen as a significant milieu achievement and as a 
positive contribution to international law and institutions. 
The dispute settlement system has reduced the need for the United 
States or others, including the EU, to resort to unilateral retaliatory 
measures. Since the advent of the dispute settlement system, the United 
States has generally abided by its agreement not to impose unilateral trade 
sanctions against WTO members without WTO authorisation. Moreover, 
the US has respected WTO decisions against it – recent examples include 
US removal of steel tariffs and abandonment of safeguard measures in 
three other areas, all in response to losses at the WTO.  
Conditioning factor: Domestic context 
It is perhaps useful to note that while the US helped to create the WTO as a 
full-fledged international institution, US opposition to a similar status for 
the WTO’s predecessor, the GATT, was the primary reason the post-war 
international trade regime remained relatively weak. In December 1945, at 
US initiative, major trading countries entered into negotiations to conclude 
a multilateral agreement for the reciprocal reduction of tariffs on trade in 
goods. Moreover, the US prompted the UN to adopt a resolution in 
February 1946, to begin efforts to create the charter of an International 
Organisation for Trade (ITO), which was agreed in October 1947. The ITO 
Charter, however, never entered into force. Jeffersonians and Jacksonians 
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economic issues, and in December 1950, President Truman announced that 
he would no longer seek Congressional approval of the ITO Charter.  
Over time, however, the lack of agreed-upon enforcement procedures 
under the GATT generated considerable US frustration. Hamiltonians and 
Wilsonians joined together to advance US support for the dispute 
settlement mechanism, united in the belief that free trade and open markets 
would not just promote economic prosperity, but could promote 
democracy and mitigate bitter conflicts with key trading partners, which 
also happened to be America’s closest allies. According to this view, open 
markets tend to open societies, liberalise politics and integrate and socialise 
nations into a predictable order. To achieve this goal, the US would also 
need to commit itself to the dispute settlement mechanism, and thus its 
possession goals and milieu goals were mutually reinforcing.  
In this second try at a stronger trade regime, neither Jeffersonians nor 
Jacksonians carried enough weight in the Congress or in the Executive to 
challenge the effort. Domestic critics, reflecting both Jacksonian and 
Jeffersonian perspectives, continue to charge that the WTO is an intrusion 
on US sovereignty. Supporters underscore that that in the end, the WTO 
panels have no power to order any member to change its laws, or to impose 
retaliation, but that the US decision to join the WTO and abide by its 
procedures is itself an exercise of sovereignty.  
Conditioning factor: Capabilities 
As we examine the question to what degree the US can be a normative 
actor, a key underlying issue in each of these cases is the relationship 
between norms and power. To what degree are the normative intended 
results due to US power to shape outcomes? Is it necessary to have 
significant capability to set a norm, i.e. can only major powers be normative 
in terms of results? In her introductory essay, Nathalie Tocci (2007) states 
that “our definition of what is normative, rather than being a pure 
expression of power, must undertake the function of ‘taming’ and 
regulating power”. 
As the world’s largest economy and champion of the rules-based 
post-war international economic order, the US clearly possessed significant 
‘shaping power’ to advance this ‘milieu goal’ of establishing the WTO and 
its dispute settlement mechanism. In fact, the US position was enhanced by 
its argument that unless an effective international enforcement procedure 
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remedies against what it deemed to be ‘unfair’ trade practices by other 
countries.24 Yet while US leadership proved essential, it is not evident that 
the final result was engineered by the US to serve its national interests at 
the expense of others. If the WTO was viewed solely as an instrument of US 
power, it is unlikely that 150 other nations would have joined, taking steps 
to secure domestic ratification of their own membership, or that others still 
seek to join. Moreover, the US has been playing by the rules and has agreed 
to be bound by WTO judgments in cases it has lost.25 In all of these senses, 
then, US normative action was able to ‘tame’ and ‘regulate’ power. 
Conditioning factor: External context 
As outlined above, by the 1980s the weaknesses of the GATT had become 
apparent to most trading countries, and there was general consensus on the 
need for an overhaul of the regime. While the US joined with most other 
major trading countries to advance the negotiations leading to the WTO, it 
is perhaps interesting for the purposes of our exercise to note that the initial 
negotiations pitted US advocacy for a strong legal model that stressed 
adjudication against EU and Japanese advocacy for what William J. Davey 
(1993) has termed an “anti-legalistic” model emphasising negotiation and 
consensus. In the end, the EU and Japan apparently persuaded themselves 
that the risk of US unilateral action was a greater danger than a demanding 
international legal system governing trade (Hudec, 1993, p. 237). Here then, 
                                                      
24 Innumerable bilateral conflicts with the European Union over its Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and with Japan over its closed market in the 1970s and 
1980s led the US to pass laws such as Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and the 
Super 301 provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 
which sought to remove ‘unreasonable and unjustifiable’ barriers to US exports by 
threatening unilateral trade sanctions. While these measures met with mixed 
results, they did help convince other countries of the merits of establishing a more 
effective system at the WTO (see Lawrence, 2007). 
25 While Beth Simmons cautions that even though “much international behavior is 
consistent with  international law…it has been far more difficult…to show any 
causal link between legal commitments and behavior”. An investigation of 984 US 
antidumping investigations, supplemented by 2,748 potential cases never initiated, 
f r o m  1 9 7 8  t h r o u g h  2 0 0 2 ,  h o w e v e r ,  m a k e s  i t  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  U S  i s  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  
investigate and impose unilateral antidumping duties against members of the 
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w e  f i n d  t h a t  t h e  t h r e a t  o f  U S  u n i l a t e ral action, born of frustration with 
weak or ineffective multilateral arrangements, can in fact galvanise action 
to strengthen rules-based international mechanisms. 
Summary 
How representative are these examples of the US acting as a normative 
power? Other examples certainly could be cited, including the creation of 
the World Bank and the IMF; the Marshall Plan or President Eisenhower’s 
push for the creation of the International Development Association (IDA) 
facility to helping the poorest of nations; the creation of the Peace Corps; 
the formation of APEC, the OAS and NAFTA; the Camp David Agreement; 
brokering the 1998 Ecuador-Peru peace treaty; US support for and active 
engagement in the Stability Pact for the Balkans following the Kosovo 
conflict; creation with others of the Lyon Group, the Financial Action Task 
Force, the Egmont group, and other ‘international non-organisations’ and 
‘name and shame’ activities that support new international norms against 
drug trafficking, human trafficking and terrorist financing; the 1967 Outer 
Space Treaty; creating the Community of Democracies; creation of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative and the Container Security Initiative; and 
the Nunn-Lugar Program to dismantle nuclear weapons and to provide 
assistance to a variety of states, including Russia, in defence conversion, 
export control, housing for demobilised military personnel and 
environmental restoration. The US has ratified a variety of international 
treaties, such as the Genocide Convention (1989), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1992) and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1994). Recent examples 
include creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation to assist the 
poorest nations of the world; the President’s Malaria Initiative; the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative for relief to the world’s poorest, most 
heavily indebted nations; and the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and 
Tuberculosis.  
In addition, the US has been the most active, and most actively 
requested, mediator of international conflicts since 1945 (Touval, 1992; 
Crocker et al., 1999). Moreover, there are various examples of mediation 
efforts by actors other than the US that do not come to closure until the US 
itself engages or demonstrates its support for those mediation efforts. 
Examples include Bosnia, Sudan, Jordan and Mozambique. Bosnia is a 
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‘normative power’. As Richard Holbrooke has commented, it is absurd that 
inter-European squabbling and impotence required America to broker the 
peace agreement for Bosnia, particularly when in 1991 (in echoes of 
‘normative power Europe’) Jacques Poos, the foreign minister of 
Luxembourg, declared: “This is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the 
Americans.” 
Finally, US cases raise the question whether legitimacy derives from 
norms developed by sovereign states, some of which may be odious, or 
from other principles, such as democracy. The first would make the 
imprimatur of the UN the test of legitimacy; the second would argue that 
support from the democratic community is a better test. US proposals 
leading to the creation of the Community of Democracies in the Clinton 
administration, and the current proposal by Republican presidential 
candidate John McCain for a League of Democracies, are examples of this 
normative thrust in US policy. 
In these and many other areas, the US has advanced normative goals 
through normative means with largely normative results. Such efforts on 
the whole have strengthened international law and institutions and 
promoted rights and duties enshrined and specified in international law, 
including the rights and duties of the US itself. They highlight the fact that 
at times the US functions as a ‘norm entrepreneur’.  
Nathalie Tocci and her colleagues have offered EU enlargement as an 
example in this category. Doesn’t the continuing enlargement of NATO 
belong here as well? It strengthens an international institution linked to the 
UN system; it is implemented through a treaty process ratified through 
parliamentary means in the US, all allied states and the accession states; it 
is certainly perceived by the ‘recipients’ of membership as an enhancement 
of their stability and anchoring of their democracy; and it reinforces a 
particular set of norms, such as civilian control of the military, that ground 
European and transatlantic security. It is certainly not perceived as 
normative by Russia. But I would argue not only that it is normative, but 
that it has been critical to the EU’s own ‘normative’ enlargement. More on 
this later.  THE UNITED STATES: A NORMATIVE POWER?| 103 
 
3.2  Normative unintended: US sanctions and targeted assistance 
regarding Belarus 
In her introductory essay, Nathalie Tocci poses a basic question for our 
exercise: under similar conditions, do different international actors opt for 
similar or different foreign policy approaches? More specifically, under 
similar conditions, do the EU and the US act in similar or dissimilar ways? 
In direct response to Tocci’s question, I have chosen to examine the same 
normative unintended case study as was used in the chapter on the EU, 
namely the case of Belarus.26 
Narrative 
Following the election of President Aleksander Lukashenko in 1994, 
Belarus saw a rapid rise in authoritarianism and a subsequent decline in 
democratic freedoms and civil liberties. Under Lukashenko’s rule, political 
repression in Belarus has been rampant: several of Lukashenko’s political 
opponents have disappeared, others have been jailed, and political activists 
and NGOs face constant harassment. Mass gatherings are illegal without 
consent from the government. In response, the US has worked closely with 
the EU to impose an incremental series of sanctions and targeted assistance 
tailored to support democracy for the people of Belarus while punishing 
the regime for its abuses.27 
Goals, means and impact  
The goal of US policy – to support initiatives that have the potential to 
advance democracy and the rule of law in Belarus – is certainly normative. 
The US has also employed normative means to advance this goal. Similar to 
EU efforts, US actions have been consistent, incremental and tailored in 
                                                      
26 As Tocci notes, time is a crucial determinant when considering such cases. For 
instance, the United States never recognised the incorporation of the Baltic states 
into the Soviet Union. This reflected in part principle, in part pressure from Baltic-
American groupings at home, and in part a useful instrument to tweak the Soviets. 
But when the cold war ended, the US found itself, perhaps unexpectedly, on the 
‘right side of history’ on this issue, and capitalised on it to advance Baltic 
integration into the West. What began as a ‘normative unintended’ example 
perhaps became a ‘normative intended’ example.  
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response to events in Belarus. The US and EU have coordinated their 
approaches, and have had the support of other international organisations 
and NGOs. US assistance programmes focus on human rights monitoring 
and education, independent trade unions, democratic political party and 
coalition development, voter education, strengthening civil society, rule of 
law, and electoral reform and monitoring, and has worked closely with EU 
partners in these areas. The US and the EU have also worked to highlight 
the Lukashenko regime’s abuses and to hold authorities accountable who 
are implicated in wrongdoing, for example, by imposing travel restrictions 
and investigating the sources of their assets. US officials are careful to stress 
that these sanctions are aimed at the regime rather than at the people of 
Belarus. US efforts appear to have had little effect, however, in advancing 
the normative goal of greater democracy in Belarus.  
Conditioning factor: Domestic context 
The US has few if any possession goals regarding Belarus; the milieu goal 
of a continent of democracies governed by the rule of law has far higher 
precedence. The issue is remote enough not to stir Jeffersonians or 
Jacksonians. It is marginal to Hamiltonians, and so the field has been left to 
Wilsonian activists. Such activism alone, however, is not sufficient to truly 
drive the US to higher-profile or more energetic activities, despite the 
relative ineffectiveness of current approaches.  
Conditioning factor: Capabilities 
While the US is a major economic power, its capability to affect Belarus 
through economic sanctions is limited because of the limited commercial 
relationship between the two countries and the ability of Belarus to avail 
itself of other channels.  
Conditioning factor: External environment 
As with the EU, the US is unwilling to incur high costs to advance its 
approach to Belarus, particularly in relations with Russia. Moreover, 
Belarus has enjoyed a more beneficial economic and energy relationship 
with Russia than some of Russia’s other neighbours, and so the effects of 
sanctions have been limited.  
Politically, since its independence from the USSR, Belarus has 
retained close political and economi c  t i e s  t o  R u s s i a ,  w i t h  M o s c o w  
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by providing energy and prices far below market rates. This situation 
changed dramatically in 2007, however, when Russia more than doubled 
the amount Belarus must pay for Russian natural gas, and forced Belarus to 
relinquish a 50% stake of its state-owned gas transport company, 
Beltranshaz, to Russia’s state-controlled gas monopoly Gazprom. 
Lukashenko now finds himself under intense pressure from both the West 
and the East, and the very basis of his regime’s stability – low oil and gas 
prices – is in danger. In such a context, current US and EU policies might 
carry additional bite.  
Summary 
Despite seeking normative goals through normative means, the US failed to 
achieve normative results through its a p p r o a c h  t o  B e l a r u s .  T h e  U S  h a s  
limited influence over Belarus, even after joining together with the EU. 
There is bipartisan yet relatively shallow support at home for vigorous US 
action, and US interests vis-à-vis Russia may mitigate the full impact of US 
policy on Belarus.  
How representative is this case for the US? Is the US often frustrated 
in its ability to advance normative ends through normative means? A 
number of other examples could be cited, for instance US sanctions against 
Myanmar; efforts to broker settlements in Darfur, Cyprus, the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, Transniestria, Abkazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-
Karabakh; or US efforts to advance international efforts against corruption. 
The United States took a leading role in the writing of treaties such as the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the 
Human Rights Covenants. In the end, however, the US often recoils from 
adhering to the far-reaching obligations of such multilateral treaties. US 
engagement in the Korean War, sanctioned by the UN, could also be 
considered normative unintended, given the inconclusive ending to the 
conflict more than 50 years later. The invasion of Afghanistan, sanctioned 
by the UN, is another example; it is listed here because of the continuing 
struggle there and the highly uncertain outcome.  
In short, the history of US foreign policy is littered with normative 
efforts that have been stymied or gone awry. Failure has had many fathers, 
but relatively weak US influence over conflicting parties, or US reluctance 
to engage fully due to other domestic or external considerations, has often 
played a part. Yet if one compares the relatively abundant, and in some 
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case, one must conclude that the US serves regularly as a major ‘norm 
entrepreneur’ – at times with failure, but at other times with considerable 
success. Moreover, such efforts did not come to a wholesale end in some 
‘golden age’ of American post-war enlightenment, as Ian Manners seems to 
suggest, but continue – albeit quite unevenly – today.  
3.3  Realpolitik intended: US policy towards Iraq, 1980-1984 
The US has also acted in ways that may be characterised as realpolitik 
intended, i.e. it has deployed policy instruments to pursue possession goals 
with results that were neither normative nor intended to be. A particularly 
instructive example is offered by the approach of the Reagan 
administration toward Iraq between 1980 and 1984.   
Narrative 
Tensions between Iraq and Iran led Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to attack 
Iran in September 1980, believing he would secure a quick victory. In the 
end, the war lasted eight years.28 The UN Security Council called for a 
ceasefire and for all member states to refrain from actions contributing in 
any way to the conflict's continuation. The Soviets, opposing the war, cut 
off arms exports to Iran and to its Iraqi ally (although arms deliveries 
resumed in 1982). In 1980 the US broke off diplomatic relations with Iran 
because of the Tehran embassy hostage crisis (Iraq had broken off ties with 
the US during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war).  
The US was officially neutral regarding the Iran-Iraq war, and 
claimed that it armed neither side. By mid-1982, however, Iraq was on the 
defensive, and the Reagan administration, having decided that an Iranian 
victory would not serve its interests, began supporting Iraq. The White 
House and State Department pressured the Export-Import Bank to provide 
Iraq with financing, to enhance its credit standing and enable it to obtain 
loans from other international financial institutions. The State Department 
removed Iraq from its list of states supporting international terrorism. The 
US Agriculture Department provided taxpayer-guaranteed loans for 
                                                      
28 For a full account, see Battle (2003). Almost all of the primary documents cited 
here and included in the briefing book were obtained by the National Security 
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purchases of American commodities. Moreover, despite US official 
neutrality in the conflict, the Reagan administration secretly began to 
provide Iraq with intelligence and military support.29  
During the conflict Iran accused Iraq of using chemical weapons. The 
Geneva Protocol requires that the international community respond to 
chemical warfare, but Iran was relatively isolated diplomatically and its 
accusations received little attention. In October 1983, Iran demanded a full 
UN Security Council investigation. The US had intelligence confirming 
Iran's accusations; internal documents described Iraq’s “almost daily” use 
of chemical weapons.30 The intelligence indicated that Iraq used chemical 
weapons against Iranian forces, and, according to a November 1983 memo, 
against “Kurdish insurgents” as well.31 
The Reagan administration responded on 26 November 1983, with 
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 114, which called for 
heightened regional military cooperation to defend oil facilities and 
improvements to US military capabilities in the Persian Gulf. “Because of 
the real and psychological impact of a curtailment in the flow of oil from 
the Persian Gulf on the international economic system”, the Directive 
stated, “we must assure our readiness to deal promptly with actions aimed 
at disrupting that traffic.” It did not mention chemical weapons.32  
                                                      
29 Policy directives from President Reagan to this effect, including National 
Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 99, were prepared pursuant to his March 1982 
National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM 4-82) asking for a review of US 
policy towards the Middle East. For the documents, see Battle (2003). 
30 See US Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Information 
Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe to George P. Shultz, “Iraq Use of Chemical 
Weapons”, 1 November 1983, reproduced  in Battle (2003), which also notes: “We 
also know that Iraq has acquired a CW production capability, presumably from 
Western firms, including possibly a US foreign subsidiary.”  
31 Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South 
A s i a n  A f f a i r s  A c t i o n  M e m o r a n d u m  f r o m  J o n a t h a n  T .  H o w e  t o  L a w r e n c e  S .  
Eagleburger, “Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons” [includes cables entitled “Deterring 
Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons” and “Background of Iraqi Use of Chemical 
Weapons”], 21 November 1983, reproduced in Battle (2003). 
32 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 114) from Ronald W. Reagan, “US 
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In December 1983, Donald Rumsfeld (who at the time headed the 
multinational pharmaceutical company G.D. Searle & Co.) was dispatched 
as Presidential envoy to the Middle East, including Baghdad, where he met 
with Saddam. The two discussed regional issues of mutual interest, shared 
enmity towards Iran and Syria, and other issues, but Rumsfeld made no 
reference to chemical weapons. He also met with Iraqi Foreign Minister 
Tariq Aziz. The two agreed that “the US and Iraq shared many common 
interests”, and Rumsfeld affirmed the Reagan administration’s “willingness 
to do more” regarding the Iran-Iraq war, but “made clear that our efforts to 
assist were inhibited by certain things that made it difficult for us, citing the 
use of chemical weapons, possible escalation in the Gulf, and human 
rights”.33  
In mid-March 1984, the US publicly condemned Iraq's chemical 
weapons use, but discussions continued regarding Export-Import Bank 
credits to Iraq and US efforts to cut off arms exports to Iran. Although US 
policy still barred the export of US military equipment to Iraq, some was 
apparently provided. When asked whether the US conclusion that Iraq had 
used chemical weapons would have “any effect on US recent initiatives to 
expand commercial relationships with Iraq across a broad range, and also a 
willingness to open diplomatic relations”, the department's spokesperson 
said “No. I’m not aware of any change in our position. We’re interested in 
being involved in a closer dialogue with Iraq”.34  
                                                      
33 United States Embassy in United Kingdom Cable from Charles H. Price II to the 
D e p a r t m e n t  o f  S t a t e ,  “ R u m s f e l d  M i s s i o n :  D e c e m b e r  2 0  M e e t i n g  w i t h  I r a q i  
President Saddam Hussein”, 21 December 1983; United States Embassy in the 
United Kingdom Cable from Charles H. Price II to the Department of State, 
“Rumsfeld One-on-One Meeting with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister”, 21 December 
1983 (both available in Battle, 2003). 
34 During the spring of 1984, the US reconsidered policy for the sale of dual-use 
equipment to Iraq’s nuclear programme, and its “preliminary results favor[ed] 
expanding such trade to include Iraqi nuclear entities”. Department of State, 
Special Adviser to the Secretary on Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Energy 
A f f a i r s  M e m o r a n d u m  f r o m  D i c k  G r o n e t  t o  R i c h a r d  T .  K e n n e d y ,  “ U S  D u a l - U s e 
Exports to Iraq: Specific Actions” [includes document entitled “Dual Use Exports 
to Iraq” dated 27 April 1984], 9 May 1984 (available at Battle, 2003). On 3 March, 
the State Department intervened to prevent a US company from shipping 22,000 
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Iran had submitted a draft resolution asking the UN to condemn 
Iraq's chemical weapons use. The US delegate to the UN was instructed to 
lobby friendly delegations in order to obtain a general motion of ‘no 
decision’ on the resolution. If this was not achievable, the US delegate was 
to abstain on the issue. Iraq’s ambassador met with the US ambassador to 
the UN, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and asked for ‘restraint’ in responding to the 
issue – as did the representatives of both France and Britain. On 30 March 
1984, the Security Council issued a presidential statement condemning the 
use of chemical weapons, without naming Iraq as the offending party.  
On 5 April 1984, Ronald Reagan issued NSDD 139, codifying US 
determination to develop plans “to avert an Iraqi collapse”. Reagan’s 
Directive said that US policy required “unambiguous” condemnation of 
chemical warfare (without naming Iraq), while including the caveat that 
the US should “place equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran from 
continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized 
recent offensives”. The Directive did not suggest that “condemning” 
chemical warfare required any hesitation about or modification of US 
support for Iraq.35  
A State Department background paper dated 16 November 1984 said 
that Iraq had stopped using chemical weapons after a November 1983 
démarche from the US, but had resumed their use in February 1984. On 26 
November 1984, Iraq and the US restored diplomatic relations.  
Goals, means and impact 
The US was determined to use Iraq to prevent Iranian victory, as one 
means to stabilise the broader region and keep Middle Eastern oil flowing. 
Iraq’s possession and use of chemical weapons, both as part of the war and 
even on its own Kurdish citizens, was viewed as a potentially embarrassing 
public relations problem that complicated efforts to provide assistance to 
Iraq, but not as a barrier to doing business. Saddam’s repressive internal 
policies, though well known to the US at the time, did not figure in US 
                                                                                                                                       
pounds of phosphorous fluoride, a chemical weapons precursor, to Iraq (see Battle, 
2003). 
35 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 139) from Ronald W. Reagan, 
“Measures to Improve US Posture and Readiness to Respond to Developments in 
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internal directives or in discussions with Iraqi leaders. During this period 
US policy was able to ensure stalemate in the conflict and to blunt any 
international effort to condemn Iraq in such a way that it would be unable 
to prosecute the war or to hinder broader US objectives in the region. 
Conditioning factor: Domestic context 
Despite domestic concern about Iraqi use of chemical weapons, there was 
no significant pressure on the Reagan administration to toughen its largely 
rhetorical opposition to Iraqi actions .  I n  t h e  w a k e  o f  t h e  U S  E m b a s s y  
hostage crisis in Tehran, US opinion leaders were fiercely opposed to 
actions that could enhance Iranian influence or capabilities in the area.  
Conditioning factor: Domestic capabilities 
Although constrained by US law in areas such as export-import loans, the 
administration did what it could to press for provision of such loans to 
Iraq, and where it had a freer hand, such as agricultural commodities, it 
acted with alacrity. It also made use of its considerable global capabilities to 
provide intelligence information to Saddam. The US had various tools at its 
disposal to stop Iraqi efforts, but made little to no avail of them. 
Conditioning factor: The external environment 
While opposed to taking sides in the Iran-Iraq conflict, other members of 
the Security Council did little to buck US efforts to water down Security 
Council condemnation of Iraqi possession and use of chemical weapons. 
The broader framework of the cold war and Western concerns about 
stability of oil flows blunted any meaningful opposition to US policy. The 
oil-rich Gulf states, concerned with Iranian resurgence, provided Iraq with 
significant financial assistance. 
Summary  
Given the strident moral rhetoric used by George W. Bush in the lead-up to 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq, US policy toward Saddam between 1980 and 1984 
is a particularly striking example of American realpolitik. How much weight 
can we assign to realpolitik when considering US foreign policy?  
When discussing the issue, it is important to distinguish between 
‘realism’, which more often than not means a pragmatic approach to policy 
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exercise as a consciously non-normative pattern of behaviour, focused 
narrowly in terms of state interest and power, to the exclusion of other 
concerns. Much debate conflates the two terms; here I am focused on the 
latter.36 
Other contemporary examples of US realpolitik could include US 
support for energy-rich yet democratically dubious Middle East sheikdoms 
and Eurasian rulers. Cold war examples in this category could include 
support for unsavoury regimes on most continents of the earth, who in the 
jargon of the time “may have been SOBs, but at least they were our SOBs;” 
US policies in the Cuban missile crisis; covert support for the Taliban in 
their fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan; Kissinger’s ‘shuttle 
diplomacy’ after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, where he pushed the Israelis to 
partially withdraw from the Sinai in deference to political realities created 
by the oil crisis; the US tilt towards Pakistan in the South Asia crisis of 1971 
(Gandhi, 2002); or Nixon’s turn to communist China in order to open a 
‘new front’ in America’s competition with the Soviet Union. The United 
States has on various occasions supported autocracies through aid, trade, 
recognition and friendly diplomatic relations, because other US policy 
goals have outweighed the US penchant for promoting democracy and the 
rule of law. The Bush administration’s approach to General Musharraf’s 
rule in Pakistan is a prominent contemporary example.  
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger are perhaps the most prominent 
adherents of American realpolitik, but the examples cited above underscore 
that leaders of both parties have engaged in such practices, and on a 
relatively frequent basis.37 Yet if one returns to the schools outlined in the 
first section of this study, when it comes to basic questions of principle, 
Kissingerian realpolitik, in the continental European sense of the word, sits 
uneasily with the American body politic. It does not fit well with 
Hamiltonian predilections, much less Wilsonian aspirations, and 
                                                      
36 For additional commentary, see Lind (2007), Mearsheimer (2001), Gilpin (1996) 
and Krasner (1983, pp. 335-339). 
37 Kissinger continues to advocate the necessity of great power balancing, but even 
he qualifies this as including principles such as legitimacy and shared values, and 
not only mechanical ‘equilibrium’ or balancing of power. See, for instance, 
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Jacksonian America disparages the very type of power balancing that 
Henry Kissinger and other realpolitiker advocate.  
On the other hand, a systematic analysis of public opinion survey 
data and empirical literature over three decades reveals that when it comes 
to specific cases, American public opinion is far more receptive to realpolitik 
than would seem likely (Drezner, 2007). Although 72% of respondents in a 
recent poll agreed that “moral principles” should be the guiding light in US 
foreign policy, a more systematic look at polls also show that in specific 
instances Americans are prepared to make other choices (Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2004). Data from the Chicago Council on Foreign 
Relations (CCFR) polls on top foreign policy priorities over the past 30 
years show that policies emphasising security and autonomy consistently 
earn more than 60% public support, whereas liberal policy priorities, 
emphasising multilateralism, democracy and human rights consistently 
earn less than 50% support. The 2002 CCFR report concludes: “Most 
Americans want a foreign policy that pursues justice as well as security. 
But protection of one’s own security and well-being naturally comes first” 
(Bouton, 2002, p. 21). 
After surveying survey data, Daniel Drezner (2007) concludes that 
“Americans think like intuitive neo-realists – they prefer balancing against 
aggressive and rising powers”, and Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes (2006) 
observe: “If asked to choose, Americans prefer proactive, assertive 
unilateral action to multilateral efforts beset by delay and compromise.” 
Indeed, Americans still favour reserving the right to use pre-emptive 
military force to a much greater extent than Europeans. Kohut and Stokes 
conclude: “In case after case, Americans are multilateralists in principle and 
unilateralists in practice.” 
3.4  Realpolitik unintended: The US and the International Criminal 
Court, 2002-07 
The US has also acted in ways that may be characterised as realpolitik 
unintended, i.e. it has pursued non-normative goals in ways that have 
actually served to achieve an entrenchment and development of 
international law and institutions. The US approach to the International 
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Narrative 
The International Criminal Court (ICC), established in 2002, is the first 
global permanent international court with jurisdiction to prosecute 
individuals for “the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community”.38 The United States initially supported the idea of creating an 
international criminal court  and was a major participant at the Rome 
Conference forging the Rome Statute, its founding treaty. President Clinton 
signed the Statute in 2000, but declared that it contained “significant flaws” 
and indicated that he would not submit it to ratification “until our 
fundamental concerns are satisfied”. In May 2002, the Bush administration 
informed the United Nations that it did not intend to submit the treaty for 
ratification, and renounced any obligations under the treaty. Subsequent 
US efforts to qualify the reach of the International Criminal Court, by 
requiring UNSC approval of referred cases, and then to subvert the Court’s 
jurisdiction itself, hardened international opposition to US demands, and 
strengthened the determination of signatory states to make the court truly 
independent of the Security Council and to embolden opponents 
committed to more binding forms of multilateralism.39 
The US has made various claims against the court.40 The first is the 
ICC’s possible assertion of jurisdiction over US soldiers charged with ‘war 
crimes’ resulting from legitimate uses of force, and perhaps over civilian 
policy-makers, even if the United States does not ratify the Rome Statute. 
                                                      
38 These include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and potentially 
the crime of aggression, if the Assembly of States Parties is able to reach an 
agreement defining it. The founding Rome Statute is available at 
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/2.htm.  
39 For further background, see Congressional Research Service (2006), Lee (1999), 
Morris (2001), Schabas (2004) and Wedgwood et al. (2001).  
40 In 2002, then Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International 
Security John Bolton summarized the US position regarding the ICC: “For a 
number of reasons, the United States decided that the ICC had unacceptable 
consequences for our national sovereignty. Specifically, the ICC is an organization 
whose precepts go against fundamental American notions of sovereignty, checks 
and balances, and national independence. It is an agreement that is harmful to the 
national interests of the United States, and harmful to our presence abroad”. See 
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The United States sought to exempt US soldiers and employees from the 
jurisdiction of the ICC based on the unique position the United States 
occupies with regard to international peacekeeping (Grossman, 2002). 
Opponents depict the objection as US reluctance to be held accountable for 
gross human rights violations or to the standard established for the rest of 
the world. Second, the US has argued that the court lacks sufficient 
oversight mechanisms for confirmation of officials, and their impeachment 
where necessary. Third, the US insisted that a prosecution should require a 
positive referral from the Security Council. Opponents rejected this claim, 
and no such requirement now exists. A prosecution can be started on the 
prosecutor’s own initiative, overseen only by the court’s own judges. 
Fourth, some Americans have criticised the court for not protecting 
defendants’ human rights through provisions commonplace in the US legal 
system, and hence that ratification by the United States of the Rome Statute 
would require an amendment to the US Constitution.41 Supporters of the 
Rome Statute contend it contains a comprehensive set of procedural 
safeguards that offers substantially similar protections as provided in the 
US Constitution. 
When the US proved unsuccessful in its efforts to reform the Rome 
Statute, it began to undertake measures to circumvent the court, to subvert 
it and to shield US nationals from it. In 2002, the US Congress passed the 
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA), which contained a 
number of provisions, including prohibitions on the United States 
providing military aid to countries that had ratified the Rome Statute.42 
More ominously for ICC supporters, Section 2008 of APSA authorised the 
President to use “all means necessary and appropriate” to bring about the 
                                                      
41 RenewAmerica articulates this: “Because the ICC is inconsistent with 
fundamental constitutional protections, the federal government is without 
authority to ratify the treaty absent a constitutional amendment.” If the US 
Government were to ratify an ICC treaty, there almost certainly would be an 
immediate legal challenge to the authority of the government to forfeit any 
constitutional right except by a constitutional amendment (see Voigt, 2006).  
42 There were a number of exceptions to this prohibition, including NATO 
members, major non-NATO allies and countries that have entered into an 
agreement with the United States not to hand over US nationals to the Court (see 
Article 98 agreements below). ASPA also excluded any military aid that the US 
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release of covered United States and allied persons, upon the request of the 
detainee’s government, who are being detained or imprisoned by or on 
behalf of the ICC. APSA limited US cooperation with the Court to cases 
dealing with enemies of the United States. The United States also 
threatened to use its Security Council veto to block renewal of the 
mandates of several UN peacekeeping operations, unless the Security 
Council agreed to permanently exempt US nationals from the Court's 
jurisdiction.43 In 2004, the Nethercutt Amendment to the Foreign 
Appropriations Bill suspended Economic Support Fund assistance to ICC 
States Parties without bilateral immunity agreements (BIAs) with the 
United States. The funds affected support initiatives including 
peacekeeping, anti-terrorism measures, democracy-building and drug 
interdiction.  
As part of the US campaign to exclude its citizens and military 
personnel from extradition by the ICC, the US Bush administration also 
approached countries around the world to conclude Bilateral Immunity 
Agreements, or ‘Article 98’ agreements. The United States has used 
bilateral diplomacy to persuade many nations to sign these agreements. 
The US has a law requiring the suspension of military assistance and US 
Economic Support Fund (ESF) aid to those States Parties that do not sign 
these agreements. The granting of such special favours is of course always 
subject to diplomacy. ESF funding entails a wide range of governance 
programmes including international counter-terrorism efforts, peace 
process programmes, anti-drug trafficking initiatives, truth and 
reconciliation commissions, wheelchair distribution and HIV/AIDS 
education, among others.  
The height of US bellicosity came in 2003, when the United States 
stopped military aid for 35 countries (among them nine European 
countries). However, in what some view as a sign that the administration is 
                                                      
43 After the Bush administration threatened to veto a United Nations Security 
Council resolution to extend the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia on the ground 
that it did not contain sufficient guarantees that US participants would be immune 
to prosecution by the ICC, the Security Council adopted a resolution that would 
defer for one year any prosecution of participants in missions established or 
authorised by the UN whose home countries have not ratified the Rome Statute. 
That resolution was renewed through 1 July 2004, but was not subsequently 
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softening its stance with respect to the ICC, the United States did not 
exercise its veto power at the Security Council to prevent the referral of a 
case against Sudan’s leaders for the alleged genocide in Darfur. 
Goals, means and impact 
Initially supportive of a new norm to address “the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community”,  yet with qualms about certain 
implication for US interests stemming from such a far-reaching initiative, 
Washington initially sought to reform the treaty. Having failed in this 
attempt, the US actively engaged in efforts to circumvent, subvert and 
shield Americans from the Court. Overall such efforts have failed. The 
Court is now a reality, and anti-ICC laws and impunity agreements have 
only served to align the US with pariah states of the international criminal 
justice system. The major impact of the US anti-ICC campaign has been to 
diminish the credibility of US efforts to forge coalitions against human 
rights abusers and to undermine future US efforts to advance international 
justice in discrete cases. Furthermore, the US is unable to vote in these 
bodies, may not nominate US nationals to serve as judges, may not cast a 
vote in elections for or against judges or the Prosecutor (or for their 
removal), and may not vote on the ICC’s budget. It will not be able to vote 
on the definition of the crime of aggression or its inclusion within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, or on any other amendment to the Rome Statute, 
unless it ratifies it. By appearing to demand special treatment in the form of 
immunity from the ICC, the United States has bolstered the perception of 
its unilateral approach to world affairs and its unwillingness to abide by 
the same laws that apply to other nations. This perception could 
undermine US efforts at coalition-building to gain international support for 
the present war against terrorism and operations in Iraq, as well as future 
international endeavours. In March of 2006, even Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice admitted that the US position was “sort of the same as 
shooting ourselves in the foot” (Congressional Research Service, 2006). 
Conditioning factor: Domestic context 
Initial Wilsonian enthusiasm for a far-reaching new norm in international 
law gave way to more sober conclusions about the implications of the ICC 
for the US position in the world, and galvanised significant opposition 
from Jacksonians and Jeffersonians enraged that an international court 
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constitutional provisions, could potentially hold sway over US citizens 
abroad or even at home. The inability of subsequent US administrations to 
arrange the type of opt-out clauses or Security Council protections typical 
of other kinds of multilateral arrangements only stiffened domestic 
opposition. 
Conditioning factor: Domestic capabilities 
Through its efforts to reform the Rome Statute, as well as its efforts to get 
around its provisions, the US demonstrated that it had a significant number 
of options at its disposal. In the end, however, US efforts proved 
counterproductive. 
Conditioning factor: External environment 
The external environment proved hostile to US efforts to arrange special 
carve-outs or privileges under the treaty, and subsequent US unilateral 
activities only harden opposition to any particular recognition of the US 
role in the world.  
All of those declared by the president to be enemy combatants, 
including US citizens Yaser Esam Hamdi and Jose Padilla, are, 
according to the Bush administration, excluded from the protections 
granted to prisoners of war by the Geneva Conventions as well as the 
due process rights afforded defendants in the American court system 
by the US Constitution and acts of Congress. 
Summary 
How much weight can we assign to US realpolitik efforts that go wrong? 
The Bush Administration’s assertion that it can exclude anyone declared to 
be an ‘enemy combatant’ from the protections granted prisoners by the 
Geneva Conventions, despite Supreme Court judgment otherwise, and 
with results that have questioned prevailing standards of international law, 
have damaged international regard for the US. In these cases the 
conditioning factors appear to be fairly significant; if an Administration 
decides to advance a realpolitik policy, it often finds acquiescence within the 
Congress and in the broader public, or at least enjoys a period of time to 
initiate such a policy before the inevitable domestic checks and balances 
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policy. Rarely does the external environment, geared more to power than 
to principle, stand in the way. Given this rather permissive setting, then, it 
is perhaps striking that such policies are relatively limited in the broad 
panoply of US foreign policies. The Iran-Contra affair is another prominent 
example (National Security Archive, 2006). This case highlights that the US 
can also act as a ‘norm blocker’, even as it acts as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ in 
other areas. 
3.5  Imperial intended: The US Invasion of Panama, 1989 
The US has also acted in ways that may be characterised as imperial 
intended, i.e. exercising control over weaker countries in ways it has 
claimed are normative, yet are widely judged to be in breach of 
international law.  
Narrative 
The United States invasion of Panama, codenamed Operation Just Cause, 
deposed Panamanian military leader and political dictator Manuel Noriega 
in December 1989, during the administration of US President George H. W. 
Bush. This action was preceded by over a year of diplomatic tension 
between the United States and Panama, the highlights of which were 
specific allegations by the US that Noriega was complicit with money 
launderers and drug traffickers and a nullified national election in 1989. 
Several months of US troop build-up followed these events in military 
bases within the former Panama Canal Zone. 
President Bush (1989) gave four basic reasons for the invasion. The 
first was to safeguard the lives of the 35,000 US citizens in Panama. There 
had been numerous clashes between US and Panamanian forces; one 
American soldier had been killed a few days earlier and several incidents of 
harassment of Americans had taken place. Bush stated that Noriega had 
declared that a state of war existed between the US and Panama and that 
he also threatened American lives. The second reason was to combating 
drug trafficking. Panama had become a centre for drug money laundering 
and a transit point for drug trafficking to the US and Europe. The US had 
evidence that Noriega was directly involved in these operations, and in 
February 1988 had been indicted for drug trafficking. The third reason 
given was to protect the integrity of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties governing 
the Panama Canal. Members of Congress and others in the US political 
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Panama Canal and that the United States had the right under the treaties to 
intervene militarily to protect the canal. The fourth was that elections 
scheduled earlier in the year, which would have brought Guillermo Endara 
to power, had been illegally nullified by Noriega, thus subverting 
Panamanian democracy.44 
A few hours after the invasion began, Guillermo Endara was sworn 
in at Rodman Naval Base. Military operations lasted only a few days. 
Noriega obtained refuge in the Vatican diplomatic mission in Panama City 
and finally surrendered to the US military on 3 January 1990. He was 
immediately put on a military transport plane and extradited to the United 
States. 
Goals, means and impact 
The US sought to maintain control over Panama in the years leading to the 
final transfer of the Panama Canal to Panamanian authority. When 
Noriega, who had once been a valuable US intelligence asset, began to act 
in ways considered ‘destabilising’, the US conveyed a clear warning to 
Noriega, as recounted by former US Ambassador Briggs: “Our underlying 
message was this: You know the current state of our relations with the 
Sandinistas in Nicaragua (where the Pentagon was providing support to 
the Contras in their war against the ruling government). If you continue to 
act as a destabilizing force, you can expect the United States to turn on you 
as we have turned on them” (Briggs, 2007). Noriega ignored this warning 
and turned against the US. When he blocked the election of US-supported 
candidate Endara, the Bush Administration concluded that Noriega had to 
go. Estimates of casualties from the invasion range from 300-3,000. 
Following the invasion and Endara’s assumption of power, relations 
between the Panamanian and US governments again became close. 
Conditioning factor: Domestic context 
Despite having ratified the Torrijos-Carter Treaties that would relinquish 
US control of the Panama Canal by the turn of the century, members of 
Congress were concerned that Noriega would politicise operation of the 
                                                      
44 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1989) concluded that 
numerous human rights violations occurred in Panama during Noriega’s 
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Canal, with negative consequences for the United States. President Bush’s 
popularity ratings soared after the invasion. In the end, the US did fulfil its 
obligations under the Torrijos-Carter Treaties and turned over the canal 
and military bases to Panama in 1999. 
Conditioning factor: Domestic capabilities 
The US had a range of instruments to deal with Noriega. He was indicted 
for drug smuggling, funds were channelled to support the opposition, an 
economic blockade was imposed and ultimately military force was used to 
depose him.  
Conditioning factor: External environment 
On 22 December 1989, the Organization of American States (OAS) passed a 
resolution deploring the invasion and calling for withdrawal of US troops. 
The OAS Charter, to which the US is a signatory and party, prohibits 
members from invading other members for any reason. Key European 
states supported the US, however: a draft UN Security Council resolution 
demanding the immediate withdrawal of United States forces from 
Panama was vetoed on 23 December by France, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States which cited its right of self-defence of 35,000 Americans 
present on the Panama Canal. On 29 December, the General Assembly of 
the United Nations voted 75–20 with 40 abstentions to condemn the 
invasion as a “flagrant violation of international law”. 
Summary 
The US has a long history of using ‘gunboat diplomacy’ to maintain its 
sphere of influence and ‘stabilise’ regimes in Central America and the 
Caribbean. The Reagan Administration’s invasion of the tiny island of 
Grenada is another example from this period. The Clinton Administration 
intervened in Haiti without UN authorisation.45 Defining the Western 
Hemisphere to extend into the Pacific Ocean, Americans targeted such 
Pacific Islands as Hawaii and Guam as appropriate venues for American 
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expansion and development. Between 1893 and 1898, an American-led 
coup toppled the independent Hawaiian constitutional monarchy and led 
to annexation of Hawaii by the United States, and the American defeat of 
Spain in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines won for the United States 
an empire of its own – though the United States permitted Cuba to go its 
way as an independent country. Further American exertions of power and 
influence won the independence of Panama from Colombia, followed by a 
coerced treaty between the US and Panama that gave the United States 
territory on the Panamanian isthmus and, ultimately, the Panama Canal.  
Other examples of ‘imperial intended’, if we use Tocci’s framework, 
would be intervention by the US and its European partners in Bosnia and 
again in Kosovo. The Bosnian intervention was carried out with support of 
the UN. The Kosovo intervention did not gain support in the UN Security 
Council, but the US and its European partners acted anyway in the face of 
massive human tragedy. In this sense, the Kosovo intervention was not 
‘intended’ to violate UN principles, but the paralysis of the Security 
Council prompted the US and Europe to act anyway. The Kosovo 
intervention, according to one observer, “was illegal in the sense of not 
having followed the letter of the UN Charter but legitimate in the sense of 
being consistent with the norms and principles that the charter embodies” 
(Jentleson, 2007, p. 281; Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 
2000). 
All of these examples raise a core question: Should the US be 
considered an imperial, rather than a normative power? Today, ‘American 
empire’ is a term of approval and optimism for some and disparagement 
and danger for others. Neoconservatives celebrate the imperial exercise of 
US power, which they believe to be a liberal force that promotes democracy 
and undercuts tyranny, terrorism, military aggression and weapons 
proliferation. Max Boot (2003) insists that the “greatest danger” facing the 
US, in fact, “is that we won’t use all of our power for fear of the ‘I’ word – 
imperialism... Given the historical baggage that ‘imperialism’ carries, 
there’s no need for the US government to embrace the term. But it should 
definitely embrace the practice.” Neo-imperialists are refuted by domestic 
critics, however, who worry about unacceptable financial costs of empire, 
its corrosive effect on democracy and the threat it poses to the institutions 
and alliances that have secured US national interests since World War II 
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Michael Ignatieff (2003a) also uses the term ‘empire’, but 
acknowledges that: 
America’s empire is not like empires of times past, built on 
colonies, conquest and the white man’s burden….The 21st century 
imperium is a new invention in the annals of political science, an 
empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, 
human rights and democracy, enforced by the most awesome military 
power the world has ever known. It is the imperialism of a people 
who remember that their country secured its independence by revolt 
against an empire, and who like to think of themselves as the friend of 
freedom everywhere. It is an empire without consciousness of itself as 
such, constantly shocked that its good intentions arouse resentment 
abroad. 
Ignatieff argues that this does not make it any less of an empire. I beg 
to differ. Words matter, and the difference between hegemony and empire 
is significant for our purposes. Rather than simply blur the definition, it is 
better to understand the distinction. 
The classic understanding of imperialism is a form of direct or 
monopoly control of another nation or region. Empires are “relationships 
of political control imposed by some political societies over the effective 
sovereignty of other political societies” (Maier, 2007; see also Lind, 2007a; 
Mandelbaum, 2005). Over the centuries empires have shared characteristics 
of subordination; coercion; some form of ethnic, national, religious, or 
racial difference between the imperial power and the society it controls; 
and assertive efforts by the empire, when challenged, to perpetuate its 
imperial rule, if need be by force, as in the case of France in both Indochina 
and Algeria after World War II. Empire is dictatorship by foreigners. 
Hegemony is different. In old Greece, a hegemon referred to an army 
commander who led armed forces consisting of free citizens of the polis 
and city-states. During that period, it was assumed that he acted in the 
interest of mutual security. Hegemony is traditionally defined as an 
international interaction and a leadership relationship “whose existence 
and maintenance are dependent, on the one hand, on the power resources, 
the will and the strategic competence of a leading state (the hegemon), and 
on the other hand, on the voluntary acquiescence, at least in principle, of a 
homogenous – in terms of organization of power – group of states.” (Maier, 
2007) 
Which pattern more accurately describes the United States? 
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aspects of the global political order that has developed around the various 
dimensions of US power – military, economic, political and normative. 
After reviewing and comparing empires throughout history, Maier (2007) 
underscores “the difficulty of shoehorning the United States into the 
received models of imperial power”, and suggests instead that “hegemonic 
power” is a more apt description. 
As discussed, the US has a long tradition of pursuing crude imperial 
policies, most notably in Latin America and the Middle East. But as John 
Ikenberry (2004) notes, for most countries, the US-led order has been a 
negotiated system wherein the United States has sought participation by 
other states on terms that are mutually agreeable. This is true in three 
respects. First, the United States has provided public goods – particularly 
the extension of security and the support for an open trade regime – in 
exchange for the cooperation of other states. Second, power in the US 
system is exercised through rules and institutions; power politics still exist, 
but arbitrary and indiscriminate power has largely been reigned in. There 
are obvious exceptions, but these are exceptions that tend to prove the rule. 
Finally, weaker states in the US-led order are given ‘voice opportunities’ – 
informal access to the policy-making processes of the United States and the 
intergovernmental institutions that make up the international system. The 
American order is hierarchical and ultimately sustained by economic and 
military power, but it is put at the service of an expanding system of 
democracy, free markets and the rule of law, and open to others willing 
and able to join. This is not empire; it is a US-led democratic political order 
that has no name or historical precedent.  
American influence in the world is certainly considerable, but the 
instances where the US has exercised direct control in the manner defined 
above are limited and rather specific, and even in these cases with other 
attributes, such as an effort, as in the Balkans, to share this control with 
others, or to divest itself of its responsibility as quickly as feasible, as in 
Haiti in the 1990s. There is no denying that such cases exist, but they are 
exceptions that prove the rule that the US acts more as a hegemonic than 
imperial power (Mandelbaum, 2005).46 
                                                      
46 In Colossus, Niall Ferguson (2004) argues that the US is an empire and that this is 
good for the world. Ferguson's concern is not that there is too much American 
empire but too little; Benjamin Barber (2004) argues in Fear’s Empire that empire is 
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The debate about empire also misses the most important international 
development of recent years: the long peace among great powers. 
Capitalism, democracy, nuclear weapons and a shared concern about 
terrorism all help explain this peace. But so too does the unique way in 
which the United States has gone about the business of building an 
international order. US success stems from the creation and extension of 
international institutions that have limited and legitimated US power. 
Ultimately, the current debate centres on this question: Does the US remain 
committed to this extensive and deep-rooted system, or does its assertion of 
power since the end of the cold war and particularly since September 11 
represent a fundamental break with the past? A more conclusive answer 
might come after examining the next category: imperial unintended. 
3.6  Imperial unintended: The US invasion and occupation of Iraq, 
2003-07 
The US has also acted in ways that may be characterised as imperial 
unintended, i.e. pursuing normative goals in disrespect of international 
law and outside the boundaries of international institutions, yet failing to 
achieve its intended results. I have chosen the US invasion and occupation 
of Iraq for two reasons. First, even though the operation continues today 
and its ultimate outcome remains uncertain, the Bush administration 
clearly did not achieve its intended results in the four years following the 
invasion. Second, the Bush Administration’s invasion of Iraq is potentially 
pivotal to the debate about the US as an imperial or normative power.  
Narrative 
The 2003 invasion of Iraq took place 18 March-1 May 2003, and was led by 
the United States, backed by British forces and smaller contingents from 
Australia and Poland. Other countries were involved in its aftermath.  
The objectives of the invasion, according to US President George W. 
Bush and former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, were to disarm Iraq of 
weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein’s support for 
terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people. Bush said the actual trigger was 
                                                                                                                                       
not inherent in US dominance but is a temptation, to which the Bush 
Administration has succumbed.  THE UNITED STATES: A NORMATIVE POWER?| 125 
 
Iraq's failure to take a “final opportunity” to disarm itself of nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons that US and coalition officials deemed to 
be an immediate and intolerable threat to world peace.47 
No such weapons were found. In January 2005, the Iraq Survey 
Group concluded that Iraq had ended its WMD programs in 1991 and had 
no WMD at the time of the invasion (although some misplaced or 
abandoned remnants of pre-1991 production were found).  
After the invasion of the Gulf War of 1991, the US and the 
international community maintained a policy of containment towards Iraq. 
This policy involved economic sanctions, US and UK patrols of Iraqi no-fly 
zones declared to protect Kurds in northern Iraq and Shiites in the south, 
and ongoing inspections to prevent Iraqi WMD development. In October 
1998, US policy began to shift away from containment and towards ‘regime 
change’, as the US Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Iraq 
Liberation Act in response to Iraq’s termination of its cooperation with UN 
weapons inspectors. The Act provided $97 million for Iraqi “democratic 
opposition organizations” to “establish a programme to support a 
transition to democracy in Iraq”. This legislation contrasted with the terms 
set out in UNSC Resolution 687, which focused on weapons and weapons 
programmes and made no mention of regime change. One month after the 
p a s s a g e  o f  t h e  I r a q  L i b e r a t i o n  A c t ,  t h e  U S  a n d  U K  l a u n c h e d  a  
bombardment campaign of Iraq called Operation Desert Fox. The 
campaign’s express rationale was to hamper the Hussein government’s 
ability to produce chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, but US 
officials also hoped it would help weaken Hussein’s grip on power. 
With the inauguration of George W. Bush in 2001, the US moved 
towards a more active policy of ‘regime change’ in Iraq. Nine days after 
September 11, President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress and 
announced a new ‘war on terrorism’, which conflated the challenge posed 
by al-Qaeda and that offered by Saddam Hussein, and which was also 
accompanied by a doctrine of ‘pre-emptive’ military action. Some Bush 
advisors favoured an immediate invasion of Iraq, while others advocated 
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building an international coalition and obtaining UN authorisation. Bush 
eventually decided to seek UN authorisation, but held out the possibility of 
invading unilaterally. 
Throughout 2002, the Bush administration made clear that removing 
Saddam Hussein from power in order to restore international peace and 
security was a major goal. Bush made his case to the international 
community for an invasion of Iraq in a 12 September 2002 address to the 
UN Security Council.  Key US allies, including France and Germany, were 
critical of plans to invade Iraq, arguing instead for continued diplomacy 
and weapons inspections. After considerable debate, the Security Council 
adopted a compromise resolution, 1441, which authorised the resumption 
of weapons inspections and promised “serious consequences” for non-
compliance. 
In February 2003, US Secretary of State Colin Powell presented 
evidence at the UN alleging that Iraq was actively producing chemical and 
biological weapons and had ties to al-Qaeda, claims that have since been 
widely discredited. As a follow-up to Powell’s presentation, the US, UK 
and Spain proposed a UN Resolution authorising the use of force in Iraq, 
but US NATO allies Canada, France and Germany, together with Russia, 
strongly urged continued diplomacy. Facing a losing vote as well as a likely 
veto from France and Russia, the US eventually withdrew its resolution. 
The US and UK then abandoned Security Council procedures and 
decided to pursue the invasion without UN authorisation, a decision of 
questionable legality. On 17 March 2003, Bush gave Hussein and his two 
sons 48 hours to leave Iraq. Iraq rejected this demand, maintaining that it 
had already disarmed as required. The invasion of Iraq began on 20 March, 
without UN support.  
While never making an explicit connection between Iraq and the 
September 11th attacks, the Bush administration repeatedly insinuated a 
connection, thereby creating a false impression among the American 
public. Similarly, assertions of significant operational links between Iraq 
and al Qaeda were subsequently largely discredited by the intelligence 
community and eventually retracted by Secretary Powell himself. 
The Bush Administration worked very hard for a UN resolution to 
authorise an attack on Iraq. It extorted cooperation primarily by threats to 
act unilaterally rather than through persuasion or concessions. It 
condemned the UN for lacking the courage of its convictions with regard to 
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Between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the US/UK invasion of Iraq 
in 2003, the UN Security Council passed nearly 60 resolutions on Iraq and 
Kuwait. The most relevant to this issue was Resolution 678, passed on 29 
November 1990, which authorised “member states co-operating with the 
Government of Kuwait...to use all necessary means” to 1) implement 
Security Council Resolution 660 and other resolutions calling for the end of 
Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti 
territory and 2) “restore international peace and security in the area”. 
Resolution 678 was not rescinded or nullified by succeeding resolutions. 
Resolution 1441 was most prominent during the run-up to the war and 
formed the main backdrop for Secretary of State Powell’s address to the 
Security Council one month before the invasion.48 At the same time, Bush 
administration officials advanced a parallel legal argument using the 
earlier resolutions. Under this reasoning, by failing to disarm and submit to 
weapons inspections, Iraq was in violation of UNSC Resolutions 660 and 
678, and the US could legally compel Iraq's compliance through military 
means. Critics and proponents of the legal rationale based on UN 
resolutions argue that the legal right to determine how to enforce its 
resolutions lies with the Security Council alone, not with individual 
nations. 
Goals, means and impact 
The administration’s goals were to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass 
destruction, to remove Saddam Hussein from power, and to “free” the Iraqi 
people. In addition, there were many statements indicating support for the 
creation of a stable, democratic Iraq closely tied to the United States. The 
US military demonstrated overwhelming military prowess and ended the 
military campaign in a very short time. Astonishingly, however, the 
administration did little to plan for securing the peace after it had won the 
war. Efforts to ensure stability, therefore, suffered considerably in the wake 
of insurgent conflict, and throughout the four-year period Iraq never 
                                                      
48 For the transcript of Secretary Powell’s address, see 
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established a secure environment in which to rebuild its economy and 
reorient its politics. 
While estimates on the number of casualties vary widely, the majority 
of deaths and injuries – numbering in the hundreds of thousands – 
occurred after US President Bush declared the end of major combat 
operations on 1 May 2003. The administration was unable to use the 
tremendous military and economic power of the United States to create the 
stable Iraq it had sought, and failed to broaden its small coalition to include 
other major allies or countries. Moreover, the Bush administration’s ability 
to use economic or other incentives as political leverage to enlist the 
support of other countries for the US effort was strikingly limited. It failed, 
for instance, to secure the support of countries such as Angola, Chile, 
Guinea, Mexico and Pakistan in the Security Council before the war began. 
The bold unilateral exercise of military power, coupled with efforts to 
disentangle the US from the constraints of multilateralism, undermined US 
legitimacy throughout the world and severely compromised the authority 
that flowed from such legitimacy.  
The Iraq war proved to be damaging to all major players. The US 
suffered considerably in terms of global perceptions of its legitimacy and 
effectiveness. The EU experienced a bitter split among its members. The 
UN was condemned by those who went to war for lacking the courage of 
its convictions with regard to 12 years of Security Council resolutions 
demanding full Iraqi compliance, and condemned equally by those who 
opposed the war for lacking the courage of its convictions and not 
censuring the invasion (Thakur & Sidhu, 2006, pp. 12-14).  
Conditioning factor: Domestic context 
The Bush administration won domestic authorisation for an invasion in 
October 2002 when the US Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorising 
military force against Iraq. A few days before the Senate vote, about 75 
senators were told in closed session that Saddam Hussein had the means of 
delivering biological and chemical weapons by unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) drones that could be launched from ships off the Atlantic coast to 
attack US eastern seaboard cities. In fact, Iraq had no such capability 
(Nelson, 2004; Lowe, 2003; and Mackay, 2003). While the resolution 
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Americans polled in January 2003 widely favoured further diplomacy over 
an invasion.49  
The Bush administration’s continued insinuations of a tie between 
Saddam Hussein and international terrorism, however, did have a 
significant impact on US public opinion: by September 2003, 70% of 
Americans believed there was a link between Saddam Hussein and the 9/1l 
attacks.50 
Critics of the war argued that Iraq was not the top strategic priority in 
t h e  w a r  o n  t e r r o r  o r  i n  t h e  M i d d l e  E a s t  a n d  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  i t  c o u l d  
potentially destabilise the surrounding region. They were marginalised, yet 
included not only Democrats but leading figures within the Republican 
party. Prominent among such critics was Brent Scowcroft, who served as 
National Security Adviser to George H.W. Bush. In a 15 August 2002 Wall 
Street Journal editorial entitled “Don’t Attack Saddam”, Scowcroft warned: 
“Possibly the most dire consequences would be the effect in the region” 
where there could be “an explosion of outrage against us” that “could well 
destabilize Arab regimes” and “could even swell the ranks of the 
terrorists”. All his predictions came to pass.  
Conditioning factor: Domestic capabilities 
The US had considerable military capability to win the war, but as 
indicated demonstrated a striking lack of ability to secure the peace. Little 
effort was undertaken to plan for the peace or to anticipate insurgent 
activity and an unsettled security environment for the years following the 
invasion. The State Department’s Future of Iraq plan was dismissed by 
both the Pentagon and the White House, which appears to have imagined 
that once the conventional battle against Saddam was won, its job was 
done, and a new state would build itself. Stabilisation and reconstruction 
capabilities were relatively weak, particularly when compared to the task at 
hand. Efforts to ensure stability, therefore, suffered considerably in the 
wake of insurgent conflict, and throughout the four-year period Iraq never 
established a secure environment in which to rebuild its economy and 
reorient its politics. 
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Conditioning factor: External environment 
The US and its small coalition of allies faced considerable opposition from 
most other nations in the world. Opposition rallies were held in cities all 
over the world. International organisations largely decided against 
engagement in Iraq due to security concerns, and a number of key US allies 
refused to participate.  
Summary 
US policies toward Israel-Palestine may also be considered as imperial 
unintended, in ways similar to those Tocci has charted in her case study on 
the EU. The Bush administration’s declaration of a war on terrorism, in 
which countries are either “with us or against us”, has also failed to garner 
enthusiastic support for a US-led global effort. The unsuccessful US 
intervention in Lebanon in the early 1980s and US efforts to destabilise the 
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, for which the United States was convicted 
at the International Court of Justice (cf. Nicaragua vs. United States), are 
other examples of ‘imperial unintended’ policies.  
As mentioned, it is still premature to conclude that the Bush 
Administration’s invasion of Iraq signals a sustained US turn away from 
the liberal hegemonic system that the US shaped, led and profited from 
over the previous six decades. The record of those six decades, on the 
whole, was successful, however, while the record of efforts to turn away 
from that order, to subvert it, or to turn US pre-eminence into true 
imperialism, has largely been one of failure. In fact, Iraq has the potential of 
becoming the most significant foreign policy blunder in the history of the 
American republic. One consequence may well be a national abandonment 
of the attitudes that were responsible for it.  
There are important signs, as reflected both in public opinion and in 
the statements of the three leading Presidential candidates, that there is 
majority support for a course affirming that US interests and ideals are 
advanced best in the world through consensus-building leadership to 
advance the peaceful growth of a relatively stable zone of democracies and 
market economies. Republican as well as Democratic candidates for the 
presidency are, with varying degrees of explicitness, promising a 
restoration of what amounts to traditional American internationalism – that 
is, a repudiation of the historically curious alliance between Jacksonians 
and neo-con Wilsonians that marked the Bush administration in favour of a 
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3.7  Status quo – Intended: US policy towards Taiwan, 1978-2007 
The US has also acted in ways that may be characterised as status quo – 
intended. US policy regarding the status of Taiwan is a good example.  
Narrative 
Over roughly three decades since US-China normalisation, the US has 
favoured the preservation of the fundamental status quo regarding Taiwan, 
i.e. indefinite acceptance by all parties of Taiwan's ambiguous political 
status. The island should continue to enjoy de facto independence, but not 
internationally recognised legal independence, until Taipei and Beijing can 
agree on a peaceful resolution of their dispute. 
The United States does not support Taiwan’s independence and 
opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either Taiwan or Beijing. It 
has encouraged both sides to establish a substantive cross-Strait dialogue, 
and supports expansion of transportation and communication links across 
the Strait aimed at increasing political, economic, social and cultural 
exchanges and reducing the chances of any miscommunication or 
misunderstanding. That rationale enables Washington to acknowledge 
Beijing's position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of 
China while continuing to sell arms to Taiwan and maintain an implicit 
commitment to defend the island against a Chinese military assault.  
Under this approach, the US pursues two tracks. First, it does not 
want to give Taipei any reason to declare formal independence, as Jacques 
deLisle (2001) states: “either by creating excessive confidence that the 
United States will stand fully behind Taiwan in a cross-strait crisis 
produced by ‘unprovoked’ moves toward full separate statehood or by 
creating excessive worry about the United States' commitment to Taiwan 
such that moves toward a claim of de jure independence look like a 
reasonable gamble in perilous circumstances.” Second, Washington does 
not want to give Beijing any reason to believe it could coerce Taipei, again, 
in deLisle’s words, “either by allowing doubt about the US commitment to 
preserving Taiwan’s autonomy or by threatening to cross Beijing’s 
threshold of intolerable ‘interference’ to ‘separate’ Taiwan from China”. 
The United States has anchored its status quo approach in a series of 
documents and proclamations, particularly its ‘one China’ policy, the 
Taiwan Relations Act, three US-China Joint Communiqués, President 
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or one-China, one-Taiwan; or for Taiwan’s membership in states-only 
organisations) and carefully crafted policy statements embodying a policy 
of ‘strategic ambiguity’.51 
Goals, means and impact 
The US seeks to preserve the status quo arrangements regarding a 
potentially explosive relationship, which if it unravelled could drag the US 
into conflict and damage vital US interests in East Asia. It does this in a 
variety of ways, resulting in a relatively tolerable situation between Taipei 
and Beijing. In addition, within the international space created by this 
approach, Taiwan has transformed from dictatorship to democracy, and its 
economy has developed close interactions with the Chinese mainland, 
providing another incentive for both Taipei and Beijing not to rock the boat 
as each seeks to benefit further from the global economy. Moreover, 
continuation of the status quo preserves confidence in American 
commitments throughout the region and gives American allies in East Asia 
less cause for serious reassessment of regional power arrangements.  
Conditioning factor: Domestic context 
Although Congressional ire due to its exclusion from the US effort to 
recognise Beijing and de-recognise Taipei led to Congressional activism, 
particularly the Taiwan Relations Act, for decades the Congress has left 
Taiwan policy largely to the Executive branch. Today, congressional 
concerns tend to focus more on economic relations with Taiwan, arms sales 
and human rights issues. In general terms, however, US domestic politics 
has provided support for the triangular status quo approach of successive 
administrations. 
Conditioning factor: Domestic capabilities 
The US commands a panoply of economic, military, diplomatic and 
political tools with both Taipei and Beijing, and seeks to use them in an 
integrated fashion to preserve its status quo approach. Whenever Taiwan 
pushes too hard on independence, or when Beijing undertakes any 
untoward motion suggesting reunification, Washington does not hesitate to 
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admonish either side. The result of this balancing act has been relative 
stability.  
Conditioning factor: External environment 
While Taipei and Beijing have each accepted the status quo for an uncertain 
period, neither has given up its respective view that ultimately the status 
quo is unacceptable. The People’s Republic of China interprets the status 
quo as synonymous with a one-China policy and Taiwan’s eventual 
reunification with the mainland. Taiwan’s concept of the status quo is 
exactly the opposite: the status quo means Taiwan’s independence. The 
status quo solution has allowed each to bide its time while blunting any 
sudden or provocative developments. 
Summary 
Other examples of status quo-intended policies include US policy towards 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt and US approaches to climate change.  
3.8  Status quo – Unintended: the US and South Africa, 1948-90 
Narrative 
The US has also acted in ways that may be characterised as status quo – 
unintended, i.e. pursued its foreign policies in full respect of international 
law and institutions with the primary purpose of simply satisfying its 
possession goals and with little interest in shaping the normative milieu, 
yet unintentionally engendering normative results. US policy toward South 
Africa is an interesting example because decades of rigid US policy 
ultimately generated a domestic backlash that, combined with changes in 
South Africa itself, upended the status quo policies of the Executive branch 
and put the US firmly on the side of normative change.  
Goals, means and impact 
Only in the late 1980s did the US engage meaningfully to oppose apartheid 
in South Africa, and only due to efforts by the US Congress and civil 
society groups, rather than the Executive branch.  
Between the 1950s and the 1970s, domestic political support within 
South Africa for the black liberation movement stemmed largely from the 
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region were receiving support from the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, Libya 
and the PLO. During the cold war, the US assigned higher priority to 
containing communism and protecting US economic interests than with 
ending apartheid, despite support in US civil society for South Africa’s civil 
rights movement. The US had multiple stakes in preserving access to a 
stable South Africa, ranging from the need to contain communism; the 
significant US corporate investments in South African trade, industry, 
banks and natural resources; and the importance of protecting the strategic 
position of the Cape of Good Hope – a heavily traversed sea lane for the 
transport of oil and a prime access point to West Africa, the Indian 
subcontinent and the Persian Gulf. These goals led the US government to 
support perpetuation of the apartheid status quo, despite a rhetorical 
stance opposing apartheid. This position became clear during the 1952 
debate on apartheid, when the US noted that apartheid was not in keeping 
with the UN Charter but emphasised that countries should not intervene in 
the sovereign affairs of other nations.52 A l t h o u g h  i t  j o i n e d  6 0  o t h e r  
countries supporting the UN resolution that rejected apartheid, it did 
nothing to curb its own investment in the apartheid state, and failed to 
apply its ‘non-interventionist’ standard to its own efforts to contain 
communism in other nations around the world. 
This dual approach characterised US policy throughout the cold war. 
Despite the anti-apartheid rhetoric of the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations, Washington refused to sign a General Assembly 
resolution calling for nations to sever economic ties, despite support by a 
large majority of other nations, and continued to rely on the apartheid 
government for support of its Cold War objectives. The US did support a 
ban on arms sales to South Africa, however, underscoring the seeming 
contradictions in US attitudes and policies. The Nixon and Ford 
administrations relaxed the arms embargo, abstained from key UN votes 
on anti-apartheid measures, extended trade between the US and South 
Africa, and supported South African intervention in Angola, all the while 
criticising apartheid in public. While the Carter administration took a 
stronger stand against apartheid, it was unable to effect significant change, 
and the Reagan administration continued the US status quo approach 
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(Nesbitt, 2004, p. 113).53 Reagan consistently rejected the use of sanctions, 
downplayed racial injustice under apartheid and even lent South Africa 
$1.1 billion in return for South Africa's cooperation in negotiating a 
peaceful settlement in Namibia and encouraging the withdrawal of Cuban 
forces from Angola (Baker, 2000, pp. 96-99; Nesbitt, 2004, p. 11). The 
administration argued that such ‘constructive engagement’ would enhance 
US influence in inducing apartheid leaders to share power with the black 
majority. 
Events, however, were making a mockery of such claims. Growing 
domestic unrest against apartheid in South Africa was sparked in 1983 by 
the establishment of a tricameral legislature that totally excluded the 
country’s black majority. South African President P.W. Botha brutally 
repressed demonstrations and spoke out against US anti-apartheid efforts. 
These developments, in turn, invigorated domestic US efforts to impose 
sanctions on the South African regime (Baker, 2000, p. 103). The Reagan 
administration’s rather tepid response – a limited ban on computer 
technology sales (Nesbitt, 2004, p. 134) – only fanned the flames of 
domestic opposition to US policy. Activists joined forces with some 
members of Congress and even with a considerable number of US 
corporations to demand sanctions against South Africa (Baker, 2000, p. 
104). In 1986, constructive engagement was upended when Congress 
approved the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) imposing a 
range of new sanctions, including bans on new investments, bank loans 
and some South African imports. Reagan vetoed the measure, but his 
congressional opponents mustered more than a two-thirds majority to 
override the President’s veto (Landsberg & de Coning, 1995, p. 8). The 
CAAA linked the relaxation of sanctions to the release of political 
prisoners, the repeal of the state of emergency and key apartheid laws. It 
also provided substantial funding for South African civil society groups 
opposed to apartheid. The CAAA was a watershed in US policy, 
overturning decades of US status quo policies toward South Africa and 
aligning the United States with anti-apartheid activists around the world. 
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Sanctions began to bite hard, and South Africa became a pariah state. The 
US began to engage actively to encourage a peaceful transition. South 
African President De Klerk abandoned apartheid in 1990 (Baker, 2000, pp. 
104-110).  
Conditioning factor: Domestic context 
Richard Goldstone (2005) has documented the history of what he calls the 
‘two American policies’ toward apartheid – that of the Administration and 
that of the Congress and American civil society. Early American support 
for the anti-apartheid movement came mainly from universities, churches, 
trade unions and civil rights organisations active in America’s own 
domestic fight over racial equality. For many American civil rights 
organisations, US policy towards South Africa became a litmus test for the 
racial attitudes of government at home. US companies also felt the 
pressure; many worked together with civil rights activists to enact what 
became known as the ‘Sullivan principles’ guiding US corporate practices 
in South Africa that promoted equality and training for black workers, 
supported their right to join trade unions, and withdrew the sale of 
products that could support apartheid (Goldstone, 2005; Goldstone & Ray, 
2004). 
The work of civil society helped convince members of Congress, led 
primarily by the Black Political Caucus, to change US policies that made the 
country complicit with apartheid. Goldstone (Nesbitt, 2004, pp. 133-134) 
concludes: “Reagan’s policy of constructive engagement crumbled in large 
part because of the efforts of organisations like TransAfrica and the Free 
South Africa Movement, which staged marches, sit-ins, and encouraged 
companies to end relations with South Africa and US citizens to disinvest 
from companies that did not apply the Sullivan principles.” 
The US legal community also made key contributions to the anti-
apartheid movement. In 1979, American lawyers, together with the Ford 
and Carnegie Foundations, organised the first human rights convention in 
the history of South Africa. Two organisations were founded there – 
Lawyers for Human Rights and the Legal Resources Center – that started 
attacking apartheid laws and actually found limited success before a few 
judges, who wrote opinions supported by human rights principles and 
struck down some egregious provisions of apartheid laws. Goldstone 
(2005): “[T]his US intervention made a lasting impression on black South 
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awareness that the United States was involved through its legal profession 
in attempting to alleviate the plight of victims of apartheid.” The American 
Bar Association initiated advocacy skills training for black South African 
lawyers, and American NGOs enabled South Africans and exiled ANC 
leaders to meet in international conferences sponsored by American groups 
– an otherwise illegal endeavour in South Africa (Mikell & Lyman, 2001, p. 
87).  
Conditioning factor: Domestic capabilities 
The US had considerable capability to influence South African policies. US 
use of its veto power was important to blocking any effort by the UN to put 
teeth into its condemnation of apartheid, and US political and economic 
support helped bolster the regime. Similarly, the withdrawal of US support 
helped to isolate the regime and hasten the post-apartheid transition. Direct 
engagement between American and South African civil society groups also 
played an important role in training and empowering the South African 
opposition. 
Conditioning factor: External environment 
A closer look at the external environment reveals that non-state actors, 
particularly principled advocacy groups, can influence official perceptions 
and ranking of national security priorities and their views of acceptable 
international norms, i.e. what constitutes ‘appropriate behaviour’. 
Summary 
The timeframe for this case study is an important consideration. If one 
considered only the period between 1948 and, say, 1975, this case study 
might fit more appropriately under status quo intended. But treating the 
entire period showcases how official government policy can be overturned 
by domestic currents in American society as much as by developments 
abroad. 
The US approach to the landmines treaty offers a related example. 
Activist leaders in the US Senate pushed the US to be the first nation to call 
for a global ban on landmines, but then the US turned against the 
international treaty due to specific possession goals, notably concern for its 
troops along the heavily-mined demarcation line in Korea. As momentum 
developed for such a treaty, however, the result of rigid US opposition was 
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such distinctions or potential opt-outs. Moreover, US civil society groups 
redefined the issue as one concerning humanitarian consequences of 
landmines rather than that of arms control or regional security, and joined 
with other NGOs in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) 
to bypass the Administration and engineer successful negotiation of the 
treaty (see International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 2005; Maresca & 
Maslen, 2000; Norwegian Nobel Committee, 1997; and Arms Control Today, 
1997). 
The landmines treaty was ratified largely because a transnational 
advocacy campaign was able to persuade enough critical states that the 
humanitarian problem posed by landmines trumped any military utility 
these weapons served, and thus generated a ‘norms-cascade’ of state 
support for the ban (de Albuquerque, 2007; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 
887-917; Price, 1998, pp. 613-644). It is important to note, however, that 
most countries in the world were not facing security dilemmas in which 
landmines would be particularly relevant or useful, and thus the political 
gain of signing the treaty, in terms of public opinion and conveying the 
impression that one was a good international citizen, was far higher than 
the security cost of not employing landmines. Thus it is unclear whether 
normative persuasion really convinced governments to do something they 
otherwise would not have done, or whether the opportunity costs were 
simply so low as to offer few downsides. This proposition might be better 
evaluated by looking at the countries that did not sign the treaty, assuming 
that those states were faced with higher opportunity costs. In fact, while the 
treaty has 153 states parties and only 42 non-signatories, the non-
signatories are significant international security actors such as the US, 
China, Russia, India, Israel, North and South Korea. EU member state 
Finland also has not signed, indicating that the Finns consider the 
normative win/security loss calculus to be too high (Price, 1998, p. 614; 
Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 901). 
4.  Summary and Conclusion: What do these typologies really 
tell us? Do they help us answer the question? 
In sum, our case studies reveal representative US instances for each of these 
stylised foreign policy types. Such categories, however, beg the deeper 
question: overall, which most closely reflects the core of US foreign policy? 
Which examples are representative of deeper currents in American society, 
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Tocci acknowledges that the same international actor can display a 
normative,  realpolitik, imperial or status quo foreign policy in different 
regions and in different policy areas at different points in time. The case 
studies presented here indicate that the US, at least, can – and does in fact – 
engage in each of these ways simultaneously.  
This refutes the rather superficial claim that the US used to be a 
normative power but isn’t today. While most ‘normative power’ EU 
theorists acknowledge, in the words of Diez & Manners (2007, pp. 170, 174, 
186), that the US “has exemplified the concept of a normative power during 
parts of its history”, particularly “in the inter-war and immediate post-war 
periods”, they deny that this has been true more recently. As this study has 
shown, however, the US advanced normative and non-normative goals, 
and deployed normative and non-normative means, before and after World 
War II, just as it does today. The reality is that the relative value or cost of 
these options has presented itself to every US administration and Congress; 
the US has not swung from purely normative phases to non-normative 
ones.  
This underscores my point that the more appropriate question is not 
whether the US is a normative actor but the degree to which it is one. I submit 
that this is also the more appropriate question when it comes to analysing 
other countries as well. To answer this question it is necessary to determine 
where the real centre of gravity lies when it comes to characterising the US 
role in the world. This requires us in turn to assign some kind of weighting 
to the different paradigms. 
Ov erall, this rev iew of U S foreign policy indicates that the United 
States has been and continues to be simultaneously a guardian of norms 
established by the international community; a norm entrepreneur 
challenging those norms and on balance pushing the international 
community towards stronger norms enshrining human rights and the rule 
of law and democratic societies; a norm externaliser when it tries to 
advance norms for others that it is reluctant to apply to itself; and a norm 
blocker when it comes to issues that may threaten its position, or that 
exacerbate domestic divisions among the co-equal branches of American 
government or among the fluid yet often-conflicting currents of American 
domestic thought regarding America’s role in the world.  
In addition, due to shifting political constellations and the separation 
of powers inherent in the US constitutional system, it is not easy to predict 
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and rather fluid nature of the US system indicates that coalitions 
transcending nominal party allegiances need to be built on most issues, and 
the strength and durability of such coalitions depend not only on the issue 
at hand, but on its relationship to many other issues.54  
Moreover, the particular weight of any one of these typologies varies 
over time. In general it may be said that the ‘normative intended’ 
dimension carries considerable weight and is a legitimate source of pride 
within the US foreign policy tradition. There are of course cases in which 
the US seeks to advance normative goals through normative means, but 
with major unintended consequences, but on the whole these appear to be 
less weighty. Over the course of the past 90 years, the US has also exhibited 
a strong tradition of hegemonic (as opposed to imperial) behaviour. There 
have been flashes of imperialism, but overall they have been subsumed 
within a broader pattern of hegemony. While one can certainly identify 
instances of US realpolitik, intended or unintended, overall they appear to 
arise on a more case-by-case, ad hoc basis and thus seem less representative 
than the other two categories. There are fewer identifiable cases of US 
status quo orientation, but here again the case study approach limits the 
analysis, since the US is considered widely to be a major, if not the main, 
custodian and steward of the current international system.  
In sum, the mainstream of US foreign policy tends more often than 
not to reflect a varying blend of normative and hegemonic approaches. This 
mainstream tradition, however, has been challenged by the historically 
unusual Wilsonian-Jacksonian coalition that over the past six years has 
dominated the US executive branch, with only some countervailing 
influence by the legislative and judicial branches. Challenges to the 
mainstream in the 1990s instead came more often than not from influential 
Jacksonian and Jeffersonian elements in the Congress. These shifting 
coalitions indicate that it is premature to conclude that the US has turned 
from the fundamental instincts that have guided it for the past 60 years. 
The rhetoric of the major contenders for the presidency in 2008, in fact, 
seems truer to mainstream tradition than to US activities of the recent past. 
Hillary Clinton, John McCain and Barack Obama each essentially claim to 
be the person best able to pass what Henry Kissinger has called the 
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historical test for this generation of American leaders: how to use 
preponderant US power to achieve an international consensus behind 
widely accepted norms that will protect American values in a more 
uncertain future. 
As we have seen, there is a particularly acute tension within the 
normative-hegemonic approach, and that is the extent to which the US is 
willing or able to bind itself to the norms it advances for others. This 
tension has characterised US foreign policy for many decades. For instance, 
no country was more responsible than the United States for the creation of 
the United Nations, and President Harry Truman was clear from the outset 
what this would mean. On 25 June 1945, in his closing address to the San 
Francisco conference that drafted the UN Charter, he stated: “[W]e all have 
to recognize, no matter how great our strength, that we must deny 
ourselves the license to do always as we please.” This statement has not 
always sat comfortably with Truman's successors. As Stephen Schlesinger 
(2006) notes, “Washington discovered soon after the UN's birth that despite 
its veto power in the Security Council, it could not always control its 
wayward child. As a result, ever since 1945, US leaders have approached 
the UN with ambivalence: hoping, on the one hand, to use it to further US 
national security interests, while, on the other hand, worrying that too 
much involvement might constrain the United States' ability to act.”55 This 
tension has characterised America’s approach to most international 
institutions and norms, even though public opinion polls consistently 
record strong public support for multilateral approaches to international 
challenges.  
The US has not always mastered this tension well. As Kalypso 
Nicolaidis (2004) notes, “in non-American eyes, there is a world of 
differences between the ‘righteous might’ of Roosevelt’s era and the self-
righteous might of George W. Bush”.  
On balance, however, and despite exceptions, over the past 60 years 
the US has sought to manage its normative-hegemonic interplay by 
accepting some limits on its power and being bound by broader 
international norms and commitments, in exchange for greater legitimacy 
and acceptance of its leadership by others. The unresolved question in the 
post-cold war, post-September 11 world is whether the US and other key 
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players are prepared to stick with this bargain, or whether the US will 
increasingly act as a ‘norm externaliser’, i.e. using its power to advance 
broad norms for others but refusing to apply such norms to itself, and 
whether other nations will refuse the ‘followership’ that leadership 
requires. “Nothing undermines US authority more than the perception that 
the United States considers itself too powerful to be bound by the norms 
we preach to others” notes former US National Security Advisor Sandy 
Berger (2004).  
5.  Postscript: Comparing the US and the EU 
Since this project was prompted by consideration of the EU as a normative 
power, and since much of the literature in this regard contains explicit or 
implicit references to the United States, a few points warrant consideration.  
First, much of the literature on the EU’s alleged ‘normative power’ 
ignores some fundamental underpinnings of European order that have 
enabled conceptions of ‘normative power’ to develop and be exercised at 
all. During the first half of the 20th century, most Europeans squandered 
any pretension they might have had to normative leadership through two 
World Wars and continued colonial rule. Following World War II, the US 
security guarantee removed – at least for half a continent – a key source of 
European conflict: the perceived need by mistrustful European states to 
build arms and alliances against their own neighbours. The American 
security commitment offered west Europeans an umbrella under which 
they could reconcile and agree on new norms that could offer a common 
foundation upon which they could work together and with others. Over 
time, the reassurances offered by a supportive – yet comfortably distant – 
hegemon enabled Europeans to create a community within which they 
could derive their security from each other rather than against each other. 
The very creation of the EU and the ability of its members to domesticate 
their foreign policies and render them normative rested on security 
guarantees provided by the United States.  
It is perhaps easy today to forget that NATO was the umbrella under 
which the European integration project could proceed, or that post-war 
institutions were created as much to prevent West Europeans from again 
dragging the world into conflict and depression as to prevent Soviet 
dominance or communist infiltration. As noted by Kalypso Nicolaidis 
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driving force was an aberration of history made possible to a great extent 
by the US”.56 
Moreover, this security logic continues even today – despite the end 
of the cold war, despite September 11, and despite transatlantic and inner-
EU squabbles over Iraq and other issues. The US continues to provide the 
ultimate reassurance enabling Europeans to reconcile, build and extend 
their Union. This is as evident in Kosovo today as it has been throughout 
the Balkans for the past decade and more.57 This logic has been particularly 
evident in the determination of Central and Eastern European states to join 
NATO as well as the EU. New member states have been very clear about 
this relationship: while they have been keen to integrate with European 
societies within the EU, they are ultimately reassured in doing so through 
their membership in NATO.  
The ‘normative power’ Europe discourse is strangely silent on this 
point. I was struck that the case study of EU enlargement in the EU 
working paper failed to even mention the parallel process of NATO 
enlargement and the obvious relationship between the two. While each 
operates according to its own particular logic, most EU countries are 
NATO countries, and the same officials and populations have been 
addressing the same historic opportunity: to extend to as much of the 
European continent as possible the democratic, free-market space where 
war simply does not happen.  
This relates to a point Diez & Manners (2007, pp. 176, 180) have made 
about the relationship between normative and military power. “In contrast 
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to civilian power”, they note, “normative power is not the opposite of 
military power. It is entirely conceivable that military force is used to back 
up the spread of normative values” and that “military capabilities may 
underpin normative power.” I couldn’t agree more. What is important to 
add, however, is that in some instances the military capabilities – and 
political commitment – that underpin the EU’s ability to project normative 
power are provided not by the EU but by the United States. 
Second, much of the literature describing ‘normative power EU’ is 
highly selective, including policies of EU member states when it is 
convenient and excluding them when it is not. There are two dimensions to 
this. The first has to do with foreign policy, where authority and 
competence still reside largely with member states. The EU, qua EU, in fact, 
has little real purview over the vast range of foreign policy decisions 
confronting any particular EU nation. Any consideration of the EU as a 
normative foreign policy actor, therefore, needs to consider the actions of 
individual EU member states, not just examples of common EU action. This 
is important for our purposes because the tendency is to compare the EU 
with the United States. In one such comparison, for instance, Diez & 
Manners (2007, p. 182) argue that the US readily resorts to force, whereas 
“the fact” is that “the EU or, rather, EU member states consider the use of 
force a last resort”. Really? What about the British and Polish invasion of 
Iraq and Spanish support for it? What about German, British, French, 
Dutch, etc. intervention in the Balkans without a UN mandate? What about 
French or British interventions in Africa or the British intervention in the 
Falklands? My point is not to criticise such decisions, it is to ask for greater 
analytical rigor – for this, too, is the EU. 
The other dimension has to do with domestic policies, or the extent to 
which EU member states have coordinated and ‘domesticated’ aspects of 
their interactions with one another. There is no doubt that in many areas 
there have been successes, even as progress is halting in other areas. The 
issue is whether the EU’s ‘normative power’ is more effective through 
active projection of  such ‘domesticated’ policies abroad or by offering a 
model to others by practicing such norms at home. This debate, while new 
to the EU, echoes the long-standing American debate between Jeffersonians 
and Wilsonians. The EU’s normative power in this regard seems to be more 
influential simply through its example at home – the fact that nations that 
regularly used violence against each other now join together in common 
cause in a variety of traditionally domestic policy areas. The EU has 
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through accession negotiations with candidates aspiring to join the EU 
itself, as well as a web of arrangements – ranging from the Barcelona 
Process in the Mediterranean and Stabilisation and Association agreements 
with Balkan states to the Black Sea Synergy initiative and the EU’s ‘Four 
Spaces’ concept with Russia – that seek to extend EU notions of norms, 
order and structure in the EU’s periphery. The EU has had less success 
extending its particular version of norms or order on a global scale. The 
death penalty seems to be a prominent example, but even here success 
seems limited largely to Europe and Latin America, and problems of 
ratification and implementation in vast parts of the world remain 
(Katzenstein, 2006). Nonetheless, the possibilities are intriguing. 
If one looks for examples beyond treaties and international law, 
however, one uncovers some promising experiments in the international 
extension of ‘domesticated’ EU policies – particularly with the United 
States. The recently created Transatlantic Economic Council, for instance, is 
in essence an effort to tie the US and the EU into a consultative process that 
identifies and then seeks to resolve domestic regulatory or policy barriers 
to the deeper integration of their economies, and to consider whether 
common standards developed through this process could form the basis for 
broader international norms. Yet it is striking that most of the literature 
either ignores the US dimension or goes to great pains to define ‘normative 
power EU’ against the US example. 
The US continues to set, or influence the formulation of standards in 
many parts of the world (often with EU support). So does the EU – often 
with US support. The US, for instance, understands that the EU is the 
legitimate framework within which such standards can be set in Europe, 
and does what it can to support their extension to wider Europe. The 
occasions where it objects are more the exception than the rule. I would 
therefore caution against the notion that the EU's regulatory norm-setting is 
unique or that it is being done at the expense of the US or has somehow 
‘overtaken’ the US in some way. There is an ‘either-or’ quality to much of 
the ‘normative power EU’ literature that just does not reflect the way the 
US and EU act in practice. 
These considerations lead to a third point – the role of the United 
States, or perhaps more accurately, stereotypes of the United States, in 
European debates about identity politics. Proponents of ‘normative power 
EU’ refreshingly acknowledge that the notion of ‘normative power’ is part 
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requires an ‘other’ against which such identities are constructed. “Not only 
is the success of this representation” of normative power EU “a 
precondition for other actors to agree to the norms set out by the EU”, state 
Diez & Manners (2007, pp. 173-188), “it also constructs an identity of the 
EU against an image of others in the ‘outside world’.” After reviewing the 
literature, however, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the ‘other’, 
whom the adherents of ‘normative power EU’ are constructing their 
arguments ‘against’ is in fact the EU’s closest partner, the United States. 
Diez and Manners explicitly seek to draw such distinctions. They 
argue that the American tradition of ‘exceptionalism’ essentially 
disqualifies the US from being considered a normative power, whereas it is 
precisely what they believe to be Europe’s ‘ordinariness’ that provides 
‘normative power EU’ with such strength and attraction. This represents 
almost wilful ignorance of the strong exceptionalist rhetoric that is part and 
parcel of daily European political debates. In fact, the very premise of 
normative power is that Europe is uniquely positioned to guide humanity 
to a better future.  
The more compelling distinction, it seems to me, is rooted in each 
partner’s sense of its own exceptionalism. As Kalypso Nicolaidis (2004) 
notes, historians trace difficulties between France and the United States to 
their similar sense of mission, of being the upholders of political and 
philosophical models for the world through the avowedly universal reach 
of their respective 18th century revolutions. I would add that German 
critiques of the United States are also rooted in part in a German sense of 
exceptionalism: since Germany had been exceptionally evil, many Germans 
today believe their country must be exceptionally good. Since the US 
helped inculcate such beliefs in German society over two generations, it is 
particularly grating for Germans when US achievements fail to meet US 
aspirations, or when US demands of solidarity force Germans to abandon 
black and white in favour of grey. The moralistic undertone to much 
German critique is inescapable, even when it is not explicit. 
These dilemmas arise in part because both the US and the EU think of 
themselves as normative powers projecting their internal norms of 
democracy and human rights abroad. Nevertheless, these two competing 
forms of exceptionalism are of a different kind. As Nicolaidis (2004) notes:  
Their respective founding myths, the escape from despotism 
and the escape from nationalism, tyranny from above and tyranny 
from below, led both entities to elevate commitment to the rule of law THE UNITED STATES: A NORMATIVE POWER?| 147 
 
as their core. But this was domestic law in the US, supra-national law 
in the EU; this meant checks and balance between branches of 
government on one side, between states on the other. While the US 
progressively became a federal state, the EU, admittedly still in its 
infancy, is braced to remain a federal union of nation-states. In the last 
two decades, while both the US and the EU have been fertile grounds 
for exploring ‘subsidiarity’, and multilevel governance, the EU alone 
has explored ways of doing this without coordination by a centralized 
state, through methods that might one day be relevant to global 
governance. US exceptionalism is a national project; European a 
postnational one.58 
Within this distinction lies an opportunity: to reconcile these different 
‘normative’ traditions rather than to deny the legitimacy of one or the other 
or to ignore the common foundations upon which they are based – all in 
all, an attractive agenda for US-EU relations. 
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4.  REBRANDING RUSSIA: 
NORMS, POLITICS AND POWER 
ANDREY S. MAKARYCHEV* 
This chapter argues that Russia is in the process of re-branding itself 
internationally, with a variety of normative arguments increasingly creeping into 
its wider international discourse. By appealing to norms, Russia tries to 
reformulate the key messages it sends to the world and implant the concept of its 
power worldwide. Yet given that Russia’s normative messages are often met with 
scarce enthusiasm in Europe, it is of utmost importance to uncover how the 
normative segment in Russian foreign policy is perceived, evaluated and debated 
both inside Russia and elsewhere. Within this framework, this paper focuses on a 
set of case studies highlighting the normative and non-normative dimensions of 
Russian foreign policy. These include Russia-EU trans-border cooperation, 
Moscow’s policies towards Estonia, Poland, Ukraine/Georgia and the UK, Russian 
strategies in the ‘war on terror’ and energy issues. 
1.  Introduction 
There are two different ways in which norms can be operationalised in 
international relations. On the one hand, ‘norms tame’ and de-politicise 
power (Adler, 2005, p. 173), when they are viewed as indisputable, essential 
and universal, thus invoking a managerial type of behaviour that leaves no 
space for political discretion. Norms under this interpretation represent 
“collective understandings of the proper behaviour of actors” (Legro, 1997, 
p. 33). The Foucauldian legacy looms large in this interpretation: the norm 
is viewed as a bearer of power claims, the core element needed to 
substantiate and legitimise the execution of power. According to Foucault 
(1999), the norm both qualifies and corrects, thus representing a “positive 
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technique of intervention and reformation”. Therefore, the reification of the 
norm signifies its gradual endorsement by a group, and the failure to 
accept the norm is equated with a pathology or deviation. The norm 
becomes a principle of conformity, which is contrasted with irregularity, 
disorder or eccentricity. On the other hand, norms may be viewed as 
political instruments. Since norms construct agents, including states, they 
perform a political function and enhance political subjectivity by 
differentiating between US (the followers of norms) and Them (the 
violators of norms). We identify ourselves (and thus our norms) by 
identifying others (those unfit or unwilling to follow our norms). The 
normative appeal is increasingly marked by a frontier separating the inside 
from the outside, a frontier between those who succeed in remaining 
within normative boundaries and those excluded from them (Zizek, 2006, 
p. 21).  
Normativity ought to be understood also as an inter-subjective 
concept. As Jurgen Habermas (2006, p. 18) argues: “in the course of mutual 
perspective taking, a common horizon of background assumptions can 
develop in which both sides reach an interpretation that is neither ethno-
centrically condescending nor a conversion, but something 
intersubjectively shared”. Inter-subjectivity is a core characteristic of 
normativity, while also having close bearings to the concept of identity. 
This points to one of the most important sources of discursive asymmetry 
between the EU and Russia. It is argued that a European identity is 
constructed in opposition to its own past through the concept of the “past 
as other” (Diez, 2005). This differs radically from the Russian perception of 
itself as a country whose identity is deeply rooted in its past. Another 
identity-driven juxtaposition between the EU and Russia is the Russian 
concept of ‘False Europe’, which includes countries with strong anti-
Russian sentiments and countries that have presumably lost touch with 
‘genuine European values’; while ‘true Europe’ includes countries friendly 
to Russia, which adhere to what Russia considers as ‘the original spirit of 
Europe’. This highlights how “for reality to be brought under the ordering 
influence of governance, it first has to be divided … into what is imagined 
to be normal and what is deviant, threatening, risky, underdeveloped, etc. 
Such a narration of abnormality, ‘othering’… is constitutive of any project 
of improvement…” (Merlingen, 2006, p. 192). In other words, the norm 
violator is crucial to a proper understanding of the norm itself. This 
explains why the concept of otherness is so closely linked with the 
manifestation of normativity in politics. 158 | ANDREY S. MAKARYCHEV 
 
Hence, one cannot properly define a norm without defining its 
exception, and this involves bordering effects and a conceptualisation of 
the Other as a challenger to the norm, a bearer of radical alternity. The 
Other takes different forms, depending on context: for the EU it can be 
personalised in Lukashenko’s regime in Belarus, while for Russia it can 
take the form of the Estonian government, which is believed to deviate 
from European norms of tolerance and remembrance of the Second World 
War. What is then needed is to link norms with their exceptions: “[i]f we 
distinguish contemporary exceptions as the limit and threshold of the 
norm, we can investigate how the one constitutes the other and vice 
versa”.59 It may be argued that “the exception gobbles up the normal case 
and becomes, in and of itself, the ordinary, general rule… It is the exception 
that defines the norm, not vice versa. The exception is primary to the norm 
and defines and informs the norm” (Gross, 2000, p. 1843). This approach 
offers an alternative explanation of the construction of international agents. 
When we speak of exception(s), there should be a clear reference to – and 
analytical distinction from – its logical opposite: the norm. In this reading, 
the concept of exception unveils strong connotations with Carl Schmitt’s 
theory, which suggests that all norm-bound orders depend on a decision-
making capacity that falls beyond the given structure of rules and 
principles. Exceptions as specific exercises of power are actualised when 
“no prior law, procedure or anticipated response is adequate. It is a 
perilous moment that exceeds the limits of precedent, knowledge, 
legislation and predictability… an expression of political authority that has 
the capacity to constitute new political and legal orders” (CASE, 2006, p. 
465). Following Schmitt (1996, p. 53): “one can say that the exceptional case 
has an especially decisive meaning which exposes the core of the matter”.  
The extension of the concept of exception to the sphere of 
international relations is justified. In particular, the deployment of the 
‘norm-exception’ dichotomy in the relationship between Moscow and 
Brussels presupposes the unpacking of what may be dubbed as 
‘recognition games’. Presumably, Russia (as well as the EU) utilises both 
norm-based and exception-based arguments to strengthen its international 
credentials and negotiating positions. The Russian message sent to Europe 
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is thus ambivalent. On the one hand, Moscow recognises the force and 
potential of the ‘policy of exceptions’ and takes as much advantage of it as 
possible. On certain occasions, it becomes the exception (e.g., Russia’s 
unwillingness to ratify the Energy Charter), while in other situations it calls 
upon EU member states to recognise the need for exceptions (e.g., Russian 
demands that the EU would not apply the acquis communautaire to 
Kaliningrad). On the other hand, Russia explores the possibilities 
embedded in adhering to what is considered as ‘normal’ by the EU. This 
gap between norm-based and exception-based policies constitutes a major 
dilemma in the contested construction of Russia’s European identity.  
This ambivalence in the concept of the norm – its ability to both 
politicise and de-politicise action – fuels debate. In this chapter, based upon 
the methodology offered by Nathalie Tocci in chapter 1, the debate over the 
meaning of norms plays out in different ways. Since norms require at least 
two parties in order to be operational (either ‘subject-subject’ or ‘subject-
object’), three model situations can be imagined, which reflect the case 
studies analysed in this paper and are selected on the basis of Tocci’s 
conceptual framework: 
•  the encounter of two norms in their de-politicised version, which 
relates to the normative intended case study: Russia-EU trans-border 
cooperation, 
•  the collision of two politically driven approaches to norms, which 
relates to the normative unintended case study: Russia-Estonia, 
•  a situation in which one actor adheres to a de-politicised norm while 
the other is inclined to use a politicised approach, which relates to the 
imperial unintended case study: the Russia-UK dispute over 
Litvinenko’s murder. 
A similar split between politicized and de-politicised interpretations 
of norms is found in case studies in which goals are ‘non-normative’: the 
realpolitik and status quo cases discussed below. The difference between the 
two is substantial. In the realpolitik scenarios, ‘non-normative approaches’ 
tend to be linked to politicised moves, consisting either of opportunistically 
transgressing the emerging political order or clashing with established 
rules of the game (i.e., the cases of Russia’s policy towards the colour 
revolutions and Poland). The status quo scenarios (i.e., the cases of 
Kaliningrad and energy policy) instead presuppose the competitive co-
existence of different yet more de-politicised norms. However, within the 
scope of these de-politicised cases, there is still scope for strongly 160 | ANDREY S. MAKARYCHEV 
 
politicised effects if one of the parties behaves as a norm violator rather 
than a legitimate competitor of norms. The same is true in cases in which 
there is an ‘encounter of two de-politicised norms’: the same type of 
politicising effects might be expected if one side adopts a political reading 
of the situation by making reference either to exceptionality or to the ‘Self-
Other’ framework. This is possible particularly in the case of Kaliningrad, 
which is formally part of Russia proper (and could thus shift from being a 
Status Quo intended to being a Normative Intended case). 
There are three further methodological observations to be made at the 
outset. First, my analysis is predicated upon a logical link between 
structural (‘goals-means-results’ triad) and conditioning (‘internal interests, 
internal capacity, external environment’ triad) factors as discussed by 
Tocci. More specifically, this paper assumes that a) internal interests 
condition the articulation of an actor’s goals, b) internal capacity conditions 
an actor’s choice of means, and c) the external environment conditions the 
policy impact (see Table 1). Taking these correlations into account, one may 
posit that conditioning factors: a) explain the goals articulated, the means 
chosen and the results attained; b) add dynamics into each element of the 
triad; and c) broaden the overall picture by including explanatory elements 
to comprehend the three core variables.  
Table 1. The correlation between normative action and conditioning factors 
  Internal interests  Internal capacity  External environment 
Goals     
Means      
Impact     
 
Second, I do not equate the ‘intended-unintended’ dichotomy to 
‘success-failure’. In cases of intended outcomes, Russia displays an ability 
to achieve and control the results of its policies. In cases of unintended 
outcomes, Russia is unable to attain its desired results or fails to control the 
impact of its policies due to a multiplicity of external/structural factors.  
Third, while norms may differ, the core question, in my 
understanding, is whether a certain country (in this case Russia) is in 
principle committed to (any) norms as opposed to pursing self-interest 
through conquest, force or possession. The norm in this sense is understood 
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and substantive values, principles and rules. We are thus not comparing 
the ethical and moral content of different norms, but rather an actor’s 
adherence to norms as opposed to other models of foreign policy conduct. 
2.  Norms, normativity, normalcy: Russia in search of its identity 
The concept of the norm – as well as its derivatives like normativity or 
normalcy – might be used to analyse Russia’s foreign policy, although there 
is a great deal of confusion concerning the operationalisation of these 
concepts. Since post-Soviet foreign policy is still in the making, its 
normative aspects are often encoded in other arguments, including 
geopolitical, economic or security ones. President Putin’s discourses often 
shift between different spheres, testifying to the fact that treating Russia as 
a black-and-white realpolitik actor is a gross oversimplification. Russia is in 
the process of rebranding itself internationally, with a normative appeal 
inscribed into a wider set of discourses. Normative arguments have become 
a tool for the reformulation of Russia’s messages to the world, while being 
embedded in Russia’s understanding of its international power. Russian 
attempts to utilise norms in foreign policy discourse are often met with 
scepticism in the EU. In the case of energy policy, Russia’s references to 
economic and financial norms are considered as inherently 
political/imperial moves by the EU. In the conflict with Estonia, Moscow’s 
references to common European values are considered as a gesture to 
conceal imperial designs and an attempted return to Soviet-style 
international conduct.  
Table 2. Russia’s role in the world: Selected case studies 
Normative  Realpolitik  Imperial Status  quo  Type of 
actor 
Intended   Un- 
intended 
Intended Un- 
intended 
Intended  Un- 
intended 
Intended Un- 
intended 
Case 
Study 
Trans-
border 
cooperation 
Estonia  Poland  Colour 
revolu-
tions 
War on 
terror 
Litvinenko  Kaliningrad  Energy 
Goals                 
Means                
Impact                 
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Despite these doubts and preconceptions, as the sections below exemplify, 
Russia’s foreign policy is varied, changing according to a variety of internal 
and external factors. It is thus of utmost importance to uncover how the 
normative dimension of Russian foreign policy discourse is perceived, 
assessed, evaluated and debated. Table 2 above summarises the selected 
case studies. 
2.1  Normative intended: Russia-EU trans-border cooperation 
Russia displays its commitment to normative foreign policy through its 
participation in a series of trans-border initiatives aimed at fostering 
cooperation with Europe, including the Northern Dimension and the 
construction of Euro-regions.  
Goals 
In developing trans-border communications with its European neighbours, 
Russia is driven by its identification with European norms and feels 
involved in European affairs. Of course, one cannot discard Russia’s 
meaningful economic interests in trans-border cooperation, but the 
normative basis driving policy seems to prevail. The membership of border 
regions in international initiatives, including the development of twin-city 
partnerships, is an important element of Russia’s Europeanisation and 
Russia has committed itself to strengthening institutions in this shared 
neighbourhood through a variety of initiatives aimed at promoting mutual 
confidence and human exchange. This normative background becomes 
clearer when contrasted with the absence of comparable cooperation 
initiatives in border regions with China, Mongolia or Kazakhstan, which do 
not have the same normative appeal in Russia as Europe does.  
In particular in the Northern Dimension (ND), Russia has 
participated in region-building efforts which either skipped traditional 
East-West divides or made them less divisive. It was important for Russia 
that the Baltic and Nordic regions were formed without an overall plan or 
superior authority, and with no strict criteria for membership, which made 
Russia’s voice in the endeavour stronger. The ND was meant to shift 
Russia’s policies in this part of Europe from realpolitik, semi-isolationism 
and unilateralism to multilateral cooperation. By participating in trans-
national region-building projects, Russia helped to elevate regionality into 
a core principle of the political construction of Europe’s margins. At the 
same time, Russia perceived the ND as an opportunity to join the REBRANDING RUSSIA: NORMS, POLITICS AND POWER?| 163 
 
‘democratic space’, in which the main priorities are human rights, the 
protection of minorities and a healthy environment (Arutinov, 2000, p. 259). 
The creation of the Nordic and Baltic regions also opened new and 
inclusive channels of dialogue with EU non-member states. Russia was 
granted the status of being ‘one of us’, a potential partner which could feel 
at home in Baltic and Nordic initiatives (Joenniemi, 1999, p. 75). A good 
illustration of this is the interpretation of the ND by many Russian analysts: 
“the Nordic game can only be played effectively within the EU 
framework… The Nordic challenge is therefore not to compete with the 
EU, but to utilize the Union’s structural framework; not to alter but to 
extend the European project” (Medvedev, 1998, p. 247). 
Means 
Russia has pursued normative goals in its trans-border cooperation with 
the EU through normative policy means, including a set of cooperative 
agreements with the EU. In 2001 Russia approved the Concept of Trans-
border Cooperation, which mentioned the need to take into account the 
peculiarities of Russia’s border regions.60 In 2002, the State Duma ratified 
the European Framework Convention on Trans-Border Cooperation. 
Thereafter, the Doctrine of the Development of Russia’s North West 
stipulated that for integration into a European milieu, Russia’s border 
regions needed special managerial techniques based on human capital, the 
innovation and non-governmental networking.61 Beyond these legal 
frameworks, Russian regions used a variety of trans-border organisations 
like the Council on Cooperation of Border Regions (CCBR) to seek ways 
out of cumbersome state-to-state interaction. In the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Council (BEAC), the regions (along with states) are the dominant actors to 
discuss non-military problems for example (Tunander, 1994, pp. 31-33). 
Useful institutional resources are also found in the Committee for Spatial 
Development in the Baltic Sea Region (CSD/BSR), which contributed to the 
elaboration of norms in housing, sanitation, public services, the 
exploitation of non-renewable resources, the preservation of cultural 
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heritage, the safety of technical supplies, the regulation of land use, etc. 
Institutional mechanisms were also established for circumpolar integration 
such as the Arctic Council, a high-level intergovernmental forum which 
includes Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden 
as members.62 
A particular manifestation of Russia’s receptiveness to the EU’s 
normative appeal was its participation in the ND, which is closely related 
to the idea of Europe as a set of ‘Olympic rings’. The political values that 
underpin the ND are “transparency, egalitarianism, and consensual 
democracy” (Schumacher, 2000, p. 11), fostering decentralised 
arrangements and leaving ample space for grass-root initiatives. The ND 
assumes that a political space can be heterogeneous and autonomous, with 
a variety of growth poles; its components being active agents in regional 
integration and not simply subjects of someone else’s policies. The ensuing 
dialogue between different actors facilitates cultural exchanges and 
undermines ‘self/other’ constructions. In this sense, the ND was meant to 
blur the distinction between insiders and outsiders, because it is defined 
not only in geographical but also in normative terms. 
Impact 
By and large, Russia reacted positively to EU trans-border initiatives, 
engendering a normative impact. Local communities and professional 
groups were particularly enthusiastic, stimulating leading regional 
institutions, shaping networks between the most active and knowledgeable 
NGOs, expanding the scope of issues being dealt with, and encouraging the 
creation of multiple overlapping networks (‘network of networks’). Russia 
attained a normative effect in several spheres. In social terms, a key effect 
was the cultivation of a space of close interaction by creating normative 
practices that bridged gaps between communities as well as facilities aimed 
at promoting tourist exchange, business-to-business contacts, etc. In 
security terms, the trans-border cooperation altered the balance of priorities 
between hard and soft security issues, raising awareness of issues such as 
depopulation and labour migration, or the poaching of precious stones, 
non-ferrous metals, furs, wood and oil products. Hence, whereas the 
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federal state has played up more the importance of geopolitics and hard 
security; the regional level has prioritised more soft security, highlighting 
the human and public policy dimension of security (Tkachenko, 2002). In 
institutional terms, an increasing number of issues (e.g., pollution, water 
purification, health care, civil servants’ training) are tackled in a technical, 
politically neutral and low-profile way though regional institutions. This 
has generated incentives to create and follow new norms of governance. 
Russian regional officials have started thinking of how to reorient their 
strategies towards providing better services, more effective marketing and 
richer public debates about future living conditions.63 Several institutional 
arrangements in Russia have started acting as “trans-boundary networking 
communities” (Shinkunas, 2003), allowing for deeper involvement of 
European business in regional economies, and the proliferation of 
trademarks, commercial brands, banking services, insurance companies, 
consulting firms, and  trans-border programmes aimed at job creation and 
educational exchanges. The effects are multiple: expansion of the social 
scope of beneficiaries of EU programmes; increased investments in human 
capital; fostering accountability and transparency of local bureaucracies; 
the identification and promotion of groups committed to pluralism; and 
greater compatibility with EU norms. 
But what explains Russia’s normative foreign policy in trans-border 
cooperation with the EU, as well as the evident normative impact of this 
policy choice? 
Internal context 
A first variable determining Russia’s normative foreign policy in its 
northwest neighbourhood is the interplay between different levels of 
government in Russia, leaving a void that has been readily filled by EU 
normative approaches. There has been a collision of two different 
approaches in Russia to trans-border relations. A first approach – dominant 
in 1990s – was based on the interpretation of Russia’s European choice as a 
policy of re-building Russian domestic rules under the influence of EU 
trans-border programmes. This approach was (and still is) promoted by 
regional elites eager to ‘go international’ and profit from their proximity to 
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the EU. Sub-national units bordering the EU contributed to cooperative 
efforts aimed at linking Russia to the European milieu. Consequently, 
borders were considered as contact zones offering incentives rather than 
posing security threats. The ND was conceptualised by these actors as an 
intermediary between core powers: the EU and Russia. Russian border 
regions would benefit from this desecuritised, depoliticised and inclusive 
understanding of regionalism, as well as from ‘policy transfer networks’ 
that would foster the transnational diffusion of information, ideas and 
social practices through travel, media, twinning and people diplomacy. 
Most of these approaches explicitly favour liberal solutions for border 
territories, including drastic limitations of bureaucratic interference in 
business (Kuznetsova & Mau, 2002, pp. 71-72). A second and far more 
conservative approach gained momentum in the last decade, and has been 
articulated mainly by federal agencies. “The Rules of Border Regime” 
issued by the Federal Security Service in September 2006 reflects this more 
conservative spirit. This document has significantly complicated the 
procedure for entering and restricted social and economic activities in 
Russia’s border areas.64 As an effect of the collision of these two 
approaches, Russia has failed to elaborate a clear set of policy instruments 
in the Baltic and Northern regions, granting the EU greater leeway to set 
the policy/normative agenda.  
Internal capabilities 
Internal capabilities have instead hindered Russia’s pursuit of a normative 
foreign policy. The major problem here has been the lack of long-term 
strategic thinking by regional elites,65 an argument confirmed by a recent 
study of the Moscow Carnegie Center (2001). European observers usually 
complain about the lack of financial transparency in collaborative projects 
with Russia; inadequate and imprecise information provided by regional 
authorities, and weak control over environmental and energy matters. 
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Another domestic factor impeding trans-border cooperation is the spread 
of nationalist ideas within border regional elites.66  
External environment 
The last and most important factor explaining Russia’s normative policy in 
its northwest border regions is the external environment. A strong 
normative pull from the EU coupled with internally divided Russian 
approaches to border regions balanced against weak internal capabilities, 
leading to an overall normative result. The EU was highly favourable to the 
external activities of Russia’s sub-national units, especially in the 1990s. In 
developing trans-border cooperation, Russia has been – softly and 
indirectly – bound by EU norms derived mainly from the acquis, which has 
been “used to varying degrees as both models and yardsticks” (Haukkala, 
2005, p. 6). The EU’s pull has been particularly effective in trans-border 
cooperation, which sees the involvement of a variety of regional governing 
agencies open to external influences (Friis & Murphy, 1998, p. 16). A key 
example highlighting the importance of the external milieu is the ‘Northern 
discourse’, which emerged in Russia’s Northwest as a clear reflection of 
European discourses on the Norden. Very much like the Nordic debate in 
Europe, the concept of the North in Russia down-played the division 
between East and West, seeing a compromise between globalisation (i.e., a 
new world order based on a Northern way of life/ or a ‘Northern variant of 
globalisation’) and regionalisation (i.e., inclusive trans-border cooperation 
and federalist ideas of multi-confessionality and poly-ethnicity). In line 
with Scandinavian and North European cultural traditions, Russia’s 
northern discourse presented the region as a territory to be managed in 
concert by free peoples who would strengthen their social bonds by 
working together. 
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2.2  Normative unintended: Russia’s policy towards Estonia, 2007 
Russia’s policy towards Estonia serves as a good illustration of a rupture 
between the pursuit of normative goals and means, and the lack of 
normative results. This case covers the events of 2007 when the Russian-
Estonian conflict was re-ignited by the incident over the Second World War 
memorial in Tallinn.  
Goals 
In its policy towards Estonia, Russia highlights two normative landmarks 
and attempts to present itself as a country that firmly defends ‘true 
European values’, which are allegedly challenged by Tallinn. The first 
normative principle is the unequivocal international condemnation of 
Nazism/fascism, which Moscow fears is being challenged by the 
association by some Estonian elites of the historical roles of Germany and 
the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Second, Russia advocates 
minority protection standards, expressing its deep dissatisfaction with 
Estonia’s denial of electoral rights to significant parts of its Russian-
speaking community. In view of these two normative shortcomings, 
Moscow argues that Estonia cannot be viewed as a fully-fledged 
democracy. This position was expressed more vocally when Estonia 
attempted to re-write the script of the Second World War. In this context, 
Russia accused Estonia of failing to acknowledge the exceptional 
contribution of the Soviet Union in defeating Nazi Germany and liberating 
the Baltic countries and Eastern Europe from Nazism. Estonian symbolic 
gestures aimed at equating the roles of Hitler and Stalin or revisiting the 
Second World War have been met with unconcealed irritation by Moscow, 
which has charged the alleged intention of ‘New Europe’ with 
misrepresenting and corrupting the original European idea. 
Means 
Russia’s reaction to Estonia’s revisionism has been expressed through 
largely normative means. First, Russia has appealed to the EU to ‘tame’ 
Estonia as one of its newcomers. In its statement of 22 October 2004, the 
State Duma declared that in the aftermath of EU accession, Latvia and 
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initiatives aimed at advancing material and political claims to Russia, as 
well as reconsidering the outcomes of the Second World War.67 Sergey 
Yastrzhembskii (2007), President Putin’s aide on European affairs, accused 
EU newcomers of displaying “fairly primitive Russophobia” and trying to 
“complicate the dialogue between Russia and the EU”, against the interests 
of “old residents” in the EU. Second, Russia has exerted pressure on 
Estonia through negative media campaigns and public demonstrations. 
Finally and least normatively, Russia has used economic leverage. Russia’s 
first vice premier Sergei Ivanov suggested Russians abstain from 
purchasing Estonian goods and travelling to Estonia.68 In some stores, 
Estonian goods were either marked or sold at drastically reduced prices.69 
While some of these measures cannot be dubbed as being perfectly 
normative, Russia did not succumb to the temptation of using overtly non-
normative means such as military pressure or official sanctions,70 in 
response to what Moscow considered a grave attack on its international 
reputation and standing. 
Impact 
Vis-à-vis Estonia, Russia has failed to achieve normative results: the state of 
political relations between Moscow and Tallinn is characterised by 
increasing alienation and tug-of-war, most recently exacerbated by 
Estonia’s decision to remove the monument erected to Soviet Soldiers from 
Tallinn. Russia was unable to block similar actions taken by local 
authorities in Bauska, Latvia in August 2007. Despite Russian pleas, the EU 
was sympathetic to the Estonian government. One of the indirect results of 
this crisis was Russia’s heightened concern with history. Russia has 
upgraded the treatment of Second World War monuments by 
Eastern/Central European authorities onto the list of criteria used to assess 
the state of bilateral relations. Positive examples in this respect are Austria 
and Slovakia, which, much to Russia’s liking, have demonstrated 
sensitivity to the graves of Russian soldiers killed during the Second World 
War. The negative attitude by Estonia (as well as Poland) instead has 
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allowed Russia to discursively identify itself with ‘true European values’ 
including the observance of minority rights and the condemnation of 
fascism in contrast to Tallinn’s behaviour. 
Yet not only has Russia failed to engender a normative impact in 
relations with Estonia, Moscow’s reliance on history as a measure of 
amity/enmity with third states is extremely vulnerable for three reasons. 
First, Russia’s own treatment of Second World War monuments and the 
socio-economic treatment of war veterans is far from satisfactory. Second, 
Russia has been unable to garner meaningful support from CIS countries in 
its confrontation with Estonia, illustrating Russia’s weak normative appeal 
in its ‘near abroad’. Third, drawing on history plays into another divisive 
debate within Russia: that of Russia’s own identity. In the dispute over the 
Second World War monuments, Russia has positioned itself as the 
successor of the Soviet Union. Yet in other instances, Russia’s articulation 
of its identity draws on different historical legacies. An interesting example 
of this confusion relates to an incident that took place in Odessa, Ukraine, 
in August 2007, when the municipal authorities removed the monument to 
‘Potiomkin’ sailors (an emblem of Russia’s revolutionary past) and 
replaced it with a monument to Katherine the Second (a symbol of Russia’s 
imperial tradition), leaving Moscow at a loss as to whether and how to 
react.  
In Russian-Estonian relations, what explains Russia’s (largely) 
normative approach coupled with its failure to achieve normative results?  
Internal context 
Russia’s policy goals towards Estonia have been greeted by a rare show of 
unanimity amongst Russian policy-makers and commentators who believe 
that Tallinn’s ‘cultural distancing’ from (or ‘cultural revenge’ against) its 
Russian-speaking minorities reflects a clear clash with European norms. A 
presidential representative put it bluntly: Estonian authorities “little by 
little push European countries to a comprehensive rethink of the Second 
World War. The actions undertaken by Estonian authorities challenge post-
war political traditions in Europe, including those condemning Nazism. 
We do not want these so-called neophytes, people with exaggerated self-
assessments and profound historical complexes to negatively affect 
European public opinion” (Yastrzhembskii, 2007). At the core of the crisis 
rests Estonia’s (mis)perception of Russia as an extension of the USSR, a 
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occupation of the Baltic states. This perception contrasts with Russia’s self-
assessment as a country that rid itself of Communism just like Estonians 
did and that was a victim of Communism just like other post-Soviet 
countries were. Against this background, the Russian public debate often 
expresses the hope that through the EU, Estonia may be induced to respect 
human rights.   
Internal capabilities 
Internal capabilities play a significant role in explaining Russia’s limited 
use of coercive means despite the unanimous condemnation of Estonia’s 
positions. First, economic sanctions against Estonia were opposed by 
Russia’s business community, which exerted strong pressure on hardliners 
in the Kremlin. As reported by the Russian media, Russian business has 
significant interests in various sectors of the Estonian economy, including 
the banking sector, tourist infrastructure, seaport facilities and transport 
routes (Kevorkova, 2007, p. 34). Second, Russia has strong political interests 
in not completely disrupting relations with Estonia. Estonia plays an 
important role in the Finno-Ugric culture, which is viewed in Russia as an 
important pathway linking Russia to Europe due to the large share of the 
Finno-Ugrian world in Russia. The absence of an Estonian delegation in the 
World Finno-Ugrian Congress in Saransk, Russia in 2007 was viewed as an 
important blow to Russia and questioned Moscow’s ability to influence 
Estonia.  
External environment 
The Russian-Estonian tug-of-war must be placed in the external context of 
discursive asymmetry between the EU and Russia. Many have argued that 
Europe’s identity is constructed in opposition to its own past (Diez, 2005). 
This contrasts sharply with Russia’s identity construction, which is derived 
precisely from a glorification (rather than repudiation) of its history. 
Against this background, the Russian-Estonian crisis must be located 
within two wider discursive frameworks: the ‘new-old Europe’ and the 
related ‘true-false Europe’ dichotomies. ‘False Europe’, as dubbed by some 
Russian intellectuals, includes countries with strong anti-Russian sentiment 
that have lost touch with ‘genuine European values’. ‘True Europe’ 
includes Russia-friendly states that adhere to ‘the original spirit of Europe’. 
What is interesting about this classification is that ‘false’ Europeans, 
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spirit and deviate from the European normative mainstream. The EU is 
thus viewed as the ‘norm-setter’, which ‘false’ Europe fails to comply with, 
making trouble for both Russia and the EU and acting as America’s ‘fifth 
column in Europe’.71 By referring to ‘true Europe’, Russia affirms its own 
European identity and indicates its circle of friends (Morozov, 2004a). It 
also explicitly invites an EU role in settling the crisis with Estonia. Yet, as 
Morozov (2004b) suggests, “the fact that Russian commentators assume the 
right to pass judgement on the Baltic States from the position of a ‘true 
Europe’…does not necessarily imply that the Russian foreign policy 
discourse becomes structured in European terms. Russia does appeal to the 
norms of Europe, but stops short of applying the same norms to her own 
policy”. This, coupled with intra-EU solidarity, is what makes Russian 
arguments less convincing to the EU.  
2.3  Realpolitik intended: Russia’s policy towards Poland, 2004- 
Russia’s policy towards Poland displays a realpolitik pattern of foreign 
policy. The new EU member states were keen to reposition themselves vis-
à-vis Russia and play a useful role as newcomers. The most striking 
example of this was Poland’s Eastern Dimension (ED), which was met by 
Russia with a great deal of suspicion and irritation. This case study focuses 
on the events that followed the debate on the Eastern Dimension blueprint. 
Goals 
The overall goal of Russia’s policy towards Poland is non-normative: to 
prevent Warsaw from becoming a key voice in the EU’s Eastern policy. 
Poland features in Russian discourse as a country with a devious political 
intent, fuelled by Washington and aimed at band-wagonning against 
Russia. Moscow does not hide that its attitude towards Warsaw is driven 
by geopolitical considerations. First, Poland is treated as an American 
satellite with limited capacity for independent foreign policy. Second and 
because of this, Russia believes it must block all Polish attempts to act as 
the EU’s voice in its Eastern policy. Moscow believes that Poland, like other 
post-Soviet states, merely aims at distancing itself, and thus the EU, from 
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Russia. Indeed, there are some indications that Poland’s main stimulus is to 
“ultimately separate [ex-socialist countries] from the post-Soviet space” 
(Hyndle & Kutysz, 2002, p. 48). The failed ED was clearly biased towards 
the idea of a Europe of concentric circles with clear subordination to a 
single political centre. M o r e o v e r ,  P o l a n d  w a n t e d  t o  m o u l d  t h e  E D  a s  a  
continuation of its centuries-long conflict with Russia by gaining a voice in 
the EU and undermining any inclination in the EU to follow a ‘Russia-first’ 
policy. Unsurprisingly Russia believes that Poland is reluctant to accept EU 
policies in the neighbourhood and pushes the Union to distinguish Ukraine 
(and possibly Moldova and Belarus) from other neighbours (Kazin, 2003). 
Russia’s reaction has been scathing. Political analyst Mark Urnov has 
dubbed Poland (“a small country”, in his view) as being swayed by 
“foolish myths and prejudices of the crowd”.72 Filip Kazin (2003), in 
reference to EU neighbourhood policies, argues that “Poles … fix the 
‘weight categories’ and put one of the players [Russia] out of the 
competition, while the EU bureaucracy wants to place everybody on a level 
playing field, hold training exercises and see what comes out”. The typical 
Russian interpretation of Poland’s motives are framed in clear realpolitik 
terms: “Warsaw is pursuing a goal that has no direct relation to Moscow: to 
strengthen its position within a united Europe and to join the inner circle of 
the EU’s most influential countries” (Lukyanov, 2007, p. 9). 
Means 
Russia carried out its policies towards Poland through hard-nosed 
economic leverage. In 2006 Russia resorted to economic sanctions against 
Poland, having banned the import of Polish meat and poultry. The official 
explanation referred to the low quality of these food products. Yet this was 
met by widespread scepticism in Europe. The ban appeared to be an 
attempt on the one hand to pressurise Warsaw and on the other hand to 
protect Russian agricultural markets against EU-subsidised agricultural 
products. As put by President Putin (2007a): “the point is not only the meat 
supplies from Poland. We see this problem as one related to the EU 
subsidising of its own agricultural sector and throwing away its products 
to our market”. 
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Beyond leverage, Russia has also dealt with Poland through neglect 
and by dealing directly with the EU and minimising contacts with Polish 
diplomacy. This also suggests that in order to act as a credible 
intermediary, a regional actor such as Poland must be viewed as legitimate 
by both centres (the EU and Russia). Russia’s own approach has not been 
normative. A perfect example of this was the celebration of the 750th 
anniversary of Kaliningrad-Kenigsberg, in which Russia deliberately 
excluded the delegations from Poland (and Lithuania). This event – 
attended by the leaders of Germany and France amongst others – was 
highly indicative of how Moscow (as well as Paris and Berlin) perceives 
decision-making in Europe. The Kaliningrad anniversary, which was 
supposed to manifest Russia’s commitment to cross-border cooperation, 
ultimately incarnated Russia’s realpolitik ambitions of belonging to and 
dealing exclusively with Europe’s ‘masters’ at the expense of 
communication with smaller ‘New Europeans’ such as Poland.  
Impact 
Russia has been rather successful in portraying Poland as a challenge to 
both Russia and the EU, as well as a complicating factor in EU-Russia 
relations. Russia effectively exploited EU criticisms of Polish foreign policy. 
For example Russia’s media coverage of the 19 October 2007 European 
Council was rife with allegations that “it is Poland, not Russia, who scares 
Europe”.73 The (possibly temporary) congruence of views between Moscow 
and the EU of the Kaczinski brothers has given Russia a rare chance to 
present its concerns about Poland in a manner that resonates in the EU. In 
this setting, Poland’s attempt to acquire a special role in the EU was 
hindered by both Moscow and Brussels. Russia was extremely reluctant to 
accept Poland’s self-attributed role as the leading EU voice in the Eastern 
neighbourhood. By the same token, the EU was unwilling to entrust Poland 
with a special role in articulating its Eastern policy in view of its troubled 
relations with Moscow. In addition, Polish ambitions were seriously 
undermined by the Russian-German platform on the North European Gas 
pipeline project. 
What explains Russia’s realpolitik approach towards Russia and the 
EU’s seeming acceptance of Russia’s non-normative approach?  
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Internal context 
Poland was part of the Russian domestic discourse in several controversial 
ways. First, during the debates on the future of Kaliningrad, Poland gained 
the reputation of being a country that was reluctant to ensure transit and 
communication between mainland Russia and the Kaliningrad exclave. 
Second, Poland featured as a country that allegedly supported and helped 
orchestrate the ‘orange revolution’ in Ukraine, thus stimulating Kiev’s shift 
away from Russia and towards the West. Third, Russia’s temporary ban on 
Polish meat was discussed and justified in Russia as a necessary act of self-
sufficiency, protecting Russian ‘food security’. Fourth, there were 
numerous TV stories in the Russian media portraying Poland as a country 
prone to challenging the Russian interpretation of the Second World War, 
whereby Russia led the liberation of Eastern Europe from Nazism. All these 
aspects help explain the antagonistic context in which Russia’s possession 
goals towards Poland were formulated. 
Internal capabilities 
Russia acknowledges that its resources to influence Polish policies are 
limited. As such, throughout the 1990s and beyond, Russia adopted a 
classical ‘wait-and-see’ approach that ended in Russia’s inability to 
formulate a strategy in anticipation of Poland’s NATO and EU accession. 
The question of which policy instruments were to be used with regards to 
countries like Poland was never seriously raised in Russian public and elite 
debates. Moreover, Moscow seemingly felt more comfortable discussing 
Poland-related problems in dialogue with Brussels (concerning a variety of 
border-related issues) or Washington (concerning the deployment of the 
new anti-missile system) than directly with Warsaw. In the fall of 2007, 
with the electoral victory of Donald Tusk’s party, the Kremlin instead 
began appreciating some of the reconciliatory moves undertaken by the 
new Polish government, including the fulfilment of Russian demands to 
deploy quality control experts in Polish meat-processing factories. This 
clearly suggests that Russia is inclined to use essentially (coercive) 
economic leverages in relations with antagonistic countries like Poland, 
while leaving hard security questions for discussion with major powers 
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External environment 
Initially, there were some positive openings in Russian-Polish relations, 
which were unfortunately lost in time. To bolster its membership 
credentials within the framework of EU accession in the late 1990s, Warsaw 
was eager to present itself as a constructive source of innovation to the EU, 
offering solutions on issues such as border visa policies (i.e., introducing 
multiple single day entry visas and the ‘delimited territory Schengen 
visas’). Within the ED framework, Poland wished to demonstrate to the EU 
that the Union’s future Eastern border regions were diverse and had 
special needs, and thus required differentiated EU policies (Gromadzki & 
Osica, 2002). At some point a Polish spokesmen even forecasted that the ED 
would have a larger and more multilateral scope than its sister initiative in 
the North (the Northern Dimension) (Kokonczuk, 2003). In this light, some 
experts from Warsaw made it clear that enforcing the Schengen acquis 
would have detrimental effects on the candidate countries’ relations with 
their Eastern neighbours, failing to prevent organised crime but potentially 
becoming insurmountable obstacles for thousands of ordinary citizens 
(Boratynski & Gromadski, 2001). Many Polish authors claimed that for EU 
newcomers the problem of Kaliningrad ought to be ranked higher than for 
the Union’s founding fathers, suggesting that Poland’s future EU 
membership could raise the likelihood of a visa-free deal with Russia. 
Criticising the EU’s ‘one size fits all’ approach was also part of the Polish 
discourse in those years and it was widely argued that it was because of the 
EU that Poland (and Lithuania) were forced to introduce visa requirements 
for Kaliningrad residents (Gromadski & Wilk, 2001, p. 9).  
Yet following Poland’s EU accession and the rise to power of the 
Kaczinski brothers, the Polish scene radically changed, sharpening 
disagreements between Moscow and Warsaw. An additional factor that 
further complicated relations was Poland’s acceptance of American plans 
to deploy anti-missile infrastructure on Polish territory. The Russian 
military establishment interpreted this move as another proof of Polish 
enmity and Poland’s alignment with US-sponsored military plans directed 
against Russian security interests. Casting Russian-Polish disagreements 
within the wider frame of Russia-EU relations suggests that both Moscow 
and Brussels have pragmatically used the Polish veto as a good pretext for 
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of the Polish veto given that Russian energy policy towards Europe may be 
facilitated by Russia’s expected fragmentation of a united EU front.74  
2.4  Realpolitik unintended: Russia’s policy towards the ‘colour 
revolutions’ since 2003 
Russia’s policy toward the countries of the ‘colour revolutions’ (Georgia 
and Ukraine) provides an interesting case of a realpolitik response to a 
normative challenge. Here we see one of the deepest discursive gaps 
between the EU and Russia: the former prefers to frame its policy towards 
the revolutions in normative terms (i.e., promoting democracy and civil 
liberties) while the latter claims that crude realpolitik lies at the kernel of 
Western interference. In fact, Russia denies the normative appeal of the 
colour revolutions, reducing them to power confrontations. This case study 
covers the events that followed the colour revolutions in Ukraine and 
Georgia since 2003. 
Goals 
There are two possession goals that Russia pursues in its neighbourhood: 
to prevent the advent to power of anti-Russian regimes, and to block any 
prospect of exporting the ‘colour revolutions’ to Russia proper. The 
Kremlin dubs “the so-called colour revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia and 
Kyrgyzstan” as a Western ploy to install pro-American regimes in Russia’s 
periphery and then engineer a regime change in Russia itself” (Trenin, 
2005, p. 1). For Russia, the colour revolution countries are perceived as 
troublemakers: relations with Ukraine have been complicated by Kiev’s 
increasing orientation towards EU and NATO, while Georgia has also been 
acused of supporting Chechen separatists. Russian policy-makers view 
Georgian and Ukrainian initiatives with irritation and as an indication of 
these countries’ malevolent intentions towards Russia. Hence, Russia’s 
negative reactions to the political events in Georgia after Eduard 
Shevardnadze and in Ukraine after Leonid Kuchma. In both cases, post-
revolution developments are not seen as having engendered democracies 
of superior quality to than in Russia. On the contrary, the political systems 
established by President Yuschenko and President Saakashvili are 
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frequently presented as being inferior to that in Russia: Ukraine is going 
through a period of intense instability and threatened 
fragmentation/disintegration, while Georgia has established a hyper-
centralised authoritarian and repressive regime. While moving in different 
directions, developments in both Georgia and Ukraine confirm Russia’s 
negative attitude to the revolutions and their aftermath. Another 
geopolitical reason for Russia’s reaction to the revolutions is Moscow’s 
disappointed expectations with the West after September 11th, in which 
Russia hoped to be recognised as a much closer Western and European ally 
than any other post-Soviet country. In this sense, the colour revolutions 
supported by the West designated a Russian failure to be treated as “dealer 
of the European values all across the ex-Soviet space” (Remizov, 2005). 
Means 
In the case of Ukraine, Russia used strong political pressure to force Kiev to 
make concessions in two important areas. The first is the recognition of 
Russian as an official language in Ukraine, given that the majority of 
Ukrainians are Russian-speakers. The second is to prevent Ukraine’s 
NATO integration, given Russia’s strategic plans to maintain a military 
presence in Sebastopol. To pursue these objectives Russia has used a 
variety of non-normative instruments: 
•  manipulating energy prices; 
•  interfering in the 2004 electoral campaign through the participation of 
Russian experts in electoral engineering; 
•  manipulating border demarcation: in 2003 the small island of Tuzla 
near the Taman peninsula became a source of serious tensions 
between Russia and Ukraine as a result of Russian attempts to build a 
dike there.75  
In the case of Georgia, Russia has reacted to Saakashvili’s anti-
Russian policy by meddling in the situation in the breakaway republics of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which gravitate towards the Russian sphere 
of influence. In doing so, Russia has used a variety of coercive instruments: 
•  introducing a visa regime which targets thousands Georgians who 
temporarily (and sometimes unofficially) work in Russia. The 
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Russian government is fully aware and is ready to exploit its 
economic leverage, which includes energy supplies and the 
attractiveness of the Russian labour market for Georgian citizens. 
•  Exerting military pressure (incidents have included the violation of 
Georgia’s airspace and the bombing of unspecified military air jets). It 
is not surprising that, according to a high-ranking Georgian official, it 
is Russia that plots terrorist acts against Georgia.76  
•  banning the import of Georgian wine and mineral water under the 
pretext of the bad quality of these products; 
•  granting Russian citizenship to residents of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, a policy which may lead to the de facto integration of these 
secessionist republics into Russia. Interestingly, in August 2007 the 
Russian Foreign Minister defined the residents of North Ossetia (in 
Russia) and South Ossetia ‘a single people’.77 
•  Conducting anti-Georgian media campaigns in Russia, which 
provoked – perhaps unintentionally – repressive and discriminatory 
actions against Georgian owners restaurants, nightclubs and casinos 
in Moscow and other major cities in Russia.  
Impact 
Russia’s realpolitik policies towards Georgia and Ukraine have unwittingly 
provoked a normative reaction from the West. More specifically, the 
establishment of the Community of Democratic Choice, as well as the 
deepened integration of Georgia and Ukraine in EU and NATO 
institutional spheres are good indications of this trend. The revival of the 
‘orange coalition’ in the aftermath of the Ukrainian parliamentary elections 
in September 2007 could also be viewed as a normative development. 
Russia eventually accepted the normative challenge and counterattacked in 
normative terms. For example, a State Duma statement of 2 October 2007 
accused the Saakashvili regime of violating democratic principles and 
human rights, including tightening control over the opposition and 
repressing dissidents. Such a response c a n n o t  b e  s i m p l y  v i e w e d  a s  a n  
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opportunistic realpolitik response covered in normative clothing given the 
absence of a genuinely pro-Russian opposition in Georgia. An important 
factor that has strengthened Russia’s normative reaction was the West’s 
gradual and reluctant appreciation, beginning in November 2007, that there 
is indeed significant popular discontent in Georgia against “a clique that 
will neither tolerate dissent nor engage in dialogue with the opposition”.78 
These assessments coincide with the dominant view in Russia. Russia, by 
the same token, has accused Western countries of backing Saakashvili’s 
“illusionary democracy” which, in Russian eyes, is oligarchic and despotic 
(Demurin, 2007, p. 16).  
What explains on the one hand Russia’s realpolitik policies in Ukraine 
and Georgia, and on the other hand the West’s normative reactions to these 
revolutions and Russia’s increasingly normative counter-response?  
Internal context 
Russia’s disdain for the colour revolutions is strongly supported by a 
nationalist and power-driven discourse. This explains Russia’s non-
normative goals vis-à-vis these countries and the coercive policy 
instruments used towards them. At the same time, Russia’s nationalist 
drivers of policy, are facing several challenges, explaining the recent 
normative turn in Russia’s policy response. On the one hand, the policy of 
confrontation with Georgia and Ukraine has clear cultural limitations since 
both countries are widely perceived as being culturally close to Russia and 
sharing similar historical and religious legacies. On the other hand, some in 
Russia are beginning to appreciate the fundamental miscalculation 
underpinning the Kremlin’s policy: the assumption that “if they get rid of 
this pro-western leadership, it will naturally be replaced by a pro-Russian 
leadership. There is almost no pro-Russian constituency in Georgia” 
(Dunbar, 2006, p. 2). Even Ukrainian former Prime Minister Yanukovich, 
despite his political rhetoric, cannot be considered as a genuinely pro-
Russian politician. In other words, as Russia appreciates that it is gradually 
losing its political leverage over its near abroad, it may gradually rid itself 
of its imperial approach and reframe its policy in a more pragmatic way.  
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Internal capabilities 
While Russia continues to use coercive policy instruments towards Georgia 
and Ukraine, empowered by its significant leverage on these two countries, 
there has been a noticeable shift in Russia’s policy tools used especially 
towards Ukraine between 2004 and 2007. A revealing indication of this was 
President Putin’s statement that “if the West wishes to support the ‘orange 
movements’, let it pay for them. Otherwise the impression is that you wish 
to support them and simultaneously make us pay for that” (Putin, 2007a). 
This statement indicates the Kremlin’s more pragmatic – albeit cynical – 
acceptance of the status quo in these countries and its abandonment of 
staunch political/ideological opposition to be pursued with any means at 
its disposal. Putin’s declaration suggests Russia’s gradual acceptance of 
Ukrainian independence, whose relations with Russia do not fit any longer 
into a ‘patron – client’ framework.  
External environment 
Russia’s stance vis-à-vis the colour revolutions can be analysed within the 
wider framework of developments in the Baltic-Black Sea region (BBSR). 
The BBSR, being deprived of any sense of cultural and social cohesiveness 
could emerge as a political project in order to expand the zone of 
democracy in EU-Russia border regions. The idea of countries such as 
Poland, Lithuania and Estonia to construct such a region has been strongly 
inspired by the colour revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia. An important 
element in this idea relates specifically to the Caucasus. The aspiration to 
transfer the Baltic experience with democratisation to the south is often 
flagged by ‘New Europe’ countries, and rhetorically backed by the US and 
the EU. Russia naturally has strong interests in deconstructing the ‘Baltic-
Black Sea’ equation both politically and semantically. Moreover, Russia has 
considerable experience in playing divide and rule with its neighbours.79 
However, this logic does not seem to work in the case of the BBSR. Most 
Russian opinion-makers have unexpectedly acknowledged the existence of 
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the BBSR and based upon it geopolitical reflections. Arguably, Russia badly 
needs an imagined BBSR in order to corroborate some of its foreign policy 
assumptions. Instead of questioning the coherence of this imagined entity, 
Moscow has used this region-building project as a means to symbolically 
construct Russia’s identity in opposition to allegedly unfriendly ‘New 
Europe’. The BBSR may thus turn into Russia’s new ‘other’, an 
unidentifiable political object which nevertheless may be used 
pragmatically to nourish Russian nationalism.   
2.5  Imperial intended: Russia’s war on terror, 2001- 
Russia’s ‘war on terror’ fits, by and large, into the imperial category in view 
of the normative coating of Russia’s foreign policy goals coupled with its 
authoritarian decision-making style. This case study covers the period 
following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.   
Goals 
Although Russia’s goals in the ‘war on terror’ can be formulated in security 
terms, they also have strong normative connotations (which however differ 
from those in the normative intended and unintended case studies). Norms 
in the imperial case studies mean the protection of peace and avoidance of 
violence directed against legitimate governments. Moreover, there are 
some indications that Russia’s political class shares the view that “if we are 
to deal with new terrorism in any normative way, then we should address 
the entire sequence of mobilization, complex causes, radicalization process 
and active symptoms of terrorism, in a ‘genuinely multi-pronged’ 
approach” (Manners, 2006, p. 413). It is within this framework that one can 
analyse the normative dimension of Russia’s war on terror. This dimension 
includes the attempt at normalising Chechnya through development and 
the rule of law, and fighting xenophobia, extremism, and religious 
fundamentalism across Russia.  
Means 
The Russian debate on the war in terror has concentrated primarily on the 
adequate means to be employed in the anti-terror campaign. The Kremlin 
shares a widespread view that anti-terrorism measures require political 
will rather than a strict observance of international and internal law. The 
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policies through authoritarian means. For instance, President Putin’s 
increased authority after the 2004 Beslan tragedy enabled him to take 
controversial political decisions such as abolishing popular elections of 
governors, rather than following democratic procedures.  
The same goes for Russia’s appeal to EU member states (particularly 
Denmark and the UK) to restrict the activities of groups considered by 
Moscow as being close to Chechen terrorists. Particularly noteworthy was 
the dispute between Russia and Denmark in 2002, when the World 
Chechen Congress was convened in Copenhagen. Russian officials felt that 
the Congress should be banned in view of its security implications, 
whereas Denmark refused this securitised logic and rested its arguments 
on the logic of the rule of law. In other words, Moscow reasoned that 
terrorism, as a radical violation of all ‘rules of the game’ should leave no 
room for compromise. Danish responses regarding the legal obstacles 
preventing a ban on the Congress were interpreted in Russia as a 
deplorable political excuse for inaction. As a footnote, it is remarkable that 
a few years later it was the EU that resorted to a similar line of reasoning, 
accusing Russia of political manoeuvring in its energy policy, to which 
Russia rebuked that its stance was justified by technical rules and 
regulations that could not be violated.   
Another interesting example was during the Danish ‘cartoon crisis’. 
There are two aspects of this discourse worth noting. First, while Russia 
accepted the normative value of civil liberties, it claimed that these should 
be curtailed in view of the political/security repercussions from the 
Muslim world. Many argued that security matters related to religion 
cannot simply be regulated by law and require exceptional political 
decisions. “Only a narrow-minded idiot can be misled by incantations 
about the allegedly sacred freedom of speech” argued Sergey Pereslegin 
(2006), a Russian political analyst. Others have declared that the Danish 
stance was an “outrageous and disgraceful occurrence”, or even “immoral 
prank”.80 Russian officials sharply criticised the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe (PACE) for siding with the Danish journalists. The 
chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs expressed 
his regret that “Europe failed to draw far-reaching conclusions after the 
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caricature scandal”, implying that Russia should set a more positive 
example.81 Putin’s personal response to the Danish authorities also referred 
to the need for a political response in such exceptional situations: “if the 
state is incapable of preventing (the publication of such cartoons), it at least 
has to apologise for this inability”.82 Hence, the logic goes, in sensitive cases 
p r o n e  t o  p u b l i c  u n r e s t  a n d  m a s s  violence, authorities should make 
exceptions to established rules guaranteeing freedoms.  
Second, the cartoon crisis induced Russia to go a step further. During 
the crisis, the first Deputy Chairman of the State Duma declared that the 
publication of the cartoons “is much worse than a mere mistake; it is almost 
a crime”.83 In other words, what was criminalised in Russia, was not an 
eventual banning of the cartoons (in violation of civil liberties), but rather 
the insult to millions of Muslims across the globe. In the conflict between 
freedom of speech (the norm) and anti-religious sacrilege (the exception), 
higher value is attached to the latter. In 2006, there were several legal cases 
initiated by Russian authorities against media outlets and web portals that 
either reprinted the Danish cartoons or published comments on them. In 
security issues, Russia has thus played with two arguments. The first, 
addressed mainly to European audiences, appeals to the policy of 
exceptions in cases of emergency. The second, going a step further and 
coined for domestic consumption, claims that the government should 
criminalise attempts to transfer to Russia EU standards of freedom of 
speech as applied to sensitive ethno-religious issues. 
Impact 
Russia – like many other states – is learning to react to the challenge of 
terrorism, experimenting with different responses. One reaction has had 
normative connotations and is grounded in the efforts to promote the 
peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups and Russian 
multiculturalism. An expression of this approach is the concealment of the 
ethnic origin of terrorists. For example, in September 2007 a State Duma bill 
proposed to ban all references to the ethnic background of criminals. 
Another Russian reaction has been the association of terrorism with other 
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threats. At the 2007 Shanghai Group summit, President Putin set out a triad 
of ‘common threats’ – ‘terrorism, separatism, extremism’. A logical 
extension of this broad understanding of terrorism leads in a non-
normative direction, since it may be used for all sorts of purposes, 
including discrediting the Kremlin’s political opponents. In fact, terrorism 
has turned into one of the most effective weapons of verbal denigration of 
the opposition. For example, the St. Petersburg-Moscow train crash in 
August 2007 was covered by the Russian media as a terrorist act 
presumably related to the forthcoming elections. Yet this type of discourse 
has not been effective to date. In the train crash incident four different 
hypotheses were publicly discussed, including ‘Chechen terrorists’, 
Russian radical nationalists, criminals, and youth groups playing war 
games. What is interesting in this menu of choices is that it groups together 
drastically different groups (professionals and amateurs, Russian 
nationalists and Chechen extremists). Hence, on the one hand, the Enemy is 
perceived as multifaceted, reducing the mobilising potential of anti-
terrorist discourse. Yet on the other hand, the conflation of opposite 
interpretations of terrorism provides an additional justification of 
repressive measures. 
What explains the normative undertones of Russia’s framing of the 
war on terror, coupled with the non-normative choice of policy means and 
the mixed albeit partly normative impact of Russian policies? 
Internal context 
The internal political context is driven by Russia’s experience of the war in 
Chechnya and the international criticism it faced due to mass-scale human 
rights violations. Chechnya explains why President Putin decided to ban 
the elections of the regional chief executive in the aftermath of the Beslan 
hostage crisis. The dominant attitude in the Kremlin presumes that only 
through a recentralisation of power in federal institutions can terrorism be 
defeated in Russia. By the same token, the issue of terrorism demonstrates 
the multiple links between foreign and domestic policies and the growing 
overlap between Inside and Outside. The Internal Enemy is typically 
presented as a projection and continuation of the External Enemy. 
Internal capabilities 
The menu of Russia’s internal capabilities in the field of anti-terrorism is 
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means to fight domestic terrorism; on the other hand, it tries to legitimise 
its actions by referring to legal arguments (e.g. the government accused 
Russian media outlets that reprinted the Danish cartoons of violating ‘hate 
speech’ legislation). Regarding the use of policy instruments, the Russian 
debate is split. Some equate terrorism with a particular type of political 
challenge; others view terrorism as criminal acts that require a legal 
response; while others still interpret terrorism as an expression of mental 
deviation. These interpretations are to some extent linked. The perception 
of terrorism as radical expression of enmity sets the frame for discursive 
politicisation. Yet as soon as this frame is replaced by one that views 
terrorism as a mental deviation, the situation ceases to be understood 
through the prism of normal politics and focuses on techniques of social 
control, regulation and adjustment. At the same time there are clear 
tensions between different interpretations. As far as the terrorists are 
concerned, there is a tendency to present criminal acts as being politically 
driven and yet requiring a political justification. As far as the victims are 
concerned, in so far as the legal system may fail to produce an adequate 
response to violations, the tendency is to bypass the law and seek an 
overtly political response. 
External environment 
Finally, the international environment, while not helping much in 
understanding the (partly) normative impact of Russia’s approach to 
terrorism, has reinforced Russia’ tendency to act in an imperial fashion (i.e., 
pursuing normative goals through non-normative means). The external 
environment has been a highly divisive issue in Russia. On the one hand, 
the US experience is viewed as problematic and anti-terrorist cooperation 
with the UK was frozen due to the ‘Litvinenko scandal’. On the other hand, 
Russia is increasingly distrustful of the activities of international 
organisations in the North Caucasus and considers that the British and 
Danish governments have been too soft on Chechen terrorism. It is the 
combination of these factors that condition Russia’s unilateral/imperial 
type of conduct in this policy area.  
2.6  Imperial unintended: the Russian-British dispute over the 
‘Litvinenko case’, 2006 
This case study focuses on the critical worsening of Russian-British 
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Goals 
There are two tactical and one strategic goal in Russia’s policy in the 
Litvinenko case. Among the tactical goals, Russia wanted to disavow 
widespread accusations of having commissioned the killing of a former 
KGB agent in London and turn the case against tycoon Boris Berezovsky in 
order to induce the UK to extradite him to Russia. Moscow’s strategic goal 
was to stage a showcase of Russia’s rising power, self-assertiveness and 
sovereignty. Both tactical and strategic goals were framed through an 
explicitly normative discourse. Officially, Russia framed the problem in 
legal terms. It was the UK which, in Russian eyes, politicised the situation 
by alluding to Russia’s inadequate legislation that made it impossible to 
extradite Andrei Lugovoi, by referring to Lugovoi’s goodwill in accepting 
trial in the UK, and by attempting to extract sensitive information from 
Lugovoi to discredit Russian politics and President Putin. Yet while 
Moscow self-confidently asserted its legal and apolitical approach to the 
problem, this was widely doubted elsewhere. A strong nationalist and 
sovereignty-based discourse was in fact hidden between the lines of 
Russian arguments, as exemplified by anti-British statements by people like 
Vladimir Zhirinovskii, Mikhail Leontiev and other conservative opinion-
makers in Russia. 
Means 
Russia used hard-nosed economic leverage towards the UK in response to 
British policies. Moscow threatened to boycott British goods in Russian 
markets. As put by Viacheslav Nikonov: “starting from this point, British 
business will face more difficulties in Russian markets”.84 In other words, 
in this case (as in others), Russia manifested its readiness to use economic 
levers as an overtly political weapon beyond the confines of the law. In the 
Russian-British tug-of-war political divisions were deemed by both 
countries as constituting a sufficient reason to reconsider bilateral economic 
relations. Finally, Russia attempted to discredit the UK within the EU by 
accusing it (as in the case of Poland) of being indiscriminately anti-Russian 
and undermining EU credibility in relations with Russia. The ‘Litvinenko 
case’ became another instance in which Russia attempted to sow European 
divisions by distinguishing between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Europeans. 
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Impact 
The effects of this conflict are explicitly non-normative. First, the 
Litvinenko case ended in a diplomatic scandal between Moscow and 
London, with four diplomats from each side being expelled from the 
diplomatic service. Second, as a measure of retaliation against the UK, 
Russia announced the end of bilateral cooperation against terrorism. The 
two countries were deeply divided over the security implications of the 
case. For the UK, Litvinenko’s murder was a terror-related case; while for 
Russia the key issue was Britain’s unwillingness to extradite Akhmed 
Zakayev, who is accused in supporting terrorism in Russia. These divisions 
resulted in M15 Chief Jonathan Evans’ assessment of Russia as an 
unfriendly country that diverts British resources to the illegal activities of 
Russian intelligence officers.85 Third, Britain complicated its visa policy 
towards Russian public officials.  
What explains Russia’s policies and its results in the Litvinenko case?  
Internal context 
The ‘Litvinenko-Lugovoi affair’ was framed in Russian domestic politics as 
a question of power and sovereignty. It is against this backdrop that one 
has to read Russia’s strong rhetoric against the UK, whose actions were 
viewed as “provoking”, “shocking” and “insulting”. On a more practical 
level, this case was intimately linked with figures such as Boris Berezovski, 
Akhmed Zakayev and other émigrés with a very bad reputation within 
Russia. Thus, Russian law-enforcement agencies accused Berezovski – an 
oligarch residing in London – of ‘sponsoring terrorism’ by supporting 
Chechen guerrillas and plotting the murder of Litvinenko in London.  
Internal capabilities 
The Russian public and mass media induced or did nothing to stop the 
authorities from tackling the case through non-normative means. The case 
was widely perceived as an entertaining spy story, without a normative 
dimension. Andrei Lugovoi was also portrayed as a high-profile media 
personality and political figure (he ran second and was elected in the 
                                                      
85 USA Today, November 6, 2007, p. 2. REBRANDING RUSSIA: NORMS, POLITICS AND POWER?| 189 
 
Zhirinovski-led LDPR party in the 2 December 2007 elections of the State 
Duma).  
External environment 
In the ‘Litvinenko-Lugovoi case’, the international environment was highly 
critical of Russia, criticising Moscow’s inclinations to assert its 
independence and pursue its interests through all means available. This 
largely explains the non-normative results of the incident. Moscow failed to 
receive meaningful support from foreign governments and was isolated. 
The incident deteriorated Russia’s image across the West, along with the 
murder of journalist Anna Politkovskaya. Under these circumstances, 
Russian policies towards the UK led to largely non-normative outcomes. 
2.7  Status quo intended: Russia’s policy in Kaliningrad, 2000- 
Russia’s policies in the Kaliningrad dispute have been and continue to be 
characterised by a status quo type of international behaviour. The time 
frame of this case study ranges from the turn of the century to the present. 
Goals 
Former presidential representative to Kaliningrad Dmitrii Rogozin, 
considering Kaliningrad “a matter of principle”, made clear that Russia’s 
political goals in the dispute should be prioritised over normative ones, 
followed by the settling of administrative technicalities.86 Russia’s overall 
political strategy has consisted of maintaining unchanged the status of the 
Kaliningrad Oblast (KO) in the Russian Federation, including the full 
implementation of Russian laws that regulate the internal affairs of the 
Oblast and its relationship with the federal centre. Russia did raise 
normative justifications for its policies, including the norms of ‘dignity’, 
‘respect’, ‘pride’ and ‘honour’. Yet these were pursued as legitimising 
elements in the attainment of Russia’s possession goals, to be defended 
against the EU, which was viewed as undermining Russian sovereign 
rights in the KO. The EU in turn claimed to pursue its own status quo logic 
– the application of the acquis communautaire to the Russian enclave. The 
clash of these two status quo logics defined the nature of the conflict as ‘a 
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never ending process of constructing a boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’, 
good and evil, and an acute fear that if this boundary is damaged, the 
identity of the community will be destroyed…Needless to say, such a 
discursive setting is hardly conducive to openness and de-bordering’ 
(Morozov, 2004a). Yet while both Russia and the EU applied a status quo 
logic to their goals in Kaliningrad, Moscow overtly applied a political logic 
to the issue, calling for a political move which is “not predetermined by the 
‘original’ terms of the structure” and “requires a passage through the 
experience of undecidability ... to a creative act” (Laclau, 1996, p. 54). 
Russia argued that the EU should take a political decision to add “one more 
deviation from the strict rules to the already long list” of allowed 
exceptions (Moshes, 2004, p. 68). The EU insisted on a technical normative 
logic, giving a clear priority to the observance of the rules and regulations 
stipulated in Community law.  
Means 
Russia and the EU however tackled the KO issue through normative means 
by implementing the idea of a pilot region. KO, as a pilot region, was 
designated as a new normative space to experiment with new 
opportunities. On the one hand, the pilot region idea fits a constructivist 
logic that asserts that regions are not predetermined entities but cognitive 
constructs. On the other hand, the pilot region notion has strong 
connotations with the business world and emerges from a culture of 
regional planning and spatial development, which gained prominence in 
Russia in the 2000s. The KO dispute was thus tackled as a ‘project’ to be 
implemented, and this greatly helped the desecuritisation of a potentially 
divisive problem. The ‘pilot project’ acted as a tool to bridge the gap 
between Russia’s highly politicised discourse on KO and the EU’s technical 
stance. The KO lent itself to the project owing to two main reasons. First, 
there is a widespread feeling that the KO, created as an administrative unit 
directly governed from the centre was somewhat dysfunctional in the post-
Soviet context. The KO was in search of a new trans-regional identity, being 
pushed towards the periphery and deeply dissatisfied with its status. 
Second and related, not only the KO, but the Baltic region as a whole, has 
traditionally been open to new ideas. In so far as old patterns of 
regionalism had become obsolete, new ones had to be invented. In 
particular, the creation of the ‘Baltica’ Euro-region (which includes the KO) 
represented an attempt to multilateralise the regional agenda and enhance 
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access to public goods and services. It also represented a region of 
innovation and progress, i.e. “a learning region” (Asheim, 2001) as well.  
Impact 
The KO dispute was partially de-securitised by: 
a)  Placing EU-Russia visa-free travel on the bilateral agenda;  
b)  promoting the environment, anti-corruption programmes and other 
soft security issues on the bilateral agenda;  
c)  Russia’s increasing focus on technical issues such as upgrading ferry 
and aircraft communications between Kaliningrad and mainland 
Russia; improving border crossing arrangements; downsizing the 
shadow economy; raising managerial standards and providing KO 
residents with proper international passports; 
d)  Negotiating a re-admission treaty with the EU.  
Yet at the same time, results are not fully normative. The pilot region 
discourse while accepted in theory, still lacks clarity in practice. A first 
approach is liberal/reformist, presuming that the KO might become a pilot 
or litmus test for liberal reforms in Russia. A second reading considers the 
pilot region idea as a means to extract privileges for the KO from the 
federal centre and the EU, and as such it has triggered negative reactions 
from other regions. A third interpretation is rooted in Russia’s defensive 
discourse, claiming that the KO as a pilot region would act as a Western 
Trojan horse into Russia. A fourth approach views the pilot region idea as a 
transnational cooperation project, experimenting in trans-boundary multi-
level governance in soft security issues. 
Table 3. Four interpretations of the ‘pilot region’ concept 
 A: 
Periphery/margins 
B: 
Specificity/normality 
C: 
Political/ technical 
1. Testing 
liberal reforms 
Useful marginality  Specificity as a 
disadvantage 
De-politicisation 
2. Promoting 
local interests 
Useful marginality  Specificity as a main 
advantage 
Politicisation in the 
framework of 
centre-periphery 
relations 
3. Strengthening 
Russia’s status 
Peripheral   Ambiguous  Deliberate 
politicisation  
4. Transnational 
cooperation 
Useful marginality  Specificity as a 
practical advantage 
De-politicisation 
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Table 3 above analyses these four interpretations, characterising them 
on the basis of several dichotomies: a) centrality/marginality; b) 
specificity/normality; c) political/technical. 
The table requires additional comments. The ‘peripheral vs. marginal’ 
dichotomy offers valuable insights regarding where the KO is heading. The 
concept of margins draws from Noel Parker (2000, p. 6): unlike peripheries 
which are subordinated to centres, margins are autonomous spaces and as 
such able to develop independent strategies based on cooperation with 
adjacent territories. Unlike peripheries, margins are reluctant to accept 
subordination from the centre and participate in defining the nature of the 
core instead. Hence, in option 3A, the KO is doomed to remain a voiceless 
periphery, with limited possibilities to influence the two cores (Moscow 
and Brussels). In options 1A, 2A and 4A instead the KO is better placed to 
reinvent its marginal role and seize the opportunities available to new 
regional actors. The ‘specificity vs. normality’ dyad invites a different 
outlook. Does a ‘pilot region’ need to be specific and unique, or should it 
represent the norm? As opposed to 2B, in the case of 1B, the KO’s 
uniqueness is a main source of disadvantage in so far as its liberal policies 
(e.g. tax privileges and maintaining visa-free travel to Lithuania for several 
years) were viewed as unrepeatable elsewhere in Russia. In 3B instead, 
Kaliningrad’s specificity has an uncertain effect: while Russia recognises 
the KO’s uniqueness as an asset in its negotiations with the EU, it refuses to 
apply special measures to manage the region effectively. Finally, in the 
‘political vs. technical’ column, option 1C is promoted by technical experts, 
while 2C reflects the intricacies of Russian federalism: the more local 
interests are pursued, the greater the tensions between Moscow and the 
KO. As for 3C, Moscow intentionally politicises certain issues in order to 
retain control over public opinion. Option 4C is interesting in the sense that 
while depoliticisation is the norm, a reverse trend is possible, given that the 
KO’s trans-national liaisons might eventually boost the region’s claims for a 
stronger political status in the federation, triggering a backlash from 
Moscow.  
Internal context 
The internal political context is characterised by two factors. First, the need 
to protect the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and second the 
desire to benefit from the KO’s peculiar location. The first factor reflects 
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possession goals), while the second best captures local interests and pushed 
Russia to tackle the situation through innovative normative means.  
The federal centre was highly suspicious of EU moves in Kaliningrad 
and constantly highlighted its sovereignty interests in the dispute. This 
suspicion entrenched a mentality of clashing identities, which assumed that 
the EU was purposely complicating the situation in order to weaken the 
KO’s links with Russia (Vladimirov, 2003, p. 11). Interestingly for example, 
Gleb Pavlovskii, a Kremlin spin-doctor, used the word ‘sovereignty’ 17 
times in a two-page interview released after the EU-Russia meeting in 
Svetlogorsk in May 2002.87 Pavlovskii’s approach was distinctly realist. He 
argued that granting a special administrative status to KO residents would 
provoke a chain reaction in Tatarstan, the Kuril Islands and other 
potentially troublesome parts of Russia; and he raised concerns that local 
authorities would act in their self-interest to the detriment of the federal 
centre by allowing corruption and selling ‘KO citizenship’ to outsiders. 
Others, such as the ex-leaders of the ‘Rodina’ party, discussed the KO issue 
in emotional and nationalistic language. KO was described as being 
‘encircled’ by unfriendly neighbours and thus that its subordination to the 
federal centre had to be restored.88 The federal centre was inclined to react 
to the situation defensively because of its disorientation, faced with blurred 
borders, shifting identities and an uncertain hierarchy of actors (Morozov, 
2004b). Moscow resisted the conceptualization of the KO within an 
emerging Baltic/Nordic region, fearful of losing its levers on the Oblast.  
By contrast, regional authorities have been sceptical of both the EU 
and Moscow. Some favoured a more pro-Russian approach. For example, a 
local politician compared the process of NATO enlargement with 
Germany’s “Drang nach Osten” (Chernomorskii, 2007). In 2003 local 
political forces issued an open letter protesting against the ratification of 
the border treaty between Russia and Lithuania, arguing that this would 
pave the way for Lithuania’s NATO membership and its blackmailing of 
Russia.89 Others used geopolitical arguments against Moscow, 
conceptualised as the other hegemonic core. From Kaliningrad’s 
perspective, Moscow is often viewed as a threat to trans-border 
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cooperation (Moshes & Nygren, 2000, p. 28), a source of trouble and 
injustice, and a “huge monster that pumps out local money”.90 However 
others still, including regional authorities and the local population, more 
familiar with the realities in neighbouring Poland and Lithuania,91 have 
resisted federal policies and called for an innovative normative solution to 
the dispute. In particular, the Baltic Republican Party, the leading voice of 
Kaliningrad’s separatism, advocates a referendum on the future status of 
the KO, proposing a republic associated with Russia that would negotiate 
its division of competences with Moscow. 
Internal capabilities 
Russia’s domestic debate on what instruments it should use in the KO 
dispute have been intense. Some claimed that Russia faced technical and 
not political problems and should thus seek technical remedies such as 
upgrading communications, providing KO residents with international 
passports and welcoming new consulates in the KO.92 According to this 
logic, what threatened the KO was not a new visa system, but Russia’s lack 
of resources to upgrade the region’s eastward communications 
(Smorodinskaia, 2007) and the absence of adequate EU financial support 
for the KO (Kobrinskaia, 2002). This reasoning favoured a desecuritised 
approach to the problem, which argued that if Russia as a whole was 
unable to behave as a Baltic country then some of its territories, such as the 
KO, might take the lead by applying European laws on Russian territory, 
including in spheres such as business regulation, environmental protection 
and product safety standards. In other words, whereas in other case studies 
Russia’s understanding of normativity has been strongly embedded in the 
assertion of Russia’s equal status vis-à-vis Europe, in the KO (as in the case 
of trans-border cooperation) a different understanding of normative action 
based on cooperation and multilateralism has taken precedence. Within 
this normative framework, one of the most debated issues has been the 
extent to which the KO should be treated as a ‘special’ region by Moscow. 
Whereas before most Kaliningraders would not distinguish themselves 
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from Russians, today their ‘special’ identity is taking root, an identity 
which does not choose between Europe and Russia but carves its own 
space as an in-between region with a dual heritage: Russian and 
Soviet/Russian (Browning & Joenniemi, 2004). The logic favouring 
normative means seemed to prevail for a while given that in order to 
protect the status quo a special EU-Russia agreement and Moscow’s special 
treatment of the KO were necessary. In other words, the KO was accepted 
as a pilot region (and thus a norm-setter) in EU-Russia relations because it 
was an exceptional case requiring innovative solutions (e.g., a special tax 
regime or simplified administrative procedures).  
Yet this point of view continued to be met with opposition by federal 
bodies that feared that granting privileges and special rights would incite 
secessionist tendencies in the KO (drawn closer to the Baltic region and the 
West) and beyond. Hence, in July 2001 the National Security Council 
created a Governing Board of the Free Economic Zone, subordinated to the 
presidential representative of the North West Federal District (NWFD), 
which took over key regional competences. The Council on Foreign and 
Defence Policy also suggested that Kaliningrad should become a special 
federal unit without local elections and with a governor directly appointed 
by Moscow (Abramov, 2001, pp. 191-2).  
External environment 
Having joined the Baltic region, the KO found itself in a controversial 
though stimulating environment, under multiple and sometimes 
conflicting external influences. In terms of religion, the Baltic region is 
located at the crossroads of Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic branches of 
Christianity; in ethnic terms, it crosscuts the Nordic, Slavic, and 
German/Prussian identities; in wider geocultural terms, it is the terrain 
where the Nordic and Baltic worlds meet each other as well as Central 
Europe. As such, the KO’s external environment is a multi-tier patchwork 
“with varying degrees of Europeanness and Eastness” (Kuus, 2004). 
Furthermore, Kaliningrad may also benefit from an understanding of the 
EU’s spatial order as set of overlapping circles, in which the KO may also 
find its place. But finding the KO’s place in the Nordic and Baltic regions is 
not easy. Being part of several region-building initiatives, the KO has been 
cast in a new yet uncertain external environment. Furthermore the 
geographical proximity to the EU has not ensured steady and robust flow 
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consider the oblast market as too underdeveloped, risky and immature for 
serious investment. In cultural terms, there is a widespread feeling that the 
KO’s location has deprived it of a strong identity of its own (Misiunas, 
2004; Jakobson-Obolenski, 2004, p. 8). The KO has always been an artificial 
territorial unit, a Soviet trophy of the Second World War with strong 
inclinations toward Europe (Krom, 2001).  
2.8  Status quo unintended: Russia’s energy policy, 2006- 
Russia’s energy policy represents another type status quo foreign policy, 
yet in this case its results have been unintended. The time frame of this case 
study covers the period beginning with the interruptions of Russian energy 
supplies to Ukraine and Belarus in 2006. 
Goals 
Russia pursues possession goals in its external energy policy. It attempts to 
bolster Russian power and influence in the world, using energy as a means 
to reassert its status in the international system. It also aims to further 
Russian economic interests by capitalising on the rising economic value of 
its natural resources.  
Means 
At the same time however, Russia claims it acts through normative or 
‘normal’ policy means. Indeed Russia uses two discourses in the conduct of 
its energy policy – politicised/non-normative and depoliticised/normative 
ones. Several examples illustrate the politicised/non-normative conduct of 
energy policy. First, energy policy has become a high profile issue in the 
complex web of Russia’s geopolitical relations, particularly vis-à-vis its 
western neighbours, which are viewed by Moscow as posing meaningful 
security threats to Russia. The EU claims that Russia’s energy policy has 
been a knee-jerk reaction to the orange revolution in Ukraine and an 
attempt to distract international attention from the excessive use of force in 
Chechnya and the allegedly authoritarian character of Putin’s presidency 
(Monaghan, 2006, p. 17). The Russian-German gas pipeline deal has also 
been interpreted as evidence of Moscow’s deliberate politicisation of 
energy matters, an attempt to signal that Russia needs no intermediaries in 
its dealings with West European powers. Second, politicisation occurs 
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distinguishing between ‘strategic’ and ‘ordinary’ oil reserves or between 
‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ energy prices (Milov, 2005). Traditionally, the Kremlin’s 
pricing policy has never been governed by world prices and Russian 
energy diplomacy has been a series of exceptions offered to special partners 
and friendly countries. In the 1990s, favourable gas prices were offered in 
exchange of the former Soviet countries’ acceptance of Russian hegemony 
in the CIS (Abedelal, 2004, p. 126). In recent years, Russia has withdrawn 
these exceptions. It is in this context that denying exceptions is 
paradoxically viewed as a deeply political/non-normative gesture.  
Yet Russia responds that the logic underpinning its energy policy is 
actually increasingly technical/economic and that Russia does not need 
assistants or facilitators in its energy dialogue with major European 
powers. Increases in energy prices are portrayed as a normative act, 
illustrating Russian willingness to conduct ‘normal’ and parity-based 
relations with its neighbours. As put by the Russian Foreign Minister: “the 
refusal of Moscow to resort to politicised approaches in trade and economic 
relations and the acceptance of market principles – what else could more 
convincingly confirm our commitment to provide normal state-to-state 
relations?” (Lavrov, 2007). The depoliticised strategy which Russia has 
resorted to since the mid-2000s is governed by market mechanisms, price 
liberalisation and the end of subsidised supplies of energy to friendly 
neighbours. Russia has publicly committed itself to following the same 
rules for all its energy consumers, regardless of their proximity to Russia or 
their geopolitical importance (Khristenko, 2006, p. 13). In other words, 
Gazprom’s business logic appears to be increasingly prevailing over the 
Kremlin’s political reasoning. According to Putin (2007b) for example, the 
North European Gas Pipeline project is based on a “market solution 
beneficial to ultimate consumers” and accusations of countries like Poland 
are snubbed as “politically explicit sloganeering”.  
Impact 
The intricate combination of politicised and depoliticised approaches in 
Russia’s energy policy has led to controversial results that may, 
unintentionally, be normative in the long-run. By turning from an 
exception-based to a norm-based approach, Russia has increasingly and 
vocally asserted its role as an energy super-power, whose status exempts it 
from international rules in the energy market (e.g., transparency standards, 
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Russia’s frequent energy disputes could have been resolved normatively 
through legal arbitration, and without relying on the disruption of energy 
supplies (World Economic Forum 2006). Yet precisely because of its rising 
role in world energy markets, Russia may well need to abide by 
international (normative) transparency standards in the long-run.  
One of most positive developments in recent years has been the 
gradual spread of transparency standards in different segments of the 
Russian economy. In the energy market, the increasing appreciation of the 
need for transparency is leading to the establishment of norm-setting 
institutional arrangements (e.g., in terms of corporate governance, state-
business relations, the management of energy flows and financial 
accountability). Transparency standards and procedures are thus likely to 
“become the normal way of working in all the relevant extractive 
industries”.93 Moreover, transparency standards and procedures serve the 
interests of different actors in Russian society. For business, transparency 
allows for fair rules of competition. For governments, it contributes to 
filling budgetary coffers. For public policy centres, it helps achieve 
professional and strategic goals. For international organisations, it 
contributes to lowering transaction costs that stem from corruption. In 
other words, while being a long-term process, the demand for transparency 
is likely to consolidate in Russia, leading to an unintended normative 
impact of Russia’s status quo energy policy. Why is this the case? 
Internal context 
Russia’s energy policy is thus both increasingly de-politicised and hyper-
politicised. De-politicisation refers to the separation of energy policy from 
geopolitical imperatives, whereby companies keep a low profile and limit 
themselves to technocratic arguments. On the flip side, politicisation refers 
to the tendency to use energy as a weapon in the hands of Russia’s ruling 
elite to strengthen their geopolitical standing. What explains this 
contradiction? The increasing overlap between norms and geopolitical 
interests provides much of the explanation. Russia’s switch to 
normative/depoliticised approaches has overlapped with its explicitly 
political goals, in so far as this switch has harmed above all countries such 
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as Georgia and Ukraine that have been drifting away from Moscow and 
towards the West. The gas price dispute illustrates this overlap: Russia 
claims that its position is grounded on the attempt to harmonise its energy 
prices for all consumers, yet in order to do so those countries whose energy 
prices were subsidised in the past and are now rising are precisely Russia’s 
least friendly neighbours. The Sakhalin project controversy is another good 
example: while justified on environmental grounds, the media largely 
covered the story as a deeply political affair in which Russia deliberately 
attempted to exclude foreign companies from the Russian energy market 
(Kovalevskii, 2006, pp. 18-21). In other words, Russia’s attempted 
depoliticisation has also aimed at legitimising its more overtly political 
intent (Critchley, 1999). Sensitive to this, Russia’s opponents finger-point 
each gesture of de-politicisation as grounded in purely political and thus 
non-normative calculations.  
Internal capabilities 
The debate on transparency highlights how Russia’s internal capabilities 
increasingly push for a normative approach in energy affairs. Government 
agencies provide the political impetus for greater transparency standards. 
Transparency allows higher tax incomes, induces efficient company 
development plans and fosters a healthy, reliable and competitive domestic 
energy market. Professional associations in turn help create the 
institutional environment for transparency by acting as mediators in 
complex situations. Expert analysis research centres instead provide 
information and monitoring, while NGOs mobilise segments of civil society 
(e.g. environmental organisations). Finally, the media places energy-related 
issues on the public agenda and creates fora for public debate. 
A shift towards a normative energy policy (beyond the current 
overlap between geopolitical interests and normative behaviour) is not set 
in stone. A fundamental problem arises when different groups in the 
energy sphere overlap and their respective responsibilities become blurred. 
When, for example, groups in government and the energy business overlap 
or when NGOs become closely enmeshed in government (which is a likely 
prospect in view of the authoritarian evolution of the Putin regime), then 
the slide from transparency into corruption becomes far more likely. The 
problem, in my view, stems from the intersection of two unfortunate 
tendencies: on the one hand, the increasingly close and exclusive relations 
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decreasing resources available to NGOs, which are associated neither with 
the state nor with the energy sector. When the overlap between state and 
business increases there is also the risk of an exchange of roles between the 
two. The state shifts from being a regulator of financial flows and a monitor 
of law enforcement mechanisms into a corporation whose members are 
motivated primarily by personal enrichment. The reverse also happens 
when the leadership of an oil company starts behaving as a political actor. 
This blurring of roles leads to distortion, opening the way to the opaque 
and corrupt functioning of the energy sphere.  
External environment 
The external environment shapes Russian energy policy in two ways. On 
the one hand, it generates demand leading to increased energy prices, 
allowing Russia to raise prices by referring to universal market norms. On 
the other hand, Western countries try to ‘normalise’ Russian energy policy 
by inducing the government to adopt the norms of transparency. Hence the 
unintended normative impact of Russia’s policy. It is exactly this point that 
most of EU countries raised when reacting to the energy-related conflicts 
between Russia and Belarus in January 2007 (as well as between Russia and 
Ukraine in 2006). European countries tried to reframe the energy debate 
with Russia by offering a different understanding of the norm: rather than 
equating the norm with market prices, the EU suggested that normative 
action in energy policy meant the respect of transparency standards. Hence, 
in early 2007 European politicians reproached Russia not for increasing gas 
prices for Belarus, but for not consulting in advance with its consumers. 
Within this logic, predictability, trust and openness acquire greater 
normative value than mere compliance with market prices.    
A good example of international attempts at inducing transparency in 
Russia’s energy policy is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI). The EITI was government-led, being launched by British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair in 2002. But the concept of transparency it promoted 
focused much on the monitoring and public awareness functions of NGOs. 
The implementation of the EITI has already received widespread support 
by major civil society actors such as the Soros Foundation (through the 
Revenue Watch Institute, Publish What You Pay, the Open Society 
Institute, and others). In 2006, the EITI was institutionalised through its 
secretariat in Oslo and has increasingly gained in reputation and 
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Initiative, including Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan. 
The debate has begun regarding Russia’s place in the EITI. As a member of 
the G8, Moscow has rhetorically supported the creation of an international 
transparency regime in the energy sector. However no practical steps have 
been taken to date. On the one hand, the Russian rhetoric on ‘sovereign 
democracy’ and ‘energy superpower’ bolster Russian claims to 
exceptionality, yet on the other hand Russia’s entry in the WTO and 
negotiations on a new contractual agreement with the EU open the way for 
possible steps forward in the field of implementation of energy 
transparency standards. For example, one of the key figures in the Russian 
Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs hinted that Russia’s objections to 
the Energy Charter – which it has signed but not ratified – will ultimately 
have to be overcome in so far as “if incidents such as those with Belarus or 
Ukraine, heaven forbid, should be repeated, they will in future become the 
subject not of bilateral relations between Russia and a country that breaks 
some rule or another, but of the international community”.94 Furthermore, 
the more transparency standards are internationalised the less will Russia 
be able to keep out of these arrangements, given the reputational and 
ensuing FDI losses it would incur.  
The situation is complicated by the fact that, unfortunately, most 
transparency-fostering impulses come from outside. Since the domestic 
demand for transparency in the energy sector is rather weak, it is unlikely 
that international norms will spill over into Russia automatically. Hence, 
Russia is only likely to adopt such standards when it appreciates its 
interests in doing so. The state’s re-evaluation of the benefits of 
transparency could begin for several reasons. First, the need for 
transparency is closely linked to environmental policy. Oil leakages caused 
by the implementation of major international energy projects such as the 
Baltic Gas Pipeline System are widely recognised as representing key 
security problems, and in some areas (e.g. Baikal, Sakhalin, Shtockman gas 
field) the Russian government is increasingly responsive to the demand for 
environmental protection. Second, transparency norms are connected to 
anti-corruption strategies and more efficient tax collection. Third, greater 
transparency is a precondition for the enforcement of anti-trust legislation 
in energy markets. Fourth, transparency would aid Russian energy 
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companies investing abroad. Both the Russian energy business and the 
government could have an interest in open information on the finances of 
countries Russia invests in. Fifth, in so far as Russia itself would welcome 
larger foreign investments, it will have to ultimately comply with 
international transparency standards.  
3.  Comparing the cases by way of conclusion 
Given that the eight case studies reveal a varied picture of Russia’s foreign 
policy, understanding where Russia’s ‘centre of gravity’ lies is particularly 
difficult. What are the most important features defining and explaining 
Russia’s use of normative approaches? First, my study confirms a well-
articulated thesis that ‘normative power’ is power that is able to shape 
conceptions of the ‘normal’ (Diez, 2005, p. 615). Russia’s current strategy is 
aimed at presenting itself as a ‘normal country’ whose political practices 
resemble those of the West. As a Russian author argues: “Putin’s strategy is 
best understood as one of ‘normal great power’, which seeks to move away 
from Soviet-style isolationism and wants to turn Russia into a full-fledged 
member of the international community” (Tsygankov, 2005, p. 134). 
Related to this, Russia’s Foreign Minister refers to a policy of pragmatism 
and common sense, which fits into the general tendencies of the 
international community. There is also a logical link between Russia’s 
alleged normalisation and the de-politicisation of its foreign policy: it is 
Russia’s denial of politicised practice that underpins its claims to being a 
‘normal country’ (Lavrov, 2007), which does not need to be ‘normalised’ by 
others.  
Yet at the same time, Russia has its own normative project. In 
relations with the EU, Russia promotes its own normative agenda (Averre, 
2007, p. 1) leading to an ensuing clash of norms. The issue of norms thus 
transforms into a wider question relating to Russia’s role in world politics. 
Putin is not only eager to get involved in the global normative debate, but 
tries to use this debate to reassert Russia’s leadership. The response from 
Europe has been lukewarm, but nonetheless the Kremlin has neither 
abandoned its pro-European stance nor rushed into an alternative Eurasian 
ideology. As put by a Russian analyst: “[h]owever unhappy the Kremlin 
may be about developments in its relationship with the West, in the eyes of 
officials, Western Europe and the US remain the only examples of ‘normal’ 
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Second, and paradoxically, Russia has attempted to reassert its 
‘normalcy’ by deconstructing the very concept of the norm. President Putin 
(2007b) once declared: “[c]apital punishment in some Western countries, 
secret prisons and tortures in Europe, troubles with mass media in certain 
countries, the immigration legislation not always corresponding to the 
established principles of international law and democratic norms – in my 
view, all this is related to what is considered as common values”. This 
approach has two implications. On the one hand, it legitimises a realpolitik 
type of foreign policy, while on the other hand, it represents a meaningful 
normative challenge to Europe in so far as “if the state that is constituted as 
non-democratic … claims to be equally democratic, then its response would 
be the undermining of the self’s identity” (Rumelili, 2004, p. 38). In fact, 
Russia’s strategy of denying Europe’s monopoly over democracy aims at 
rendering its key concepts (inclusion, participation, tolerance, solidarity, 
etc.) ‘empty signifiers’ to be discursively filled by specific content in the 
process of debate. 
Third, Russia grounds its alleged ‘normalisation’ in another element 
of de-politicised discourse – universalisation. Russia refers to a set of norms 
that it considers as being already universally accepted. There are two 
practical advantages in doing so. References to pre-existing global norms 
deprive Russia of any responsibility for their articulation. In addition, 
President Putin accepts responsibility of transforming and adapting these 
norms as long as their rearticulation is understood as having universal 
applicability. This relates to the discussions on the independence of 
Kosovo, which Russia links to similar problems in Transnistria, South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia. It is here that Russia’s version of normativity reveals 
its decisionist, technocratic and radically apolitical nature. 
In this paper, I have described several cases that might be 
instrumental in comparing how Russia, as opposed to the EU, articulates 
and implements normative arguments. A first situation arises when one 
side appeals to a normative argument, while the other sticks to a non-
normative approach. This includes Russia’s reaction to the normative 
challenge presented by the colour revolutions, which Moscow claims to be 
driven by technical/economic arguments while being widely perceived as 
representing hardnosed realpolitik by others. It also includes the Russian-
Estonian dispute over the Second World War monuments in Tallinn, in 
which Russia claims to be driven by norms although it is viewed in 
Western Europe as being motivated by strategic possession goals. A second 
situation arises when both Russia and the EU are committed to normative 204 | ANDREY S. MAKARYCHEV 
 
arguments, but their advocated norms clash. In the Russian-Estonian 
conflict for example, Russia appealed to ‘common values’ and shared 
historical memories, while the EU referred to diplomatic norms and the 
need to ensure the safety of the Estonian Embassy in Moscow. The question 
is which norms should and do prevail, a question which inevitably returns 
to the relationship between norms and power. A third and final situation 
arises when there are divergent interpretations of what constitutes non-
normative goals and means. For Russia, its energy policy, while pursued at 
the service of Russian strategic and economic interests, is conducted within 
general market rules and as such cannot be deemed non-normative. Yet 
most Western countries interpret Russian energy policies as ruthlessly non-
normative. In other words, when the interpretation of both milieu and 
possession goals collides, a wider space is opened to debate norms, politics 
and power in the international system.  
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5.  INDIA AS A FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR – 
NORMATIVE REDUX 
RADHA KUMAR* 
This chapter analyses India’s behaviour as a foreign policy actor by looking at 
India’s changing relations over the past decade with the EU, US, China, Japan, 
Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal and, in a historical departure, the former princely state 
of Sikkim. It argues that though India has almost always been a normative actor, 
Indian foreign policy is today transiting from abstract, and frequently 
‘unrealpolitik,’ views of what constitutes normative behaviour. India’s ‘Look East’ 
policy has been the cornerstone of this transition, indicating that economic growth, 
maritime capability and peace and stability in its neighbourhood are key goals of 
India’s present behaviour as a normative foreign policy actor. 
1.  Introduction 
Observers of Indian foreign policy are often puzzled by its inchoate 
combination of idealist rhetoric on international issues, post-modern 
nitpicking in negotiations and isolationist behaviour when it comes to 
matters of national interest. “What does India want?” they ask in 
frustration: “Do you want to be a major power, or do you just want to score 
points?”  
The question is difficult to answer. When India achieved 
independence in 1947, the country’s founding fathers assumed it would be 
a leading international player, expanding rules for normative behaviour in 
relation to goals as well as means. But though India’s founding fathers 
produced grand policy visions, such as the 1946 Asian Relations 
Conference for an institutional structure to buffer Asia against the cold 
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war, they were unable to translate their sweeping goals into action. The 
Asian Relations Conference ended with minor agreements on educational 
cooperation (Gonsalves, 1991). 
Sixty years later, India’s new policy-makers define India as ‘a rising 
power’ that is today beginning to match global goals and means in order to 
achieve the most favourable results for its citizens, and at the same time 
expand normative principles for inter-state and transnational behaviour. 
India’s steady 8-9% growth over the past decade, and the Indian 
government’s proactive diplomacy in the same period, allow Indian policy-
makers to bring context and substance to the normative principles that 
their predecessors advocated – a development that one leading Indian 
analyst describes as “crossing the Rubicon” from idealism to pragmatism 
(Mohan, 2003), and another as “India Unbound” (Das, 2002); both phrases 
indicate what a large leap it is. Indian policy-makers used to advocate 
principles divorced from political reality, to use Morgenthau’s definition 
(Morgenthau, 1982), but today they seek to combine normative principles 
with national interest. The transition is not easy to make, and as so often 
happens in the early phases of policy change, the conceptual shift in 
approach has outpaced the implementers: most of the desk officers and/or 
their superiors who make policy through case-by-case practice. 
Morgenthau was ill-placed to derive the consequent point that flows 
from his distinction – the transition from principles that are divorced from 
political reality to normative principles based on national interest is one of 
the most complicated transitions to make, especially in post-colonial 
countries. As other contributions to this volume have pointed out, 
categories of what is normative vary from culture to culture, and are hotly 
debated across cultures (see especially chapter 1 by Nathalie Tocci). 
However, Indian foreign policy is curious in this regard: traditional views 
of what is normative are very similar to European and US principles, but 
the colonial and cold war experience led Indian policy-makers to be 
skeptical of European and US claims to normative behaviour on the one 
hand, and on the other to distrust their own normative heritage. Prior to 
the new policy-making described above, Indian positions on normative 
behaviour in international forums often appeared schizophrenic: Indian 
representatives claimed idealist positions, but often defended reprehensible 
regimes on grounds of state sovereignty even when there was no clear 
national interest involved. While India’s new policy-makers have jettisoned 
the abstract normative positions of their cold war predecessors, elements of INDIA AS A FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR| 213 
 
the old position-taking remain, especially amongst Indian policy 
implementers. 
Part of the problem is that Indian policy-making is shaped by two 
major strands that  have never been synthesised to create a doctrine that 
takes into account the national interest: one, traditional principles drawn 
from the Gita and Mahabharata and most heavily from the doctrine of 
statecraft framed by the 4th century BC scholar-statesman, Kautilya (also 
known as Chanakya); and two, modernist principles that uneasily combine 
Enlightenment values with a passive, sometimes dependent realpolitik, 
instilled by the experience of British colonialism in the 19th to mid-20th 
centuries. Most Indians perceive the two strands as internally conflicting, 
especially when it comes to issues of normative behaviour.  
Traditional Indian foreign policy doctrine highlights the following 
key principles: firstly, the behaviour of states should adhere to rule-based 
or legal norms, with the important corollary that the law must enshrine an 
ethical worldview whose core principle, derived from the Mahabharata and 
Gita, is that war is the worst of last resorts.95 The canonical text of Indian 
statecraft, Kautilya’s Arthashastra (laws of political economy), which 
remains the most widely quoted text by Indian policy-makers,96 laid down 
that the primary goals of a good government were to provide peace, 
security and prosperity for its citizens. The best governments, said 
Kautilya, adhered to the norms set out in the Dharmashastras  (laws of 
principle and duty), which formed the state’s judicial system and should be 
administered by a group of judges and ministers. 
Secondly, the most effective means of delivering these goals were 
normative means such as international alliances, trade, infrastructure 
development and free movement across national borders (Kautilya, Book 
VI, Chapters 1 and 2; and Book VII, Chapter 1).  
Thirdly, the behaviour of a state should be assessed by the 
transparency of its actions. Before a government act or agreement could be 
implemented, the group of judges and ministers that administered the law 
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would have to decide whether the government’s acts and agreements were 
valid or void. The criterion for valid agreements was that they should be 
transparent (Kautilya, Book III, Chapter 1).97 Incidentally, transparency was 
also underlined by US President Woodrow Wilson in his 14 Points and held 
to be the turning point after which quiet diplomacy was increasingly 
supplanted by public diplomacy.98 
Thus the Arthashastra highlighted three key pillars of normative 
statecraft: engagement with the world, adherence to rule-based norms and 
transparency. Written for the most outward looking of India’s several 
empires, the Mauryan dynasty, whose rule spanned the Indus valley and 
was home to one of the greatest universities of its time: the Buddhist seat of 
Taxila (now in Pakistan), the Arthashastra based its normative principles on 
national interest, and has been described as an “interest-based framework 
that (saw) international relations as an interlocking pattern of the foreign 
policy priorities and dispositions of crucial states” (Gyngell & Wesley, 2007, 
p. 188; Cohen, 2001, p. 15). 
Kautilya’s thinking included a distinctly realist strand. The 
neighbourhood was viewed as a core foreign policy priority and defined as 
a set of concentric circles. If the proximate neighbour was an enemy, the 
enemy’s next-door neighbour would be an ally and his neighbour would be 
an enemy: a kind of Swiss roll version of containment (Kautilya, Book VII, 
Chapters 2 and 18). He also counselled further and more general realist 
precepts: greater powers should be cultivated, equal or weaker powers 
could be defeated through judicious alliances, and weaker powers could be 
attacked, patronised or ignored.  
These views led to a debate on whether Kautilya was the ultimate 
political realist who, in Weber’s words, made Machiavelli seem naïve 
(Livingstone, 2004, p. 88); or whether the Arthashastra skilfully combined 
elements of idealism with realpolitik serving the national interest (Boesche, 
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2003; Alagappa, 1998, pp. 74-75). The latter characterisation is more 
convincing – Kautilya believed that alliances for peace were preferable to 
war even if war highlighted a country’s primacy over others. He 
emphasised the role of diplomacy and assigned two types of diplomats to 
negotiate: envoys who would issue démarches and envoys who would make 
agreements (Book I, Chapter 16). He also set humanitarian standards for 
civilian protection during and after war (Book VII, final chapter). 
Had the traditional strand remained dominant in Indian foreign 
policy doctrine; it would have been easy to classify India as a normative 
(although not necessarily naively idealist) international player. But British 
colonialism added a new element to Indian foreign policy – that of 
dependency. Whereas previous empires had been rooted in India and 
adopted foreign policies that served Indian state interests, Britain was a far-
away country and India’s foreign policy was adapted to suit British 
interests. Thus what I term “unrealpolitik” international action (because it 
subordinates national interests to that of other countries) entered into 
Indian foreign policy. Unrealpolitik behaviour gained strength through the 
education policy framed by T.B. Macaulay in 1835, who argued that the 
Indian education system should generate contempt for native traditions 
and respect the superiority of European values and practice.99 This led 
successive generations of Indian policy-makers and analysts to doubt their 
own ability to frame the national interest. 
Indian attitudes towards norms based on Enlightenment values were 
also complicated by the fact that these values arrived in India as a 
consequence of empire and were most often invoked to justify contempt for 
natives. Hypocrisy would have been bad enough; but here hypocrisy was 
                                                      
99 “I have read translations of the most celebrated Arabic and Sanscrit works. I 
have conversed, both here and at home, with men distinguished by their 
proficiency in the Eastern tongues… I have never found one among them who 
could deny that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole 
native literature of India and Arabia… We must at present do our best to form a 
class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern – a 
class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in 
morals and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular 
dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed 
from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for 
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combined with brutality towards an entire populace. No wonder that in the 
decades that followed Indians have tended to view European and to some 
extent American references to normative behaviour with scepticism – and 
are unable to distinguish between normative and non-normative Western 
behaviour. Most Indian policy-makers and analysts do not, for example, 
see a difference between European policies in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the 
US and allied invasion of Iraq. Humanitarian intervention, they argue, is 
not distinct from regime change or ‘shock and awe’: it is merely a cover for 
imperial design (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2003, pp. 44-45; 
Dixit, 1999; Swamy, 1999; Naqvi, 1999).  
How do these views affect India’s behaviour as a foreign policy 
actor? During the cold war, India’s positions in the international arena 
were mostly normative but divorced from political reality (Morgenthau, 
1982) and were directed to exclusively ‘milieu goals’ (Wolfers, 1962, pp. 67-
80). From 1920, when Indian National Congress leader MK Gandhi sent a 
delegation to the Paris Peace Conference to demand that the territories of 
the former Ottoman Empire be granted the same rights to self-
determination as those granted to the territories of the former Austro-
Hungarian Empire – qualified in this case as the right to Muslim rule 
(Ghose, 1991, pp.128-129) – India’s foreign policy focus was on 
decolonisation and multilateral constraints over Great Power domination. 
Furthermore, Indian leaders sought consensus rather than using economic, 
political or military pressure to influence world affairs, an approach that 
lasted well into the 1990s.  
Under Prime Minister Nehru (1946-64), India actively aided state and 
nation-building in newly decolonised countries, especially in Africa, where 
the Indian Army and civil service helped countries such as Kenya, Egypt, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe to build administrative and/or defence 
institutions, and spearheaded UN action against South Africa’s apartheid 
(Reddy, 1985). Nehru’s efforts were less successful in Asia. His hope that 
Asia’s countries might set up a cooperative network that could prevent 
Great Power conflict shifting to the Asian theatre in the aftermath of WWII 
proved to be unrealistic (Gonsalves, 1991). The Chinese revolution, 
followed by the Korean, Vietnamese and Cambodian wars, brought the 
cold war into the heart of Asia.  
Nevertheless, in the 1940s-1960s, India achieved considerable soft 
power across Africa and Asia (especially in the latter through its film 
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between the US and China during the Korean War (1951) and protect 
dissidents in Hungary (1956).100 In the early years of the cold war, India 
founded the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) along with Indonesia, 
Yugoslavia and Egypt at the Bandung Conference of 1955. Even if the NAM 
was treated as a mosquito-like irritant by the US and UK for much of its 
existence, it did keep the idea of an alternative to the cold war alive in Asia 
(Gonsalves, 1991). 
Following the 1962 war with China – which was largely Tibet-driven 
and in which India suffered a crushing defeat – and Nehru’s death in 1964, 
Indian foreign policy veered back to unrealpolitik, which in this case put the 
interests of the USSR above its own. Unrealpolitik reached its zenith under 
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1966-75 and 1978-84), during which 
period India aligned itself firmly with the USSR and its economy became 
dependent on the Soviet military-industrial complex. Although Indian 
foreign policy retained a normative element in bilateral relations, in 
multilateral forums it adopted normative policies only rarely, such as 
sanctions against apartheid South Africa and support for a Palestinian state 
– not least because both of these positions were also supported by the 
USSR.  
With the end of the cold war, India experienced what some called an 
opportunity to combine normative and realpolitik goals (Kumar, 2006), and 
others defined as a conflict between the two (Mohan, 2003). But Indian 
policy-makers were slow to take advantage of this new opening. After the 
long winter of the cold war, when India was estranged from the US and to 
a lesser extent from Western Europe, the end of the cold war caught India 
unprepared and Indian diplomats withdrew into a lengthy introspection 
from which the country emerged at the turn of the century having lost most 
of its policy edge in East and Central Europe. The rise of Hindu nationalism 
during the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) years in government (1998-2003) 
further shattered India’s relatively strong relations in the Gulf and North 
Africa. It was only in the early years of the 21st century that Indian policy-
                                                      
100 See Nehru’s speech in the Lok Sabha (House of Commons) on 19 November 
1956, (available on the website of the Embassy of India in Budapest: 
http://209.85.175.104/search?q=cache:ihyjhZG0FHgJ:www.indianembassybudape
st.org/html/TnCMinister/Press%2520Release%2520-%252024%2520oct.htm+India 
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makers made a concerted effort to re-engage with the world; and this time 
it was the Kautilyan strand in Indian foreign policy that came to the fore.  
In contrast to India’s cold war leaders, the country’s new policy-
makers came to the conclusion that if India was to pull its weight 
internationally it would have to become an economic and regional power 
(Dasgupta, 2003, pp. 92-111; Schiff, 2006). This was a view that had been 
cogently put by Kautilya and kept alive during most of the Mughal Empire 
because its rulers became native to India, but was then lost during colonial 
rule and the cold war.  
After the first wave of economic liberalisation in 1990-91, when many 
of the bureaucratic constraints on industrial growth were lifted, wave two 
of economic liberalisation prioritised resource and infrastructure 
development. The new policy-makers believed that neither could be 
achieved without integration into the global economy – as the past decade 
had shown with the spectacular rise of Indian information technology (Das, 
2002). So they swung into an active diplomatic campaign to improve 
relations with the major powers, identified as the US, EU, Russia, Japan 
and China (Dasgupta, 2003) and implement a ‘Look East’ policy in the 
wider Asian neighbourhood, especially the ASEAN countries where the 
Indian ‘footprint’ had a long reach (Saran, 2003, p. 115).  
India, which had eschewed membership of multilateral forums under 
Indira Gandhi, joined a slew of regional trade and security organisations in 
the short span of a decade, such as ASEAN, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation, the Asian Regional Forum, the Asia-Europe Meeting process 
and the East Asia Summit. Finally, India’s new policy-makers also 
recognised that India would fail as a regional power until it could turn its 
South Asian neighbours around. As a result, the Indian government 
launched several new peacemaking initiatives – with Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, Nepal, and Sri Lanka – hoping that these 
could help pull South Asia out of the slough of hostility and poverty that it 
had slipped into following independence from British rule.  
Former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran (2003, p. 115) put 
India’s renewed focus on its neighbourhood as follows:  
Proximity is the most difficult and testing among diplomatic 
challenges a country faces. We have, therefore, committed 
ourselves to giving the highest priority to closer political, economic 
and other ties with our neighbours in South Asia… We regard the 
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around a central axis of historical and cultural commonalities… 
pursuing a cooperative architecture of pan-Asian regionalism is a 
key area of focus of our foreign policy. Geography imparts a 
unique position to India in the geo-politics of the Asian continent, 
with our footprint reaching well beyond South Asia and our 
interests straddling across different sub-categories of Asia – be it 
East Asia, West Asia, Central Asia, South Asia or South-East Asia. 
The new diplomacy had mixed results. On the whole it yielded rich 
dividends for improved relations with the major powers and East Asia; but 
South Asia proved to be an uphill climb. Turmoil in Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and Bangladesh put peace initiatives with India on a back burner, the Sri 
Lanka conflict re-escalated, Nepal underwent a revolution and Myanmar 
another wave of authoritarian crackdowns.  
How did India respond to the troubles in its neighbourhood? This 
paper looks at eight case studies of India’s foreign relations – with Pakistan, 
China, Japan, the US, Nepal, Sikkim (now an Indian state), Myanmar and 
the EU – to examine what kind of foreign policy actor India is, accounting 
for varied purposes and power. Do India’s current foreign policy actions 
conform to its founding fathers’ vision? If they are different, can they still 
be called normative? Have Indian views on what constitutes normative 
foreign policy changed? What can other countries expect from India? 
2.  The Case studies 
The eight cases discussed below reflect different aspects of India’s relations 
with its neighbourhood. One was a neighbouring country (Sikkim), three 
are neighbouring states (Pakistan, Nepal and Myanmar), two are part of the 
wider neighbourhood and are closely involved in South Asia (China more 
than Japan), and two are not neighbours but are deeply engaged in South 
Asia (the US and EU) and discuss their South Asia policies with India. The 
methodology used is adapted from the one introduced by Tocci in chapter 
1. The table below indicates how the selected case studies reflect the 
different stylisations of foreign policy. Most of the examples are drawn 
from the current period, but one – Sikkim – is historical, although we 
analyse the current impact of an Indian action undertaken 20 years ago.  
 
 220 | RADHA KUMAR 
 
Table 1. Indian foreign policy: Selected case studies 
Type of 
actor 
Normative  Realpolitik  Imperial Status  quo 
  Intended Unintended Intended Unintended Intended Unintended  Intended  Unintended 
Goals  Peace & 
regional 
integration 
Cooperation & 
coexistence 
Commercial  Economic & 
political 
support  
Stable 
border  
Stable relations  Realpolitik 
with 
normative 
strand  
Maintain 
bilateral 
relations 
Means  CBMs talks 
trade 
Trade border 
talks 
Naval 
exercises 
Military 
cooperation 
Govt. to Govt. 
Diaspora 
Annexation  Political 
pressure/ 
open borders 
Political/ 
aid pressure 
Strong 
bilateral/ 
wary EC/EP  
Result  Moving to 
normative 
Realpolitik  Mixed  Norm 
changing  
Integration  Greater 
acceptance 
Status quo   Moving to 
normative  
Case 
Study 
Pakistan  China  Japan  US  Sikkim  Nepal  Myanmar   EU  
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The Indian cases do not fit entirely into Tocci’s framework. For 
example, India’s goals and means with Pakistan were normative, but the 
results were mixed normative and status quo; with a hesitant foray into 
realpolitik, India-Japan relations are relapsing into a cross between status 
quo and realpolitik. Similarly, India’s merger of Sikkim was imperial but the 
results are beginning to be normative. India’s goals as well as means with 
Myanmar had strong normative elements, but the results so far have been 
status quo. India’s goals with the EU were also initially status quo, and the 
means had a minor normative strand, but the results are normative. 
Nevertheless, the categories serve to sharpen contrasts of detail which add 
to our understanding of India as a foreign policy actor. 
2.1  Normative intended: India-Pakistan peace initiatives 1998-
2008 
Normative goals 
In late 1998, India and Pakistan began talks to end a half-century of 
hostility. Indian goals, as spelt out by Prime Minister Vajpayee (1999a and 
b) at the launch of the Delhi-Lahore bus service in February 1999, were to 
show support for a strong and stable Pakistan; settle disputes through 
peaceful negotiations; end terrorism; put Kashmir talks on a fast track; 
liberalise trade and visa regimes; set up mechanisms for nuclear risk 
reduction; and work with Pakistan to make the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) a substantive regional organisation. 
Although these goals were clearly normative, many doubted the 
seriousness of their intent, including then General Musharraf 
(Parthasarathy, 2003). One reason for doubt was the immediate context. 
The 1998 peace initiative was undertaken under international pressure, 
following nuclear tests by the two countries initiated by India.101 
International response to the tests was severe: the US and some European 
countries slapped sanctions against India and Pakistan (James Martin 
                                                      
101 Inexplicably, the Indian nuclear test decision made by the Hindu nationalist 
government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) seemed to pay little attention to 
its potential regional or international impact – it was conducted for primarily 
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Center, 1998) causing considerable economic damage, especially to 
Pakistan, where there was a military coup one year later.  
Lending weight to the sceptics, the first few years of the peace 
process oscillated between highs and lows, its lowest points being the 
Kargil war of 1999, sparked by Pakistani incursions into the Indian region 
of Jammu and Kashmir (Centre for Contemporary Conflict, 1999) and the 
Indian Parliament attack in 2001, allegedly launched by Pakistan-based 
armed groups. The Pakistani leadership, in particular the army, was a 
reluctant partner in the peace process. In this context could/would India 
persist in its pursuit of normative goals? As framed by the national policy 
debate, India’s choice was between two options – either strike the bases of 
armed groups in Pakistan and shock the government into abandoning its 
dual policy once and for all (Bedi, 2001), or persist with normative 
behaviour in the belief that external and internal circumstances would 
move Pakistan towards a normative path as well.  
India chose to remain within narrowly defined normative 
boundaries. India snapped diplomatic ties and moved troops to the border 
with the demand that Pakistan act against armed groups responsible for 
terrorist attacks in India (Vajpayee, 2001). These actions were normative to 
the extent that they did not violate international law by entering Pakistani 
territory. They were also intended to be norm-setting – by massing troops 
on the border, the Indian government aimed to signal what would not be 
tolerated from across the border. Alongside this however, the massing of 
troops acted as a form of coercive diplomacy (George, 1991, p. 4)102 or 
strategic coercion (Freedman, 1998): President Musharraf arrested close to 
1,000 armed radicals and closed down their offices. 
The Congress coalition government that took over in 2004 built upon 
the peace initiatives begun by Vajpayee, with the difference that they did 
not respond coercively to ensuing terrorist attacks, of which there were 
                                                      
102 As put by George (1991, p. 4): “The general idea of coercive diplomacy is to 
back one’s demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for 
noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him 
to comply with the demand”. As an exercise, India’s foray into coercive 
diplomacy failed because the Indian government was unable to convert 
Musharraf’s response into cooperative mechanisms, such as extradition, police 
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many. They focused instead on getting additional institutional structures 
for engagement in place, such as the 2004 South Asian Free Trade 
Agreement (SAFTA) and the 2006 Joint Mechanism for Counter-Terrorism; 
using existing multilateral structures such as the World Bank under the 
Indus Waters Treaty; and encouraging Track II inputs in policy-making 
(Kumar, 2005; Khatri, 2007). These steps demonstrated that India had 
expanded its range of normative actions. Under the Joint Mechanism, the 
Indian government moved to share information with a historical enemy in 
order to strengthen rule of law; by using the Indus Waters Treaty, it 
accepted multilateral arbitration on selected issues; and it sought advice 
from civil society, heretofore a severely limited practice. Finally, for the 
doubters claiming that India would only pursue peace initiatives that 
served its narrow national interests and stall on Kashmir (Amin, 2005; 
Quraishi, 2004), Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was able to put Kashmir 
talks on a fast track, both between New Delhi and dissident Kashmiris, and 
between India and Pakistan.   
Normative means 
After its foray into coercive diplomacy, India focused on five normative 
means to make peace with Pakistan: confidence-building measures (CBMs), 
arbitration, negotiation, trade and security cooperation. First, the CBMs 
that India used combined conventional means such as military-to-military 
hotlines and regular meetings of border forces, with aspirational means (i.e. 
means that addressed the aspirations of the affected people), such as 
opening new travel routes between divided Punjab, Kashmir, Sindh and 
Rajasthan, easing visa and trade regimes and encouraging people-to-people 
exchanges. In early 2005, India and Pakistan reopened the Srinagar-
Muzaffarbad road which had been closed since 1949, linking the two parts 
of divided Kashmir. This soft-border CBM had a major trust-building effect 
on India-Pakistan relations, inducing Pakistani policy-makers to begin to 
believe that terrorism was not the only lever they had over India on 
Kashmir.  
Second, in 2005 India and Pakistan agreed to use a multilateral forum 
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Jammu and Kashmir (the Baglihar dam), and went to a World Bank-
appointed tribunal for arbitration.103  
Third and again beginning in 2005, India and Pakistan engaged in 
negotiation and trade relations, setting up a regular schedule of meetings at 
foreign secretary, additional secretary and joint secretary levels to negotiate 
disputes, trade, consular and security issues. The greatest progress was 
made on the Kashmir dispute – in which the back-channel contacts 
between envoys appointed by the governments of Pakistan and India 
allegedly reached a near consensus. While some progress was made in 
trade, it was slow and appeared to make two steps forward and one step 
backward. Though trade negotiations took place at both the regional 
(SAARC) and bilateral levels, little progress has been made at the regional 
level, where SAFTA is indefinitely postponed.  
Finally as far as security affairs are concerned, in 2007 India and 
Pakistan agreed to set up a Joint Counter-Terrorism Mechanism. This is still 
largely a paper body, but it signifies that India is getting closer to setting 
the norm for security cooperation against non-state armed groups. 
Results – Normative interrupted 
The tangible normative achievements of the India-Pakistan peace process 
are considerable. Between 2003 and 2007, trade between the two countries 
trebled to $600 million (this is still a very low volume; India’s trade with Sri 
Lanka, which is much smaller than Pakistan, is $1billion). The Baglihar 
dam dispute, stalemated for a quarter-century, was settled in 2006 by a 
World Bank-appointed arbitrator, who ruled in favour of India. Both the 
Line of Control in divided Jammu and Kashmir and the border between 
India and Pakistan have been softened through reopening pre-partition 
routes (so far four routes have been reopened, two each in Jammu and 
Kashmir). Since 2004, the number of people travelling between the two 
countries has increased twenty-fold; the Indian High Commission in 
Islamabad issued an average of 8,000 visas a day in 2006, up from 400 a day 
in 2005. Figures for Pakistani visas are not available (Sarwar, 2005).  
                                                      
103 Under the 1963 Indus Waters Treaty (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
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Back-channel talks progressed so well that by 2005-06, the Pakistani 
government ended its support for armed groups operating against India 
(although they did not crack down on their non-government sources of 
funding) and by late 2006 it seemed that a resolution of the Kashmir 
dispute might be achieved in 2007. Then in March 2007, Pakistan began its 
plunge into internal turmoil with a clash between the army and the 
judiciary and a series of violent crises have occurred since, the latest being 
the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on 23 December 
2007. The peace process stands suspended. 
Conditioning factors 
In the immediate aftermath of the nuclear tests, external factors such as 
international sanctions pushed India and Pakistan into normative peace 
overtures. Once peace overtures had begun, however, external factors 
exerted a greater influence on Pakistan and internal factors on India. 
Pakistan’s 1999 Kargil intrusions led US President Bill Clinton to demand 
immediate Pakistani withdrawal; then the 9/11 attacks of 2001 focused 
international attention on Pakistan’s role as a host to Islamic militant 
groups. From 1999, the US and European governments put pressure on 
Pakistan to enter a peace process with India and cutback support for armed 
groups, and this pressure grew exponentially after the 9/11 attacks and the 
Madrid and London bombings. At the same time, the US-NATO 
stabilisation mission in Afghanistan allowed Pakistan to play yo-yo with 
armed groups fighting in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Although Pakistani 
support for these groups has much reduced over the last years, the 
Pakistani government remains selective in its choices of which groups it 
cracks down on and which it still supports (The Daily Times, 2008). 
Furthermore, as internal violence grew from 2005 on, the Pakistan Army’s 
room to manoeuvre vis-à-vis different armed groups has shrunk. Benazir 
Bhutto’s assassination threw the military-mullah dilemma into stark relief. 
These external pressures on Pakistan had a trust-building impact on 
India, that Pakistan’s dual policy could not be easily sustained in the post-
9/11 climate. Yet external factors alone cannot account for India’s 
normative policy course. Between 1999 and 2006, key internal determinants 
affected India’s policy approach. Firstly, India’s accelerated economic 
growth – in particular, the IT (information technology) boom which took 
place at around the same period – led Indian policy-makers to argue that 
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and that in turn was dependent on peace with India’s neighbours. 
Secondly, the positive impact of peace initiatives on Jammu and Kashmir 
was immediate. Thirdly, India’s US diaspora, which was part of the growth 
story, actively supported a peace process with Pakistan, and this influenced 
both Indian policy-makers and civil society (Kumar, 2005).  
2.2  Normative unintended: ‘Chindia’, 2005-07 
Normative goals 
The economist-politician Jairam Ramesh (2005), currently Minister of State 
for Commerce, wrote a book on the potential impact that India-China 
relations could have on the world if the two countries worked together as 
‘Chindia’. Chindia rapidly became a concept that defined India’s new 
policy towards China: to boost trade bilaterally and evolve common 
strategies in the global marketplace, settle border disputes and develop 
cooperative mechanisms in Asia. A third goal emerged as a result of India’s 
growing economic and strategic ties in East and South-East Asia – to avoid 
being, or being seen as, a counterweight to China. India has been careful to 
deal with China within the normative frameworks that the Chinese 
leadership agrees to (Puri, 2005 and 2006; Varadarajan, 2007a and b).  
In April 2005, the two countries signed a Strategic Partnership and set 
up high-level talks to resolve their border disputes. In January 2006 they 
agreed on a Memorandum for Enhancing Cooperation in the Field of Oil 
and Natural Gas that permits joint bids on energy assets in third countries. 
In May 2006 India and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding for 
joint military exchanges and exercises, collaboration in counter-terrorism, 
anti-piracy and search-and-rescue efforts. In December 2007 they held their 
first joint military training exercise and in January 2008 announced they 
would formulate a joint global economic strategy, including common 
action in the World Trade Organisation and on regional climate change, 
and agreed on civil nuclear energy cooperation. 
These are normative goals and policies insofar as they are grounded 
in cooperation and international agreements without being directed against 
third parties. For India, however, pursuit of the normative goal of 
cooperation has also entailed subordinating other normative objectives, 
such as support for Tibetan Buddhists. India continues to offer sanctuary to 
the Dalai Lama, but has recently traded recognition of Tibet as part of 
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classic realpolitik action. More significantly, India’s energy cooperation with 
China has led India to ignore normative requirements in both Sudan and 
Myanmar until 2007, when a course correction began.  
Normative means 
Bilateral negotiations between India and China are supposedly governed 
by the normative ‘Panchsheel’ or five principles of peace – respect for each 
other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and 
peaceful coexistence – which are also applied to border settlement 
negotiations.104 In policy practice, these normative means have been 
essentially respected as far as trade, climate change and border negotiations 
are concerned. In 2003 China and India agreed to reopen the Nathu La pass 
between Sikkim and Tibet, combining a soft border policy with recognition 
of each other’s claims. Though there are complaints that China has violated 
the Panchsheel principles over 100 times in the past year by patrolling the 
Indian side of the border in Arunachal Pradesh, the Indian government has 
downplayed these violations, saying they are dealt with through the joint 
border cooperation mechanism (Singh, 2006; Muckerjee, 2008). Both 
countries at first ignored a fresh wave of human rights violations in Sudan 
and Myanmar, where they have high energy (and in the latter, security) 
stakes at play; yet China has now used its good offices in Sudan and India 
is attempting to do so in Myanmar.105 
However, China has shown a disconcerting readiness to drop 
normative means for realpolitik ones. For example, under the Panchsheel 
principles the two countries agreed to exchange maps in order to facilitate 
border negotiations, and have exchanged maps where the less contentious 
middle sector is concerned. But the talks have moved to the more 
contentious northern and eastern sectors, and the Chinese are now refusing 
to exchange maps (Raman, 2008). China has also used norm-challenging 
                                                      
104 Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and 
India, signed on 29 April 1954 and expanded two months later to cover all bilateral 
relations between India and China, reiterated in the 1993 Agreement on the 
Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility on the Line of Actual Control in the India-
China Border Areas (http://mea.gov.in/celdemo/panchsheel.pdf). 
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means, such as nuclear and arms aid to Pakistan. Though this declined 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, it grew sharply following India’s 
tests in 1998, and was again upped following the India-US civil nuclear 
energy pact. China recently aided Pakistan’s building of the Chashma II 
and unsafeguarded Khushab reactors with the promise of more reactors to 
come, supplied plutonium and provided components for ballistic missiles 
(Paul, 2003; Parthasarathy, 2007). In fact, the bulk of Chinese arms sales are 
to India’s neighbours (Malik, 2001). Indeed, China sometimes seems to 
make hay from India’s normative actions in its neighbourhood – for 
example, when India suspended arms sales to Nepal in 2005 to put 
pressure on the King to restore democracy, China stepped in place, though 
only briefly.106  
Non-normative results 
The results thus far have not been normative. Chindia has worked where 
the two countries’ national interests coincide, chiefly in the areas of trade 
and the pursuit of energy. It has not w o r k e d  w h e n  i t  c o m e  t o  s e c u r i t y  
issues – though the boundary talks may yet reach normative results based 
on soft borders and freedom of movement. China has in fact continued to 
pursue a mixed and partly non-normative approach towards India. China’s 
support for India’s observer status at the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization and the pacts signed in 2005-06, especially for joint energy 
acquisition when China had previously outbid India, imply that normative 
policies have been pursued only when they have coincided with Chinese 
national interests (lower energy prices). Yet China’s policy goal following 
the 1962 war, according to the secret talks between Nixon and Zhou 
Enlai,107 was the containment of India by arming Pakistan and wooing the 
US, and from the late 1970s China helped Pakistan develop a nuclear 
weapons programme. This policy appears to linger on in current Chinese 
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policy (Johnston, 1998, p. 63; Griffin, 2006). China’s “string of pearls” naval 
bases in the Indian Ocean stretching from Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal to 
Gwadar in Pakistan, may be primarily directed at economic expansion, but 
nevertheless encircle India (Prakash, 2007). While signing several strategic 
pacts with India, the Chinese government has denounced the growing 
India-US and India-Japan relations as attempts to contain China, initiate 
strategic competition in East and South-East Asia and wreck the non-
proliferation regime (Jacob, 2006; Rediff News, 2007; People’s Daily, 2006 
and 2007).  
The 2008 declarations made during Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh’s first visit to China, suggest that some of these irritants are 
becoming less salient. Chinese opposition to the India-US nuclear energy 
agreement is down to mild from vociferous (Chandrasekar & Raghavendra, 
2008). More significantly, China discussed Pakistan for the first time with 
India and the ‘Vision Statement’ issued by Singh and Jiabao indicate 
Chinese acceptance of India’s growing role in Asia: 
The (two countries) will explore together and with other 
countries a new architecture for closer regional cooperation in Asia 
and make joint efforts for further regional integration of Asia…The 
two countries will strengthen their coordination under the 
framework of Asia-Europe meeting and are committed to 
strengthening and deepening Asia-Europe comprehensive 
partnership.108 
In other words, in bilateral policy areas China’s goals appear to be 
realpolitik; but in multilateral areas of engagement, including South and 
East Asia, India and China are progressing towards normative cooperation.  
However, it should be noted that China sought to engage with India only 
after the US did so, which implies realpolitik  goals. And in the “Vision 
Statement” of 2008 China has wangled an extraordinary Indian 
commitment to “oppose any activity that is against the one China 
principle,”109 without an evident quid pro quo. 
Indian suspicions, roused by China’s non-normative actions, have led 
to irrational Indian responses at times. Though the two countries agreed to 
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reopen Nathu La in 2003, it was eventually opened only in 2006 because 
Indian security analysts feared that infrastructure development on the 
Chinese side of the pass could bring Chinese arms and troops to the Indian 
border in hours, and therefore resisted improvement of roads on the Indian 
side. While China-India trade has risen rapidly, doubling to $38 billion in 
2005-07, the trade deficit, which was in India’s favour in 2005, has grown to 
$9 billion, a result that unfavourably impacts the quest for normative 
relations as far as India is concerned. 
Conditioning factors 
External factors have clearly played a role in explaining India’s non-
normative results in its relations with China. China’s deep engagement in 
South Asia often leads it to pursue actions that could be inimical to Indian 
interests. China’s infrastructure development, including military 
infrastructure in Tibet, has heightened Indian fears that China is gaining an 
unassailable military edge (Rakshak, 2008). India’s growing ties to the US 
and Japan and in South-East Asia could challenge China’s domination in 
East and South-East Asia. The two countries are engaged in maritime 
rivalry in the Indian Ocean.  
Yet non-normative results are also explained by internal factors. The 
two countries have a tendency to overreact to each other’s actions, due to 
their prior history of mistrust and misperception. As sinologist John Garver 
(2000, p. 311) commented: ‘[w]hat exists in the Indian Ocean is a classic 
security dilemma in naval guise. Each side acts to defend itself, but in 
doing so, threatens the other’. 
2.3  Realpolitik intended: India-Japan maritime cooperation,   
2006-07 
Realpolitik goals 
India-Japan Maritime Cooperation is primarily directed towards protecting 
commercial sea lanes in the Indian Ocean and East Asian straits, through 
which over 60% of the two countries’ energy imports travel, though a 
subsidiary interest is joint disaster management. The Indian and Japanese 
navies first worked together in a relief mission for the tsunami-affected in 
2004, along with the US and Australian Navies. In 2006, the two countries 
announced they would boost military cooperation in counter-terrorism and 
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management (Suryanarayana, 2006). In 2007 they held joint exercises with 
Singapore in the Malacca Straits, with the US off the Japanese coast and in 
the Bay of Bengal with the US, Singapore and Australia. They also held a 
quadrilateral meeting on the sidelines of East Asia Summit.  
These goals could be classified as normative, were it not for the US 
and China factors. China had blocked initial Japanese efforts to join 
multilateral patrols in the Malacca Straits, opposed the Japanese and Indian 
bids for seats in the UN Security Council and was reluctant to have India at 
the East Asian Summit. Both India and Japan, therefore, have a common 
interest in ‘multi-polarity’ in East and South-East Asia, against dominance 
by a single country or a bipolar US-China divide (Saran, 2003). To this 
however, Japanese Prime Minister Abe added in 2007 the proposal that 
India join Japan to create an ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ constituted by 
democracies in Asia,110 which would by definition exclude China, 
prompting Chinese accusations of a policy of containment.111 The proposal 
did not take off because the Indian government did not respond and it was 
shelved when Prime Minister Fukuda replaced Mr. Abe. At present India-
Japan maritime cooperation can be considered realpolitik with a normative 
strand, as it conforms to international law and is not directed against any 
other country.  
Attempted realpolitik means 
The term realpolitik does not apply to Japan-India maritime cooperation in 
itself. Japan briefly attempted realpolitik means when Prime Minister Abe 
proposed the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, which would have 
antagonistically challenged growing Chinese domination in Asia, but the 
idea has been indefinitely shelved. A secondary point is that although 
maritime cooperation is now an established mechanism between the two 
countries, more normative cooperation, such as working together for the 
Sri Lankan peace process, is on a back burner. This indicates that the two 
countries are still more comfortable cooperating in traditional areas of 
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national interest convergence and not moving beyond these into more 
normative terrain. 
Realpolitik results 
The impact of India-Japan maritime cooperation has been to exacerbate 
Chinese suspicions of Japan and its opposition to any US-Japan-India 
alliance (Zhaokui, 2007). Although the US, as a partner in Japan-India 
maritime exercises, made clear that the joint exercises were not part of an 
effort to contain China (Armitage & Nye, 2007), as did the Indian and 
Japanese leaders (Abe, 2007; Varadarajan, 2007), China’s relations with 
Japan plummeted since Prime Minister Koizumi’s adoption of a 
‘normalisation’ policy that entailed overturning Japan’s post WWII ban on 
military missions overseas (although he authorised solely civil-military 
missions) and saw him visiting war memorials that also housed the graves 
of accused war criminals from the Japan-China war (Calder, 2006, pp. 4-7). 
Moderating these realpolitik results however is the fact that China will not 
allow its suspicions to compromise its relations with India, and Japan and 
China are slowly mending fences.  
Conditioning factors 
External factors set the context for India’s realpolitik approach towards 
Japan. China had reached equilibrium with the US under the Nixon 
administration in the late 1970s and had grown dominant in East and 
South-East Asia during the 1990s, when the Clinton administration was 
focused on European integration and the wars in former Yugoslavia. But 
Japan’s new military exercises and the revival of traditional suspicions 
through the ‘normalisation’ policy re-ignited Chinese fears of an alliance to 
contain it, fears that some US analysts fanned by advocating a US-India 
alliance as a counterweight to China (Carpenter, 2001; Weiss, 1999; Hill & 
Associates, 2005).  
Yet, as far as internal determinants are concerned, what diminishes 
the degree of realpolitik in India-Japan relations is the fact that India is not 
prepared to join in a policy expressly aimed at containing China. Both 
Japan and India have strong economic ties with China. At the same time, 
analysts in both countries perceive Chinese statements of mistrust as an 
attempt to restrict their expanding international and Asian roles 
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2.4  Realpolitik unintended: The US-India civil nuclear energy 
agreement, 2005-07 
Realpolitik goals with a normative strand 
The US-India civil nuclear energy agreement was negotiated for realpolitik 
goals, to allow India to free itself from ‘nuclear apartheid’ as former 
Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh put it (1998, pp. 41-52), gain access to civil 
nuclear energy technology and supplies, while continuing to be an 
unrecognised nuclear weapons-possessing state. The US goal was to 
acquire a stable ally in an increasingly and dangerously unstable South 
Asia post-9/11. Though the agreement was based on India’s normative 
conduct – India had not exported nuclear technology or material to other 
countries and had not threatened use of nuclear weapons in war – the fact 
that the two ‘estranged democracies’ (Kux, 1994) only came together post-
9/11 suggests realpolitik  intent and behaviour. The end of the cold war 
provided an opportunity for India and the US to develop a common cause, 
but the 1998 Indian nuclear tests simultaneously propelled the two into 
dialogue and brought US pressure on India to join the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT). After the 9/11 attacks, US policy underwent a drastic 
revision – and the US and India began to work together in counter-
terrorism and military-military relations. For the first time, the two 
countries began to ‘cooperate for their greater security’ (Gaffney, 2003).  
Realpolitik and normative means 
The means that India and the US used to push through the agreement were 
primarily normative: negotiations, diaspora support including lobbying, 
trade, international backing (Russia, France, Mr El Baradei of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA). However the agreement itself 
both broke established norms and set new ones. It bypassed the existing 
regulations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and set the new norm of 
exception for a responsible democracy. The Indian government was itself 
unsure of whether the agreement was realpolitik or normative – in other 
words, whether the agreement intended to project India’s power abroad or 
whether it contributed to improve and diversify India’s civilian energy 
supplies – and it did not promote the civil nuclear energy agreement as 
being about either weapons or energy. Thus, although the agreement was 
one of several, including collaboration in space research and agricultural 
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accelerated military-military ties, comprising naval and air exercises, 
mountain warfare training, counter-terrorism and border monitoring 
practices.  
Unrealpolitik results 
In some ways, the realpolitik goals of the two countries were illusory. In the 
US, the thrust of improved relations with India had always had a strong 
normative strand, summed up in the phrase launched during President 
Clinton’s visit to India in 2000 but which has become common currency 
since then: “the world’s largest and oldest democracies” (Albright, 2000; 
Ros-Lehtinen, 2005; Thain, 2004). Yet in India there was an opposing 
normative push: the governing UPA coalition, in power with Indian 
Communist Parties that are inimical to the US, was always going to have a 
hard time selling to its partners a significantly closer relationship with the 
US. The civil nuclear energy agreement is at present stalled; only time and 
the US presidential elections in November 2008 will show what impact this 
will have on US-India relations. 
The Indian domestic opposition to the civil-nuclear energy agreement 
appears to have revived the unrealpolitik strand in Indian foreign policy. 
From the BJP’s accusations of compromising India’s nuclear weapons 
programme112 to the Communist parties’ argument of compromising the 
independence of India’s foreign policy,113 neither influential political group 
is prepared to recognise that the agreement is a testimonial of confidence in 
Indian democracy. While the BJP sought and failed to negotiate a similar 
agreement during its government, according to former Deputy Secretary of 
State Strobe Talbot (2004), the Communists’ argument that the US-India 
civil nuclear deal makes supplies conditional on Indian support for or 
participation in US foreign policy ‘adventures’, suggests that the Indian 
government is liable to subordinate its national interest to that of another 
country. The example they use – Iran – points to the contrary. The Indian 
government’s position on Iran’s nuclear programme is somewhere between 
the Russian and Chinese positions and the European one. India is opposed 
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to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons but advocates negotiations rather than 
coercive instruments to resolve the impasse (Sivaswamy, 2005).  
Conditioning factors 
The factors blocking an agreement that is clearly in India’s national interest 
are solely internal and reflect domestic politics in India. The Communist 
parties see the US as an imperialist hegemon with whom India should not 
have strong relations; the BJP is not willing to let the agreement go through 
on the Congress’ watch. Hence, opposition by these parties has put the 
agreement in jeopardy. The Communist parties delayed negotiations with 
the IAEA until January 2008, which represents the next step for getting the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group on board. Meanwhile, as the US begins the race 
for Presidential nominations, time is running out for Congress to ratify the 
agreement.  
2.5  Imperial intended: Sikkim’s merger with India, 1975 
Imperial goals with an ambiguous normative thread 
Though the official Indian position is that India acted on the will of the 
people in admitting Sikkim to the Indian Federation,114 the merger was 
widely criticised as annexation (Datta-Ray, 1984). It is fairly clear that 
India’s primary goals were to maintain Sikkim as a buffer against China, a 
role it had played during British rule, which was carried over after Indian 
independence through a treaty placing Sikkim under the Indian foreign 
and security policy umbrella. Within these confines, the Indian leadership 
also acted normatively by pushing Sikkim’s monarch, the Chogyal, to 
democratise. In 1955 the Chogyal established a state council, but it worked 
mostly in the breach. Following failed negotiations and public riots, India 
ultimately occupied Sikkim. In May 1975, Sikkim became the 22nd state of 
the Indian Union and the monarchy was abolished. The speed with which 
India acted and the presence of Indian troops suggest India’s goal was 
more imperial than normative. India was criticised for exploiting ethnic 
divides – the Chogyal represented the Bhutia tribes that had left Bhutan 
and the Sikkim Congress’ base was Nepali settlers who constituted 75% of 
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Sikkim’s population – and accused of rigging the referendum on merger as 
cover for the annexation of Sikkim.115 
Imperial means 
The means that India used in 1975 were clearly imperial insofar as they 
were coercive and in breach of international law. From the late 1960s to the 
early 1970s, the new Chogyal tried to negotiate an amended treaty that 
would give Sikkim an international personality: the Indian government 
was offended, and the Sikkim National Congress opposed his move 
(Gupta, 1975, pp. 798-790). In 1973 public riots broke out against rigged 
elections to the state council. The Indian government stepped in to 
negotiate a tripartite agreement between the Chogyal and Sikkim’s political 
leaders, with India as guarantor. Under the agreement Sikkim would have 
an elected State Assembly based on proportional representation for all 
ethnic groups. The tripartite agreement in 1973 was arguably more 
normative than imperial: had the Chogyal agreed to a constitutional 
monarchy, with ethnic power-sharing, the crisis might not have occurred. 
However, the new Assembly voted for a constitutional monarchy; the 
Chogyal resisted and in early 1975 Sikkim’s Congress Prime Minister 
appealed to the Indian Parliament for Sikkim to become an Indian state. 
Indian troops moved in and seized the capital Gangtok, disarming the 
Palace Guards. Under the army’s supervision, a referendum was held 
within 72 hours in which 97.5% of the people voted to join India.  
Normative results 
Although China and Nepal refused to recognise Sikkim’s new status and 
there was considerable international criticism, pressure was not severe 
enough to reverse the merger. Sikkim’s neighbours, Bhutan and Nepal, 
feared Indian intentions towards them – Bhutan was under India’s security 
protection, Nepal had an open border and a Treaty of Peace and Friendship 
with India – but these fears allayed over time.116 Sikkim slowly stabilised 
and has gradually become one of the most peaceful and prosperous states 
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in India’s North-East. Today Sikkim is seen as India’s gateway to China. 
The Nathu-la Pass, once part of the ancient Silk Road that linked China, 
Tibet and India, was reopened in 2006 following a negotiated agreement 
between India and China, 44 years after it was closed during the 1962 
India-China war. This normative result was accompanied by an imperial 
quid pro quo – India recognised the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of 
China and China recognised Sikkim as part of India. As a symbolic Chinese 
rebuff, the date chosen for Nathu-La’s opening was the Dalai Lama’s 
birthday (Lague & Gentleman, 2006). 
Conditioning factors 
Internal factors explain the normative strand underpinning India’s goals in 
Sikkim. The Indian government was under pressure from Sikkim’s political 
parties such as the Sikkim National Congress to intervene, not least in view 
of the close ties between the Sikkim and Indian National Congresses. The 
failure of the Chogyal to democratise and the Sikkim political parties’ 
support for the merger with India provided a further normative push to 
India’s interventionist approach. Alongside this, external factors explain 
how and why India was able to pursue its (partly normative) goals in 
Sikkim through coercive means. The annexation of Sikkim was in fact 
relatively undisturbed because there was little international pressure to 
reverse it. The US response was representative:  
The Indian absorption of Sikkim does not directly involve 
the US. We have never questioned India's protecting authority 
over Sikkim and its new status raises no question of direct 
American legal obligation to an existing sovereign state. 
Nevertheless, there is public interest in Sikkim because the 
Chogyal married socialite Hope Cooke. She is now separated from 
the Chogyal and living in New York. So far she has made no 
statement on events, although she was previously outspoken for 
greater Sikkimese autonomy. We have not been queried by the 
p r e s s  a b o u t  S i k k i m .  I f  w e  a r e ,  w e  p l a n  t o  t a k e  a  ‘ n o  c o m m e n t ’  
line.117 
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2.6  Imperial unintended: India’s engagement in the Nepal peace 
process, 2005-07 
Imperial Goals Mutating to Normative 
India’s chief priorities in Nepal were initially based on realpolitik goals 
similar to those in Sikkim, to have a reliable and dependent buffer between 
India and China. In 1950, India signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship 
with Nepal which bound the two countries together in defence and trade; 
the India-Nepal border is the only open border in South Asia. However, 
India’s behaviour changed to normative in the 1990s – in 1996, India began 
to alter the economic dependency relationship, providing Nepal with 
quota-free access to Indian markets and boosting Nepali exports to India to 
$425 million per year. By this time, the security arrangements under the 
1950 Treaty remained mostly on paper. The political relationship between 
Indian and Nepali leaders had dwindled to the point that India did not 
attempt to intervene when the Nepali Maoists began an armed movement 
in 1996, and India remained quiescent even when the Maoists were 
reported to have spread to almost half of Nepal’s 75 districts by 1999.118 
India’s goals changed more decisively to normative after the ruling 
monarch was assassinated in 2001. When the king’s brother Gyanendra 
took office, a standoff between the monarchy and Nepali Maoists 
accelerated and civil war broke out in 2002. Indian policy-makers initially 
supported the king against the Maoists, as did much of the international 
community, including the US and China. India altered its policy only in 
early 2005, when the king dismissed Nepal’s parliament, constituted by 
India-brokered peace negotiations in 1990-91. Indian goals shifted to 
seeking peace between the Nepali king, the parliament and the Maoists; 
and supporting a constitutional process to resolve conflict over the nature 
of the Nepali state. When ethnic conflict broke out in the Terai region of 
Nepal, India pressed for reconciliation and minority representation. In a 
major departure from India’s prior policy goal to resist international 
engagement in its neighbourhood, the Indian government expanded its 
pursuit of normative goals in 2006 by cooperating with the international 
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community to support the peace process and help implement the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  
Imperial means, replaced by normative 
India initially attempted to retain the monarchy in Nepal, backing the king 
and continuing military aid to the Royal Nepal Army. By late 2004, 
however, it was evident to most observers that the king could not subdue 
the Maoists militarily. The Indian government soon moved to a more 
interventionist but normative approach, facilitating a peace process in 
Nepal in coordination with the US, UK, EU and UN. There was shuttle 
diplomacy between Khatmandu and New Delhi; and political pressure was 
deployed on a wide range of tracks – by erstwhile Indian royals 
intermarried with the Nepali royal family; Indian political parties with 
links to the Nepali parliamentary parties (Congress) and Communists with 
ties to the Nepali Maoist leaders who had studied in India (Communist 
Party of India-Marxist); as well as India-Nepal military to military, 
intelligence and civil society relations.  
In November 2005, India brokered a 12-point agreement between the 
Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance of constitutional political parties, 
which led to an extension of the Maoist cease-fire declared two months 
earlier. The agreement called for an end to the ‘autocratic monarchy’, 
parliamentary democracy and elections for a Constituent Assembly. The 
Maoists agreed to place their arms under UN supervision or “any 
dependable international body”, provided the Royal Nepal Army did so 
too.119 Although army-Maoist clashes resumed, the agreement gave India 
along with the international community (now including China) leverage to 
pressure the king into restoring the parliament in April 2006. Hectic 
international, including Indian diplomacy, ensued, in which India also 
used aid as a lever, offering a package of USD 315m in August 2006.120 In 
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the same month, despite discomfort with a UN presence on its eastern 
border, the Indian government looked the other way when the 
constitutional parties and the Communists requested a UN mission in 
Nepal. In November 2006, the Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance signed 
a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, after which the Alliance formed an 
interim government that was supposed to oversee elections. 
By this time, the Indian government had created a twin-track 
approach: foreign office representatives focused on working with Nepali 
constitutional parties and Communist MPs worked with Nepali Maoists, an 
approach which intensified when a new threat of ethnic conflict emerged in 
2007. In January 2007, tensions over the non-representation of Madhesis (a 
group of Hindi-speaking ethnic communities) in the constitutional process 
sparked violent protest in the southern Terai region bordering India. The 
interim government tried to quell the protest by force; but when that led to 
increased violence, they hastily amended the interim Constitution to 
provide greater Madhesi representation. The gesture did not work as the 
amendment was not made through consultation with the Madhesi 
representatives (Philipson, 2008). Relations between Madhesi groups and 
Nepali Maoists rapidly worsened, and in the summer of 2007, Indian 
Communists set up meetings for the Maoists with Madhesi representatives, 
while Indian foreign office representatives consulted with the interim 
government. As a result, Prime Minister Koirala invited Madhesi 
representatives to a meeting in which he promised that representation for 
the Constituent Assembly elections would be increased for the Terai 
districts in proportion to the population. He also proposed that the new 
Constitution would include provisions to strengthen the federal 
structure.121 In early 2007, the Maoists joined the interim government, but 
were not able to agree with the Seven Party Alliance on two critical issues. 
While the Comprehensive Peace Agreement stripped the king of his 
powers and property, it left the issue of the monarchy to be decided by a 
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Constituent Assembly.122 The Maoists wanted Nepal to be declared a 
republic immediately, whereas the Seven Party Alliance upheld the process 
laid down in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 
The issue of elections was even more contentious. The Maoists 
wanted a proportional electoral system in which parties would be elected 
according to their share of the vote; the constitutional parties wanted a 
combined system of proportional and ‘first past the post’. In September 
2007, the Maoists walked out of the interim government; in October the 
Indian government stressed the importance of holding elections (Pradhan, 
2007), in November the Communist MP Sitaram Yechury went to Nepal to 
discuss elections with the Maoists, and in early December the Indian Prime 
Minister’s envoy, Shyam Saran, was in Nepal for talks with the government 
as well as with the Maoists. In mid-December the Nepali government 
introduced a Bill to provide for an electoral system that would be 58% 
proportional and 42% first past the post.123 Elections are scheduled for 
April 2008; the Maoists rejoined the interim government in January 2008 
and their head, Prachanda, is set to contest elections. 
Non-normative results 
Despite the hectic efforts of the international community, and by India, the 
peace process has not delivered on the ground. The ceasefire has held, but 
the breakdown of law and order continues. The UN Mission in Nepal, 
which was set up in January 2007 under the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, registered 2,855 weapons each from the Nepal Army and the 
Maoists in April 2007 (the figure has now grown to 3,475); meanwhile, the 
process of integrating Maoist fighters into a retrained Nepal Army is yet to 
be agreed, although there were meetings between the Maoists and the 
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Nepal Army in autumn 2007.124 Maoist fighters began to leave the 
cantonments in which they were sequestered under the peace agreement 
by mid-2007. In December 2007, after the UN verified the remaining 19,602 
Maoist fighters in cantonments (Martin, 2007), analysts warned they would 
leave as well (ICG, 2007). Sporadic conflict has returned to Maoist-affected 
regions; intimidation, extortion and kidnappings have increased and in 
many areas Maoist groups have set up parallel administrations (UN 
Security Council, 2008).  
Madhesi groups have begun to arm and the biggest one, the 
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (Jwala Singh group), has declared a 
boycott of the April elections unless they are “conducted by an interim 
government formed after a round table conference with participation of the 
parties led by Madhesi groups, organisations and fronts”.125 Although the 
Nepal Army has raised a new battalion of 850 personnel of Madhesi and 
Terai origin, the step appears to be too little too late. Serious security 
discussions between the Maoists and the Nepal Army would help, but 
there is no indication yet that the Indian government will play the 
mediating role here. 
Conditioning factors 
India’s shift to an active role in brokering peace in Nepal was due to a 
combination of external and internal factors. As far as external factors are 
concerned, proactive roles by the US, EU, UK and UN made the Indian 
government nervous but it had no means of blocking them. Indian 
representatives concluded it was better to use India-Nepal ties creatively to 
bring about peace agreements. As far as internal determinants of Indian 
policy are concerned, the Indian Communists were anxious to facilitate a 
peace process and opposition parties were using the ruling Congress 
coalition’s relative passivity as a weapon to accuse them of weakness. 
Given the historic relationship with Nepali parties, there have been strong 
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domestic constituencies in India favouring an active Indian role in 
resolving the crisis in Nepal. 
2.7  Status quo intended: Inching From realpolitik to normative, 
India-Myanmar 2007-08 
Status quo goals with a developing normative strand 
Before the junta’s crackdown on the Burmese monks’ peaceful protests in 
September 2007, India’s goals with Myanmar were to improve relations 
with the junta in order to counter growing Chinese economic and military – 
especially naval – domination of the country, deal jointly with cross-border 
insurgent groups and bring Myanmar into its ‘Look East’ policy as a 
gateway to South-East Asia, which could also aid economic growth in 
India’s North-East (Khosla, 2003, p. 607).   
These goals were a shift from India’s earlier policy of supporting the 
pro-democracy movement, whose leader Aung San Suu Kyi had studied in 
India. Indian strategic analysts began suggesting a rethink of relations with 
the junta in 1992, when they found that Myanmar was becoming militarily 
and economically dependent on China during its international isolation 
after the 1988 arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi. The fear that Myanmar’s 
dependency on China might adversely affect India’s security grew when 
Myanmar leased the Coco Islands to the Chinese government in 1994, 
where China established a maritime reconnaissance and electronic 
intelligence station and built a base. The Coco Islands are a crossing point 
for seaborne traffic between the Bay of Bengal and the Malacca Strait, and 
the perfect strategic spot for monitoring Indian naval facilities and naval 
movement across the eastern Indian Ocean (Ramachandran, 2005).  
Despite these imperatives, India’s policy in 1992-98 combined 
support for the pro-democracy movement and developing working 
relations with the junta, which were mostly confined to cross-border issues 
such as smuggling, narcotics and containing cross-border insurgent groups. 
The shift to closer relations began in 1998, when the BJP-led government 
came to power. By this point analysts were arguing for a new policy based 
on a number of strategic considerations: for their maritime security, India, 
ASEAN and Japan all had an interest in balancing Myanmar’s dependency 
on China; in economic terms Myanmar was rich in resources, its energy 
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mutual interests in counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency cooperation 
(Bhaskar, 1999, pp. 432-434).  
Between 1998 and 2006, India’s economic and military relations with 
Myanmar developed rapidly. When the latest phase of the pro-democracy 
movement began in 2003-04 and was stonewalled by the junta, the Indian 
government’s first response was silence. But the junta’s drift towards 
increasing isolation, as symbolised by the 2005 decision to move the capital 
to the remote Pyinmana region of central Burma roused international fears 
and consequent international pressure on India and China to exert their 
influence on the junta. Although India’s response to these calls was 
extremely cautious, in early 2006 Myanmar signed a gas agreement with 
China that was earlier promised to India (A. Kumar, 2006), a gesture that 
could be construed as a warning.   
Following domestic outcry at the Indian government’s silence to the 
brutal attacks on pro-democracy monks, India’s goals began to shift from 
status quo to normative, and from October 2007 Indian officials began to 
call for “inclusive political reforms”, release of political prisoners and an 
enquiry into human rights abuses during the crackdown (Dikshit, 2007). 
India has also begun to discuss Myanmar with the UN, UK, EU and US. 
However, although the call for democratisation was repeated in talks with 
the junta – from Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s first meeting with 
Myanmar’s Prime Minister Lieutenant General Thein Sein in November 
2007, to his discussion with Myanmar’s Foreign Minister in January 2008 – 
India did not apply substantive pressure, leading some analysts to posit 
that India continued to support the status quo (Lintner, 2007). The 
expansion of India’s economic and strategic cooperation with Myanmar in 
January 2008, with an agreement to build a port at Sittwe, suggests that 
India continues to put status quo goals above normative ones;126 but the 
Indian government’s suspension of arms sales to Myanmar following the 
September 2007 crackdown127 may also suggest that India is using a two-
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track policy of engagement and selective embargo to achieve the normative 
goal of democratisation of Myanmar along with good relations with India.  
Status quo and normative means  
The means India used to develop relations with the junta were chiefly 
status quo means: high-level military exchanges, sale of initially non-lethal 
military supplies such as uniforms but later military sales including light 
combat aircraft and strategic economic cooperation such as building roads 
and ports. While the junta crackdown was in progress, Petroleum and 
Natural Gas Minister Murli Deora flew to Myanmar to sign an agreement 
to explore gas in three new blocks off Myanmar’s southwestern Arakan 
coast. But India has also used normative means – Burmese dissidents and 
refugees continue to be sheltered in India. Moreover, the means India has 
used to improve relations with the junta changed between 1997 and 2007 
from being normative to realpolitik and back to normative again. India 
initially shared the then ASEAN view, that integration into South-East 
Asian trade and institutions would open Myanmar’s isolationist junta to 
political reforms. The first initiative that India took in 1997 was a follow-up 
of this policy: the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and 
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). BIMSTEC initially comprised 
Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand, but soon expanded to include 
Myanmar, and later Bhutan and Nepal. BIMSTEC covers 13 ‘Priority 
Sectors’ for cooperation: trade and investment, technology, energy, 
transport and communication, tourism, fisheries, agriculture, cultural 
cooperation, environment and disaster management, public health, people-
to-people contact, poverty alleviation and counter-terrorism and 
transnational crimes.128 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, India’s goals became more overtly 
realpolitik. In 1998, India and Myanmar signed agreements to promote 
border trade (intended to improve economic conditions in their troubled 
border regions),129 agricultural development and technology. Then in 2000 
India began non-lethal military sales to Myanmar and in 2006 it began 
military sales, such as T-55 main battle tanks, and 105 mm light artillery 
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guns, pledging further to sell armoured personnel carriers, light combat 
aircraft and small naval vessels.130 The plans to supply light combat aircraft 
were permanently shelved following pressure from the EU, as some of the 
aircraft’s components originated from EU member states that backed 
sanctions against Myanmar.  
From 2006 India started, albeit reluctantly, to take UN normative 
concerns on board, meeting the UN envoy to Myanmar on his visits to the 
region. The Indian government also started coordinating with the US, UK 
and EU. Military sales were suspended following the 2007 crackdown 
(Bedi, 2007), and the Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon, 
followed up a meeting with Mr. Gambari with a visit to Myanmar in mid-
February. India is, thus, moving from status quo back to normative means 
in Myanmar.  
Status quo results 
The results thus far have been status quo. There were initial glimmers of 
hope in November 2007 – the junta appointed Labour Minister General 
Aung Kyi to mediate with Aung San Suu Kyi and allowed her to meet the 
National League for Democracy’s executive committee (whom she had not 
met for four years). Aung San Suu Kyi issued a statement through UN 
envoy Ibrahim Gambari that she was ready to cooperate with Burma’s 
military junta “in the interest of the nation”.131 Suu Kyi’s supporters feared 
“that she had fallen victim to another ploy by the junta to win time and 
deflect mounting international criticism”.132 The suspicion was based on the 
fact that no meeting between Suu Kyi had taken place by the time of this 
writing and her party executive was not allowed to meet her again. In 
January 2008, the NLD asked for another meeting with her in order to 
discuss national reconciliation,133 the junta has yet to respond. 
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India’s efforts at opening up the junta through regional integration 
via BIMSTEC failed; worsening relations with Bangladesh over terrorism 
issues have led Bangladesh to stall on implementing the pipeline 
agreement with India and Myanmar. It remains to be seen whether Indian 
diplomacy, along with Chinese pressure, can soften the junta. 
Conditioning factors 
External pressure from the US, EU and UN contributed to India’s partial 
and gradual shift from status quo to normative goals and means. However 
perhaps more important has been China’s gradual shift under international 
pressure, easing India’s own move. Although China twice vetoed Security 
Council attempts to impose sanctions on Myanmar, the Chinese 
government began to discreetly meet dissidents linked to the NLD in 2006-
07, condemned the military crackdown and demanded that the junta 
“restore internal stability as soon as possible, properly handle issues and 
actively promote national reconciliation” (Spencer, 2007). As India’s 
realpolitik  goals had been formulated in response to China’s growing 
strategic presence in Myanmar, the Chinese shift meant that India had less 
to lose from adopting normative goals and means. At the same time, 
China’s resistance to international pressure on Myanmar, which blocked 
efforts to put sanctions and a timetable for democratic reforms on the 
ASEAN agenda in November 2007, has also limited the impact of any 
normative actions by India. India fears stronger action will bring back the 
situation of 1988-98, when China consolidated Myanmar within its sphere 
of influence.  
Turning to internal factors, India’s inclination was to pursue 
normative policy towards Myanmar, but realpolitik circumstances, both 
external and internal, led India to adopt status quo goals and means. 
Domestic outcry at the 2007 crackdown, when the Myanmar dissidents 
were headline television news for a month, fuelled by Burmese refugees in 
India, made clear that there was popular support for an Indian shift in a 
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2.8  Status quo unintended: The EU-India strategic partnership, 
2004-07 
Status Quo to Normative Goals 
Despite the fact that India entered a ‘Strategic Partnership’ with the EU in 
2004, which was followed by the launch of a Joint Action Plan in 2005, 
India’s goals are to replicate at the EU institutional level the country’s 
strong bilateral relations with several EU member states. While EU goals in 
the strategic partnership have stressed India as a rising power, citing its 
newly warm relations with the US, its growing relations with China and its 
Look East policy as reasons for multilateral cooperation with India, 
especially for peace and stability in South Asia (European Commission, 
2004), Indian analysts concluded that the EU’s failure to achieve a Common 
Security and Foreign Policy made a substantive policy partnership unlikely 
(Dasgupta, 2003). Moreover, many of them argued, the EU is “not willing 
to take political risks” with India (unlike the US), it will not put the EU-
India partnership at the same level as that with China, and it tends to 
hyphenate India with Pakistan, though this impression is now fading (Jain, 
2005, pp. 6-7). In essence, the EU relationship with India is that of a status 
quo power, in contrast to the US relationship which is that of a revisionist 
power, rewriting the rules in India’s favour (Mohan, 2006), a reference to 
the civil nuclear energy agreement.  
European analysts had a more positive view of the relationship, but 
this too was in terms of its potential rather than practice (Cameron, et al., 
2005). Up until 2006, progress was chiefly in space cooperation and to some 
e x t e n t  i n  t r a d e .  A l t h o u g h  o n  p a p e r both sides reiterated that their 
cooperation goals were normative – shared values of democracy and 
pluralism, commitment to multilateralism, mutual areas of interest in South 
and West Asia (Government of India, 2004) – in practice there was little 
coordination on any of these goals.  
In 2006 this situation began to change, with the EU gradually 
coordinating policy towards Nepal with India. By 2007, the partnership 
had developed to the point that the Joint Statement issued at the November 
2007 EU-India Summit said that India and the EU “would preserve and 
promote peaceful uses of technology through forward looking approaches 
among countries committed to disarmament and non-proliferation”, rather 
coyly implying EU acceptance of the civil nuclear energy agreement. The 
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reconstruction in Afghanistan, an area of cooperation that the Indian 
government had suggested in 2004 in its “Response” to the EU proposal for 
a strategic partnership (Government of India, 2004) but got little purchase 
due to troops-contributing countries’ fears of a hostile Pakistani reaction. 
The Joint Statement also expressed shared views on the conflicts and/or 
peace processes in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Each region 
welcomed the other’s inclusion in multilateral structures of which it was 
part, such as the Asia-Europe Meeting process and SAARC. And the two 
announced a slew of new collaborations to deal with climate change, such 
as research and development of alternative energy sources, including bio-
fuels and solar energy.134  
In other words, the goals of the partnership are moving from status 
quo to normative; a trend that was predicted given the normative self-
perception of both regions, but also carries potential for collision between 
differing perceptions of normative versus “intrusive” behaviour 
(Abhyankar, 2003).  
Status quo means 
The means that the EU and India used to develop their strategic 
partnership were chiefly governmental – from ministerial summits to 
diplomatic and administrative negotiations. Although parliamentary 
exchanges gathered some steam in 2006 and in March 2007, the European 
Parliament set up a Delegation for Relations with India,135 a partner group 
still has to be set up by the Indian Parliament.  
Of the implementing groups set up under the Joint Action Plan, the 
ones that have worked, in terms of moving to next steps, are in science and 
technology, alternative energy, bio-fuels, aviation, maritime matters and 
trade. The soft-power elements of the partnership – civil society and 
cultural exchanges and think tank round tables – have become marginal. 
The Civil Society Roundtable set up under the partnership is described in 
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the Summit Statement of November 2007 as “a useful forum”,136 cultural 
exchanges consist of a small film festival and the think tank roundtables 
that were envisaged at the 2002 Summit met twice between 2003 and 2004 
but were then dropped for unspecified reasons.  
Hard-power elements were even more marginal: an India-EU 
security dialogue was set up only in 2006 though it was announced in 2005, 
and meets only once a year; the second dialogue was described as “a 
fruitful discussion on global and regional security issues, disarmament and 
non-proliferation”, in other words nothing concrete. Consultations on 
terrorism are scheduled to resume in 2008 after a gap of three years,137 
although they were the first priority in the 2005 Summit Statement.138 
By contrast the political statements on South Asia have grown more 
concrete – while generalised desire for peace and stability in the 
subcontinent was expressed in all the summit statements, it was only in the 
2006 statement that India and the EU spelt out priority steps country by 
country, and the 2007 statement was even more concrete. On Myanmar, the 
2007 Joint Statement called for dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and the 
ethnic groups, and support for UN efforts, including the human rights 
Rapporteur; on Nepal and Bangladesh it urged early elections; on Sri Lanka 
it stressed a ‘credible’ devolution package and reiterated that there was no 
military solution; and on Pakistan briefly expressed the hope that stability 
and democracy would soon return. Despite this apparent policy 
convergence, joint action was only discussed in relation to Afghanistan “to 
continue cooperating and coordinating their efforts to impart greater 
strength to… a coherent and united international commitment”.139 
However, the EU has used normative means to expand the 
partnership through its funding programmes, targeting university, media 
and think tank exchanges. The initiative has by and large been one-way: 
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the Indian government has not targeted European universities, media and 
think tanks; some Indian analysts view EU development assistance as a 
projection of its soft power (Abhyankar, 2003). 
Status quo results 
The partnership has yielded some soft-power benefits which will aid 
research and development, especially scientific and technological, in both 
regions. EU-India trade grew from €40 billion to €47 billon from 2005-06; 
the EU is India’s largest trading partner, though China is close behind. 
However, India is the EU’s ninth largest trading partner,140 and accounts 
for only 1.4% of EU outflows.141  
The two are converging in their political approaches to conflict 
and/or instability in South Asia, but whether this will result in joint 
policies and coordinated actions is an open question. As of now it appears 
likely that each will take independent policy action.  
Nevertheless, the EU and India are building institutional ties at a 
number of different levels, which will strengthen the normative elements of 
the partnership over time. The problem is how much time – meetings are 
still relatively infrequent and interactions between EU and Indian officials 
are around one-twentieth of those with China (Jain, 2005). Despite their 
efforts, the EU is relatively unknown in India and India is known only in 
those member states with which it already had strong bilateral relations. In 
sum, EU-India relations will grow steadily but at a low profile; both hard- 
and soft-power elements of the strategic partnership could be replaced by 
research and development goals.  
Conditioning factors 
The EU-India strategic partnership is overshadowed by the India-US and 
India-China partnerships, both of which deal with issues of immediate and 
overweening interest for India. By contrast, although the EU is engaged in 
South Asia and its neighbours are a priority for India, India has little to 
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gain from EU support, as the EU still has limited leverage in South Asia. 
However, the American and Chinese attention to India are what influenced 
the EU to seek a strategic partnership with India in the first place, and in 
the near term these realpolitik factors are likely to influence EU relations 
with India more than will the normative factors of pluralist democracy that 
both regions cite as shared characteristics. India’s approach is to use the 
EU’s competitive reaction to the US in its favour – Indian priorities being to 
gain scientific collaboration and ensure some freedom of labour movement.  
Internally India has yet to come to grips with the EU as an umbrella 
institution for European countries. Within India, EU member countries are 
more active diplomatically than the EU is. The EU erroneously sees this as 
a ‘visibility’ problem to be solved through better communication and 
people-to-people contacts, but most Europeans view themselves and are 
viewed as citizens of a particular European country rather than an 
overarching European Union. Until some balance is achieved between the 
EU and the member states, the EU will be seen more as a funding and 
trading organisation than as a strategic policy-maker. 
3.  Conclusion 
What kind of a foreign policy actor is India? From the cases above, a mixed 
picture emerges, but certain general conclusions can be derived 
nevertheless. 
The most important of these is that Indian policy-makers and a large 
proportion of its middle class of 250 million perceive the country as a rising 
power; moreover, this perception is shared by important international 
players, especially the US, EU and South-East Asian countries. For the first 
time since it became an independent country, India’s leaders describe their 
new international weight as being based on growing economic clout rather 
than moral precepts or history (decolonisation). For the first time too, they 
seek to marry normative goals and behaviour to policies furthering the 
national interest, broadly defined as extending from traditional to human 
security for its citizens. Speaking at a think tank in 2007, Foreign Secretary 
Shivshankar Menon identified three key goals for India’s foreign policy: 
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powers; and, thirdly, issues of the future, namely food security, water, 
energy and environment”.142 
The means that he listed to pursue each goal were different. To build 
peace in the neighbourhood, India looks to create social partnerships, offer 
economic benefits such as zero tariffs for the poorer South Asian countries, 
support cross-border infrastructure and development projects, stress 
‘civilisational linkages’ that grew from the ancient flow of people and ideas, 
and work for intra-regional trade through SAARC, ASEAN and the East 
Asia Summit. Significantly, Menon described the neighbourhood, as Saran 
did, in the same terms as Kautilya: “expanding circles of engagement, 
starting with the immediate neighbourhood, West Asia, Central Asia, 
South-east Asia and the Indian Ocean region”.  
There is, however, a slight elision of categories in this description.  
Looking at the cases discussed in this paper, there is a clear distinction 
between India’s policies in South Asia and India’s policies in East Asia. In 
South Asia, India has increasingly engaged in peace-making both with its 
neighbours (Pakistan) and between warring factions within its neighbours 
(Nepal). India has not been so proactive with the one South-East Asian 
country with which it shares a land border, Myanmar; and is proceeding 
gingerly in peace-making with its most powerful neighbour, China.  
Indian policy-makers, therefore, perceive a greater threat to the 
country’s security from instability in its South Asian neighbours, an 
assessment that the US and EU share. They also act with more confidence 
in seeking to resolve the threat, perhaps because South Asian countries 
share a common regional forum, SAARC (even though SAARC’s mandate 
is restricted to economic cooperation). It is significant that Menon’s speech 
was remarkably silent when it came to the peace initiatives that India 
launched in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, indicating that the 
country’s policy-makers are unwilling to ‘talk up’ their peacemaking 
capabilities, or include these in their doctrine of international relations. 
Whether this means that Indian policy-makers continue to have 
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reservations about the scope of normative actions in international relations, 
as they did during the cold war, is an open question. 
India’s reservations during the cold war were related to upholding 
state sovereignty. Hence, while India was one of the UN’s largest troops’ 
contributors, it sent troops only under the UN mantle. The only exception 
was the Indian peacekeeping mission to Sri Lanka in 1980, which resulted 
in a stalemate and withdrawal; as a result, the initiative did not result in 
expanding India’s peacekeeping tenets. Today, the situation is different. 
India’s sovereignty is not under question; and India’s non-normative 
behaviour in Sikkim is unlikely to be repeated. India’s peace initiatives 
with Pakistan and in Nepal have been sufficiently sustained to indicate that 
India is being proactively normative in its behaviour with its neighbours. 
With India having joined the UN Peace-Building Commission, the 
inclusion of peacemaking capabilities in its foreign policy doctrine is likely 
to occur in the coming decade.   
Turning to the broader Asian neighbourhood, the first striking point 
is that India’s Look East policy indicates a new departure for India, a focus 
on maritime interests. India has found it easier to develop strong relations 
with its neighbours at sea than with its land neighbours, and these 
successes have entered Indian doctrine. Today Indian policy-makers see 
India “at the confluence of two seas”, to use the words of the 17th century 
Indian ruler, Dara Shikoh, and India’s Navy is involved in an increasing 
number of multilateral exercises to improve maritime security.143  
India’s Look East policy has clearly been the primary impetus to 
India’s recent economic growth and has deepened strategic relations with 
the major powers, whom Menon listed as the US, EU, Japan, Russia and 
China (in that order). India-US strategic cooperation was founded on 
maritime security in South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean, as was India-
Japan strategic cooperation, and the former was accompanied by a rapid 
rise in trade. Up until 2005 the US was India’s largest trading partner, with 
a trade volume of $32 billon that year. The US has now been outstripped as 
a trading partner by the EU and China, but arguably it was the India-US 
strategic partnership that prompted the India-EU and India-China 
partnerships, both of which gained substance only after they took off. 
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Menon tellingly commented that the India-US partnership had a “positive 
effect… on our dealings with the rest of the world” (Menon, 2007). 
That said, India’s goals in partnering with the Great Powers were 
quite different from India’s goals with Asia; they were, in Menon’s words, 
“access to markets, high technology and resources crucial to our future 
economic growth and development”. While Indian goals thus mix 
realpolitik and normative elements, the means that India has used are by 
and large within the normative framework of international law (the EU-
India and India-Japan strategic partnerships). But they have also on 
occasion sought to alter or expand international law (the US-India civil 
nuclear energy agreement). At the same time, India is developing 
institutional partnerships, for example between space, technology, defence 
and agricultural agencies (the EU and US), as well as through membership 
of regional forums (the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia 
Summit).  
If these points indicate that India is beginning to expand as a 
normative foreign policy actor and has been able to bring some depth to its 
normative behaviour as a rising power, it is also worth noting that Indian 
policy-makers have encountered a surprising obstacle to achieving some of 
their goals, in particular the civil nuclear energy agreement – domestic 
political opposition. This casts doubt on whether there is internal consensus 
or even clarity on what constitutes the national interest. Similarly, India’s 
China policy appears to be timid to the point of subordinating one strand 
of national interest, settling border disputes on normative principles and 
retaining the right to deal normatively with regional issues (Tibet and 
Taiwan), to another strand of national interest, trade and relations in South-
East and East Asia, where China dominates. 
These factors indicate that India might remain a rising rather than 
established power for a longer time than it would take if the country’s 
political parties had an overarching and non-partisan conception of the 
national interest. This is unlikely to affect India’s behaviour as a normative 
foreign policy actor, although it will dent policy-maker confidence and 
could mean that India’s ability to be effective in its actions will be curtailed. 
Much depends on how well the India-EU and India-US partnerships 
develop on the one hand, and how steadily India’s Look East policy 
progresses on the other hand. The potential is good: each set of 
relationships is based on a strong foundation of goodwill, little strategic 
competition and diaspora ties. The India-China relationship is more 256 | RADHA KUMAR 
 
complicated and lacks the foundation that the other three have, but it too 
could improve as the other three progress.  
In short, India is steadily becoming a more influential as well as 
normative foreign policy actor, despite domestic confusion, and this trend 
is set to grow over the coming decade. 
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6.  CHINA AS A NORMATIVE FOREIGN 
POLICY ACTOR 
BRANTLY WOMACK* 
Although China’s foreign policy behaviour is often judged in terms of its 
compliance with Western norms, the evolution of China’s own norms merits 
serious attention. From early times to the present day, China’s international action 
has been structured in terms of norms. When China’s recent behaviour is described 
in terms of the normative structure proposed by Tocci in the introductory chapter, 
its unique perspective is highlighted, although tentative questions concerning the 
structure are also raised. Moreover, the case of China challenges the general 
interpretation of norms because it emphasises relationships as essentially 
interactive. From the Chinese perspective, international relations are not an area 
for the application of abstract norms to cases, but rather a set of particular 
international relationships, with concrete obligations defined within the context of 
each relationship. The cardinal virtue of normative interaction is respect for the 
other. By focusing on this Chinese interpretation of normative action, this chapter 
analyses eight case studies in Chinese foreign policy, discerning whether when and 
why China behaves as a normative foreign policy actor. 
1.  Introduction 
China has been defined variously as Westphalian, realist, and as a 
subverter of the unity of Western normative action, in places such as Sudan 
and Myanmar. If the topic of this working paper were how China affects 
Western and especially American policy initiatives, then these would be 
familiar depictions. However, if we allow for the possibility that ‘our’ 
norms are not the only possible norms, and perhaps not the only valid 
ones, then the distance between China’s behaviour and that of the West 
may not be a measure of China’s moral defects, but rather of the 
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distinctiveness of China’s perspective in its external relationships. 
Understanding China on its own terms as an intentional actor should be a 
prerequisite to understanding China as a normative foreign policy actor. 
China is certainly worth the effort. Its long history as a resilient traditional 
empire, its collapse and transformation in the twentieth century, its 
revolutionary policies during the Cultural Revolution, and the current era 
of reform and openness, all have essential moral dimensions to be 
explored.  
Besides the intrinsic interest in China as a normative foreign policy 
actor, analysing China requires a broadening of the spectrum of possible 
normative approaches, and suggesting several fundamental principles of 
normative international action that are sometimes neglected in the West. 
China was one of the many countries that were at the wrong end of the 
mission civilizatrice; unwillingly, it helped carry the white man’s burden. 
China’s radical norms were therefore based on the critical rejection of 
imperialism and the presumed right of intrusion into weaker political 
communities. Even today, many of the normative differences between 
China and the West stem from the kto-kovo [who-to whom] differences in 
the experience of imperialism.  
Beyond the critique of Western intrusiveness, analysing China can 
add new depth to a study of normative international action. The Western 
focus tends to be on the actor and its moral motive. Both traditionally and 
at present, the Chinese focus is instead on relationships and the ethics of 
relationships. A relational perspective can highlight the role of power in 
asymmetric relationships. It also stresses respect for the other as the 
cardinal virtue of normative relations. The consideration of norms and their 
effects should involve more than an assessment of one’s actions and their 
consequences for one’s own conscience, but take into consideration the 
effects on others. In this respect, China as a thinking moral actor poses 
many stimulating and challenging questions concerning the interactive 
framework of normative action. 
This working paper consists of three major parts. The first considers 
the evolution of China as a normative foreign policy actor from the 
traditional Chinese empire to the present. The second presents case studies 
of Chinese foreign policy in the framework suggested by Nathalie Tocci, 
but according to China’s own norms. The last part reflects on the challenges 
and contributions that China can bring to a more general theory of 
normative foreign policy action. CHINA AS A NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR| 267 
 
2.  China’s Norms in Historical Context 
2.1  Norms and Chinese norms 
The English word ‘normative’ has an interesting family. A ‘norm’ can be a 
moral principle, but it can also be an expectation of non-deviance. A 
‘normal curve’ or ‘normal distribution’ is the expected pattern of outcomes, 
and to be ‘normal’ is not to be abnormal. When in 1685 Jean-Baptiste de la 
Salle founded the first teachers’ college, the Ecole Normale, the term 
‘normal school’ was used because the mission was to standardise teacher 
training and education. The term ‘normative’ dates only from the 
nineteenth century, but its implication of applying a rule to behaviour 
hearkens back to its Latin ancestor, norma, a carpenter’s square. 
The Chinese translation of ‘normative’, biaozhun标准, conveys only 
the sense of standardisation rather than a moral imperative. However, if we 
look at attitudes towards ethically-guided behaviour, the Chinese tradition 
is at least as rich as that of the West. With its basic premise that human 
nature is good, Confucianism presented a very sophisticated ethic of social 
interaction that emphasised leadership by example, teaching morality, and 
the duties associated with relational roles. When it became China’s 
orthodoxy in the Han dynasty (206 BC to 220 AD), Confucianism not only 
provided the moral code for the Empire’s external relations, but also the 
examination curriculum for recruiting the bureaucracy. By contrast, the 
Daoists criticised the moralism of the Confucians as unnatural: “The 
human heart is like a spring. The more you press it down, the higher it will 
leap.” The Daoist emphasis on the way of nature and non-activity was not 
suited to be a governing orthodoxy, but it remains a fundamental influence 
on personal values and on Chinese aesthetics. Another strand of classical 
thought, the Legalists (also called Realists – in Chinese fa jia 法家) were 
instead brutally unconcerned with morality. They recommended to the 
ruler to hold on to the “two handles” of reward and punishment, and to be 
“empty, still, and silent, and from your place of darkness observe the 
weaknesses of others.” 
As different as these three Chinese approaches to the ethics of state 
are, they have some traits in common and stand in contrast to Western 
norms. They are not based on the revealed commands of God, nor are their 
recommendations justified by transcendental rewards and punishments. 
There is no glorification of altruism or self-denial per se, even though they 268 | BRANTLY WOMACK 
 
all require tremendous self-discipline. The cardinal virtue of Confucianism 
is humanity (ren 仁, the character is derived from two people together), not 
obedience, even to God or the ruler. The focus is neither on the universal 
nor on the individual, but rather on proper behaviour in relationships. 
‘Proper behaviour’ in relationships refers to actions that in the long run will 
be successful. It is with regards to which actions will be successful – and 
indeed what success is – that Confucians, Daoists and Legalists differ in 
their advice. 
2.2  From empire to victim 
From the Han Dynasty to the fall of the last dynasty two thousand years 
later, an ‘imperial Confucianism’ evolved. In domestic politics, the empire 
was supposed to be a pyramid of virtue, recruited on the basis of 
Confucian merit and serving the emperor by the judicious management of 
relationships among those in their charge. A distinctively Confucian 
foreign policy emerged more slowly but by the Tang (618-907) and the 
Song (960-1279) dynasties, the major elements were clear and very much an 
extension of domestic principles. First, China was dominant in its 
international environment not because of conquest, but because of its virtue 
(de 德). Because humanity is good, even barbarians could appreciate the 
virtue of China and learn from it. Tribute missions were expressions of 
deference to virtue and usually left with gifts more valuable than those 
they brought.  
Generally China did not interfere in the domestic politics of its 
neighbouring states. However, it recognised and dealt with the hereditary 
rulers, and when they were challenged by domestic turmoil, China’s 
dilemma was precisely whether to support the recognised ruler or to shift 
recognition to the victorious usurpers. As this dilemma suggests, the 
emphasis on virtue created a vital role for hypocrisy in Chinese diplomacy. 
As Machiavelli might have said, the appearance of Chinese virtue was 
often more important than its reality. On the other side of the coin, for 
China’s smaller neighbours the show of deference while in Beijing was 
counterbalanced by the claim of absolute authority while at home. The 
implication that neighbouring states were inferior did not sit well with 
their kings, and therefore various ruses were used to preserve the 
conflicting images of absolute authority at home and deference to China in 
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son as the ‘official king’ in dealing with China, and once sent an impostor 
to receive the seals of office (Buu Lam, 1968). When China was defeated by 
Vietnam in 1427, it accepted Vietnam’s apology and recognised the new 
ruler when he sent a golden effigy of himself to be punished. The handling 
of tribute missions was done so that anything other than deference was 
hidden from the emperor. The British mission of Lord McCartney in 1793 
was a prime example of deflection of a very different emissary from the 
established pattern of deference (Hevia, 1996). 
Ultimately, the contradiction between China’s presumptions of 
superiority and the West’s growing ambitions for power created a series of 
confrontations, from the Opium War in 1840 to the Boxer Uprising in 1900. 
China lost each one. Each time its capacity for further resistance was 
reduced, so was its capacity to maintain domestic order. Finally, the Qing 
Dynasty collapsed in 1911 and was replaced by a situation of total chaos 
(Tsou, 1986). Warlords fought each other in the countryside, foreigners 
governed the modern economy in the cities, and Japan was tempted to 
extend its empire. Humiliation was the defining theme of China’s first 
century of contact with imperialism (Cohen, 2003).  
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, 
domestic weakness and external vulnerability came to an end, but the 
formative influence of suffering as the victim of Western and Japanese 
power remained. Even in China these resentments of past wrongs and 
sensitivities to bullying are today criticised as a ‘victim mentality’ 
(Medeiros & Taylor Fravel, 2003). However, it should be remembered that 
a ‘victim mentality’ has its roots in the reality of being a victim, and it is no 
more pathological than its opposite, the ‘victor mentality’, with its rosy 
memories of past glory and callousness in presuming that might is right.144 
2.3  Virtue and the new communist order, 1949-1970 
China’s victimhood provided the historical context for the diplomacy of the 
People’s Republic of China, but the attitude of ‘new China’ was one of 
confidence. There was confidence in the Communist Party of China, 
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because it had led a rural revolution to overwhelming victory. There was 
confidence in the people, because the main strength of the revolution was 
the mobilisation of the masses. There was confidence in Marxism-Leninism, 
because in the version creatively applied by Mao Zedong to Chinese 
conditions, its ideological guidance had proven correct. The tremendous 
success of the revolution led to the expectation that further revolutions in 
world politics were possible. 
China’s revolutionary foreign policy was based on unity with the 
socialist camp, solidarity with the third world, and opposition to the 
capitalist world. Despite the chequered history of the Soviet Union’s 
relations with the Communist Party of China before 1949, Mao was willing 
to become part of the Soviet camp because it appeared to represent the 
organised forces of world revolution. Solidarity with the third world was 
also a fundamental commitment, because Mao expected that the “vast zone 
of…capitalist, semi-colonial and colonial countries” in between the United 
States and the Soviet Union would be the battleground on which the people 
would determine the victory of revolution (Mao Zedong, 1967, p. 99). 
Opposition to the capitalist world was founded on Lenin’s application of 
class struggle to international relations. However, in concrete negotiations 
and in the conduct of relations, compromise was possible and peaceful 
relations were preferable. For example, the British were allowed to keep 
control of Hong Kong even though their presence was considered 
illegitimate. On the other hand however, given the choice between 
diplomatic relations with France and support for the Viet Minh, China 
chose Ho Chi Minh.145  
The great events of Chinese foreign relations in the 1950s were the 
Korean War, the Geneva Conference of 1954, and the Bandung Conference 
of 1955. The Korean War confirmed the hostility between China and the US 
that persisted until Nixon’s visit in 1972. Nevertheless, it demonstrated that 
China was a credible military force and thus set the stage for the inclusion 
of China as a major player at the Geneva Conference. This was China’s 
debut on the global diplomatic stage, and Zhou Enlai was instrumental in 
securing the agreement of the Viet Minh to the Geneva Accords. The Asian-
African Conference, better known as the Bandung Conference, was a 
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different kind of success for China. In the run-up to the Conference, Zhou 
Enlai improved relations with India and Burma, co-formulated the “Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and then played an active part in the 
Conference itself.146  
Unfortunately however, the Bandung Conference proved to be the 
high-water mark of Chinese diplomacy, as China soon entered the 
turbulent stream of leftism. China was certainly a ‘normative foreign policy 
actor’ in the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1969, but it drew such a 
sharp distinction between the friends and enemies of world revolution that 
it alienated almost everyone. Its criticism of the Soviet Union as revisionist 
and then as social-imperialist caused alienation from all but Albania in the 
socialist camp. Even Vietnam, which was dependent on Chinese aid, was 
shocked by China’s strident tone. Third world countries that had been 
favourably impressed by China at Bandung drifted away. China’s shrill 
and self-righteous leftism in these years produced isolation rather than 
world revolution. On the positive side of revolutionary activism, the 
building of the TanZam Railway in Africa in 1970-1976, at a cost of $500 
million, was a remarkable and successful example of revolutionary 
goodwill, and vital in breaking the economic stranglehold of apartheid-
riven South Africa on its neighbours. 
2.4  Evolution of reform era norms 
While the reform era in domestic policy started with a bang in December 
1978, the ideological evolution of Chinese foreign policy was more gradual 
and complex. By 1970, the Soviet threat and the failure of radical foreign 
policy induced Mao Zedong to adopt an approach that might be called 
revolutionary pragmatism. On the one hand, there remained the hope of 
world revolution, while on the other hand this was acknowledged as not 
being imminent. Therefore Mao decided to establish relations with any 
state that would recognise the PRC instead of the Republic of China on 
Taiwan, and he began the rapprochement with the US that culminated in 
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the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972. After taking over China’s seat at the 
UN Security Council in 1971, China was very cautious and decidedly un-
revolutionary. Foreign trade began its rapid expansion in the 1970s, 
although it remained under tight state control. 
The two most dramatic policy changes at the beginning of the reform 
era in January 1979 were the normalisation of relations with the US and the 
adoption of a policy of peaceful reunification with Taiwan. Five years later, 
the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong was signed on the basis of 
Deng Xiaoping’s ‘one country, two systems’ policy. Without belittling the 
significance of these events, it could be argued that the abandonment of 
state trading monopolies and the encouragement of foreign investment 
were even more important. In the 1980s the economies of China and Hong 
Kong began to merge, setting the stage for more general economic 
globalisation in the 1990s.147 Contact between China and the outside world 
was increasingly deregulated.  
Adaptation to international norms has been a major dimension of 
China’s diplomacy in the reform era. China sought international advice in 
designing its Patent Law in 1984, and then adapted the law to WTO 
standards in 2000. The Copyright Law was passed in 1990, and China 
acceded to the Berne Convention on international copyright protection in 
1992. In the area of non-proliferation, China has been establishing export 
regulations for nuclear, biological, chemical, missile and conventional 
dangerous materials since 1987.148 It issued a White paper on non-
proliferation in December 2003, and became a member of the Nuclear 
Supplier’s Group in 2004.149 In conventional arms sales, China ranked ninth 
in 2006, behind Germany, France, Netherlands, Italy, UK and Spain.150 Its 
arms sales had climbed to 8.7% of the world total in 1987, but have since 
declined to 2.1%. There is however a cultural ‘Doppler Effect’ in the 
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international appreciation of China’s accommodation to international and 
Western norms. Movement towards what is habitual and familiar in the 
developed world is accepted as ‘natural’, while critical attention is focused 
on the remaining differences and on problems of implementation.  
Developments in foreign policy norms have occurred in four major 
areas since the 1990s. First, China’s policy of non-interference in domestic 
affairs – which was part of its original Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence – was applied more strictly. In contrast to China’s public 
criticism of Soviet revisionism in the 1960s, there was no official criticism of 
the much more dramatic abandonment of communism by Mongolia, the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The lack of criticism and the continuity 
in diplomatic relations is especially noteworthy given the conservative 
lurch in China’s domestic politics after the Tiananmen incident, which 
occurred on the same day – 4 June 1989 – that Solidarity won the Polish 
elections. Similarly, after China decided to support UN efforts to install a 
unity government in Cambodia in 1990, it ceased to support the Khmer 
Rouge and did not try to influence the factional composition of the 
government. In recent years there have been subtle modifications of the 
policy of non-interference, most notably behind-the-scenes pressures on 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Myanmar, but even in these 
cases the appearance of pressure is carefully avoided. 
Second, after the international uproar and isolation from developed 
countries resulting from the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, China began to 
pay more diplomatic attention to its Asian neighbours (Womack, 2003a). 
China normalised relations with Indonesia in 1990, Singapore, Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia in 1991, and South Korea in 1992. It established 
positive relationships with the new Central Asian republics created after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, and developed an unexpectedly close 
rapport with Boris Yeltsin’s Russia. In the Asian financial crisis of 1997, 
China’s promise not to devalue its currency was not only deeply 
appreciated by its neighbours, but it also demonstrated an impressive 
degree of international financial autonomy. China’s success with its 
neighbours is somewhat counter-intuitive, considering that its rising power 
has increased the relative vulnerability of its neighbours. In an anarchic 
world, one would expect the neighbours to ally with one another and to 
weigh in against China. 
Third, and greatly facilitating Beijng’s good neighbourhood strategy, 
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global perspective, the most dramatic event was China’s entry into the 
WTO in December 2001, and this was indeed an important watershed. But 
even more important, creative and successful have been China’s 
involvements in regional multilateral arrangements with its neighbours. 
The best known and least successful of these has been the Six Party Talks 
on Korean nuclear weapons. Although the intransigence of both North 
Korea and the US has impeded progress in negotiations, China has 
established itself as the reliable mediator. China’s multilateral relations 
with Southeast Asia have developed rapidly in the last decade. It joined the 
‘ASEAN plus three’ talks with Japan and South Korea in 1997, and then 
established a China ASEAN Free Trade Area in 2002. At the same time, 
China signed an agreement with ASEAN committing to a peaceful 
resolution of differences in the South China Sea.151 These agreements were 
especially important for Southeast Asia because of the greater competitive 
pressure they faced as a result of China’s entry into WTO.  
China’s greatest success in regional multilateralism has been the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, founded in 1995 as the ‘Shanghai 
Five’. This organisation, including China, Russia and the Central Asian 
republics, has progressively expanded its membership and agenda from 
narrow security concerns to comprehensive regional concerns. It has 
become the major Central Asian organisation, attracting the presidents of 
Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to its meetings as well as the presidents of 
its member states. Considering the chaos that surrounds the diplomacy of 
newly established states in a poorly defined region, the establishment of a 
new regional organisation is a major accomplishment. 
Finally, since the late Cold War, China has viewed the global 
situation as one of multipolarity, in which no state can successfully 
dominate the rest and cooperation is necessary (Womack, 2004a). The idea 
of multipolarity was used to criticise American unipolarity, but its premise 
was that no state could and should dominate the world, and thus 
successful foreign policy involves cooperation on the basis of mutual 
interest and respect. The related Chinese concepts of a ‘democratic world 
order’ and a ‘harmonious world’ develop the idea implicit in multipolarity 
that international relations should be built on respecting all states as 
autonomous actors. The peacefulness of ‘China’s peaceful rise’ is therefore 
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not simply a normative commitment. China’s successful rise has peace as a 
prerequisite. 
3.  Case Studies 
How can the intentional behaviour of different actors be compared if they 
have different intentions and interpretations of norms? An action that 
seems a moral requirement for one actor may be morally repugnant to 
another. In 1840 for example, the British righteously upheld freedom of 
trade when they punished the Chinese for destroying British opium, while 
the Chinese were upholding their domestic law banning opium as well as 
destroying what they considered to be a dangerous and debilitating drug. 
If intentional actions are reduced to empirical behaviours, then the 
researcher’s moral judgment displaces the original intention. The question 
of normative action is thus reduced to how it measures up to the 
researcher’s own norms and interpretations.  
This dilemma notwithstanding, we can follow Immanuel Kant and 
look for categories defining normative action that transcend their specific 
content.152 An example at the individual level would be sincerity, which 
regardless of one’s value system would be considered important for 
normative action. The structure of cases that Nathalie Tocci has proposed 
comes close to being an a priori array of defining categories that can be 
applied to any international normative actor regardless of content. 
Tocci’s four categories of action can be grouped into two polarities: 
normative and realist, and imperial and status quo. The first pair attributes 
different importance to the normative dimensions of action (normative in 
the case of the normative actor and non-normative in the case of the realist 
actor). The second pair is instead characterised by normative revisionism 
and unilateral intrusiveness at one end of the spectrum (the imperial actor) 
and conserving the existing situation (the status quo actor). These universal 
descriptive categories will be applied to a variety of actors. However, these 
polarities do not have to be disjunctive to be meaningful; they must only 
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define a spectrum of possible actors and actions. The additional 
differentiation between ‘intended’ and ‘unintended’ policy impacts yields 
eight categories for which cases must be found. 
Since the four categories form the common framework of the research 
project and plausible Chinese cases can be cited for each category, this 
paper will abide by the framework. However, it should be noted that a 
linear four-category structure is logically demanding. It must exhaust the 
universe of relevant action and the categories must be either mutually 
exclusive or they must partly overlap only with their two neighbouring 
categories. In Figure 1 for example, point A can be ambiguous with respect 
to (N) and (R), but not to (I) and (SQ). The fact that a case study can be 
plausibly put in a particular category does not demonstrate the validity of 
the linear framework. It must be increasingly implausible to place it in a 
more remote category. 
Figure 1. The categories as linear 
  Normative (N)  Realist(R)  Imperial(I)  Status Quo(SQ) 
 
 A  B  C 
 
 
An alternative structure suggested by the presence of two polarity 
pairs is a two-dimensional array. In contrast to the linear array, this defines 
a space in which each case study must relate to both poles.  
Figure 2. The categories as complementary polarities 
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In this mapping, the previously ambiguous cases A (normative-
realist) and C (imperial-status quo) must be able to be placed on the other 
dimension as well. Case study B (realist-imperial) would no longer be 
ambiguous, because it is now located at the intersection of the two axes 
rather than between two categories. If we assume that the polarities are 
dichotomous pairs, then the space can be a 2x2 table. The advantage of the 
two-dimensional mapping is that is raises interesting questions about the 
interrelationships between categories, but it has the disadvantage of 
reducing the number of cases and displacing the intended/unintended 
distinction into a separate analytical question. For the purposes of an initial 
attempt at comparison of normative actors, a variety of cases is an 
advantage. Therefore the linear approach is more appropriate as an 
exploratory schema.  
Tocci also suggests that all foreign policy actions can be analysed in 
terms of their goals, means, and impacts. While each of these categories has 
its empirical ambiguities in any concrete case (example: what was the goal 
of the American invasion of Iraq?), they are useful for discriminating 
between general approaches. In particular, the distinction between goals of 
possession and milieu goals provides a good first cut at normative versus 
self-serving purposes (Wolfers, 1962, pp. 67-80). Tocci suggests the 
enhancement of international law and institutions as a further criterion for 
normativity. Of course, this presumes the legitimacy and adequacy of 
international law and institutions, which may be problematic and also 
reflects international power politics. It should be recalled that Leopold II’s 
most brutal exploitation of the Congo was based on agreements signed (but 
not understood) by various chieftains, and then his private possession, the 
so-called ‘Congo Free State’ was ratified by European powers at the Berlin 
Conference in 1884-5, with no Africans present. Because of this, as Tocci 
rightly argues, both goals and means require critical evaluation in each case 
study. 
The conditioning factors raised by Tocci – domestic politics, domestic 
capabilities, and external environment – can also be reasonably expected to 
be present whatever the norms of the normative actor. The conditioning 
factors highlight the focus of the analysis on the normative actor’s 
individuality rather than on the relationship within which the action takes 
place – on the normative actor rather than the normative interactor. The 
state at the other end of the relationship is the object of action, a part of the 
external environment. We will return to the question of normative 
interaction within relationships in the third part of this working paper. 278 | BRANTLY WOMACK 
 
Table 1. China’s Case Studies 
Normative  Realpolitik  Imperial Status  quo 
Intended Un-
intended 
Intended Un-
ended 
Intended Un-
intended 
Intended   Un- 
intended 
ASEAN 
1997- 
 
 
#1 
Tibet 
1950-55 
 
 
#2 
DPRK 
 
 
 
#3 
Khmer 
Rouge 
1977-90 
 
#4 
Sino- 
Indian 
War  
1962 
#5 
Vietnam 
1979 
 
 
#6 
Cambodia 
1991- 
 
 
#7 
Myanmar 
1988- 
 
 
#8 
 
3.1  Normative intended: China-ASEAN cooperation, 1997- 
China’s relationships with Southeast Asian states were chequered from 
1964 to 1991. By 1991, China had normalised relations with all states in the 
region and established relations with the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). By holding the value of its currency steady during the 
1997 Asian financial crisis, China contributed to regional stability, and 
China took the lead in proposing an ASEAN-China free trade area. In 2002 
China added two important security dimensions to its relationship with 
ASEAN by becoming the first extra-regional state to accede to the region’s 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and agreeing to the peaceful settlement 
of disputes in the South China Sea (including the Spratly Islands, disputed 
by 5 claimants). Just as important as its direct assurances of non-aggression, 
China has not tried to establish exclusive security relations with the region.  
Goals, means and impact 
The goal of China’s ‘good neighbourhood policy’, of which better relations 
with ASEAN is an important part, is to stabilise China’s relationships with 
Asian neighbours and jointly pursue mutual benefit. These goals have been 
pursued by supporting, and seeking through negotiation, the peaceful 
expansion and intensification of multilateral organisations of sovereign 
members. Although a positive outcome requires sustained cooperative 
efforts on all sides, the results so far have been impressive. Both by China’s 
own normative standards and by the international law and institutions 
standards indicated by Tocci, China’s interaction with ASEAN over the 
past decade has been a tremendous success. On the one hand, China’s CHINA AS A NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR| 279 
 
strategy of multipolarity and multilateralism have succeeded in bringing 
the ten countries of Southeast Asia and their regional association into a 
much closer relationship of mutual benefit. On the other hand, the creation 
of a free trade area, China’s accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity, and the 
agreement on the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea, 
must be seen as milieu achievements in the region and as positive 
contributions to international law and institutions (Cheng, 1999). 
Conditioning factors 
Two principal factors explain China’s intended normative foreign policy 
towards ASEAN. On the one hand, the internal political context has been 
favourable, with the post-Deng leadership being unanimously supportive 
of a cooperative approach (Womack, 2004b), and public opinion not 
playing a noticeable role (either in favour or against). On the other hand, 
the external context and in particular the adroit and non-confrontational 
diplomacy of Southeast Asia was essential for success. Had Southeast Asia 
band-wagonned against China after Tiananmen, or split into pro-China 
and anti-China groupings, cooperation would have been impossible. A 
more distant contextual factor was that the presence of the US that gave 
Southeast Asia a latent option that might have influenced China to be 
gentler. However, against this interpretation it should be noted that China 
has not undercut relations between the US and Southeast Asia. Finally, it is 
interesting to note that while China had the capabilities to act 
cooperatively, it also disposed of the means for a more aggressive and self-
serving policy towards Southeast Asia. It did not maximise its increasing 
bargaining power vis-à-vis its Southeast Asian neighbours. Encouraging 
multilateralism decreased its options for ‘divide and rule’. However, this 
policy has been a strategic success and one of mutual benefit, not one of 
self-sacrifice. 
3.2  Normative unintended: The peaceful liberation of Tibet, 1950-
1955 
While few would doubt that China’s relations with ASEAN were 
normative, the incorporation of Tibet into China in the early 1950s may not 
seem an obvious choice for a normative action, albeit with an unintended 
outcome. From a Chinese perspective, the incorporation of Tibet was part 
of national liberation, not a matter of foreign policy. However, it did 
involve negotiation with an existing government, and there was an option 280 | BRANTLY WOMACK 
 
of more forceful action. From a Western perspective instead, the 
subsequent events in Tibet have overshadowed earlier policies. Relations 
between China and the Dalai Lama’s government in Lhasa became 
increasingly tense from 1956, culminating in the March 1959 revolt and the 
Dalai Lama’s flight to India. Within Tibet, the leftist turn in China’s politics 
combined with the Dalai Lama’s breach of the Seventeen Point Agreement 
abruptly led to a particularly harsh regime in Tibet that lasted until 1980. 
Since then there have been ongoing discussions regarding reconciliation, 
but so far they have not been successful (Womack, 2007). 
Goals, means and impact 
The goal of the peaceful liberation of Tibet is ambiguous, but normative 
considerations prevail. On the one hand, the incorporation of Tibet into the 
People’s Republic of China was a mission of establishing sovereign 
possession. In 1949 Tibet was not recognised as a sovereign state by any 
other state, although it had been autonomous for four decades. After the 
British invasion of 1904 and the failure of the Qing dynasty to re-establish 
control, Tibet was left alone by the Republican government, although it 
maintained a symbolic presence and did not cede independence. On behalf 
of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong then claimed all Chinese 
territory, including Taiwan and Tibet.153 The control of Tibet was 
considered a strategic necessity because of its history of British 
involvement and the probability of future American involvement. On the 
other hand however, Mao’s commitment to inducing Tibet’s voluntary 
compliance might be seen as a normative milieu goal which presumed 
mutual benefit as the basis of policy. Mao was well aware that Tibet was 
ethnically and culturally distinct from the rest of China, and that the ethnic 
Tibetan involvement in the Chinese r e v o l u t i o n  h a d  c o m e  f r o m  o u t s i d e  
Tibet proper.154 For these reasons, Mao offered to the existing Tibetan 
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government that it could keep its current structure, including its army, and 
that “in matters relating to the various reforms in Tibet, there would be no 
compulsion on the part of the central government”.155 The sincerity of 
China’s normative motives – respect for the existing order in Tibet, 
unwillingness to force compliance unless the masses were behind it – is 
demonstrated by the negotiations and compromises that continued after 
the People’s Liberation Army was stationed and motor roads were built. 
Indeed, the Dalai Lama himself was deeply impressed by Mao’s sincerity 
during his year-long visit to Beijing and returned to Lhasa in March 1955 
eager to participate in reforms and even asked to join the Communist Party 
of China. As Goldstein (2007, p. 547) puts it, “Mao’s improbable strategy of 
winning over the Dalai Lama had turned out to be an amazing success”. 
The means were also ambiguous, but overall China did not, up until 
1955, use all the coercive means at its disposal. True, the presence of the 
People’s Liberation Army, though peaceful, left little doubt that even if 
Tibetans were not persuaded to cooperate, they would have no other 
option. However, as described by Melvyn Goldstein (2007) in his definitive 
history of the period, Mao Zedong chose to liberate Tibet peacefully, 
although he certainly had the military means to force an occupation. The 
Chinese leadership was respectful of existing institutions and leadership, 
and established its new relationship through unforced negotiation.  
However, China’s normative strategy vis-à-vis Tibet soon failed. 
Ethnic Tibetan areas outside Tibet began a drumroll of concerns about 
imposed reforms that culminated in the 1959 revolt, which unleashed pent-
up radical interventions that reached a second crescendo in the Cultural 
Revolution. The internal norm of multicultural respect was lost, and the 
international norm of milieu improvements and international law suffered 
as well. The incompatibility between the interests of the Tibetan elite and 
the increasingly leftward direction of China’s politics thus led to the 
confrontation of 1959, and afterwards Tibet suffered the sudden collapse of 
its autonomy. 
Conditioning factors 
Unlike the case of ASEAN, from the beginning there was a split in the CPC 
leadership between Mao’s policy of voluntary incorporation of Tibet and a 
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more forceful unification. The difference was embodied by the rift between 
the two commanderies involved in the practical administration of Tibet 
policy: the Northwest Bureau and the Southwest Bureau. Eventually Mao 
personally removed Fan Ming, the aggressive leader in the Northwest 
Bureau and a more normative approach prevailed for a while. Yet latent 
divisions, coupled with domestic capabilities and the external environment 
led to ultimate failure. China certainly had the capacity to defeat Tibetan 
resistance, and there was no foreign power capable of effectively assisting 
Tibetan resistance. Moreover, there were many opportunities for the early 
termination of a peaceful reunification. This coupled with the external 
hostility towards China, especially from the US, raised the importance of 
Chinese strategic control of Tibet and suspicions of Tibetan autonomy. 
These security concerns increased after 1959, and anti-separatism became a 
justification for harsh Chinese policies. 
3.3  Realpolitik intended: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
China has been deeply involved in supporting the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (North Korea) since its inception, sometimes at great cost 
to itself, but it has not controlled North Korea. Nevertheless, North Korea 
has served Chinese realpolitik purposes by acting as a buffer between China 
and American allies in the Cold War. When the Cold War ended, the utility 
of North Korea for China became less clear, but its collapse would pose 
serious uncertainties for China, and so support continues. China’s realpolitik 
policies have been sustained, but cannot be counted as a normative victory 
either by Chinese or by general international standards. 
Goals, means and impact 
The goal of China’s support of the DPRK has not been one of possession, 
but it has been the preservation of a buffer state regardless of the interests 
of its inhabitants. Tens of thousands of ethnic Koreans joined the People’s 
Liberation Army during its campaign in Northeast China, and afterwards 
many of these demobilised Koreans formed the backbone of the North 
Korean army (Chen, 1994). Despite this close link, the Korean War was 
clearly Kim Il Sung’s personal initiative, and China supported it only 
because the alternative would have been a hostile puppet state on the 
border of its major industrial base. By the late 1950s, Kim had removed all 
subordinates with ties to China, and yet North Korea’s utility as a buffer 
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relations with South Korea in 1992. The 1990s were the coldest period in the 
China-North Korean relationship, but China continued to support a North 
Korean buffer state. Likewise, the nuclear crisis since 2002 has heightened 
tensions but has not changed the bottom line. However, the diplomatic 
opportunity of hosting the Six Party Talks has somewhat modified China’s 
framing of the North Korean problem, giving it a greater interest in 
resolution. In order to pursue the goal of a North Korean buffer state, 
China has used a mixture of state-to-state support, war in the 1950s, and 
international negotiations since 2002. The result, while being a realpolitik 
success, has not constituted much of a moral victory. Certainly the Six 
Party Talks can be considered positively from a normative perspective. 
However, North Korea’s missile test and nuclear explosion in 2006, against 
China’s public advice, constitute a clear non-normative result, which has 
once again chilled North Korean-Chinese relations.  
Conditioning factors 
Internal interests coupled with limited capabilities and external constraints 
all explain China’s realpolitik policy towards North Korea and its intended 
effects. There is little disputing of the realpolitik logic in China’s North 
Korea policy. The areas bordering North Korea and the ethnic Koreans in 
China understand and support the policy. Furthermore there is little 
concern in China about North Korea’s nuclear or broader military capacity. 
Indeed alternative scenarios of either a desperate or a collapsed North 
Korea inhibit China’s alternative goals. It would be difficult to imagine a 
failed state in North Korea being more morally desirable, and American 
policy towards North Korea, while more self-righteous, has exacerbated 
and prolonged the crisis. Moving on to capabilities, China’s realistic 
options have been rather limited. It could not (and cannot) force more 
desirable behaviour without endangering its bottom line of a stable border. 
In turn, North Korea’s awareness of this has given it considerable leeway. 
Finally, the external environment explains both China’s realpolitik policies 
and its intended effects. North Korea is an especially interesting case for its 
external effects, because in 1989-92 the justifying environment of Chinese 
policy was transformed, but one bottom line (Cold War buffer) was soon 
replaced by another (danger of collapse) with the same effect (continuing 
support for North Korea). North Korea’s own objectives also play a role in 
explaining China’s intended effects. Just as China has needed a buffer state 
to secure its borders, North Korea has needed its last non-hostile ‘friend’, 
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3.4  Realpolitik unintended: Khmer Rouge support 1977-1990 
It is sometimes mistakenly believed that China’s support for the Khmer 
Rouge was due to its affinity with the extreme policies in Cambodia. This is 
not the case (Richardson, 2005). Before the defeat of the American-
supported Lon Nol regime in 1975, Sihanouk, the Soviet Union, China, and 
Vietnam all supported the Khmer Rouge because they were the most 
significant resistance force in Cambodia. From 1977 however, the Khmer 
Rouge became violently anti-Vietnamese, and this fit China’s realpolitik 
purposes as the division between China and Vietnam became more hostile. 
Ironically, Chinese support of the Khmer Rouge increased as China’s own 
domestic policies shifted toward pragmatic reform after Mao’s death in 
September 1976. After Vietnam drove the Khmer Rouge out in December 
1978, China continued to support the Khmer Rouge, again for realpolitik 
purposes: because they were the most determined anti-Vietnamese force 
(Chanda, 1986). Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge in the 1980s is quite 
comparable to American support for the Contras against Nicaragua at the 
same time. By 1990 Sihanouk’s efforts at negotiating a settlement of the 
Cambodian problem were beginning to bear fruit, and China shifted its 
support away from the Khmer Rouge and behind the UN-sponsored 
coalition government. Ironically, since 1991 China has been the most 
steadfast supporter of a Cambodian government largely derived from the 
pro-Vietnam government that the Khmer Rouge, supported by China at the 
time, was fighting. 
Goals, means and impact 
China claimed that it supported the Khmer Rouge because of Vietnam’s 
occupation of Cambodia, but it is clear that support began before the 
invasion, and that China was slow to respond to opportunities to end the 
occupation. China’s policy objectives were clearly realpolitik: the Khmer 
Rouge was an enemy of China’s enemy, and therefore a friend. The 
Chinese claim after 1979 that they were supporting the Khmer Rouge 
because of Vietnamese violations of Cambodian sovereignty was thus a fig 
leaf for their anti-Vietnamese policies, although it was the same fig leaf 
worn by the UN, the US, and ASEAN. In fact, China’s Cambodian policy 
was derivative of the Sino-Vietnamese hostility. Similarly, the means of 
supporting the Khmer Rouge as a force hostile to the Vietnamese 
occupation was founded neither on mutual benefit nor on the rule of law. 
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respect for Norodom Sihanouk, who managed to break the Cambodian 
stalemate through his individual efforts. The results were unintended. 
China’s diplomatic reputation was badly tarnished by its support of such a 
reprehensible group, even if it was not responsible for its crimes. Moreover, 
the attempt to contain and pressure Vietnam failed, and an unintended but 
more normative situation evolved in time. The failure of China’s support 
for the Khmer Rouge was thus the flip side of the ensuing emergence of 
regional peace.  
Conditioning factors 
There were Chinese officials who were privately critical of increasing 
hostility towards Vietnam, and the Chinese who were in Cambodia with 
the Khmer Rouge were shocked by their policies. However, this was an 
area of great personal concern to Deng Xiaoping, and he was a forceful 
fellow. Hence China used all means at its disposal to support the Khmer 
Rouge, but it could not force Vietnam out of Cambodia. By 1989 many of 
the experts were convinced that a policy adjustment was necessary, but it 
required a shift in the external environment. Indeed the external 
environment was the most important factor explaining China’s policies and 
the unintended effects. First, shared hostility to Vietnam was the reason 
China supported the Khmer Rouge, and Vietnam’s alliance with the Soviet 
Union was the chief reason China opposed Vietnam. Second, in the 1980s 
common opposition to Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia strengthened 
China’s relations with the rest of Southeast Asia and the US. So there were 
indirect benefits to China’s position. Third and finally, due to shifts in 
Vietnam’s policy and Prince Sihanouk’s heroic diplomacy, the external 
environment ultimately shifted away from supporting stalemate. This 
isolated China, and eventually China also changed its policy. As its later 
successes in Southeast Asia demonstrated, a more moderate policy may 
have been more successful. 
3.5  Imperial intended: The Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962 
The Sino-Indian Border War of 1962 arose from the attempts of two anti-
colonial states to enforce the conflicting claims of two historic empires. 
While the middle of the Himalayan frontier was buffered by the presence 
of Nepal and Bhutan, in the east and west the PRC enforced the boundaries 
of the Qing Empire, while India demanded the most forward claims of the 
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to a mutual commitment to friendly relations. The disputed territory was 
extraordinarily high and rugged, with little or no indigenous population 
and no obvious resources. However, alienation grew, in part as a result of 
the PLA’s suppression of the Tibetan revolt of March 1959 and the Dalai 
Lama’s subsequent refuge in India. The first armed border clash was in 
August 1959, and the decisive battles were fought between 10 October and 
21 November 1962. Altitude and logistics made battle conditions harsh. The 
Indian army was routed, but the PLA stopped when it reached the edge of 
the disputed territory, and to this day China remains in control of the 
territory. At present, serious negotiations are in progress to trade India’s 
claim to the western territory (Aksai Chin) for China’s claim to most of the 
eastern territory.  
Goals, means and impact 
China had grounds to claim the territory on the basis of the Qing frontiers 
and India was provocative in its infiltration of the territories. This property 
dispute was of considerable value to China. Despite its emptiness and 
formidable altitude, the Aksai Chin is important to China because it 
provides the only land route between Tibet and western Xinjiang 
(Kashgar). Yet the means employed to pursue this goal – use of force – did 
not further international peace or mutual benefit, even if China should be 
given credit for restricting the war to the territory under dispute. With 
regards to the outcome, the war was a success for China, but at the cost of 
its relationship with India. China’s victory settled the possession of the 
territory and redefined the terms of future negotiations. Yet the war was 
the main event confirming India’s profound alienation, suspicion and fear 
of China. Furthermore, China was universally blamed for the war at the 
time, though judgements have become more complex since (Maxwell, 1970) 
and India improved its relationships with both the US and the Soviet Union 
as a result. 
Conditioning factors 
China pursued war against India as a matter of prime strategic importance. 
It was a central policy without domestic opposition. While having the 
capabilities to pursue its goals through military means, alternative 
strategies were improbable. Given the nationalism and self-righteousness 
of both sides leading to the armed conflict, it is hard to imagine a 
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3.6  Imperial unintended: Hostilities with Vietnam, 1977-1990 
China’s hostility towards Vietnam after the American war in Vietnam 
resulted from an increasingly hostile series of interactions with Vietnam, 
but it can be considered unilateral. Both China and Vietnam had illusions 
of victory after 1975. Vietnam thought that it would retain world attention 
and support, and China thought that it had gained a grateful younger 
brother (Womack, 2003b). As Vietnam asserted independence vis-à-vis 
China and continued its relationship with the Soviet Union, China 
increased pressure on Vietnam and aid to the Khmer Rouge. Vietnam 
(rightly) perceived the China-Cambodian alliance as a national security 
threat, and invaded Cambodia in December 1978. Deng Xiaoping 
responded by invading and occupying five of Vietnam’s six border 
provinces. The border war of January-February 1979 was a limited 
incursion like the border war with India, but it was intended to be a ‘lesson’ 
to Vietnam, so the action was one of domination rather than coercive 
border delimitation. On the day that Lang Son, the last of the provincial 
capitals, was captured, the withdrawal began. A ‘second lesson’ was 
threatened up until 1985, sporadic hostilities continued on the border until 
1986, and normal relations were not restored until December 1991, after 
Sihanouk returned to Cambodia at the head of a UN-sponsored coalition 
government.  
Goals, means and impact 
Although Vietnam’s behaviour was also at fault, the primary reason for 
China’s hostility was its perception of a Soviet-Vietnamese alliance. Even 
the invasion of Cambodia was secondary, although it provided the trigger 
for hostilities. The case for the action being normative is somewhat weaker, 
since China was trying to push Vietnam into being a deferential neighbour. 
But had it succeeded, perhaps Southeast Asia would have been 
permanently split into a socialist camp of China’s protégés and a weak 
ASEAN supported by the US. The means that China used were diverse. 
Most obviously, limited war was used in 1979, but this was followed by 
collaboration with ASEAN and the US against Vietnam, and by successful 
efforts to seat the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea at the 
UN, which included the Khmer Rouge as a veto-wielding member and 
major armed force. Although the result was unintended, the case could be 
made that it had positive normative consequences. The persistence of 
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withdraw from Cambodia in 1989. This opened the way for a multilateral, 
UN-brokered solution to the Cambodia problem, certainly a positive milieu 
change. The conflict however could not be considered a success by either 
side. Vietnam was not forced to submit, and yet its economic development 
required normalisation of relations with its neighbours, first and foremost 
China. 
Conditioning factors 
Although there are no empirical indicators of Chinese public opinion in 
1978, which was in any case focused on domestic issues, Vietnam’s 
provocations excited public anger. Vietnam had forced 140,000 ethnic 
Chinese residents over the border into China in 1978, leading to Chinese 
public support in favour of China’s limited war. China could have waged a 
larger war in Vietnam, but the consequences for both countries would 
probably have been disastrous. Even the limited conflict was deadly, with 
20,000 casualties estimated for each side. However, it is incorrect to say that 
Vietnam stopped the Chinese advance given that from the beginning it was 
a limited action. The results of the war are largely explained by the external 
environment. From 1976 to 1979 there was negative complementarity in the 
interaction between China and Vietnam that made conflict unavoidable, 
and from 1979 to 1986, China, the US, and ASEAN cooperated against 
Vietnam and in order to create a stalemate on Cambodia. A low point in 
this cooperation was the seating at the UN of the Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea, a group headed by Sihanouk but which included 
the Khmer Rouge as a veto-holding member and as the main fighting force. 
From 1986 to 1989 Sihanouk’s efforts at personal diplomacy broke the 
stalemate and created conditions for a solution. 
3.7  Status quo success: Cambodia, 1991- 
China’s began to cut its support for the Khmer Rouge in 1990, and did not 
use its leverage on their behalf during the May 1993 elections of the United 
Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC). After the elections, China 
supported the uneasy compromise between the chief vote-winner, Prince 
Ranariddth, and Hun Sen, the leader installed by the Vietnamese who was 
actually in control of government machinery. The uneasiness of the 
compromise is indicated in their respective titles of First and Second Prime 
Minister. Thereafter, China quickly became a major donor to development 
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criticised even within ASEAN and some non-Chinese aid projects were 
suspended. China however pursued a status quo policy, continuing aid 
flows. In 2002 Premier Zhu Rongji visited Phnom Penh and announced the 
cancellation of all debts owed to China by Cambodia.  
Goals, means and impact 
China’s support for the UNTAC in Cambodia in 1991-93, followed by 
support for the Kingdom of Cambodia since 1993, has been an impressive 
application of its policy of non-interference in domestic affairs and respect 
for existing governments. China decided to recognise the new status quo in 
Cambodia and more generally in Southeast Asia. The means used in this 
policy shift were normative, first supporting the efforts of the UN and 
Sihanouk to rearrange the context of Cambodian politics, and then backing 
the government actively but not intrusively. China’s status quo policies in 
Cambodia had their intended effects. China did not try to influence the 
factional infighting in the 1990s, and the government has matured since 
then. Unlike North Korea, Myanmar, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, where China 
has begun to reconsider uncritical support of current regimes, Cambodia is 
probably better off for China’s uncritical support. Moreover, what 
Cambodia has most lacked from the fall of Sihanouk in 1970 to the present 
is international respect for its autonomy. American bombs, Chinese 
support for the Khmer Rouge, and the UN’s money monsoon were all 
profound distractions from the internal learning experience of a political 
community. No country can create that experience for another country, but 
at least China (finally) gave Cambodia some space.  
Conditioning factors 
China’s policy shift in favour of a status quo approach in Cambodia was 
largely driven by the external environment. By 1990 China’s support for the 
Khmer Rouge had no future. More importantly, the stalemate surrounding 
Cambodia was breaking up, and China ran the risk of being isolated in its 
intransigence. Hence, the policy shift, which was widely approved within 
China, with no strong interests pushing in favour of a more activist 
normative approach. Cambodia is not an issue for most Chinese. China 
could have tried to influence the factions in Cambodia, continuing to 
oppose the remnants of the government installed by the Vietnamese and 
cooperating with other external forces for this. But Chinese foreign policy 
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China’s relationship with the Kingdom of Cambodia has been rather 
indifferent to external environment. Western donors have criticised China’s 
policies towards Cambodia, swinging from (unfounded) suspicions of 
China’s continuing covert support for the Khmer Rouge to complaints of 
too few strings attached to Chinese aid programmes. Furthermore, 
international donors in Cambodia feel that they have lost leverage because 
of China’s independent behaviour. However, this has not affected China’s 
policy approach. Given the needs of Cambodia and the ignorance and 
arrogance of some donors, the steadfastness of China’s support is 
appreciated (Richardson, 2005). 
3.8  Status quo failure: Myanmar 1988-2007 
China is known for its uncritical support of the Myanmar military junta 
after they suppressed demonstrations in 1988, overturned the 1990 
elections and placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest. China has not 
been alone in its support of Myanmar. Myanmar was admitted into 
ASEAN in 1997, and India and Japan have been involved in aid and 
development. But China has been Myanmar’s major external partner since 
1988. China’s uncritical support for the status quo in Myanmar began to 
waver in May 2003 when Aung San Suu Kyi was briefly released from 
house arrest and then imprisoned after being attacked by a mob. Since then 
China’s public media has included external criticisms by other states in its 
coverage of Myanmar. Nevertheless, in January 2007 China and Russia 
vetoed a draft UN resolution sponsored by the US calling for various 
reforms including the release of political prisoners. South Africa also voted 
against the resolution although its position was more explicitly critical of 
Myanmar’s domestic politics and it agreed that the issue should be dealt 
with by the UN Human Rights Council.156 Yet regardless of the outcome in 
Myanmar and despite the fact that China has not been alone in pursuing 
status quo policies, its policy of uncritical support for the regime has been a 
failure. If the demonstrations succeed in transforming the government, it is 
likely to be more pro-Western and more distant from China. If the regime 
again suppresses the demonstrators, then China will have to reconsider its 
policy of support towards it.  
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Goals, means and impact  
Contrary to the opinions of many outside observers, China’s uncritical 
support of the Burmese government was not aimed at seizing the 
opportunity of fishing in troubled waters, but was rather an application of 
its general policy of non-interference in domestic affairs. Burma was a 
sensitive case for this policy approach because in the recent past China had 
in fact interfered in Burma. But the new policies applied to Burma did not 
differ from those applied, for example, to Mongolia, whose post-
communist government quickly found many other friends abroad. When 
China continued its relationship with the Myanmar government despite the 
demonstrations and elections of 1988, it did so according to its policy of 
non-interference in domestic affairs. Its policy of non-interference was 
bolstered further by Chinese awareness that the status quo in Myanmar 
does not threaten regional or international stability. In this respect the 
statement by Wang Guangya, China’s ambassador to the UN in January 
2007 is revealing: “the present domestic situation in Myanmar does not 
pose a threat to international or regional peace and security”, he stressed, 
adding that “similar problems exist in many other countries as well”.157  
The means of China’s support have been the normal contacts of 
neighbouring states, but distorted in their salience by Burma’s isolation 
from global powers. Back in 1988, at the same time as the demonstrations, 
the United Wa State Army disbanded the Burmese Communist Party and 
exiled its leaders to China. China did not support the exiles, nor did it use 
its own large population of ethnic Wa to destabilise the Wa leaders. The 
United Wa State Army soon reached a compromise with Myanmar’s 
military government and remains in charge of part of the border with 
China. Moreover, the Wa have been a leading producer of opium and 
supplier of opium to China. If the Wa state were Pancho Villa and China 
were the US, a Chinese General Pershing would have crossed the border 
and more interventionist policies would have been pursued. As it is, China 
has only used economic incentives to encourage alternative crops, and the 
Wa area has recently been declared opium-free by the UN (Fuller, 2007).  
Nevertheless, China appears to be gradually appreciating the 
unsustainability of its status quo policies. Especially in the past year, China 
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has supplemented its normal state-to-state relations with attempts to 
encourage the Burmese government to manage its political crisis. In June 
2007, China hosted the first meeting between officials of the US and 
Myanmar since 2003, and US criticisms of the regime were published in 
People’s Daily.158 Most notably, State Counsellor Tang Jiaxuan told the 
special envoy of Myanmar’s Head of State at a meeting in China’s official 
offices in Beijing that “China whole-heartedly hopes that Myanmar will 
push forward a democracy process that is appropriate for the country”. He 
then said to U Nyan Win, Myanmar Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the 
democracy process was in the fundamental interests of the people of 
Myanmar and conducive to regional peace, stability and development.159 
Nevertheless, public reporting on the September demonstrations has been 
extremely low-key in China and undoubtedly China is waiting for the 
outcome before it responds. The loosening of China’s status quo attitude 
toward Myanmar shows both a recognition of the increasing difficulties of 
its status quo policy and a growing sophistication in its appraisal of the 
interactions between domestic conditions and international relations. China 
is hardly likely to be converted to a missionary zeal for human rights, but 
has become more sensitive to the issues. Only time will tell if the current 
turmoil in Myanmar will end in a positive transformation of the 
government or yet another crackdown by the military, but China is no 
longer indifferent to the outcome. 
Conditioning factors 
The main driving force for China’s cautionary status quo policies towards 
Myanmar is the domestic complication that much of what happens on the 
border between Myanmar and Yunnan is not under the control of the 
central government. Clearly China has the capacity to join in sanctions 
against Myanmar, but it is less clear that such sanctions would be effective. 
Considering South Africa’s experience with sanctions under apartheid, its 
stance is perhaps instructive. However, the unwillingness of the Myanmar 
junta to do anything but make empty promises and drift further into a 
conservative dead end is probably the chief reason for the recent and 
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tentative shift in China’s policy, abandoning a clear cut status quo policy. 
Regional and global pressures were probably less significant. 
4.  General Lessons from China as a Normative Foreign Policy 
Actor 
Can these cases be mapped? 
Table 1 again. China’s case studies 
Normative  Realpolitik  Imperial Status  Quo 
Intended  Not  Intended Not  Intended Not  Intended    Not 
ASEAN 
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Sino- 
India 
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Vietnam 
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Cambodia 
1991- 
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1988- 
 
 
#8 
 
   N o r m a t i v e     Realpolitik 
    
  Imperial  1,  2?      5        6 
       
 
          
       3   4 ?  
 Status  Quo  7    8 
 
Just as an experiment, I have tried to map my eight cases into a 
polarity-based space. It was not easy. A major problem was with the 
unintended outcome cases – should the intention be mapped, or the 
outcome? The most obvious example is Tibet. Perhaps this problem 
illustrates the difficulty of combining outcomes with intentional action on 
the same schemata. Perhaps it illustrates an inherent flaw with the polarity 
idea. I await the thoughts and cases of others.  
Fitting China’s actions into an a priori schemata does not exhaust its 
potential contributions to a general theory of normative international 
action. I would like to describe four lessons, of two different kinds. The 294 | BRANTLY WOMACK 
 
serious consideration of China as an intentional actor demands from 
Americans and Europeans a stretching of ideas about normative action 
beyond the common sense of the West. The first two lessons are lessons 
drawn from the difference, or more precisely, lessons from the experience 
that difference is not simply a measure of defectiveness. These lessons are 
first, that perspective matters, and second, that asymmetry of power 
matters. The second two lessons are substantive lessons deriving from the 
rationality of China’s normative behaviour. They are first, that 
relationships matter, and second, that respect for the other can be 
considered as the cardinal virtue in normative international action. Of 
course, I do not mean to stake a claim that these lessons are China’s (or my) 
exclusive intellectual property. Implicit in the claim of generality is that 
they can be found elsewhere as well. 
The first lesson is that perspective matters. If we assume that 
international interaction is merely a phenomenon of behavioural events, 
and the purpose of norms is to sort these events into normal and abnormal, 
good and bad, then the question of perspective does not arise. But 
perspective lurks in the background, because the standpoint of the judge 
has been ‘absolutised’. If we are to treat the producers of events as 
intentional actors, then we must unbundle the behaviour from our 
judgement of it, and consider it as their actions, with their intentions. 
All actors, international or individual, are located actors. They move 
within a framework of possible actions that is given meaning by their 
history, their resources, and their judgement of those with whom they are 
interacting. It would be naïve historicism to think that actions are 
determined by situation. However, the salience of a decision, its meaning 
as an intentional act, is determined by location in the broadest sense. For 
example, one might tolerate class distinctions and differences of treatment 
between tourist and business classes in an airplane, but not in a lifeboat. 
China has been closer to the lifeboat situation for most of the twentieth 
century, and thus it is not surprising that concerns of equity have prevailed 
over those of property. The history of a political community provides its 
shared images of alternatives and their consequences, and the history of 
each community is different. Resources set the horizons of the feasible, and 
the shortage of vital resources can define the urgency of interests. To the 
extent that action is interaction, expectations regarding the behaviour of the 
other become an essential part of one’s own intentionality, and the pattern 
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The second general lesson is the reality of the asymmetry of 
international power. China is an interesting case for asymmetry because it 
was on the ‘big end’ of asymmetric relationships for most of its history, 
then on the small end for the first hundred years of its modern era, and 
now is re-emerging as a major power. The lessons of China’s asymmetry – 
which can be found elsewhere as well – are that differences in capacity 
have a profound effect on relationships, but that the larger side is rarely 
able to enforce its will unilaterally on the smaller side. The assumption in 
international relations theory that only the relations of great powers are of 
interest, and that the weak are simply dominated, is a pernicious error of 
remarkable hardiness. In fact, most international relationships are 
asymmetric, and usually they are negotiated rather than forced. 
Even in a normal asymmetric relationship, however, the difference in 
capacity profoundly affects the perspectives of each side.160 The larger side 
risks less in the relationship, and thus tends to be less attentive. When a 
crisis arises, it is inclined to use its power to push the weaker into line. The 
smaller side is proportionally more exposed in the relationship. Both the 
opportunities and the risks are more vivid. In a crisis it tends to see the 
bullying of the larger side as an existential threat. In a more complex 
regional or global environment there are intermediate powers that are 
larger than many but smaller than one or a few great powers. It is not 
surprising that intermediate powers are the strongest supporters of 
multilateral legal regimes, because they are powerful enough to be part of 
the ‘establishment’ but vulnerable eno u g h  t o  w a n t  g r e a t  p o w e r s  t o  b e  
bound by rules.161  
The third general lesson is more specific to China. In both domestic 
and international interactions, Chinese tend to emphasise the logic of 
relationships rather than the logic of transactions. The logic of relationships 
is longitudinal. It assumes that while the future is unknown, the partners in 
the future are the same as in the past and present. Therefore the 
significance of any specific interaction lies in how it shapes a particular 
relationship. The polar opposite of relationship logic is transactional logic, 
epitomised by microeconomics. In microeconomics each transaction is an 
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event in itself, determined by supply and demand, and occurring between 
anonymous bargainers in infinite numbers.  
As China applies relationship logic to international relations, its 
actions aim to optimise relationships rather than transactions. In this model 
China does not use preponderance of power to optimise its side of each 
transaction, but rather to stabilise beneficial relations. For instance, tribute 
missions to Beijing usually left with more valuable goods than they 
brought, because it was more important to China to have them want to 
participate in the Empire than it was to squeeze a bit more out of the 
transaction. Similarly, as a central power (or an aspiring central power), 
China’s preferred mode of interaction is unilateral accommodation of the 
perceived needs of the other side rather than bargaining. China’s recent 
forgiveness of the debts owed by Laos and Cambodia fit this pattern. Note 
that this is not altruism. China’s gains are deferential and trouble-free 
relationships. 
For the last lesson, China is both a ‘teacher by negative example’ and 
a positive example. If all international action is interaction, then a cardinal 
virtue of international relations should be respect for the partner. This is a 
fundamentally different attitude from that of the modern West, which has 
tended to use the carpenter’s rule of its own norms to level and if necessary 
pressurise others into uniformity. Consider the American occupation of 
Iraq; a magnificent commitment to democratise Iraq down to the last Iraqi. 
Are not all human beings entitled to their own autonomy as well as to their 
rights? Can people be forced to be empowered? 
China’s negative example of respect is more oblique. Traditional 
China strove for normal asymmetric relationships with its neighbours, 
which meant relationships that were beneficial to the neighbours as well as 
to China. China provided a non-intrusive regional order, and in it the 
neighbours were assured that the central power acknowledged their 
autonomy. Vietnam, for instance, was much happier and more secure 
occasionally going to Beijing than later having Paris come to it. This is why 
Vietnam requested China’s help against the French in the 1880s. However, 
China’s claim to infinite moral and civilisational superiority was 
intolerable, and led to the hypocrisy of deference in Beijing and 
surreptitious defiance at home. China’s positive example of respect can be 
seen in its diplomacy of the past ten years. China’s improved relations with 
its neighbours and with Africa are the result of an intense and skilful 
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China lavishes attention on the leadership, assures that it will not publicly 
murmur about domestic politics, much less intervene, and it shows 
understanding for the vulnerabilities of local economies. China is not only 
non-threatening, it is reassuring. Perhaps as China becomes more powerful 
it will become more arrogant and hence less respectful. However, as long 
as it values relationships, respect, whether direct or oblique, will remain a 
cardinal virtue. 
All these general lessons are interrelated. If international actors are 
located actors and have their own perspectives, and if they are located in a 
matrix of unequal interrelationships, then their individual perspectives will 
generate sets of particular relationships. After all, geography, demography, 
and resources imply that, whatever happens in the world, each state will 
deal primarily with a particular set of other states, and will tend to stay on 
the larger or smaller side of these relationships. To return to my familiar 
example, China and Vietnam have been through many changes over the 
past three thousand years, but there has always been a relationship, and it 
has always been an asymmetric one in China’s favour. 
If international relations are essentially a matrix of international 
relationships, then the logic of relationships should play a larger part in the 
guidance of foreign policy. The ‘should’ indicates that relationship logic 
ought to be a normative requirement, but it is not a universalistic or 
altruistic one. The bottom line in relationship logic is that both sides feel 
that they are better off if the relationship continues – this is the minimum 
meaning of ‘mutual benefit’. A normal relationship does not require 
symmetry of partners or equality of exchanges, but it does require 
reciprocity. 
In an asymmetric world, reciprocity requires respect. In a world of 
equals, each is in a similar situation, and each can respond in kind to the 
actions of others. With symmetry, respect for others can be reduced to the 
Golden Rule, because in fact others can do to you what you do to them. In a 
world of asymmetric relationships, respect – appreciation for the situation 
and autonomy of the other – requires special attention. Respect for the 
weaker side is not simply noblesse oblige or an act of generosity of the 
stronger. The weak can only afford to be deferential to the strong when it 
feels that its identity and boundaries will be respected.  
China was the world’s most successful traditional empire not because 
it had the strongest army, but because its skilful management of its 
asymmetric relationships gave a resilience to its domestic and external 298 | BRANTLY WOMACK 
 
order. In a world that is integrated and multi-nodal, one that is beyond the 
fixation with great powers and world wars, China’s experience should be 
useful. Moreover, in the past decade there is no country that has made 
more friends than China, and this is by no means a natural fate for a rising 
power. China has much to learn and much adapting to do, but it also has 
lessons for the rest of us. 
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7.  COMPARING NORMATIVITY IN  
FOREIGN POLICY:  CHINA, INDIA,  
THE EU, THE US AND RUSSIA 
NATHALIE TOCCI
∗ WITH IAN MANNERS
∗∗ 
1.  Introduction 
The conceptual framework presented in chapter 1 of this book to assess 
normativity in foreign policy presumes that any international player can 
act in a variety of ways in different foreign policy instances. In this final 
chapter we shall conclude by attempting the difficult task of comparing 
such normativity in the foreign policies of the five major global actors, 
selected in view of their population sizes and permanent seats on the UN 
Security Council – China, India, EU1, US and Russia.  
The principal question which arises is: where does the centre of 
gravity in each actor’s foreign policy lie? Can we ascertain whether an actor 
is predominantly normative, realpolitik,  i m p e r i a l  o r  s t a t u s  q u o ?  A s  t h e  
chapters in this book reveal, all major global actors make claims regarding 
their normativity in world politics. Likewise, all authors in this volume 
more or less explicitly suggest that the centre of gravity for the 
international player under their investigation tends to be normative. Tocci 
et al. explain in chapter 2 how the EU has conceived of itself as an internal 
normative project since its inception, and as a normative actor in world 
affairs since the early days of its fledging foreign policy. Hamilton argues 
how mainstream of US foreign policy has tended to represent more often 
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than not a changing blend of normative and hegemonic approaches. 
Womack argues that China is predominantly normative when judged 
according to its own standards. Makarychev explains how Russia has been 
using norms in order to reassert its power in world politics. Kumar claims 
that in its awakening from the Cold War limbo, India is ‘returning’ to the 
world scene as a normative actor.  
But when asked about each other’s normative stance, the picture 
changes. A fairly accurate guess of predominant views across our five 
major players would reveal that the EU is viewed as a relatively weak 
status quo actor while the US as a realpolitik/imperial power by China, 
Russia and India. The EU probably views the US as a normative/realpolitik 
actor, whereas the US views the EU as a status quo/normative one. The US 
and the EU view both China and Russia as unambiguously realpolitik 
actors, while considering India as uneasily and perhaps opportunistically 
shifting between realpolitik and normative approaches. 
If we try and imagine how other countries and regions may view our 
five major players, responses may be different still, complicating further the 
picture. Serbia is likely to view Russia as normative and the US/EU as 
imperial, while Kosovars consider Russia as realpolitik whereas the US/EU 
as normative. In the Middle East, the widespread perception is that the US 
is an imperial/realpolitik actor while the EU an imperial/status quo one. In 
Eastern Europe the US is likely to be viewed as unambiguously normative 
whereas the EU as a mixed status quo/normative actor. Turning east, 
within the context of the Six Party Talks on North Korea (including North 
and South Korea, Japan, Russia and the US), China is considered by all 
players as a largely normative actor, although its policies towards 
Myanmar or Tibet are viewed as quintessentially realpolitik in the case of 
the former and imperial in the case of the latter. Finally, Pakistanis are 
likely to view China as being more normative than India, whereas the 
opposite is true of Tibetans.     
What explains this confusion and mismatch in perceptions? Part of 
the answer is self-evident. First, in so far as we are all “located” actors, our 
assessments of “our” international player are inevitably biased towards 
normativity. The authors in this book are all specialists in the foreign 
policies of “their” international player and, with the exception of the 
chapter on China, all are citizens of their country/Union under 
investigation. The more in-depth the understanding of a particular actor 
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thus creating a natural bias towards a judgement of normativity (in so far 
as normative is also associated with “good”). Second and linked to the 
cross-perceptions of each other as well as the views of third countries, 
judgements of normativity are inevitably linked to amities/enmities in 
international affairs. Hence, any actor is more prone to viewing its friends 
as normative and its foes as not: Israelis view American foreign policy as 
normative whereas Palestinians do not; Serbs view Russia as normative 
whereas Kosovars do not, etc.   
There are two further answers which are far less evident and more 
interesting. This final chapter aims at tackling them. First, normativity is 
not a black-and-white concept but comes in shades of grey, explaining the 
different normative interpretations by different actors standing at different 
points in time and space. Second, substantive normative interpretations 
differ across different actors, and each norm can claim a strong basis in 
international law and ethics. To delve into these points, we shall first revisit 
the analytical framework set out in the first chapter “Profiling Normative 
Foreign Policy”, adapting the tripartite framework first introduced by 
Manners (2008) to modulate our judgements of normativity. Second, we 
shall enter into a substantive discussion of norms, examining the different 
normative interpretations between different actors and presenting reasons 
for such normative differences. We shall then conclude by asking where 
does the interaction between different actors and norms take us in the 
study of normativity in foreign policy. 
2.  Modulating the Analysis of Normative Foreign Policy: 
Introducing Shades of Grey 
This book chose to compare the normativity in the foreign policies of five 
global actors in terms of three variables: foreign policy goals, means and 
impact. Another tripartite rendering of this  analytical method was used by 
Manners, comparing and contrasting what the EU ‘is’ (its principles); what 
the EU ‘says’ (its actions); and what the EU ‘does’ (its impact) in the 
original ‘normative power Europe’ article (Manners 2002, p. 252; see also 
Manners 2006b, p. 69-81; 2008, p. 67). The framework chapter also proposed 
international law as a “universal” benchmark to assess normativity within 
the tripartite analysis.  
The chosen method to assess normativity in foreign policy revealed 
four principal weaknesses. First, regarding the choice of taking 
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and Makarychev point out in their contributions why this approach is 
problematic for a whole range of reasons involving the legitimacy, 
interpretation and implementation of international law, particularly in the 
Chinese, US, and Russian cases (Womack 2008, p. 8; Hamilton 2008, p. 2-3; 
Makarychev 2008, p. 30). More generally as we shall explore below, 
international law is far from immune to power politics and may in fact be 
viewed as the expression of it.2  
Second, the method chosen sets a high bar for an assessment of 
normativity in foreign policy. It involves judging global actors according to 
the tensions and contradictions between their proclaimed goals, means and 
impact (Calhoun 1995, p. 23), considering normative only a foreign policy 
which fulfils all three conditions.3 Yet as Hamilton makes clear, ‘no nation 
on earth could pass this test with any consistency’ (Hamilton 2008, p. 1). 
Third, the chosen method presents a black-and-white understanding 
of normativity. The analysis of foreign policy in general and normative 
foreign policy in particular involves a debate on whether normativity 
should be viewed as diametric in nature (see Cochran, 1999, p. 1; Manners, 
2006a, p. 116-8; Tocci, chapter 1 of this volume). Diametric approaches 
attempt to distinguish between normative and un-normative foreign policy 
as if these were diametrically opposed to each other – as if it were possible 
to separate material from non-material concerns; separate the agent from 
the structure; separate the analyst from the analysis. In contrast, such clear-
cut differentiation may be viewed as both problematic in theory and 
impossible in practice. As Tocci points out in the first chapter, ‘a clear 
distinction proves elusive’ between ‘normative goals and strategic ones’ 
As most of the contributing chapters in this book agree, normativity 
is contested and comes in shades of grey. As Womack emphasises, 
“understanding China on its own terms as an intentional actor should be a 
prerequisite to understanding China as a normative foreign policy actor” 
(emphasis added). Similarly, Tocci et al. suggest that EU normative power 
is contextual: ‘while it can certainly influence the external context, 
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particularly in its neighbourhood where it has real foreign policy presence, 
it is bound to also rely on fortuitous external circumstances to effectively 
assert its normative power’ (Tocci et al., 2008, p. 31, emphasis added). 
Hamilton captures this need to assess degrees of normativity on their own 
terms and in changing external circumstances when he argues in favour of 
an analytical framework for judging ‘the degree to which’ a global actor is 
normative ‘both in particular circumstances and over time’ (Hamilton 2008, 
p. 2, emphasis added). It is this need for a subjective, contextual and 
temporal analysis of foreign policy that leads Makarychev to suggest that 
‘normativity ought to be understood also as an inter-subjective  concept’ 
(Makarychev 2008, p. 1, emphasis added). Kumar’s analysis of India stands 
apart in this respect, as she talks of the combination of ‘normative 
principles with national interest’, viewing the two as diametrically opposed 
to each other, although she also allows for degrees of normativity in foreign 
policy (Kumar 2008, p. 1, emphasis added). 
Re-elaborating the tripartite analysis of the goals, means and impact 
to allow for degrees of normativity, we could thus state that normativity in 
foreign policy means the degree to which foreign policy 1) pursues normative 
goals 2) through normatively deployed means and 3) is effective in 
fulfilling its normative intent (Tocci, chapter 1). In this respect normativity 
involves promoting a more widely accepted, universalisable foreign policy. 
Clearly phrases such as ‘more widely accepted’ or ‘universalisable’ are 
themselves contested, but they at least capture the idea that comparing 
normativity in foreign policy needs to include different dimensions of 
policy practice, as well as judging the degree to which global actors engage 
in these practices. 
Fourth, by exploring the interplay between normative/non-
normative foreign policy goals and means, the framework chapter created a 
‘2x2 matrix of stylised alternatives’.4 What these stylizations provide is a 
means to pre-select cases based on whether the ‘foreign policy type’ is 
normative, realpolitik, imperial or status quo. Adding impact to these four 
stylized models opens the way for analysis of whether the foreign policy is 
intended or unintended, leading to eight possible stylized cases. While 
generating a relatively manageable framework for comparative analysis, 
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each of the eight cases studies in the five empirical chapters (i.e. all 40 
cases) tended to read as unique, one-off foreign policy examples; and the 
filling of the matrix tended to make it difficult to compare and contrast the 
five global actors over time. As Hamilton argued throughout his chapter, 
comparing and contrasting the five global actors over time ‘requires a 
framework that establishes some weighting, or illuminates some 
relationship, between normative ends and means and other interests and 
instruments of a nation’s foreign policy, both in particular circumstances 
and over time’ (Hamilton, 2008, p. 1-2). 
On the basis of these critiques, it might be worth briefly revising and 
adapting our conceptual framework for the needs of any future work on 
comparing normativity in foreign policy. In order to allow for degrees of 
normativity and looser requirements of consistency in foreign policy, and 
to allow for criteria of assessments beyond international law, a suggestion 
could be to reintroduce the distinction presented in Diez’s argument to 
Manners and Tocci between 1) the legitimisation of foreign policy goals 
based on self-interest vs. international norms and 2) the distinction in 
foreign policy means on the basis of non-coercive vs. coercive means. On 
the basis of these elements, a future framework might look like Figure 1 
below. This new framework in turn opens the prospects for a more fruitful 
comparative analysis in time and space. For example, to follow Hamilton’s 
proposal it would ease the analysis of the same case studies from the 
perspectives of different global actors (see discussion of Belarus in 
Hamilton, chapter 3). Another idea could be that of analysing the same case 
studies over time – for example comparing Chinese, Indian, EU, US and 
Russian goals, means and impact in the WTO, or the ‘war on terror’, or 
with particular states such as Belarus/Burma/Iraq over time.  306 | NATHALIE TOCCI WITH IAN MANNERS 
 
Figure 1. Comparative normativity in foreign policy 
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3.  Normative Differences between Global Actors  
A second key consideration that emerges from the contributions to this 
volume lies in the fact that our five global players often interpret norms 
and normative foreign policy action differently. Indeed the conceptual 
framework used to analyse normative foreign policy in this book provided 
an empty shell, or, as put by Womack in chapter 6, an “an priori array of 
defining categories that can be applied to any international normative actor 
regardless of content”. When applied to our five international actors – COMPARING NORMATIVITY IN FOREIGN POLICY | 307 
 
China, EU, India, Russia and US – two striking facts come to the fore. First, 
the idea of defining normative action in terms of goals, means and impact, 
and exploring the different combinations between these three elements 
‘works’ for all five players. Without excessive difficulty, the authors found 
empirical cases to fit or approximate each of the stylized categories set out 
in the first chapter. As discussed above, while a mix of normative and non-
normative elements could be detected in most case studies calling for the 
need to modulate our analysis of normative action, the authors made clear 
arguments regarding why the scales tipped in one direction or the other, 
and therefore why particular goals, means or impacts were predominantly 
normative or non-normative. Hence, on a whole, the chapters confirmed 
that all international actors can and have acted in a variety of ways across 
different regions, thematic areas and time periods.  
Where they differ, and do so fundamentally, is in the substantive 
interpretation of norms and normative action. In other words, the 
conceptual categories (goals, means and impact) and stylized foreign policy 
types (normative, realpolitik, imperial and status quo) provide useful 
“empty signifiers”, to be filled with specific and distinct normative content 
across the five major actors. This is hardly surprising. Normative action, as 
argued by Finnemore & Sikkink (1998), is defined from within by actors 
with a given identity. Conversely the definition of one’s norms is a defining 
feature in the articulation of a political subject’s identity. In other words, as 
argued by Makarychev (chapter 4), not only are norms and interests 
mutually constitutive, but so are norms and identities. These are likely to 
differ for historical, geographical and power political reasons, as we shall 
see below. Yet their difference also serves to define the international 
identity of a particular actor in juxtaposition to that of another.  
A. Individual rights versus state sovereignty  
A first critical difference between our five major actors lies in the degree to 
which normative value is bestowed upon individual political, social and 
economic rights and freedoms on the one hand, or collective rights, self-
determination and state sovereignty on the other. Here we see how the five 
international players position themselves along a spectrum.  
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On one end, we find the US, inclined to give prime normative value 
to individual rights and freedoms in both the political and economic 
realms. Notwithstanding the different understandings of what constitutes 
normative action within the US, Hamiltonians, Wilsonians, Jeffersonians 
and Jacksonians share a similar reading of norms. Hamiltonians, despite 
their realist emphasis on the strong state, adhere to the principle that that 
“the state exists for man and not man for the state”, and emphasise 
economic rights and believe that international trade fosters the global 
spread of democratic governance. Wilsonians and Jeffersonians insist upon 
democratic rights in and of themselves – abroad in the case of the former 
and at home in the case of the latter. Jacksonians prioritise economic and 
security rights, including the right of individuals to bear arms. Yet the locus 
of attention in all schools of thought is on the individual. Even 
Jeffersonians, highly reluctant to intervene in other states’ affairs, justify 
their isolationism primarily because intervening in the Hobbesean world 
could corrupt the American democratic order. To them, the US’s normative 
influence worldwide would be best played by simply acting as a model 
polity for other nations to emulate, in this respect reflecting also much of 
the thinking within the EU. With the norm of individual rights in mind, 
many in the US view the defence of state sovereignty with contempt. 
Americans are in fact ready to point out how in a world in which the most 
lethal conflicts take place within state borders, national sovereignty acts as 
a normative barrier shielding mass violations of human rights (Hamilton, 
chapter 3). 
Next down the line comes the EU, which like the US bestows prime 
normative value to individual rights and freedoms. Whereas the EU and 
the US may differ on specific questions (e.g., the death penalty, the right to 
bear arms and secularism), both share the same core beliefs regarding 
human rights and democracy (Nicolaidis 2004, p. 102). As discussed by 
Manners (2008), the EU’s substantive norms include sustainable peace, 
social freedom, consensual democracy, associative human rights, 
supranational rule of law, inclusive equality, social solidarity, sustainable 
development and good governance. When these principles are translated in 
the realm of foreign policy, we note that at least five – social freedom, 
consensual democracy, associative human rights, inclusive equality and 
good governance – place primary emphasis on the political, social and 
economic rights of individuals. The remaining four – sustainable peace, 
supranational rule of law, sustainable development and social solidarity – 
have strong implications both for the individual and the collectivity/state.  COMPARING NORMATIVITY IN FOREIGN POLICY | 309 
 
Third comes India, which bestows equal normative value to 
individual rights and state sovereignty. On the one hand, Gandhian foreign 
policy placed prime emphasis on the norms of self-determination, 
decolonization and development. Under Nehru as well, India played an 
active role in promoting state and nation-building projects in newly 
independent countries in Africa. On the other hand, India views norms 
similarly to Europe and the US, and especially in the post-Cold war era, it 
has prided itself on being the largest democracy in the world, aspiring to 
promote peace and democracy in its turbulent neighbourhood, as 
illustrated by the recent turn in Indian policy towards Nepal. This has led 
to what Kumar in chapter 5 describes as seemingly “schizophrenic” Indian 
international behaviour, whereby India has justified the defence of 
democracy and rights as well as non-interference and state sovereignty on 
normative grounds. However in key instances in which the two sets of 
principles have collided, such as in the case of India-China relations, India 
has tended to prioritize the norm of sovereignty over that of democracy 
and human rights. As put by Kumar in chapter 5, India has in fact 
prioritised the normative goal of state-to-state cooperation with China over 
the normative objective of actively supporting Tibetan monks for example. 
Fourth is Russia, which under Putin interestingly coined the slogan 
‘sovereignty democracy’ to differentiate its normative stance from that of 
other powers, and in particular the West. By associating the notion of 
democracy to that of sovereignty, Russia has recognised the normative 
value of democracy while insisting that the West does not hold monopoly 
control over its interpretation. Hence, democracy has been deliberately 
viewed as an empty signifier, which Russia, just like others, has equal right 
to fill with specific meaning. The meaning Russia has chosen for the term 
has emphasized the collective/state-based attributes of democracy. In other 
words, normative action implies the respect for the democratic choice of 
other peoples and thus the sovereignty of other states. The normative value 
given to collective rights also emerged in Russia’s handling of the Danish 
cartoon crisis, where, when faced with the clash between individual rights 
(e.g., the freedom of expression) and collective rights (the respect of other 
peoples’ culture), Russia unambiguously tilted in favour of the latter. 
Likewise, in the Litvinenko affair, the norm Russia publicly defended was 
that of non-interference, accusing the UK of interfering in Russia’s internal 
affairs.    
Finally China’s understanding of norms and normative action hinges 
on the idea of sovereignty and sovereign relations conducted in search of 310 | NATHALIE TOCCI WITH IAN MANNERS 
 
the common good. At a philosophical level, the concept of humanity 
(“ren”) is symbolized by two people standing together, highlighting the 
importance of respect and equality in relationships. Translated in 
international politics, China has set out five principles of normative action, 
shared with India (known in India as the Panscheel), which include respect 
for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in 
internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. In all 
five principles the idea of the common good stands out. Hence, normative 
action does not necessarily promote a universal principle applicable to 
someone or something. It does not, as put by Womack in chapter 6, 
promote the ‘logic of transaction’, in which what is optimised is a specific 
good at a specific point in time. It rather promotes an understanding of the 
collective good articulated as the optimisation of a relationship over time.    
B. Rules versus mutual respect 
The different emphasis placed on individual versus collective rights also 
translates into different interpretations of normative means across the five 
major actors.  
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of the US, emphasis is placed on following international 
rules, regardless of where these rules derive from. This also and often 
comes alongside acting through international organizations, in so far as 
international rules and procedures often call upon states to act through 
multilateral organizations. Yet the crux of normative means lies in the act of 
following rules and procedures that underpin a stable and accessible 
international order. In the case of the EU instead, while great importance is 
placed on international rules, laws and procedures, equal or more 
emphasis is put on multilateral institutions intended as the source of rules 
as well as the objects of those very rules (Pollack 2003). In other words, 
multilateral institutions are important not only because international laws 
and rules call upon states to act through them, but because these rules are 
elaborated, negotiated and agreed upon within such multilateral 
frameworks.  
Mutual respect    Multilateralism    Rule of law 
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Moving down the line, we find India, Russia and China, emphasising 
instead the source of international rules rather than the rules themselves. 
Not least in view of their vivid appreciation of the tight connection between 
international law and power as we shall see below, these three ascending 
powers focus on how international laws and rules are produced, valuing 
the process of consensual negotiation, cooperation, reciprocity and mutual 
respect necessary to establish normative international rules. As put by 
Womack, normative action in China is interpreted as a relational concept. 
To act normatively means to act in respect of the other, applying reciprocity 
even in situations of asymmetric power. Hence the value attributed to 
multipolarity which, far more than multilateralism, entails an international 
system where no state can dominate the rest, raising the likelihood of 
cooperation based on the respect of others as independent and autonomous 
actors.     
C. The sources of normative differences 
What explains why certain powers opt for and prioritize some norms over 
others? Three principal explanations emerge when analysing our five 
international players. First is the role of history and philosophical 
traditions.  
In the cases of China and India, ancient history and philosophy play 
primary roles in determining the interpretation of norms and values in 
foreign policy. In China the tradition of Confucianism set out a complex 
ethic of social interaction establishing obligations to be respected in 
relationships. China’s traumatic experience of colonialism, from the 1840 
Opium wars, to the 1900 Boxers revolt and Japan’s occupation of 
Manchuria, reinforced this tendency further. In the case of India we find, 
on the one hand norms related to individual rights extracted from the Gita 
and the Mahabharata, while on the other the attachment to state 
sovereignty in view of the painful experience of British colonialism. Hence, 
the confused and confusing oscillation between the two.  
In the case of Europe, and by extension the US, history’s impact on 
foreign policy making is more recent, with the primary emphasis on 
individual rights and freedoms being unmistakably linked to the legacy of 
enlightenment. More precisely, in the case of the US, Jeffersonian and 
Hamiltonian traditions applied to foreign policy gathered steam following 
the Civil War (1865) when the US began projecting more visibly its foreign 
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Jacksonianism (mid-19th century) and later enriched by Wilsonianism (early 
20th century). When it comes to Europe instead, the EU – as opposed to its 
member states – has deliberately attempted to shape its internal as well as 
international identity in contrast to its own war-torn and imperial past 
(Diez 2005). The unfinished European project certainly can and has meant 
that in many occasions the EU has failed to have a foreign policy 
altogether, not least because of the normative and interest-based 
differences between member states. Nonetheless, history remains of the 
essence in defining the EU’s international identity, by setting the 
benchmark for what Europe is not (or would not like to be) rather than 
what it is. 
Further still in this direction comes Russia, which largely ignores its 
Soviet history (with the partial exception of the case of Estonia, in which 
Russia has defined itself by making reference to its role in the second 
World War). Moscow today attempts to reassert its role in the world 
largely by defining itself in opposition to a geopolitical rather than 
historical other, i.e., the West rather than its own past. 
Second, background, location and perspective matter. As vividly 
described by Womack in chapter 6, whereas first and second-class 
treatment is viewed as acceptable on an airplane, it is certainly not on a 
lifeboat. Given that China has been in a “lifeboat situation” over the past 
century or so, it is hardly surprising that considerations of equity, 
relationships and respect override those of property. The same applies to 
India and Russia. By contrast in the case of Europe and the US, the largely 
intra-European World Wars notwithstanding, the power and prosperity of 
the West in the past centuries provides an important perspective into why 
rights, freedoms and choice occupy most of the space on the normative 
agenda.   
Third and related, normative interpretations are closely linked to the 
power political configuration in which an actor finds itself in the 
international system. Power closely relates to the three conditioning factors 
set out in the first chapter to explain why an international player may act 
normatively or otherwise in international affairs. Internally within each 
international player, power balances affect the formulation of the interests 
at stake as well as the foreign policy capabilities that can be used to pursue 
them. Externally, the intended/unintended impact of a particular foreign 
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vis-à-vis its target state/issue as well as with respect to the wider external 
environment that shapes events within a third country and/or issue area. 
Under Marxist as well as realist readings of international relations 
(e.g. Kagan 2003), power also plays a pivotal role in both the interpretation 
of norms and in the ability to render them internationally recognized and 
“universal”. The stronger an international player within the world system 
and the more likely it will subscribe to norms that allow for “intrusion” in 
other countries’ affairs (Womack, 2004). It is thus not surprising that the US 
and to a lower extent the EU especially over the last half a century have 
championed cosmopolitan norms of individual rights over collective rights 
of state sovereignty. By contrast actors such as China, Russia and India, 
which are still ascending second-status powers in the international system 
continue to jealously guard the norms of self-determination, autonomy and 
sovereignty. This the US itself did when it was still to “come of age” as 
exemplified by its non-entanglement policy in the early 20th century, shying 
away from membership of international organizations and alliances up 
until the two world wars.  
Moreover, a realist reading of international politics and law suggests 
that power is a critical factor explaining when and which international 
norms come to be internationally recognized and viewed as “normal” to 
the point of being enshrined and codified in international law (Goldsmith 
& Posner, 2005; Krasner, 1993, p. 161,). In other words, international law is 
not immune to power politics but is rather a reflection of it. In order to be a 
successful “norm entrepreneur” an international player must have the 
hegemonic power to persuade others to accept new norms and render them 
legally binding internationally. Further still, what makes an international 
power a hegemon is precisely its ability and will to create international 
norms (Keohane 1984). Notwithstanding the moral virtues of Switzerland, 
it is highly unlikely that it can succeed in generating, spreading and 
codifying new international norms without the support of other powers. It 
is because of this tight interconnection between norms and power that a re-
ascending player such as Russia has used precisely the normative domain 
as a means to reassert is power. Law may thus be viewed as a means to 
regularize, institutionalise and render the exercise of (hegemonic) power 
‘normal’. 
We need not accept such a black-and-white realist analysis of the 
relationship between norms and power. Beyond power, the legitimacy and 
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explaining its ability to act as a norm entrepreneur and generate a ‘norm 
cascade’ in the international socialisation, spread and codification of 
international norms (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). Yet accepting this by no 
means contradicts an acknowledgement of the importance of power in 
explaining how norms emerge and become enshrined in law.    
Accepting the close link between norms and power may at first sight 
sit uneasily with the claim, advanced in the first chapter, that the normative 
virtue of international law lies precisely in its ability to ‘tame’ and curtail 
the use and abuse of power. Indeed the normative quality of international 
law lies in the fact that it helps ‘tying the hands’ of major players in 
international affairs. Reconciling this apparent contradiction lies beyond 
the scope of this chapter. However, a tentative suggestion may lie in the 
rate of change of an international player’s power and status within world 
affairs. Whereas a powerful (and legitimate) actor may successfully 
enshrine and codify internationally new norms, as and when its power 
declines its incentives to act as a norm blocker or violator may increase. 
Whereas ascending powers may be more prone to make new norms but 
less able to break existing ones, powerful yet declining international 
players can break but are less likely to make new norms.  
4.  Normative Interactions between Major Powers 
A. Dissonant or consonant norms in international relations? 
Do normative differences entail conflict, or are different norms compatible, 
mutually reinforcing or overlapping? In the case of procedural 
norms/normative means, while conceptually distinct, different 
interpretations tend to overlap. In the case of the US and to a lesser extent 
the EU, adhering to international rules entails self-binding action. Tying 
one’s hands in the exercise of external power is viewed as a critical 
ingredient of normative action in so far as it sets an example and 
establishes legitimacy, reliability and credibility vis-à-vis others. Yet the 
EU, far more than the US, feels bound by action that does not harm or 
infringe upon the sovereignty of third states. Hence, its preference for non-
coercive policy instruments and methods such as dialogue, persuasion and 
shaming; delving at most into the use of positive conditionality and only 
very rarely and where clear interests are at stake engaging in negative 
conditionality, sanctions or war. As far as Russia, India and China are 
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derive from mutual respect, international negotiation and agreement, 
rather than from the imposition of the strong upon the weak. Normative 
(inter)action is thus about respecting others and treating them as equals. In 
both cases equality stands out as a cardinal virtue, be this as a means to 
establish legitimacy and set an example (in the case of the US or the EU) or 
as an end in itself (China, Russia, India).  
The potential for conflict is far starker in the case of substantive 
norms. There where the US and to a lesser extent the EU push for the rights 
of individuals, to the point of discursively justifying military intervention 
in breach of a third state’s sovereignty to secure such goals, China, Russia 
and India are far more inclined to defend the principle of non-interference 
at the cost of tolerating gross violations of human rights and democratic 
principles. International law itself reflects this dilemma, whereby 
international human rights law (cosmopolitan law) may and does at times 
clash with the right to state sovereignty and territorial integrity. In the 
conflict between the two – individual and state rights – international law 
however unmistakably tilts in favour of sovereignty. This is not least 
because, the protection of individual rights relies on collectivities, which, in 
the absence of world government, remains the sovereign state (Womack 
2004). In fact, beyond entrenching rights and duties, international law also 
set rules governing choices when different norms compete or contradict 
with one another. In other words, law acts as a normative boundary within 
which several codified and at times contrasting norms can be interpreted 
and pursued, without however resolving the inherent tension between 
them. The potential for conflict exacerbates when deliberately different 
interpretations of norms serve the purpose of defining identity in 
opposition to the “other”, affirming power and strengthening bargaining 
positions in international relations. As discussed by Makarychev, this is 
clearly the case of Putin’s Russia in its relations with the EU (and the US), 
whereby the norm-exception dichotomy has been translated and applied to 
the juxtaposition of Us (norm-abider) versus Other (norm violator). 
In policy terms, the result is fourfold. First and most evidently, the 
clash of norms generates a conflict of policies generating tensions, disputes 
or standstill in the international system. In the case of the Russian-Estonian 
dispute for example, the support for different norms by Russia (the 
recollection of historical memory and the defence of minority rights) and 
the EU (sovereignty, independence and member state solidarity) generated 
standstill (Makarychev, chapter 4). More generally in so far as (re)claiming 
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such as Russia, India and China to assert their status in the international 
system and shed their legacies of weakness or colonial submission, 
normative clashes can be instrumental to serve such power political ends.    
Second and related, the clash of norms can lead to unintended 
outcomes. Across all chapters, the causes of ‘unintended’ foreign policy 
impacts often reside in the external environment, in which different actors, 
by promoting different norms within a third country, may generate 
contrasting impacts. Whether the ’unintended’ impact is normative or 
otherwise depends on the eye of the beholder. In the case of Belarus for 
example, a ’normative unintended’ case for both the US and the EU, the 
failure to promote democracy and human rights – the norm according to 
Europe and the US – is principally due to Russia’s support to Lukashenko’s 
regime, a support discursively justified on the grounds of non-interference, 
cooperation and mutual respect. Conversely in the cases of Ukraine and 
Georgia, the colour revolutions, the establishment of the Community of 
Democratic Choice and the deepened integration into EU and NATO 
structures – all viewed as normative by the EU and US – were in large part 
a boomerang effect of Russian intrusion into its former Soviet satellites 
rather than simply the result of normative Western policies in the region.    
Third, normative dissonance generates mistrust among major 
powers. This occurs especially when one international actor interprets a 
normative difference as another party’s violation of a universal norm rather 
than as a legitimate challenge to its own norms. In these cases, the norms of 
others are often viewed as mere discursive palliatives concealing hypocrisy 
and the ruthless pursuit of realpolitik. Hence, Russia views Western support 
for the colour revolutions or the expansion of the EU and NATO as crude 
“Great Game” strategies in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, whereby the West 
would attempt to install pro-Western regimes in the neighbourhood and 
perhaps ultimately in Russia itself. Europe and the US however articulate 
these policies in clear-cut normative terms related to the spread of 
democracy, good governance, security and development. By contrast, the 
EU and the US have considered Russia’s energy policies towards its 
neighbours as coercive realpolitik in response to the colour revolutions and 
an attempt to distract international attention from Chechnya. Russia 
instead has portrayed its energy policies as a technical/apolitical 
application of market prices or, viewed differently, the end of special 
treatment to several neighbours and the establishment of “normal” state-to-
state relations with them. Many more examples can be listed. Europeans, 
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legitimize regime change in Iraq on the grounds of human rights and 
democracy. The US and the EU have balked at Chinese or Indian silence 
over Myanmar justified on the grounds of mutual respect and non-
interference. China and India, carrying the heavy baggage of Western 
colonial and neo-colonial practices, view with scepticism Western 
democratization policies. This said however, even pursuing the same 
norms in a situation of mutual mistrust can generate conflict. In the case of 
India-China relations, precisely because each party upholds the norm of 
sovereignty and non-interference, in a context of mutual mistrust, each 
other’s policies are viewed as attempts to threaten or encircle the other 
rather than pursue mutual benefit (see Kumar, chapter 5).      
Finally, because of the mistrust they generate amongst international 
actors, conflicting norms can lead to a normative downgrading in 
international politics. If the actions of one international player are viewed 
and portrayed by others as crude realpolitik rather than normative foreign 
policy, this may induce or legitimize the latter to discard norms in their 
own foreign policies. It is indeed common practice for international players 
to rebuff external accusations of unnormative behaviour directed to them 
by citing the frequent norm violations of their accusers. Hence China 
discards Western accusations of its human rights violations by citing 
American torture practices in Iraq or Guantanamo; and Russia snubs 
European criticisms of its policies in Muslim Chechnya by citing European 
double standards in its accession policy towards Turkey or the 
discrimination against its Muslim migrant communities. As noted above, it 
may well be unrealistic to expect that all major players act in each and 
every circumstance in an impeccably normative manner. Nonetheless, the 
risk of violating one’s own norms is that of setting in motion a negative 
multiplier effect whereby one’s violations are paradoxically flagged as the 
normative justification for the violations of others.     
B. Seeking a higher normative equilibrium in international 
interactions 
Is there the tendency for “bad money to crowd out good money” in the 
normative interactions between major powers? In view of the different 
interpretations of norms, and the conflicts and misunderstandings these 
may give rise to, the risk clearly exists. How could this negative spiral be 
reversed and what would be the necessary conditions for such a reversal?  318 | NATHALIE TOCCI WITH IAN MANNERS 
 
First is the need to enhance consistency in each international actor’s 
foreign policies. Regardless of the chosen content of one’s own norms, the 
scope for mistrust, and mutual accusations and self-justifications reduces 
the greater the consistency in the normative behaviour of each actor’s 
foreign policy. Precisely because of the substantive normative differences 
between major actors, the only criterion that applies equally to all is the 
consistency with which they adhere to their own normative yardsticks. 
While, as noted in the first section of this chapter, consistency is best 
measured in shades of grey, standing up to one’s own norms can certainly 
add trust and predictability in international relationships thus raising the 
scope for virtuous normative interactions.  
The question may arise as to whether, by consistently adhering to 
different norms, the scope for international conflict increases rather than 
reduces. Indeed international conflicts have often arisen precisely when 
different players have diligently followed their preferred norms. The case 
of Kosovo is a prime example, in which conflict between the EU/US and 
Russia was generated precisely because the former prioritized individual 
rights whereas the latter stood in defence of state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. In such a case, normative inconsistency may be viewed 
as “resolving” conflict, but it would not lead to a process of genuine long-
term cooperation precisely in view of its exceptional nature. Needless to 
say, a convergence of norms as well as a consistency in their application 
would represent an ideal goal. Yet faced with the reality of normative 
differences, greater consistency in normative foreign policy would add two 
critical assets to international relations. First, consistency would contribute 
to instilling predictable expectations in global interactions, thus reducing 
the scope for mistrust and miscommunication. Second, it would signal the 
importance attributed to norms (albeit different ones) in international 
politics. In other words, while norms may differ, the very fact of acting 
consistently according to (different) norms signals that norms are not 
merely instrumental, existing only when there is a happy overlap with self-
interest, but have value in and of themselves.  
As mentioned above, the fact that all actors have foreign policies to 
reflect the entire spectrum of stylised types suggests that none is consistent 
in adhering to their normative standards. Indeed there are cases in which 
the US has refrained from normative action in the alleged respect of state 
sovereignty. In South Africa for example, Washington for a period opposed 
sanctions arguing that although apartheid contravened the UN Charter, 
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opposed the International Criminal Court, this time appealing to the 
defence of its own sovereignty. Interestingly as reported in his chapter by 
Hamilton, when in 2002 Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security John Bolton made the case for US’s opposition to the 
ICC, he stated that the Court’s precepts “go against fundamental American 
notions of sovereignty, checks and balances, and national independence”.  
The EU also has manifested frequent inconsistencies in the defence of 
state sovereignty versus individual rights, at times accepting authoritarian 
practices in the name of sovereignty (e.g., North Africa) while at other 
times intervening with heavy sticks and carrots to reverse democratically 
expressed popular choices (e.g. the Palestinian Authority). In the case of 
Russia, Makarychev notes how despite Russian accusations against Estonia, 
Moscow’s own treatment of 2nd World War memorials and veterans is far 
from commendable. The way in which Kosovo has been dealt with also 
provides an interesting example, whereby the West on the one hand has 
legitimized secession on the grounds of individual rights, i.e., the rights of 
Kosovars who could not be reintegrated into Serbia given the violations 
suffered during Milosevic’s rule. Yet on the other hand, the EU and the US 
have publicly stated that Kosovo does not represent a precedent for other 
secessionist conflicts in the former Soviet space, which should be resolved 
strictly within the confines of the metropolitan state’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. However, the very fact that Kosovo has seceded with 
the blessing of the West and therefore the West has displayed evident 
inconsistency in dealing with secessionist conflicts has inevitably set a 
precedent, which breakaway entities in the European and Russian 
neighbourhoods enthusiastically embrace in an attempt to bolster their 
own negotiating positions.  
Last but not least, in the cases of India and China, Kumar and 
Womack highlight the frequent inconsistencies in these actors’ foreign 
policies. At specific points in time for example, China violated to different 
degrees the norms of sovereignty, non-interference and mutual respect in 
relations with India, Korea or Vietnam. In the case of India and Vietnam, 
disputed territory was involved, thus a dispute between sovereignties; 
whereas in the case of Vietnam, China’s attack went well beyond the 
disputed territory and in the case of Korea, China became involved at the 
request of DPRK when US/UN troops were approaching its border.     
Second, a higher normative equilibrium could be a achieved through 
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player would thus set global normative standards in its area of 
‘comparative advantage’ determined by its capabilities, interests and 
inclinations across different spheres of governance. This, as discussed 
above, is likely to reflect to some extent the power political configuration as 
well as the moral legitimacy and standing of different actors across 
different policy areas.  
As argued above, international law, as it stands, represents a lowest 
common denominator, rife with internally unresolved tensions (e.g. 
between the rights to self-determination and territorial integrity). It sets out 
the basic hard norms that may be considered universally applicable. All are 
based on a presumption of state sovereignty, which may be viewed as the 
‘norm of norms’ or the normative underpinning and source of legitimacy 
for international law, as we know it, to exist.  
Hard norms include UN-wide treaties which include approximately 
fifty international agreements ranging from human rights, the environment 
and sustainable development, trade, customs and transit, disarmament and 
penal matters. Other hard norms derive from the accepted body of 
customary international law and the general principles of law. These 
include the Geneva Conventions setting out the laws of war and 
occupation as well as the principle of non-refloulement regarding the rights 
of refugees. It also, yet far more debatably, includes the right of 
humanitarian intervention, applied exclusively with the stated objective of 
ending or reducing human suffering caused by civil war, humanitarian 
crisis or genocide. Within the body of customary international law, jus 
cogens (i.e., the peremptory norms of international law) refers to principles 
of international law that are so fundamental that no state may refuse their 
application. These include the prohibition against piracy, slavery, genocide 
and crimes against humanity.  
Table 1 lists the major international law instruments and their 
acceptance by our five major players. We note here the important 
differences between the EU, Russia, China, India and the US, with the EU 
having accepted a total of 32.5 instruments compared to the US which 
stands at a mere 16 (and Russia, China and India lying in between at 28, 24 
and 22 respectively). According to this schema, our five players could thus 
be placed on a continuum, with the EU being followed by Russia, China, 
India and finally the US in terms of their normative ‘centre of gravity’.  
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Table 1. Principal instruments of international law  
  China India EU  27  US  Russia 
International Bill of Human Rights 
Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 1948  
       
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 1966 
----  1979 27  1992 1973 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 
2001 1979 27  1977  1973 
First Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 1966 
---- ----  26  ----  1991 
Second Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 1989 
----  ----  25  ----  ---- 
Core International Human Rights Instruments 
International Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, 1948 
1983 1959 26  1988  1954 
International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, 1965 
1981 1968 27  1994  1969 
Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination against 
Women, 1979 
1980 1993 27  1980  1981 
Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 1984 
1988  ----  27 1994  1987 
Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 1989 
1992 1992 26  1995  1992 
Human Rights sub-total 
 (9 maximum) 
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Humanitarian Law 
Geneva Conventions, 1949  1956  1950  27  1955  1954 
First Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Conventions, 1977 
1983  ----  27  ----  1989 
Second Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Conventions, 1977 
1983  ----  27  ----  1989 
Biological Weapons Convention, 
1972 
1984 1974 27  1975  1993 
Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993  1997 1996 27  1997  1997 
Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel  Mines, 
1997 
----  ----  25  ----  ---- 
Rome Statute on the International 
Criminal Court, 1998 
----  ----  27  ----  ---- 
Humanitarian Law sub-total 
 (7 maximum) 
5 3 6.9  3  5 
Fundamental Labour Rights Conventions 
Freedom of Association and 
Collective Bargaining:  
       
     Convention 87, 1948  ----  ----  27  ----  1956 
     Convention 98, 1949  ----  ----  27  ----  1956 
Elimination of Forced and 
Compulsory Labour: 
       
     Convention 29, 1930  ----  1954 27  ----  1956 
     Convention 105, 1957  ----  2000 27  1991 1998 
Elimination of Discrimination in 
Respect of Employment and 
Occupation: 
       
     Convention 100, 1951  1994  1958  27  ----  1956 
     Convention 111, 1958  2003  1960  27  ----  1961 
Abolition of Child Labour:           
     Convention 138, 1973  1999  ----  27  ----  1979 
     Convention 182, 1999  2002  ----  27 1999  2003 
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International Environmental Treaties 
Convention of the Law of the Sea, 
1982 
1996 1995 27  ----  1997 
Vienna Convention for the Protection 
of the Ozone Layer, 1988 
1989 1991 27  1986  1986 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
deplete the Ozone Layer, 1989 
1991 1992 27  1988  1988 
Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, 1992 
1993 1993 27  1992  1994 
Kyoto Protocol to the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 1997 
2002 2002 27  ----  2004 
Convention on Biological Diversity, 
1992 
1993 1994 27  ----  1995 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 
2000 
2005 2003 27  ----  ---- 
Convention to Combat 
Desertification, 1994 
1997 1996 26  2000  2003 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants, 2001 
2004 2006 22  ----  ---- 
Environmental Treaties sub-total 
(9 maximum) 
9 9 8.8  4  7 
          
Total International Law Instruments 
(33 maximum) 
24 22 32.5  16  28 
 
Yet limiting our analysis to these instruments is far from sufficient. 
Not only, as discussed above, do normative perceptions vary across 
different players, but also does the consistency with which an international 
actor actually fulfils the legal duties it has nominally subscribed to in 
international treaties. Moreover, much of the nuts and bolts of international 
politics lies beyond the scope of these agreements. In the absence of world 
government, and in view of the limited applicability of international law 
and of the multiplying interactions within a globalizing world, there are 
clear-cut spillover arguments for smaller and larger powers alike to move 
towards more global norms. This may come about through the normative 
contributions of the major international actors according to their 
“comparative advantages”, and their respective interests and inclinations.   324 | NATHALIE TOCCI WITH IAN MANNERS 
 
Hard norms thus represent the normative boundaries within which 
other at times more specific soft norms or rules can be defined and 
interpreted across different areas, ranging from the political (e.g., the 
different interpretations of minority rights), to the economic (e.g. trade and 
competition rules), security (e.g., norms on arms sales) and other technical 
domains (e.g. financial, environmental or energy norms). The pursuit of 
these soft norms would also need to take place “normatively”, i.e., in 
compliance with international law and through negotiation rather than 
unilateral imposition.  
Following and adapting Finnemore and Sikkink’s approach (1998) 
different international actors would thus act as ‘norm entrepreneurs” in 
different areas according to their relative “comparative advantages” 
determined both by their relative power and their legitimacy and moral 
standing in specific issue areas and/or regions. They would create the 
norm, articulating it within the confines of international law, then 
contribute to spreading the norm through their international relations as 
well as transnational networks; and ultimately lead to a “cascade” of norm 
compliance through successful socialization of other international actors.   
In some areas this is already happening and international interactions 
are yielding a higher normative equilibrium. In the case of EU-Russia trans-
border cooperation in the north, Makarychev (2008, p. 4-8) explains how 
Russia has adopted EU acquis norms regulating air and water pollution, 
water purification, healthcare, civil servant training and financial 
regulations. In more political domains as well, we also may see a certain 
degree of normative socialisation in EU-Russia relations. Interestingly in 
the case of the colour revolutions, Moscow may be slowly rising to the 
normative challenge posed by the West, precisely because of the normative 
boomerang effect of its realpolitik policies towards Georgia and Ukraine. In 
Georgia for example, Russia promptly attacked Saakashvili’s regime on 
normative grounds following the regime’s crackdown on the opposition in 
the autumn of 2007, despite the fact that the Georgian opposition cannot be 
seriously deemed to be pro-Russian. Moscow in fact noted how using 
normative arguments to criticize Saakashvili’s policies made far greater 
headway in raising Western doubts regarding the regime in Tbilisi.  
Turning east, Womack notes how China has accepted Western norms 
in the realm of trade, most prominently by seeking Western advice in 
designing its Patent Law in 1984, adapting this to WTO standards in 2000, 
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International Copyright in 1992 and entering the WTO in 2001. In terms of 
transatlantic relations, the EU appears to be setting higher normative 
standards in terms of consumer protection in competition policy, in 
practice forcing US companies such as General Motors and Microsoft to 
comply. Likewise, in accounting standards, the EU has led negotiations on 
international standards, it has gone ahead in making International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) EU law internally and has pushed for 
the IFRS to become the European international accounting norm in 
competition with the American US-GAP (Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles). In the energy domain, the EU has legislated and ratified the 
Energy Charter after negotiations with Russia and the US, and is now 
pressing Russia to follow through with ratification. On the environment, 
the EU’s commitment to the Kyoto Protocol as well as post-Kyoto targets, 
generated by the strong convergence of interests between the member 
states, the Commission and public opinion, has been crucial in accelerating 
momentum on climate change across 170 countries, including Russia, 
China and India, with only the US (and Kazakhstan) to come on board.  
Indeed as Laidi points out (2008) the EU’s “normative empire” is 
being constructed not necessarily through the pursuit of straight-forward 
political norms (e.g., democracy) or clear-cut economic norms (e.g., trade), 
but rather through the spread of EU “regulatory norms” across different 
“in-between” sectors such as the environment, sustainable development, 
competition and consumer protection as well as criminal justice. This also 
reflects the EU’s greater “power” worldwide in these areas with its 500m 
citizens, one quarter of the world’s GNP, 40% of world exports, and with 
the Euro representing the second major international reserve and trade 
currency (Zielonka 2008). This bestows upon the Union the ability to win or 
buy over the consent of others. A case in point is Russia’s signing up to the 
Kyoto protocol in return for the EU’s support for Russia’s entry in the 
WTO. Further examples include China’s adoption of EU regulations 
regarding its motor industry, food safety and mobile communications, and, 
more important still, EU anti-trust and merger law. China is also on the 
way to adopting the EU-led REACH (Regulation, Evaluation and 
Authorization of Chemicals) Directive on chemicals and has also been 
particularly interested in studying the EU’s internal market dynamics in 
order to apply these, mutatis mutandis, to its own relationship with the 
provinces. In other words, whereas the US used to be the “norm 
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whereby stricter norms are formulated and pursued by the EU in these 
sectors.   
Naturally this does not entail that normative competition need to be 
an “either-or” concept, with exclusively one international player setting the 
global norm in each and every area. Indeed when it comes to transatlantic 
relations, the US continues to set, or influence the formulation of norms in 
many parts of the world with EU support; likewise the EU with US 
support. The spread of EU norms in Eastern Europe in fact took place with 
active US support, and cases in which the US objects to the spread of EU 
norms in Europe remain exceptional. In other words, norm competition 
need not take place between different actors, and the spread of global 
norms may come about through the convergence and joint pursuit of 
norms between different players.5  
Problems and tensions naturally emerge when some international 
players act as ‘norm blockers”, again to use Finnemore and Sikkink’s 
definition (1998), challenging the efforts pursued by norm entrepreneurs. 
The more “powerful” the norm blocker, to return to the tight 
interrelationship between norms and power, and the more likely will the 
efforts of the norm blocker be successful. Yet the intrinsic logic and appeal 
of a norm as well as the support it garners across state and non-state actors 
worldwide may lead to cascade effects even when a new norm is “blocked” 
by a powerful international player. The momentum generated at and after 
the UN Summit on Climate Change held in Bali in December 2007 to push 
for a post-Kyoto agreement is an evident case in point, as is the momentum 
generated by the International Criminal Court.  
Who sets the norms across different policy areas and geographical 
regions is also and inevitably the reflection of different power balances in 
different sectors. Yet these different and changing balances in a multipolar 
or multinodal world could yield an overall higher normative equilibrium. 
As the world becomes increasingly multipolar, and provided 
multipolarism is accompanied with a strengthening of multilateral 
institutions, rules and procedures, we could see ascending powers, and 
most prominently China and India beginning to set norms in other 
domains, and particularly on those relational norms concerning mutual 
respect and solidarity aptly set out by Womack and Kumar in their 
                                                      
5 I would like to thank Dan Hamilton for raising this point.  COMPARING NORMATIVITY IN FOREIGN POLICY | 327 
 
contributions. Hence, “old” Western powers may have occupied much of 
the normative space in establishing, spreading and codifying norms and 
rules relating to rights and freedoms of individuals across the political, 
economic social and other “in-between” domains. However, the normative 
ground remains wide open for a further specification or re-specification of 
the rules and norms governing relations between collectivities, given the 
reality of asymmetric power relations, and it is here that the value added of 
the ascending powers in the east may best manifest itself.  
5.  Concluding Remarks 
The original challenge inspiring this book was the wish to take a critical 
look at the EU’s role in the world, given that European scholars working on 
European foreign policy have often tended to view the EU as a necessarily 
“benign” force in the world. The presumption was that all international 
players can and do act normatively in the world on some occasions and at 
some historical moments, but in other instances their foreign policies are 
best characterized as realist, imperial or status quo. Moreover, foreign 
policy impacts can be intended or unintended, reflecting or otherwise 
original foreign policy goals. Variations in foreign policy behaviour are in 
turn the result of different mixes in what we define as conditioning factors: 
interests, capabilities and external environment.  
The contributors to this book succeeded, without too much difficulty, 
in finding empirical cases to “fit” the somewhat rigid grid presented to 
them, analysing foreign policy case studies in which “their” international 
player manifested different combinations of normative and non-normative 
behaviour. Yet whether explicitly stated – as in the cases of chapters of 
China, India or the US – or implicitly suggested – as in chapters on the EU 
and Russia – all authors have tended to view the “centre of gravity”  n the 
foreign policy of their international player as being principally normative.  
There are clear reasons why this is the case, related to our roles as 
researchers “located” in time and space. Yet probing deeper, this chapter 
has explored two further reasons why this is the case. The first relates to the 
need to move away from black-and-white conceptions of normativity, 
analysing instead the degree to which a particular foreign policy is 
normative and how that policy may evolve over time. The second reason 
relates to the fact that different international players subscribe to different 
norms, all of which have standing within the loose boundaries set by 
international law. Different normative interpretations can generate conflict, 328 | NATHALIE TOCCI WITH IAN MANNERS 
 
mistrust and a normative downgrading within the international system. In 
order to yield a higher normative equilibrium we call for greater 
consistency in the application of norms, even when norms differ. 
Consistency would help creating dependable expectations and thus 
optimizing international relationships, as stressed by Womack. Finally we 
suggest that virtuous normative interactions may take place between 
different international players in a multipolar world, whereby a healthy 
“competition of norms” may engender an increased multilateralisation and 
regularization of the international system across different policy spheres.  
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